|
by Lorenzo Vidino
from
MiddleEastForum Website
Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim
Brotherhood (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced
the political life of the Middle East.
Its motto is telling:
"Allah
is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law.
Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope."[1]
While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of
generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost
some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh
repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations
of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.
But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world.
Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political
development. Since the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood
members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but
steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques,
charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic
community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be
simply "to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,"
but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United
States.[2]
Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student
refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their
descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim
communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite.
Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside
over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.
These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they
continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain
links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German,
Dutch, and French, they have gained acceptance among European
governments and media alike. Politicians across the political
spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims
arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the
burgeoning Muslim community.
But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they
drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their
representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on
television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the
evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of
commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to
raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans,
eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected
Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity.
The case is particularly
visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in
Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but
also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim
Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood
presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if
only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at
face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The situation in Germany is particularly telling. More than anywhere
else in Europe, the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany has gained
significant power and political acceptance. Islamist organizations
in other European countries now consciously follow the model
pioneered by their German peers.
During the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of Muslim students left the
Middle East to study at German universities, drawn not only by the
German institutions’ technical reputations but also by a desire to
escape repressive regimes. Egyptian ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser’s
regime was especially vigorous in its attempts to root out the
Islamist opposition. Beginning in 1954, several members of the
Muslim Brotherhood fled Egypt to escape arrest or assassination.
West Germany provided a welcome refuge. Bonn’s motivations were not
simply altruistic.
As terrorism expert Khalid Durán explained in his
studies on jihadism in Europe,[3] the West German government had
decided to cut diplomatic relations with countries that recognized
East Germany. When Egypt and Syria established diplomatic relations
with the communist government, Bonn decided to welcome Syrian and
Egyptian political refugees. Often, these dissidents were Islamists.
Many members of the Muslim Brotherhood were already familiar with
Germany. Several had cooperated with the Nazis before and during
World War II.[4] Some had even, reportedly, fought in the infamous
Bosnian Handschar division of the Schutzstaffel (SS).[5]
One of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first pioneers in Germany was Sa‘id
Ramadan, the personal secretary of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan
al-Banna.[6] Ramadan, an Egyptian who had led the Muslim
Brotherhood’s irregulars in Palestine in 1948,[7] moved to Geneva in
1958 and attended law school in Cologne.[8] In Germany, he founded
what has become one of Germany’s three main Muslim organizations,
the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (Islamic Society of Germany, IGD), over which he presided from 1958 to 1968.[9]
Ramadan also co-founded the Muslim World League,[10] a well-funded organization
that the Saudi establishment uses to spread its radical
interpretation of Islam throughout the world. The U.S. government
closely monitors the activities of the Muslim World League, which it
accuses of financing terrorism. In March 2002, a U.S. Treasury
Department-led task force raided the group’s Northern Virginia
offices looking for documents tying the group to Al-Qaeda, Hamas,
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In January 2004, the Senate Finance
Committee asked the Internal Revenue Service for its records on the
Muslim World League,
"as part of an investigation into possible links
between nongovernmental organizations and terrorist financing
networks."[11]
This privileged relationship with the oil-rich
kingdom granted Ramadan an influx of money, which he used to fund
the powerful Islamic Center of Geneva and to bankroll several
financial and religious activities. Hani Ramadan, Sa‘id’s son,
currently runs the Islamic Center. Among its other board members is
Sa‘id’s other son, Tariq Ramadan, who recently made headlines
in the United States when the Department of Homeland Security
revoked his visa to teach at Notre Dame University.[12] Sa‘id
Ramadan’s case is not isolated.[13]
Following Ramadan’s ten-year presidency of the IGD, Pakistani
national Fazal Yazdani briefly led the IGD before Ghaleb Himmat, a
Syrian with Italian citizenship, took the helm. During his long
stewardship (1973-2002), Himmat shuttled between Italy, Austria,
Germany, Switzerland and the United States.[14] Intelligence
agencies around the world have long scrutinized Himmat’s terrorist
connections. He is one of the founders of the Bank al-Taqwa, a
powerful conglomerate dubbed by Italian intelligence, "Bank of the
Muslim Brotherhood," which has financed terrorist groups since the
mid-1990s if not earlier.[15]
Himmat helped Youssef Nada, one of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s financial masterminds, run Al-Taqwa and a web
of companies headquartered in locations such as Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, and the Bahamas, which maintain few regulations on
monetary origin or destination. Both Himmat and Nada reportedly
funneled large sums to groups such as Hamas and the
Algerian Islamic Salvation Front[16]
and set up a secret credit line for a top associate of Osama bin
Laden.[17]
In November 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department designated both
Himmat and Nada as terrorism financiers.[18] According to Italian
intelligence, the Al-Taqwa network also financed several Islamic
centers throughout Europe[19] and many Islamist publications,
including Risalatul Ikhwan,[20] the official magazine of the Muslim
Brotherhood. After the U.S. Treasury Department designation, Himmat
resigned from the IGD’s presidency. His successor was Ibrahim el-Zayat,
a 36-year-old of Egyptian descent and the charismatic leader of
numerous student organizations.
The fact that IGD leaders Ramadan and Himmat are among the most
prominent Muslim Brotherhood members of the last half-century
suggests the links between the IGD and the Ikhwan. Moreover, reports
issued by internal intelligence agencies from various German states
openly call the IGD an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.[21] In
particular, according to one intelligence report, the Egyptian
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has dominated the IGD
since its early days.[22]
The Muslim Brotherhood—led by Ramadan and Himmat[23]—sponsored the
construction of the imposing Islamic Center of Munich in 1960,[24]
aided by large donations from Middle Eastern rulers such as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia who, according to a 1967
Sueddeutsche Zeitung
article, donated 80,000 marks.[25]
The Ministry of Interior of Nordrhein-Westfalen states that the Islamic Center of Munich has
been one of the European headquarters for the Brotherhood since its
foundation.[26] The center publishes a magazine,
Al-Islam, whose
efforts (according to an Italian intelligence dossier),[27] are
financed by the Bank al-Taqwa. According to the interior minister of
Baden-Württemberg, Al-Islam shows explicitly how the German Brothers
reject the concept of a secular state.[28] Its February 2002 issue,
for example, states,
In the long run, Muslims cannot be satisfied with the acceptance of
German family, estate, and trial law. … Muslims should aim at an
agreement between the Muslims and the German state with the goal of
a separate jurisdiction for Muslims.
The IGD, of which the Islamic Center of Munich is one of the most
important members, represents the main offshoot of the Egyptian
Brotherhood in Germany. But the IGD is also the quintessential
example of how the Muslim Brotherhood has gained power in Europe.
The IGD has grown significantly over the years, and it now
incorporates dozens of Islamic organizations throughout the country.
Islamic centers from more than thirty German cities have joined its
umbrella.[29] Today, the IGD’s real strength lies in its cooperation
with and sponsorship of many Islamic youth and student organizations
across Germany.
This focus on youth organizations came after Zayat’s succession. He
understood the importance of focusing on the next generation of
German Muslims and launched recruitment drives to get young Muslims
involved in Islamic organizations. But a Meckenheim police report on
the sharply dressed Zayat also reveals alarming connections. German
authorities openly say he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.
They also link him to the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a
Saudi nongovernmental organization that seeks to spread Wahhabism,
the radical and intolerant Saudi interpretation of Islam, throughout
the world with its literature and schools.[30]
WAMY, which falls
under the umbrella of the Muslim World League, has the stated goal
of "arming the Muslim youth with full confidence in the supremacy of
the Islamic system over other systems." It is the largest Muslim
youth organization in the world and can boast unparalleled
resources.[31] In 1991 WAMY published a book called
Tawjihat
Islamiya (Islamic Views) that stated,
"Teach our children to love
taking revenge on the Jews and the oppressors, and teach them that
our youngsters will liberate Palestine and Al-Quds [Jerusalem] when
they go back to Islam and make jihad for the sake of Allah."[32]
The
sentiments in Tawjihat Islamiya are the rule rather than the
exception. Many other WAMY publications are filled with strong
anti-Semitic and anti-Christian rhetoric.
Meckenheim police also link Zayat to Institut Européen des Sciences
Humaines, a French school that prepares European imams. Several
radical clerics lecture at the school and several European
intelligence agencies accuse the school of spreading religious
hatred.[33] German authorities also highlight the fact that he is
involved in several money laundering investigations.[34]
Zayat has
never been indicted for terrorist activity, but he has dubious
financial dealings and maintains associations with many
organizations that spread religious hatred. The IGD may have changed
leadership after the U.S. Treasury’s designation of Himmat, but it
did not change direction.
While the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has chosen
Munich as its base of operations in Germany, its Syrian branch is
headquartered in Aachen, a German town near the Dutch border. The
former Carolingian capital, with its famous university, is now home
to a large Muslim population including the prominent Syrian Al-Attar
family. The first Attar to move to Aachen was Issam, who fled
persecution in his native country in the 1950s when he was leader of
the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Other members of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood soon followed. With time, Islamists from
other countries adopted Attar’s Bilal mosque in Aachen as their base
of operations.[35] From hosting exiled Algerian terrorists[36] to
operating a charity designated by the U.S. Department of Treasury as
a financial front for Hamas,[37] Aachen is well known to
intelligence agencies throughout the world.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood base in Aachen kept close relations
with their Egyptian counterparts. For example, confirming the
tendency of important Muslim Brotherhood families to close alliance
through intermarriage, Issam al-Attar’s son married the daughter of
Al-Taqwa banker Youssef Nada.[38] Links between the two Muslim
Brotherhood branches are more extensive than a single marriage,
however. The Aachen Islamic Center reportedly received funding from
Al-Taqwa.[39] Staff members have rotated between the Islamic Centers
in Aachen and Munich. For example, Ahmed von Denffer, editor of the
Islamic Center of Munich’s Al-Islam magazine, came to Munich from Aachen.[40] Nevertheless, some distance remains. The Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood has never joined the IGD, instead preferring to keep
some form of independence.
Milli Görüş
Of all of Zayat’s financial activities, the one that has attracted
the German authorities’ greatest suspicion has been his association
with officials of Milli Görüş (National Vision, in Turkish).
Milli
Görüş, which has 30,000 members and perhaps another 100,000
sympathizers,[41] claims to defend the rights of Germany’s immigrant
Turkish population, giving them a voice in the democratic political
arena while "preserving their Islamic identity."[42] But Milli Görüş
has another agenda. While publicly declaring its interest in
democratic debate and a willingness to see Turkish immigrants
integrated into European societies, some Milli Görüş leaders have
expressed contempt for democracy and Western values.
The Bundesverfassungsschutz, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, has
repeatedly warned about Milli Görüş’ activities, describing the
group in its annual reports as a "foreign extremist
organization."[43] The agency also reported that "although Milli
Görüş, in public statements, pretends to adhere to the basic
principles of Western democracies, abolition of the laicist
government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic
state and social system are, as before, among its goals."[44]
Milli Görüş’ history alone indicates why the group should be
considered radical. Former Turkish prime minister Nehmettin Erbakan,
whose Refah Party was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court in
January of 1998 for "activities against the country’s secular
regime,"[45] is still
Milli Görüş’ undisputed leader, even if his
nephew Mehmet Sabri Erbakan is its president.
The 2002 European Milli Görüş meeting held in the Dutch city of Arnhem, where
Nehmettin Erbakan was the keynote speaker, provides a glimpse into
Milli Görüş’ ideology. After a tirade against the evils of
integration in the West and U.S. policies, Erbakan declared that
"after the fall of the wall, the West has found an enemy in
Islam."[46]
A Bundesverfassungsschutz report reveals
Milli Görüş’
real aims:
While in recent times, the Milli Görüş has increasingly emphasized
the readiness of its members to be integrated into German society
and asserts its adherence to the basic law, such statements stem
from tactical calculation rather than from any inner change of the
organization.[47]
Milli Görüş pushes an agenda similar to that of the
IGD, even if its
target is more limited. Nevertheless, both Milli Görüş and the IGD
collaborate on many initiatives. There is also a family connection.
Zayat married Sabiha Erbakan, the sister of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan.[48]
The siblings’ mother is also involved in politics and runs an
important Islamic women’s organization in Germany. The Zayat family
is active as well. Ibrahim el-Zayat’s father is the imam of the
Marburg mosque; other members of his family are involved in Islamic
organizations.
As Udo Ulfkotte, a political science professor
specializing in counterespionage at the University of Lueneburg and
an expert on Islamic terrorism, notes, the Erbakans and the
Zayats lead networks of organizations that aim at the
radicalization, respectively, of the Turkish and Arab communities in
Germany.[49]
IGD and Milli Görüş are active in their efforts to increase
political influence and become the official representatives of the
entire German Muslim community. With well-endowed budgets, their
mosques provide social services, organize conferences, and
distribute literature nationwide.
As the Office for the Protection
of the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz) in Hessen[50] notes:
The threat of Islamism for Germany is posed … primarily by Milli
Görüş and other affiliated groups. They try to spread Islamist views
within the boundaries of the law. Then they try to implement … for
all Muslims in Germany a strict interpretation of the Qur’an and of
the Shari‘a. … Their public support of tolerance and religious
freedom should be treated with caution.[51]
It presents a problem that politicians and security services in
Germany view the IGD and Milli Görüş so differently. But, as
Ulfkotte wrote about Zayat in his book, Der Krieg in unseren
Staedten (The War in Our Cities),[52] "politicians of all colors and
parties try to reach out to him."[53] For example, the prestigious
Berlin Catholic Academy invited Zayat to represent the Muslim point
of view in an inter-religious meeting organized by the academy in
October 2002.[54] German politicians and Christian institutions
regularly partner themselves with Milli Görüş in various
initiatives.
Milli Gazete, the official journal of Milli Görüş, once
stated that "Milli Görüş is a shield protecting our fellow citizens
from assimilation into barbaric Europe."[55] Nevertheless, German
politicians meet regularly with Milli Görüş officials to discuss
immigration and integration issues. The fact that an official like
Ahmed al-Khalifah, IGD secretary general, represents Islam before
members of parliament who are discussing religious tolerance,[56]
shows the success of Brotherhood-linked organizations’ efforts to
gain acceptance as the representatives of German Muslims.
The Office
for the Protection of the Constitution well described these efforts,
saying that Milli Görüş (and the IGD),
"strives to dominate regional
or nationwide federations and umbrella organizations for Muslims
which are increasingly gaining importance as interlocutors for state
and ecclesiastical authorities and thus to expand its influence
within society."[57]
Zentralrat, the Islamist Umbrella
In 1989, under the auspices of Abdullah at-Turki, powerful dean of
Bin Saud University in Riyadh, the Saudis created the Islamische
Konzil Deutschland (Islamic Council of Germany). Turki assumed the
presidency with other top positions held by Ibrahim el-Zayat,
Hasan
Özdögan, a high-ranking Milli Görüş official, and Ahmad Khalifa, an
officer from the Islamic Center of Munich.[58] While an official
German parliament report describes the Islamische Konzil as
just "another Sunni organization," such an assumption indicates a
dangerous misunderstanding of the Saudi relationship to German
Islamists.[59]
The trend toward consolidation took a step forward in 1994 when
German Islamists realized that a united coalition translated into
greater political relevance and influence. Nineteen organizations,
including the IGD, the Islamic Center of Munich, and the Islamic
Center of Aachen, created an umbrella organization, the Zentralrat
der Muslime. According to a senior German intelligence official, at
least nine out of these nineteen organizations belong to the Muslim
Brotherhood.[60]
The German press has recently investigated the Zentralrat president,
Nadeem Elyas, a German-educated Saudi
physician and an official of the Islamic Center of Aachen. Die Welt
linked Elyas to Christian Ganczarski, an Al-Qaeda operative
currently jailed as one of the masterminds of the 2002 attack on a
synagogue in Tunisia.[61]
Ganczarski, a German of Polis descent who
converted to Islam, told authorities that Al-Qaeda recruited him at
the Islamic University of Medina where Elyas sent him to study.[62] Elyas said he could not remember meeting him but did not deny the
possibility that Ganczarski, who never completed high school, might
have been one of the many individuals he had sent over the years to
radical schools in Saudi Arabia.[63] Saudi donors paid all of Ganczarski’s expenses.[64]
Ganczarski was not alone. Elyas
admitted to having sent hundreds of German Muslims to study at one
of the most radical universities in Saudi Arabia.[65]
The Zentralrat, which portrays itself as the umbrella organization
for German Muslim organizations, has become, together with the IGD
and Milli Görüş, the de facto representative of three million German
Muslims. Even though the IGD is a member of the Zentralrat, the two
organizations often operate independently. Their apparent
independence is planned. With many organizations operating under
different names, the Muslim Brotherhood fools German politicians who
believe they are consulting a spectrum of opinion.[66] The media
seek the Zentralrat’s officials when they want the Muslim view on
everything from the debate about the admissibility of the hijab
(headscarf) in public schools, to the war in Iraq, and so forth.
Politicians seek the Zentralrat’s endorsement when they want to
reach out to the Muslim community. Many German politicians are
uninformed about Islam and do not understand that the view and the
interpretation of Islam that the Zentralrat expresses, as does the
IGD and Milli Görüş, is that of the Muslim Brotherhood and not that
of traditional Islam. Accordingly, the Zentralrat expresses total
opposition to any ban of the hijab, supports Wahhabi-influenced
Islamic education in schools, and endorses a radical position on the
Middle East situation.[67]
While many Muslims endorse these views,
the problem is that the Zentralrat neither represents nor tolerates
those with divergent views. Moderate German Muslim groups lack the
funding and organization of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups. In
terms of numbers, influence on the Muslim community, and political
relevance, the Zentralrat and its two most important constituent
parts, the IGD and Milli Görüş, dominate the scene. With ample Saudi
financing, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to become the voice of
the Muslims in Germany.
Recently, the German public was shocked to hear what is preached
inside Saudi-funded mosques and schools. In the fall of 2003, a
hidden camera-equipped journalist from Germany’s ARD television
infiltrated the Saudi-built King Fahd Academy in Bonn and taped what
it taught to young Muslim children. One teacher called for jihad
against the infidels.[68] While the images elicited a rebuke from
German politicians, the rather sterile debate about Saudi influence
on German Muslims has not effected tangible change. Saudi officials
and Saudi-run nongovernmental organizations continue to groom
Muslim
Brotherhood organizations.
First Germany, Then Europe
While the Muslim Brotherhood and their Saudi financiers have worked
to cement Islamist influence over Germany’s Muslim community, they
have not limited their infiltration to Germany. Thanks to generous
foreign funding, meticulous organization, and the naďveté of
European elites, Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations have gained
prominent positions throughout Europe. In France, the extremist
Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (Union of Islamic
Organizations of France) has become the predominant organization in
the government’s Islamic Council.[69] In Italy, the extremist Unione
delle Comunita’ ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of
the Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy) is the
government’s prime partner in dialogue regarding Italian Islamic
issues.[70]
In parallel to European Union integration efforts, the Muslim
Brotherhood is also seeking to integrate its various European
proxies. Over the past fifteen years, the Muslim Brotherhood has
created a series of pan-European organizations such as the
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, in which
representatives from national organizations can meet and plan
initiatives.[71]
Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood’s greatest
pan-European impact has, as with the Islamische Gemeinschaft
Deutschland, been with its youth organization. In June 1996, Muslim
youth organizations from Sweden, France, and England joined forces
with the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe and the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth to create a European Islamic youth
organization.[72]
Three months later, thirty-five delegates from
eleven countries met in Leicester and formally launched the Forum of
European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO),
which maintains its headquarters in Brussels.[73]
According to its official publications, FEMYSO is,
"a network of 42
national and international organizations bringing together youth
from over 26 different countries."
FEMYSO proudly stated in 2003
that over the preceding four years it had become
The de facto voice of the Muslim youth in Europe. It is regularly
consulted on issues pertaining to Muslims in Europe. It has also
developed useful links with: the European Parliament, the Council of
Europe, the United Nations, the European Youth Forum, and numerous
relevant NGOs at the European level.[74]
Ibrahim el-Zayat, who held the presidency until his commitments in
Germany forced him to step down, even used the FEMYSO perch to
address the European Parliament.[75] Because
the Muslim Brotherhood
provides the bulk of FEMYSO’s constituent organizations, it provides
the "de facto voice of the Muslim youth in Europe." While FEMYSO
claims that it "is committed to fighting prejudices at all the
levels, so that the future of Europe is a multicultural, inclusive
and respectful one,"[76]
such statements ring hollow given the position of sponsors like the
World Assembly of Muslim Youth which believes that,
"the Jews are enemies of the
faithful, God, and the Angels; the Jews are humanity’s
enemies. … Every tragedy that inflicts the Muslims is caused by
the Jews."[77]
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ample funds and organization have
contributed to their success in Europe. But their acceptance into
mainstream society and their unchallenged rise to power would not
have been possible had European elites been more vigilant, valued
substance over rhetoric, and understood the motivations of those
financing and building these Islamist organizations. Why have
Europeans been so naďve?
Bassam Tibi, a German professor of Syrian
descent and an expert on Islam in Europe, thinks that Europeans—and
Germans in particular—fear the accusation of racism.[78] Radicals in
sheep’s clothing have learned that they can silence almost everybody
with the accusation of xenophobia. Any criticism of Muslim
Brotherhood-linked organizations is followed by outcries of racism
and anti-Muslim persecution. Journalists who are not frightened by
these appellatives are swamped with baseless and unsuccessful but
expensive lawsuits.
In some cases, politicians simply fail to check the backgrounds of
those who claim to be legitimate representatives for the Muslim
community. As in the United States, self-described representatives
for the Muslim community are far more radical than the populations
they represent. In other cases, politicians realize that these
organizations are not the ideal counterparts in a constructive
dialogue but do not take the time to seek other less visible but
more moderate organizations, several of which exist only at the
grassroots level, impeded by financial constraints.
What most European politicians fail to understand is that by meeting
with radical organizations, they empower them and grant the Muslim
Brotherhood legitimacy. There is an implied endorsement to any
meeting, especially when the same politicians ignore moderate voices
that do not have access to generous Saudi funding.
This creates a
self-perpetuating cycle of radicalization because the greater the
political legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood, the more opportunity
it and its proxy groups will have to influence and radicalize
various European Muslim communities. The ultimate irony is that
Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna dreamed of spreading
Islamism throughout Egypt and the Muslim world. He would have never
dreamed that his vision might also become a reality in Europe.
Lorenzo Vidino is deputy director at the Investigative Project, a
Washington D.C.-based counterterrorism research institute.
[1] "Homepage," Muslim Brotherhood Movement website, accessed Dec.
22, 2004.
[2] The Chicago Tribune, Sept. 19, 2004; also see Daniel Pipes, The
Islamic States of America?, FrontPageMagazine.com, Sept. 23, 2004.
[3] Khalid Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," The Journal of
Counterterrorism and Security International, Fall 2000, pp. 12-5.
[4] Richard Labeviere, Dollars for Terror: The U.S. and Islam (New
York: Algora Publishing 2000), p. 141.
[5] Georges Lepre, "Himmler’s Bosnian Division: The Waffen SS
Handschar Division 1943-45," Schiffer Aviation History, Jan. 2000,
pp. 31-4.
[6] M. H. Faruqi, "Les Frčres Musulmans. Politique de ‘rabbaniyya,’
les pričres avant le pouvoir Dr. Saďd Ramadan, 1926-1995,"
Historique du Centre Islamique, Islamic Center of Geneva.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] "Prasidenten der IGD," Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland
website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[10] Faruqi, "Les Frčres Musulmans," Historique du Centre Islamique.
[11] "Senators Request Tax Information on Muslim Charities for
Probe," U.S. State Department news release, Jan. 14, 2004.
[12] Fouad Ajami, "Tariq Ramadan," The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 7,
2004.
[13] Labeviere, Dollars for Terror, p. 122.
[14] Official dossier on Ahmed Nasreddin (hereafter Nasreddin
dossier), Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica
(Italian secret service, SISDE), Apr. 6, 1996, p. 10.
[15] Ibid., p. 24.
[16] Ibid., p. 31.
[17] Newsweek, May 12, 2004.
[18] "Recent OFAC Actions," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office
of Foreign Assets Control, Nov. 7, 2001.
[19] Nasreddin dossier, p. 31.
[20] Ibid.
[21] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland" Innenministerium,
Nordrhein-Westfalen land website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004; "Islamismus,"
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Hessen website, accessed Dec. 22,
2004.
[22] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium,
Nordrhein-Westfalen land.
[23] Official Guide to the Munich Mosque (Munich: The Islamic Center
of Munich), purchased by the author at the Milli Görüş’ bookstore,
Cologne, Feb. 2004.
[24] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium,
Nordrhein-Westfalen land.
[25] Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), July 29-30, 1967.
[26] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium,
Nordrhein-Westfalen land.
[27] Nasreddin dossier, p. 31.
[28] Report on radical Islam, Baden Württenberg state
Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2003, p. 48.
[29] "Koordination mit Zentren in folgenden Städten," Islamische
Gemeinschaft in Deutschland website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[30] Report on Ibrahim el-Zayat, Cologne police, Aug. 27, 2003, p.
3.
[31] David Kane, FBI senior special agent, affidavit in
"Supplemental Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention," United
States of America v. Soliman S. Biheiri, U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. The affidavit also details WAMY’s
links to the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas.
[32] Kane, "Supplemental Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial
Detention."
[33] The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 15, 2003.
[34] Report on el-Zayat, Aug. 27, 2003, p. 4.
[35] Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," pp. 12-5.
[36] Klaus Gruenewald, "Defending Germany’s Constitution," Middle
East Quarterly, Mar. 1995, p. 10.
[37] See Al-Aqsa Foundation, "Recent OFAC Reports," U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 6, 2003.
[38] Nasreddin dossier, p. 9.
[39] Ibid., p. 30.
[40] Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," pp. 12-5.
[41] "Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus," Innenministerium,
Nordrhein-Westfalen land website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[42] Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the
Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz), 2000, Cologne, p. 174.
[43] Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the
Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz), 1999, Cologne, p. 165.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Agence France-Presse, Jan. 16, 1998.
[46] Mehmet Ülger, "Manifestatie Milli Görüş in Arnhem," De
Humanist, July 2003.
[47] Annual report, Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2000, p. 198.
[48] Udo Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten (Frankfurt:
Eichborn Publishing, 2003), pp. 32-3.
[49] Author interview with Udo Ulfkotte, Frankfurt, Feb. 2004.
[50] Within the German federal system, each state has its own Office
of the Protection for the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz),
which is independent from the national Bundessverfassungsschutz.
[51] "Islamismus," Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Hessen.
[52] Frankfurt: Eichborn Publishing, 2003.
[53] Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 38.
[54] "Christentum und Islam," German Association of Muslim Social
Scientists (GMSG), Oct. 26, 2002.
[55] Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9 (Tel Aviv: Stephen Roth
Institute, Tel Aviv University, 2000).
[56] Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 38.
[57] Annual report, Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2000, p. 174.
[58] Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 164.
[59] Ibid., p. 162.
[60] Hartwig Mueller, head of the Verfassungsschutz of Nordrhein
Westfahlen, interview on German television SWR, Mar. 21, 2003.
[61] Die Welt (Berlin), May 6, 2003.
[62] Michael Waller, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Oct.
14, 2003.
[63] The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 2003.
[64] Die Welt, May 6, 2003.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Author interview with Ulfkotte, Frankfurt, Feb. 2004.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Time, Nov. 2, 2003.
[69] Ibid., Apr. 27, 2003.
[70] Renzo Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili. Gli Italiani e l’Islam (Bari:
Laterza Publishing, 2003), p. 14.
[71] "The Global Community," MABOnline, Muslim Association of
Britain, Dec. 20, 2004.
[72] Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations
brochure, emailed to author by a representative of FEMYSO, Jan.
2004.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] "L’Islam en Europe ou L’Islam d’Europe," conference program,
European Parliament, Brussels, Dec. 11, 2002.
[76] FEMYSO brochure.
[77] "Animosity toward the Jews, " A Handy Encyclopedia of
Contemporary Religions and Sects (WAMY), FBI translation from
Arabic; Steven Emerson, statement to the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 9, 2003; Kane,
"Supplemental Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention."
[78] Bassam Tibi, Islamische Zuwanderung, Die gescheiterte
Integration (Munich: DVA, 2002), p. 135.
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