MONEY CREATORS AND THE POLITICAL CONTROL
In their inception, so-called political parties were other expression of the
principle of rule of tyrant or dictator. Though apparently instituted in
opposition to each other, such societies, or groups, or even persons,
representing such seemingly conflicting political interests, were the very
natural outcome of complete usurpation of the essence of sovereign power,
the god-force from on high that gave life to a people or state, through
conspiracy in respect to interference with the issue of the unit of exchange.
Such front organizations are the natural result of the existence in any
such state or people, of semi-secret societies in one form or the other,
religious or racial, alien by origin or otherwise, arrogating to themselves
that privilege which formerly belonged to the god alone, of the creation of
exchange units, abstract or otherwise.
The only limit to the amount of such
private issue, especially if abstract, i.e., as by transferable ledger
credit page entry (indicated by the use of assignments or cheques) would be
the limit dictated by caution against over-saturation of that money market,
national or international being interfered with. Naturally it was usually
born in mind that the (silly) goose that laid the golden eggs, must not be
altogether destroyed, and care was taken that the real meaning of these
activities (1) was deeply concealed for fear that ruler and people might
come to realize the true nature of the forces at work in their midst...
Each of these groups of persons in the case of
so called political parties, or each of these persons in the case of tyrants
or dictators, could not but be instrument for private money creative power.
Such establishment of conflicting groups, each claiming to have the answer
towards perfect government, and, in the case of a constitutional monarchy,
each swearing allegiance to the monarch, now but paid servant of money
power, or in the case of a republic, each swearing allegiance to a
president, in reality an elective king raised up from the "People", was a
very efficient device of such private money creative power towards the
maintenance of its own hegemony...
Herein was venality and corruption
enthroned... Such "Politicians" as turned to look a little too closely at
the hand that fed them, promptly found their "Perks", (2)
or "Political Rewards", cut off.
Should any government begin to be restless, and unwilling to accept the
axiom that it should have no real say in that most serious matter of all,
monetary emission, the line of communication from the god in heaven to the
people, then it would be but a short time before private money creative
power transferred its favors to the so-called opposition.
Funds would be
made available sufficient to guarantee under normal circumstances their
winning the "Election" and their consequent assumption of the government.
At the same time funds would be withdrawn from the "Political Party"
previously in control of the "government"; which would very likely mean
that, in the following confusion, men more "suitable" and "pliable" would
force their way to the top; so that even if that particular government was
reelected, private money creative power would have no further fears.
The price was always continuance of those
policies most needed by such private money creative power necessary for its
own real purposes, and therefore the continuance of its hegemony...
The greater part of the units of exchange as emitted by private money
creative power are of no intrinsic value other, perhaps, than those denoted
by precious metal symbols, and with which the confidence of peoples and
rulers was gained. Therefore the cost of instituting that total control of
any state so "captured" by private money creative power, i.e., the bankers,
was virtually nil, since clearly such state financed its own lamentable
condition!
It is clear that each unit issued into circulation, of fraudulent origin or
otherwise, reduced by an exact valuation, the worth of previous units as
worked in the exchanges; transferring such loss of worth to the holder of
the new unit. If later, with growth of industry deriving from the creation
of such unit, all circulating units increased in worth, such increase in
worth rarely caught up with the original decline in worth, or purchasing
power of those previously existing units.
The steady decline in worth or purchasing power, of the unit of exchange at
any place and in any period of history, will be sufficient proof in itself
of the existence of secret creation and manipulation of abstract units of
exchange by a relatively invisible force.
Only under most unusual
circumstances would even a sharp rise in the number of precious metal units
circulating, cause distinct and disturbing inflation of values, without an
accompanying fraudulent, and secret expansion of the total number of working
units, through issuance of false receipts against non-existing valuables or
non-existing warehoused goods, or by creation of transferable ledger credit
page entry money against assignment of "collateral".
Precious metal units in themselves soon wear
out, disappear for purposes of speculation abroad, or are hoarded.
Thus the creation and issuance of money constitutes free gift to the issuer
when such issuer be private person. It automatically and immediately
despoils he who thinks himself to have money or to be a person of worth. It
is an indirect and hidden form of taxation no less than any other such
indirect or hidden tax. (3)
If, continuing to speak of ancient times, such units of money, fraudulent or
otherwise, were accepted by the simple folk as money, and seemed to serve
equally well as had served that lawful money of earlier times yet again,
which had been an order on the treasury or warehouses of the god of the
city, then indeed, such units were money to all intents and purposes of the
immediate needs of exchange.
The fact of their legal issuance as a loan at
interest against goods and services as collateral pledges, placed in the
hands of their creator and issuer the power of total discrimination,
formerly recognized as being the sole and absolute prerogative of the god,
through his servants the priest-kings of ancient times; those who were the
carriers of the breath of Life Eternal from God to Man...
As time went on, the fact of their creation,
issue, acceptance, and effectiveness in the exchanges, once the people had
resigned themselves to slow inflation of values, placed in the hand of this
private creator of these originally fraudulent exchange units, All-Power!
Whatever the material on which the units of exchange or their divisibles or
multiples were recorded, the customer still thought in terms of silver, as
even today most still think in terms of gold though none to speak of has
circulated for thirty five years or so.
So long as the ruler concurred in the first
place in the conspiracy to denominate these exchange units as being as
acceptable as those previously issued by the god and his people, and between
whom the king had been the connecting link, then the power of preferment or
rejection was soon in the hands of the banker as agent for what corresponded
in that day to the international bankers of today totally in opposition to
that natural order of life in which the unit of exchange represents the will
of the benevolent god.
Needless to say, this person would not extend his preferment to those who
instinct told him might be able to come to understand the real truth of the
emptiness of those shadowed vaults from which his hand reached forth.
It might safely be assumed that discrimination
would be exercised against those whose obliteration was included in the
overall plans of those mystic, if not satanic figures that lurked in the
inner sanctuaries of temple, mint, or counting house; in which secret places
were formulated those policies that decided the promotion or otherwise of
kings, tyrants, dictators, or political parties...
The extraordinary wealth and power according to the standards of the day of
this secretive, and apparently humble money power, is shown clearly by the
following extract from Babelon: (4)
"We know that the Greek bankers were money changers; all the more important
financial transactions were negotiated through their agency. Their counters
were the meeting place of businessman and the stock market. They controlled
at the same time the sea-borne trade, and the affairs of the caravans, above
all, in Asia Minor.
The exploitation of mines was often in their hands.
These guardians of treasure received the precious metal deposits belonging
to private persons or traders, keeping open account for their clients, thus
accumulating enormous amounts; they hoarded, they loaned to Princes as well
as private individuals.
Listen then to the story of Nicholas of
Damascus more eloquent than any commentary:
'Wishing to carry the war into Caria, Alyatte, King of Lydia (610-561 B.C.)
gave the order to his commanders to bring him their contingents at Sardis,
by a certain day. Amongst the generals chosen was Croesus, the oldest son
of the King, at that time Governor of Adramyttium and of the plain of Thebes.
Negligent and prodigal, ill regarded by his father on account of his
dissipations, very desirous of being received back into his father's good
graces, and of confounding his calumniators, but not having the wherewithal
to raise and hire mercenaries, the young Prince, in order to overcome his
embarrassment, resolved to contract a loan. With this purpose in mind he
sought out Sadyattes, the richest merchant of Lydia.
This person, occupied
with his ablutions, firstly let Croesus wait impatiently at his door. Then
he agreed to receive him, but this was only to refuse him money; 'If I must
lend to all the sons of Alyattes', he cried, 'there will not be enough!'
Rebuffed, Croesus proceeded to Ephesus. There, an Ionian friend, Pamphaes,
learning the reason of his visit, obtained a sum of a thousand gold staters
from his father, Theocharides, who was possessed of considerable fortune,
and which he hastened to bring to the necessitous prince. Thanks to these
subsidies, Croesus, furnished with troops, was the first of all at the rendez-vous, and regained the favour of his father who took him in as
partner in this expedition.'
Croesus later on revenged himself on Sadyattes who had turned him away,
confiscating his treasure to the endowment of the temple of Artemis at
Ephesus.
The plunder taken from the unhappy banker
was large enough to make two pillars of gold and the golden calves, with
which the temple of the Goddess was adorned.
Later we see a banker of Caelenae, Pythias, of Lydian extraction, make a
gift to King Darius of a plane tree in gold and a vine in gold. Some while
afterwards, doubtless in fear that his immense fortune might only come to
excite the covetousness of the prince, Pythias made up his mind to ward off
the danger by making a concession.
Spontaneously he offered Xerxes subsidies
for the war. As the Great King was questioning him in kindly curiosity as
to the extent of his wealth, the banker confessed, not without misgivings
that he possessed in his coffers two thousand talents of silver, and that he
was short of four million darics, by only seven thousand darics.
Sadyattes, Theocharides, Pamphaes, Pythias, wealthy guardians of treasure,
possessing the confidence of the public who as well as princes, envied their
riches, struck monetary ingots in the doorway of their counting houses..."
The above excerpt from Babelon and Nicholas of Damascus illustrates a clear
cut case in ancient days of effort by money power to control political
succession.
For the real reason of the refusal by Sadyattes of the loan to
Croesus, although not recorded by Babelon, was that Sadyattes had already
pledged himself to the support of Panteleon, Croesus' half-brother (5)
and
probably was also the source of the rumors in regard to the "unsuitability"
of Croesus for succession to the throne, and the unsatisfactory reports to
Alyattes.
Panteleon was clearly more "suitable", and more "pliable" than
the strong minded Croesus, who, Sadyattes probably knew via his spies, would
be his enemy; although his offensive conduct towards a royal son would
suggest he considered his position inviolable. The surly arrogance of this Sadyattes in causing the young Croesus to wait at the door, and then
refusing him his request in no pleasant manner, so typical of this class of
person today, as much as in Croesus' day, undoubtedly caused Croesus to
enquire a little more deeply into this precious metal money "Racket" when he
finally did become king, a "racket" which allowed low and unsavoury persons
to make a mockery of kingship.
The results of his enquiries undoubtedly
showed him that above all, for his kingship to be meaningful, monetary
emission had to be removed from the control of private persons... Further
evidence of history would suggest, in Lydia at least, Croesus destroyed the
arrogance and power to subversion of this class of persons, not the most
noble amongst his subjects, by the institution of the issue of equal weights
of precious metal or coin, as state prerogative; thus, he thought,
returning to himself as representative of the god on earth, that essential
power so necessary towards the maintenance of true order in life, the total
control of monetary emission...
That the reputed fate of Croesus after
conquest by Cyrus, the new Persian Monarch, founder of the Achaemenid
Dynasty somewhat later on, was influenced by the longing for revenge of
those leaders of finance in Babylon City, in one way or another the main
force behind Cyrus and his conquests and for whom Sadyattes would very
likely have been important agent or co-conspirator, as previously pointed
out, seems reasonable supposition.
Hence the real source of the so rapid decay of all relatively recent
civilizations and so called empires of the last 6000 years, whose
establishment was so often due to the behind the scenes activities of
bankers as agents for what was necessarily an internationally spread network
of bullion interests, was the complete dearth in the later days of such
civilizations or empires, of dean and noble men in places of control and
power...
Such natural and truly dedicated leadership had been destroyed, either by
the planned discriminatory activities of the bankers, or by the never dying
fires of war that maintained these so-called "Empires"... Their
places had been taken by the progeny of their slaves, or, as in Sparta, by
their women.
Clearly in that day almost all money in circulation arrived there created
and issued by private persons of a class stranger to the whole world, and
whose only guide was never more than their indifference to the miseries of
mankind.
Today, despite the continuance of the naïve belief of those who
toil from day to day, that this money is created and injected into the
circulation by the presumably benevolent will of the state, it is the same
as in the days of the corruption and crumbling of the god-given distribution
systems of the Ancient Orient, in the face of the attack on their integrity,
by the privately issued commodity currencies of silver...
This attack later
having been intensified when, as a result of the stripping of the
ornamentation from tomb and temple, both in Egypt, and right across the
ancient oriental world, that silver apex to the inverted pyramid of abstract
money by which the great banking houses were manipulating the exchanges,
became further augmented by gold, the magic metal so long dedicated to
ornament for the god-kings, in life as in death, or to holy ritual...
That
burning metal, almost a god in itself, now falling into the greasy hands of
the money-changers, exchanged with silver in the ratio, so far as the middle
East was concerned, of about 13:1. (6)
So far as ancient Persian and Greek history is concerned, it will be quite
safe to say that the apparent beneficiaries of such system were front men
for a wider and more international system extending from China to Britain,
of which evidence in China may have been that strange Hebrew community whose
decaying fragments were found south of Peking by the Jesuits who entered
China in the 17th Century; a community that knew nothing of the Talmud, or
of Jesus Christ, and who consequently thought in terms of Christians as in
terms of a sect of themselves, and who undoubtedly were the descendants of
the agents of a most ancient trading community. (7)
The evidence of this
world wide financial system in Britain exists in the gold staters of the
Iceni, Cassivellauni, Brigantes etc. still existing, (8) and which
circulated there long before Julius Caesar. Although gold was obtained in
Wales and in Ireland, its use as money could only have been inspired and
organized from that central point where the original staters were minted,
the Near East and the cities wherein dwelt the controllers of international
trade and mining...
Amongst other principles of political control by money power, certainly one
of the most important of all, used in ancient times, just as much as today,
was that which is known as liberalism...
Liberalism in simplified language
meaning that he who hath shall give to him who hath not; not so much out of
proper charity, but so that he who hath not may come to put his foot on the
neck of him who (formerly) had, and who now foolishly gives him his own
strength.
Thus money power, by injecting liberalism along the very arteries
of society through those underground channels under its control, made sure
that what might be described in the language of today as "Permanent
Revolution", would prevent any power group from having control long enough
to see the true source of that which is the power of the ruler, if he is to
truly be in the saddle, namely, monetary emission...
Money Power, then as
today, fully understood the necessity towards the continuance of its
hegemony, of the promotion amongst the leading families of the states of
corrupt persons who took pleasure in destroying their own; persons
basically corrupt who had deeply drunk of the poison of liberalism, persons
possessed of the wealth of kings because so pleasing to the central
designing force, though at the same time having the natural outlook of the
slave... truly strange combination!
One such family identified in ancient times with the promotion of liberalism
and its attendant sister, welfarism, both equally beneficial to money power,
was that Athenian family known as the Alkmeonidae, who, although suspected
at the time of the Battle of Marathon (490 B.C.) as being the source of the
heliograph that sent information across the bay of Marathon to the Persian
commanders, (9) strangely enough continued to maintain power and place at
Athens.
Equally strange had been the awarding of the
contract for the rebuilding of the Temple at Delphi after it had been burned
down (548 B.C.), to this same family in exile from Athens.
As previously surmised, International Money Power above all must have sought
control of the great temples and oracles. Delphi was such, and the oracle
at Delphi was highly regarded over the ancient world. The building of a
major temple was a gift which must have been arranged by those interests who
were best of all served by the family policies of the Alkmeonidae.
It might
safely be said that if this same family had been rejected by Athens, the
gift came from that financial force whose favour they had clearly enjoyed
from generation to generation: namely the money power that guided the
policies of the Achaemenid Rulers of Persia and Babylonia...
Pericles, scion of this notorious family, while being the front man for
those forces driving Athens into war with Sparta, was the instigator of the
Donatives and later, of theorica, (10) outstandingly undermining
factor to Athenian self-esteem and national morale.
Theorica allowed two oboli per
person to the lessee of the Oratorium (11) and thus two corrupt purposes
were served:
-
It made sure all or at least a great
part of the citizenry attended the plays, thus keeping their minds
off more serious matters as do cinema and television particularly in
this day; more especially keeping their minds off that most serious
matter of all which is true understanding of politics; in other
words, understanding of the meaning of the essential forces that
guided their existence.
-
It assured the lessee of the Oratorium
(and that politician who most promoted his interests), a certain
profit.
A third purpose would also have been served, although there is absolutely no
record that says so: the maintenance of an unbalanced budget and consequent
stimulation of government indebtedness to private money creative power, i.e.
the bankers.
If the sophistication of Sales Tax was known to Periclean
Athens, (12) it may safely be assumed were also known the sophisticated
practices in relation to government indebtedness as practised particularly
in Anglo-Saxon countries today. (13)
Officially theorica was drawn from the
fund for war preparedness. The only conclusion that can be drawn as to the
true meaning therefore of the establishment of theorica, (14) so far as the
bankers were concerned, was to further increase necessity of government
borrowing in time of war, and so strengthen the hold of that so called
National Debt almost certainly held by themselves. (15)
Thus the principles of the total hegemony of private money creative power
were as clearly understood by its masters yesterday, as much as they are
today.
The limiting factors to the complete destruction with which we are
now threatened as a result of the flare-up in this all consuming cancer
which began about some three hundred years ago, and now rages on virtually
uncontrollable, were, at that time, that kings and councils still ruled, and
kings still thought of themselves as the sons of God, the saviors of their
peoples.
If in any way they had understood the malignance of this growth
that had penetrated the sub-structure of life it would have been short
shrift for its controllers. Hence the necessity for an absolute secrecy
most restrictive in its effects. Clay, the material on which records were
kept throughout Babylonia at least, did not have any of the potential of
paper so far as went the keeping of records.
Parchment and papyrus while
not standing up to constant use, were becoming increasingly rare and
expensive, and vellum, relatively rare, was not known until the time of
Pergamum where the first books written on this material appeared in 198 B.C.
(16)
Neither did those states escape a certain international control of their
money such as did not adopt the relatively new idea of coined precious metal
money, but continued to use copper, bronze orichalcum, or iron, and whose
value depended on the scarcity or otherwise of its circulating symbols
relative to the need for them; designated a fiduciary money...
For instance, in the case of Greece, the silver bullion brokers who were
clearly based at Athens, obviously would be able to control the exchange
rates of such cities as used their own fiduciary or national currencies,
(17) if, as usually would be the case, such cities sought the good graces of
Athens towards obtaining food and raw materials and towards marketing their
manufactures. Thus, through the exchange rates, the bankers and bullion
traders would also be able to exercise some control over the political life
of such cities.
The City of Athens itself, its monetary system based
directly on their internationally required products, silver and gold, was
clearly under their immediate control. If the state owned the mints, of
which there seems to be no knowledge, it would make no difference. The
states own the mints today for what it means; which is little or nothing so
far as goes control of Monetary Emission... (18)
With the end of the bronze age in warfare, from one end of the world to the
other, enormous amounts of copper and bronze must have come on to the
markets of the world as scrap; much of which would have been obtained at
little more than the cost of its removal from national arsenals by the money
changers or their agents.
Where copper and bronze fiduciaries, as at Rome, circulated at values many
times more than their value by weight of metal on the international bullion
markets, relative to their value in silver or gold bullion, clearly such
copper and bronze bullion such as came on to the markets as military scrap,
would have been more useful towards the counterfeiting of such currencies,
than sold at its bullion value.
For instance, if the value of one libra of
copper as offered on the bullion market (if such could exist) at Rome was
one Aes, the value of a minted Aes of one libra weight in an overvaluation
of the minted coin relative to copper bullion prices internationally, would
be as the demand for them rose and fell, according to supply and demand.
It appears that at Rome during the middle Commonwealth, the overvaluation of
the Aes relative to the same weight of bullion was 400-500%; in the
countryside and more distant colonies often being far more. If in latter
times (during the 18th Century A.D.), the copper rouble of czarist Russia,
issued at an overvaluation of up to 800% according to the value of copper
bullion relative to the price internationally of silver bullion, (19)
brought into Russia a very inundation of counterfeits minted in Western
Europe, (20) clearly the of Aes at substantial overvaluation,
made the creation and of counterfeit coin an equally profitable affair in
ancient Rome.
Thus international money power would have succeeded in diminishing the
beneficial effects of such national currency, continuing to use Rome as the
example, by mass counterfeiting, which would have seen rapid increase once
gold and silver commenced to circulate alongside the Aes after the Second
Punic War.
Clearly the main purpose of the counterfeiters, then, as agents
in some degree of the international silver bullion traders, would be to
inject their copper or bronze counterfeits into circulation at the best
overvaluation possible, which would be through money-lending in the
provinces, at the same time requiring repayment, if possible, in silver and
gold.
Hence the steady disappearance of the precious metals from the
circulation, was either due to the activities of the smaller moneylenders
dealing in counterfeit, or due to the activities of the Argentarii or
Numularii making loans in exactly the same manner as the bankers today,
loans which never saw light as money, being always cheques in transit, but
which, in the final repayment were as often as not, gold, silver, or Aes;
the later being immediately convertible into gold or silver, which seems
largely to have then moved Eastward.
This disappearance of the precious metals from the circulation (21)
Eastward
seems to have been a factor inspiring the vehemence of Cicero in his Oration: Pro Flaccus. The indignation of Cicero as recorded in this Oration may be
traced to the indifference of certain persons who lived close to the
Aurelian steps, to the good of the Roman State wherein they lived and whose
solidarity enabled them to arrange to have mobs intimidate the proceedings
of the court which heard a person, probably a member of the banking family
known as the Lollii, (22) attempt to smear the reputation of Lucius Flaccus,
who, as Praetor of Syria, had issued edict forbidding this movement of
precious metals Eastward for deposit at the Temple in Jerusalem. (23)
Of Roman banking the great 19th century scholars, Mommsen and Marquardt,
wrote: (24)
"The conduct of banking was done for the most part through the intermediary
of the argentarii and of nummularii: these last were known under the name
of collectarii mensularii... In countries of Greek origin there was a kind
of state bank as at Tenos, at Ilium, and at Temnos in Aeolide; they were
also in Egypt: in every Nome was found a beneath the direction of a royal
employee, and through him as intermediary it was customary to make certain
contracts and payments.
Among the Romans, on the contrary, it was only in
the most extraordinary circumstances that public banks were organized under
the direction of state functionaries (mensa publica); thus amongst others,
in 402-352 (B.C.) under the direction of quinqui viri mensarii, in order to
facilitate the liquidation of debts, by advances made against
guarantees, with state funds, and during the period 538 to 543-216 to
211 B.C. for different reasons, and finally to carry out the collection
of funds loaned free to the state...
... it was about that time that the tabernae argentariae
were established of which the first indications are in 443-399 B.C.;
often occurring later on.
It is through the intermediary of the argentarii that most payments were
made, as also they were entrusted with the collection of moneys due, the
placing of capitals at interest, the sale of merchandise, and particularly
the liquidation of estates by way of auction sales and finally investments
of all kinds; exchange transactions, notably the changing of foreign moneys
and the sale of Roman money appear originally to have been reserved to the nummularii.
Under this heading we must first of all take a look at the dealers in
exchange, who had to check the qualifications of new money; as such they
seem to have had a mensa from which they put new money into circulation,
taking in the course of their business old money as well as foreign money,
and it was their custom to set the rates of exchange; outside of Rome the publicae mensae nummulariorum appeared to have existed. In second place
this description applied to private persons whose business was dealing in
the precious metals.
Concurrently with the argentarii, they conducted all
the activities that go with banking business; they accepted capitals for
deposit, they made payments for the account of other people, they placed
capitals at interest and for exchange transactions they levied a charge or
bonus... these bankers, the argentarii, the same as the nummularii, were
placed under the surveillance of state functionaries, praefectus urbi, at
Rome during the empire, and in the provinces under the surveillance of the
governor.
They were probably the subject of the granting of a franchise, or
investiture, that was only accorded to a very limited number of people; in
the case of dispute they were obliged to produce their books (rationes
edere), which were evidence of payments made and transactions entered into.
For their franchise they were subjected to legal regimentation.
These books were of three kinds: in the first place was a cash book, codex accepti et expensi in which in order of date were recorded the deposits and
withdrawals of the argentarius with mention of the nature of the business
and the names of the persons interested. In second place, a running account
(rationes, liber rationum) in which the banking operations of the
argentarius with every person involved were kept by debit and credit; thanks
to which, it could be known at a moments notice how much the merchant
was owed by every one of his clients, and how much he had to pay out to
him.
In third place a book was kept, adversaria, in which was preserved record of
the transactions under way, and even having their designation in code.
Amongst these books, that which is peculiar to the argentarii, is the
running account book, rendered necessary by the great number of transactions; the cash book, on the contrary, in which were entered by order of date the
deposits and withdrawals, expensum ferre, acceptum referre, was kept by
every head of a family until the IIIrd century A.D., in which period this
custom fell into disuse.
Mensae scripturae: The mensae scripturae served in that which touched the
activities of banking, as much to establish contract, as to furnish proof,
and the greater part of payments were effected by transcriptions and
endorsements recorded in the account books of the argentarii; direct
payment (domo ex arca sua) was rarely made, but it was very often made
through the intermediary of bankers (de mensa scriptura), whether moneys had
been deposited with them for which they were obliged to give account
(rationem reddere), or whether it had been possible to open a credit with
them out of which they made payment following an assignment."
The above excerpt from the works of two scholars of vast learning, is
revealing.
No doubt will be left with the reader who understands modern day
banking practices, that just as in today 95% of all money in circulation, is cheques and assignments in transit, often written against credits granted by
bankers where no actual funds previously existed, but however without which
the drive and turmoil of this civilization could not have come to be, so it
was in Rome and in Greece.
Indeed, for all those movements of vast armies,
and for all those movements of peoples through the consequent sale and
transfer of slaves, and for the erection of all those great works in stone,
many of which still stand, from the pillars of Hercules to Parthia and
Arabia, the instigative factor was the same as the instigative factor behind
all the mighty works and mysteries of today. It was none other than the
driving force of that abstract money that none can see, but that functions
just the same as that which can be seen, the mysterious "Credit" of the
banker; force that once had been the will of a benevolent god, but now was
an instrument towards the wilful redesign and enslavement of mankind...
In
the late Roman Commonwealth and the early Empire, the assignments and cheques in transit may not have equalled 95% of all money in circulation,
and it is by no means impossible that they were even more, taking into
account the fact that today's high speed printing presses and coining
machines, the fount of the 5% of the circulation that can be seen, can
create these visible units on which the inverted pyramid of the invisible
units is erected, at a hundred thousand or more times the speed of slaves
striking and finishing metal units of money by hand. (25)
In Harpers Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities, Roman banking
is dealt with as follows, in close agreement with Mommsen and Marquardt:
... “ The Argentarius thus did almost the same sort of business as a modern
banker.
Many persons entrusted all their capital to them (Cicero: Pro. Caec. 6.16) and instances in which the argentarii made payments in the name
of those whose money they had in hand, are mentioned very frequently. A
payment made through a banker was called per mensam, de mensa or per mensae
scripturam, while a payment made by the debtor in person was a payment ex
arca or de domo.
An argentarius never paid away any person's money without
receiving a cheque (perscriptio), and the payment was then made either in
cash, or, if the person who was to receive it kept an account with the same
banker, he had it added in the banker's book, to his deposit.
This was
likewise called perscribere or simply scribere... we also find that argentarii made payments for persons who had not deposited any money with
them: this was equivalent to lending money; which in fact they often did
for a certain percentage of interest... ” (26)
Thus banking was carried on in almost the same manner in the Roman world as
in our world of today, and to those who understand the significance of the
practices of modern day banking, nothing could be clearer.
Even the
ostentatious display of a metal safety deposit vault is recorded by the
antiquarian, Lanciana, (27) of the time of Hadrian; doubtless to
encourage people to leave their valuables with the bank and so strengthen
their "confidence"...
In the earlier days when the senate was truly government in the saddle, that
is until the end of the integrity of the numerical currency, with the
resumption of the striking of silver money and therefore reentry into the
orbit of the silver bullion brokers, mining of the precious metals had been
forbidden in Italy, (28) and copper mining had been state monopoly, clearly
indicating the futility of any discussion of whether the striking of coinage
had been free or otherwise...
Where the policy of the state had been to
maintain an overvaluation of its bronze coinage relative to bullion prices,
(29) it is quite clear that it could in no way permit private individuals
the privilege of the mints, free or otherwise. To do so would be to concede
them the right and the power to manipulate price levels, and so, confounding
the economy, dismay the rulers.
Thus it was not until the time of Cicero
that evidence appears of private persons bringing bullion to the mints, (30)
significantly coincidental with the general collapse of the ancient manners,
and the essential forces that had guided Rome, as is described by Sallust.
(31)
Such matters of state finance seem to have been well understood during the
middle commonwealth. However, as a result of the second Punic war and
Trasimeno and Cannae (32) and the desperate need to rearm quickly that
followed these unfortunate battles, Rome clearly had been obliged to allow
the whole currency system to become based on the international valuation of
silver as common denominator of values. She also had been obliged to permit
the reduction of the value of the aes coinage to the value of its weight as
bronze bullion relative to the arbitrary value internationally of silver
bullion.
It follows that it was only after Rome had thus surrendered much of her
sovereign prerogative in money matters to the international silver bullion
brokers, reluctantly, as was shown by subsequent events, that growth of
liberalism, and consequent undermining of the morale of the people and their
government, finally gave rise to the warlords known as the Triumvirate and
the beginning of rule which might best be described as complete negation of
that which had been government by decree of the senate.
With the reckless abuse of the powers of their Imperium through those
bankers who supported them, particularly in relation to their right to
strike money in the field, the warlords derived virtual independence from
the auctoritas of an already corrupted senate and when, in 23 B.C., the aes
coinage which had been the backbone of the Republic, was returned to the
senate with S.C. Senatus Consulto (by decree of the senate) (33)
stamped thereon, it was more in the nature of a concession to a
dignity and authority that once had been the reality guiding Roman political
life, but now had become a meaningless front, a shadow.
Thus with the rise of the warlords, who were in effect, would-be tyrants
under arms, each with his own Money Power, was the triumph of the empire
concept... In the case of Caesar, his supporting bankers appear to have
been the L. Cornelius Balba for whom the A. Hirtius of Caesar's aes coinage
as issued in the country of the Treveri in Gaul, seems to have been agent
with H. Clovius, emittor in Cisalpine Gaul of Caesar's orichalcum (brass)
issues. Also C. Vibius Pansa and Q. Sulpicius Rufus, all of whom are
described by Michael Grant as "eminent financiers". (34)
Of this period An Encyclopaedia of World History says: "If the crossing of the Rubicon marked
the final fall of the Republic, the battle of Actium signalized the final
triumph of the Empire.
The last century of the republic was characterised
by the collapse of popular government, because of the wide extension of the
citizenship, the considerable adulteration of the citizen body at Rome by
the introduction of un-Romanized orientals, chiefly through the manumission
of slaves, the growth in Rome of an unemployed proletariat, the rise of
demagogues, and the complexity of the problems of government.
The
increasingly corrupt senate had lost control of the assemblies, the armies
and the generals. The financiers as well as the governors, saw in the
provinces only a field for exploitation." (35)
Clearly moneyers and bankers reigned supreme as far as it was possible
behind some powerful military figure such as had been Caesar or Anthony or
Octavian, or in some measure of direct authority as seems to have been the
case with Sosius, moneyer and financial organizer to Anthony, who also came
from a banking family.
The same Sosius when quaestor and governor of Syria
and Cilicia, dethroned Antigonus, the last of the Hasmonean kings of
Jerusalem in 37 B.C. after six months siege, replacing him with Herod,
later known as "The Great", first of the Idumean line in that city.
(36)
Considering how extensive a part the coinage of Sosius had played in the
fortune (or lack of fortune) of Anthony, Sosius was lucky to have been
spared by Octavian. (37) The absence of Herod from the deciding battle of
the civil wars, the battle of Actium (31 B.C.) under the excuse that he was
detained more urgently in Arabia fighting the King of Arabia on Anthony's
behalf, (38) may be the answer here.
No doubt Sosius, in the same way as
any good banker in ancient or in modern times, knew how to keep a foot in
each camp; equally wise was also his friend Herod... Q. Oppius who emitted
the
orichalcum coinage inaugurated by Anthony, also appears to have belonged
to a well known family of bankers. (39)
The name of the bankers behind Augustus does not appear to be known, but the
extent of their massive operations is revealed by the widespread circulation
of their heavy weight aes coinage from their mint at Nemausen, right across
the Empire; from Britain, to Portugal, to Pannonia... (40) It may safely be
concluded that their coinage circulated without discount and at par value
with all other aes coinage previous or present, state issued, or otherwise,
or by imperium or auctoritas...
The question would be: was this excellent and adequate coinage which so well
met the needs of great military and civil day to day expenditures, and which
undoubtedly was the origin of the sure accession to power of Augustus,
emitted by an organization of similar character to the Bank of England of
recent world power, or more recently again, the Federal Reserve Bank of the
United States of America... ?
Both of which, though apparently state
departments, in reality were private international organizations set up by
the international circle of bullion traders, or, as they are now generally
known, the International Bankers...
That which seems to be clear out of the fragments of information existing,
is that there was no such thing as a permanent interest bearing state
indebtedness until the period which may mark the beginning of the decline of
imperial Rome; the significance of which is that no Roman Government ever
entirely lost control of that power so essential to the maintenance of its
sovereignty, the power to directly inject the unit of exchange into
circulation as according to its own needs...
Of this period until the 3rd Century A.D. the most learned Professor
Heichelheim wrote: "...There were regular lending associations while usury
constituted quite an important item in the legal provisions of the Corpus Iuris and the Talmud. Only State Usury was rare, for the Roman State was
still in a supreme position. (41) At the most, autonomous areas were the
only exceptions here.
Large interest free loans advanced to the state by
individual citizens or chance patrons for reward in the form of honours or
other more indirect advantage, were quite frequent up to the 3rd Century
A.D..." (42)
However, it may reasonably be assumed that even during the period of the
Commonwealth and the true greatness of the Roman people, though Roman
Government had endeavored to monopolize all sources of the material of its
tangible currency, and had prevented as much as possible the circulation of
precious metal, which clearly would undermine the integrity of the state
issued unit of exchange, the grandiose aes, it still could not prevent
counterfeits from entering the circulation.
It could not prevent the
corrupt practices of oriental banking after the extensive reentry of silver
into the circulation as a result, clearly, of concessions made to the
international bullion traders during the 2nd Punic war, nor thereafter the
functioning of Gresham's so-called law which such entailed... "Bad money
drives out the good"; which, of course, depends on what is bad and what is
good! Nor, therefore, could it control the extent in absolute, right across
the Roman Empire, of the activities of that underground that garnered the
precious metal from the circulation for more profitable use elsewhere.
As a consequence of the rejection by growing and powerful states such as
Rome of the early and middle commonwealth of the claim of silver bullion
interests that all tangible money should be founded on their product as base
and common denominator of values, and the creation and paying into
circulation of their own tangible money, with value deriving from its
scarcity or otherwise, using largely copper or bronze as the material on
which its numbers were recorded, as previously pointed out, much copper or
bronze that came the way of the international bullion brokers would,
undoubtedly have been used in what must have been an extensive industry
devoted to counterfeiting of these fiduciary currencies.
The product of this industry which would have
been carried on abroad no doubt, while yielding handsome profit, through
disturbance of that mass of abstract money based on the tangible currencies
into which such products would have been injected, would also create
instability of price in the states concerned.
Thus would be created conditions in which foreign money lenders would be
better able to flourish, and secure the establishment of their own peculiar
systems of private money emission based usually on the fiction of valuables
on deposit for safe-keeping.
Under such systems, when fully under way, the
next step would be political control through so called political parties
that such money power would bring into being, each necessarily dedicated to
some "cause" through a so-called "Leader", also chosen through the agency of
such money power and by those forces it controlled. Such leaders would be
"suitable" men, and would be chosen because pliable and, too often,
naturally corrupt.
Raised as likely as not from the lower ranks of society,
and therefore dazed by the dizzy heights to which fortune had lifted them,
such men would be most likely to carry out without question the policies
required for the fulfillment of their master's purposes and dreams;
principally that of World Government, which should raise such
masters, strange thought though it might be, to the position of world
rulers, and therefore heirs of the god-kings of ancient days, in their own
eyes.
Although to the eye of any clear-seeing man they
might better have been called the anti-god, or in the language of the
naïve Christians of a somewhat later time to the god-kings, demons...
References
1. Further support is given to the opinions of the present author in respect
to money creation and issuance by the remarks of Dr. Paul B. Trescott in his
work: Money, Banking, & Economic Welfare (Page 55), in which the process
of deposit creation in modern times (which would be known as money
creation if more direct language were used), is briefly, but aptly
summarized.
According to Dr. Trescott, in order to make a loan of $1000.00 to a
customer, "a bank needs only to credit his account with $1000.00 in its
books by a stroke of the pen." The following words of Dr. Trescott certainly
convey the impression that, despite the fact that nothing has been given by
the bank in question that will cause any decrease in its assets, the
customer will give the bank something of real value " in exchange for the
deposit credit," his IOU, " or an interest bearing security." According to
Dr. Trescott, this process by which deposits are created, consequently
causes increase in the total money supply. Dr. Trescott further remarks: "
The process of creating deposits is obviously a simple and painless one for
the banks..."
2. In days gone by it was customary for most who did business with ships, to
make a gift, usually money, to both Master and First Mate. These gifts were
known as "Perks". The "Perks" of the Master were unknown to the First Mate; in some degree they took the place of commissions that shipmasters had
formerly received on cargo bookings in the days before the advent of
telegraphs etc., when they truly were kings of the sea in many senses of the
word.
3. Hence the existing situation in what is left of Anglo-Saxon
governments: As their (unnecessary) expenditure beyond tax income is
financed by the creation of debt directly to private persons, which
indeed are the Banks (that everyone so unquestioningly accepts these
days as an established feature in living) under incredible conditions,*
units of exchange in circulation automatically suffer increase, and
consequently there is a steady fall in their purchasing power.
Such fall in purchasing power immediately and arbitrarily constitutes a
hidden tax on all who hold monetary units in one way or another. Levied in
an unseen manner by those private persons who supposedly make the
so-called loan to the government, its effects are not understood by the
people, nor its origin.
Further than this hidden tax imposed with
dubious legality, there is the absurdity of an interest rate, which,
parallel to that of previous so called loans, creates a yearly interest
bill which in itself necessitates further such borrowing, without ever
thinking of paying off the principal; such system necessarily compels a
government that has been trained to unquestioned acceptance of its
financial liabilities to be servant in some considerable degree, of
those private persons, its supposed benefactors.
*For a clear statement of the workings of this unbelievable system in
Canada, see Brief submitted to the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance
by Mel Rowatt, Ottawa, 1964.
For the opinions of orthodox Political Economy see: James M. Buchanan: The
Public Finances; pp. 359-69. Homewood; Illinois; 1965. Reuben A. Kessel
and Armen A. Alchian: Effects of Inflation, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. LXX, pp. 521-37, December, 1962.
4. " On sait que les Banquiers Grecs étaient en même temps des changeurs; toutes les grosses affaires d'argent se traitaient par leur intermédiaire
(I). Leur comptoir étaient le rendezvous des gens d'affaires, la bourse; ils tenaient a la fois le commerce maritimes et le commerce des caravanes,
surtout en Asie Mineure. L'exploitation des mines étaient souvent entre
leurs mains. Ces manieurs d'or recevaient des dépôts de métal précieux
appartenant au rentiers ou au négociants, tenaient caisse ouverte pour leur
clients, emmagasinaient d'énormes sommes; as thésaurisaient; ils prêtaient
aux princes aussi bien qu'aux particuliers. Ecoutez plutôt ce récit de
Nicolas de Damas, plus éloquent que tous commentaires: " Voulant porter la
guerre en Carie, le roi Lydie, Alyatte (610 a 561 av. J.C.) donna l'ordre a
ses lieutenants de lui amener à jour fixé, leurs contingents a Sardes. Aux nombres des généraux figurait le fils aine du roi, Crésus, alors gouverneur
d'Adramyttium et de la plaine de Thébé. Négligent et prodigue, mal vu de
son père, a cause de ses dissipations, très désireux de rentier en grâce
auprès de lui et de confondre ses calomniateurs, mais n'ayant pas de quoi
lever et soudoyer des mercenaires, le jeune prince, pour se tirer
d'embarras, résolut de contracter un emprunt. A cet effet, il alla trouver
Sadyatte, le plus riches négociant de la Lydie. Celui-ci occupé a ses
ablutions, laissa d'abord Crésus se morfondre sa porte. Ensuite il
consentit à le recevoir, mais ce fut pour lui refuser de l'argent: " S'il
me fallait prêter tous les fils d'Alyattes, s'écria-t-il je n'y pourrais
suffire." Rebuté Crésus se rendit a Ephése. Là un Ionien de ses amis,
Pamphaés, apprenant le motif de sa visite, obtint de son père Théocharides,
dont la fortune étaient considérable, une somme de milles statères d'or,
qu'il s'empressa de céder aux prince nécessiteux. Grâce ces subsides,
Crésus équipa des troupes, fut le premier de tous au rendez-vous et
reconquit le faveur de son père qui se l'associa dans cette expédition."
Crésus, plus tard, s vengea de Sadyattes qui l'avait éconduit, en
confisquant ses trésors au profit de Temple d'Artemis d'Ephése: les de pouilles du malheureux banquier furent assez considérables pour qu'on en pût
fabriquer des colonnes d'or et de génisse d'or qui ornèrent le Temple de la
Déesse.
Plus tard nous voyons un banquier de Caelenae, Pythés, d'origine Lydienne,
faire cadeau au roi Darius d'un platane d'or et d'une vigne d'or. Quelques
temps après dans la crainte sans doute, que son immense fortune ne vint
exciter la convoitise du prince, Pythes prit le parti de faire la part du
feu: il offrit spontanément a Xerxés des subsides pour la guerre; Comme le
Grand roi s'enquérait, en curieux bienveillant, de l'étendue de ses
richesse, le banquier confessa, non sans inquiétude, qu'il possédait dans
ses coffres deux milles talents d'argent et qu'il ne lui manquait que sept
milles pièces d'or pour qu'il eut quatre millions de Dariques.
Sadyatte, Théocharides, Pamphaés, Pytbés, voila les opulent manieurs d'or,
en possession de la confiance de la public, qui aussi bien que les princes,
envieux de leurs richesses, estampillent les lingots monétaire au sortir de
leurs caisses. (Ernest Babelon: Les Origines de la Monnaie, P. 106.)
5. Herodotus; The Histories; Book I.
6. A. del Mar: A History of Monetary Systems in Various States, P. 29, and
pp. 35-53.
7. William C. White: Jews in Kaifeng; Toronto; 1966.
8. R.A.G. Carson: Coins, Ancient Medieval, and Modern, p. 70. London;
1962.
9. A.R. Burns: Pericles and Athens, P. 11; London; 1948.
10. According to Augustus Boeckh in The Public Economy of Athens (Vol. II;
P. 289): " The Public donations or distributions amongst the peoples were
of frequent occurrence. To these belong the distributions of corn which
have been mentioned before, the cleruchiae and the revenues from the mines,
which, before the time of Themistocles (471 B.C.) were divided amongst the
citizens; and lastly the money of the Theorica for the introduction of
which, Pericles is chargeable."
11. Ibid. P. 290.
12. Display in the Royal Ontario Museum, 1972.
13. Bray Hammond and the staff of the Federal Reserve System (1939): The
Federal Reserve System; Omni, Hawthorne, Calif. 1958.
14. Augustus Boeckh: The Public Economy of Athens, P. 289, Vol. II.
15. Ibid. P. 277. Vol. II. Analysis of the remarks of Demosthenes as quoted
hereunder leave little doubt in respect to this matter:
..."In ancient days " says Demosthenes " everything that belonged to the
state was costly and splendid, and no individual distinguished himself from
the multitude; and the proof of it is, that if any of you know the houses
of Themistocles and Miltiades, and the famous men of that time, he will see
that they are not more magnificent than those of other people; but the
buildings and construction of the State were of such size and number, that
it is not in the power of succeeding generations to surpass them--the Propylaea, the Docks, the Porticoes, the Piraeus, and other works with which
you see the city adorned! But now all who are concerned in the management
of public affairs have a superfluity of riches, that some have built private
houses more magnificent than many public edifices and some of them have
purchased more land than all of you who are sitting in the court are
together possessed of; but your public buildings and works, it is
disgraceful to tell how scanty and contemptible they are. What indeed can
be said of your works ? What of the parapets we throw up ? of the roads we
construct and the fountains and trifles at which we labour?...Thus speaks
the ardent enthusiast for the happiness and fame of his country; his
speeches of admonition might with a few alterations be adapted to the
present age, in which such vast sums have been squandered away without
producing anything useful or durable."
16. A. del Mar: History of the Precious Metals, P. 105; New York; 1968.
17. Augustus Boeckh: Public Economy of Athens, P. 43, Vol. I. London;
1828. Also Michael Grant, P. 3.
18. The Royal Commission on Banking and Finance. Ottawa; 1964. Brief
submitted by Mel Rowatt, and page 138 on " Swap " deposits etc.
19. During the brief reign of Peter III (1762-1763 A.D.) the pood of copper
was coined into 32 roubles, copper bullion itself being approximately 5
roubles per pood.
20. According to the memoirs of Count Munnich, to his knowledge 6,000,000
counterfeit roubles entered Russia from Western Europe being exchanged as
against the silver rouble at a profit of 566%. This amount was known. The
unknown amount must have been much greater. A. del Mar: Money and
Civilization, P. 303; London 1886.
21. Naturalis Historia, xii, c. 18.
Pliny. Minimaque computatione millies
contena millia sesertium annis omnibus India et Seres peninsulaque illa
imperio nostro adimunt. Tanto nobis deliciae et feminae constant. (History
of Monetary Systems, P. 126. A. del Mar.)
22. Michael Grant, (From Imperium to Auctoritas. P. 57.), makes mention of a
banking family known as the Lollii. Cicero speaks of a Laelius; (Orationes: Pro Flaccus, Book XVII.). They are more likely members of the same
family.
23. Cicero: Orationes: Pro Flaccus, Book XVII. Clearly transfer of the
precious metals in the time of Cicero meant transfer of prosperity in the
same way as it did in the European controlled world until recently.
24. " Les opérations de banque se faisaient pour la plupart par
l'intermédiaire des argentarii et des nummularii; ces derniers étaient
aussi connus sous le nom collectarii, mensularii... Dans les pays d'origine
Grecque il avait des espèces de banques d'Etat, comme Tenos, Ilium, a Temnos
en Aeolide: il y en avait aussi en Egypte: dans chaque Nome se trouvait
une sous la direction d'un employé royal, et par l'intermédiaire duquel se
faisaient certains contrats et les paiements. Chez les Romaines au
contraire, ce n'est que dans des circonstances extraordinaire que l'on a
organisé des banques publiques sous la direction de fonctionnaires de l'Etat
(mensa publica); ainsi notamment, en 402-352 B.C, sous direction des quinqui
viri mensarii, pour faciliter l'extinction des dettes par les avances faites
sur garanties, avec les fonds de l'Etat; en 538 a 543-216 a 211, pour des
motifs différents et enfin pour opérer l'encaissement de sommes librement
prestées l'Etat...; c'étaient là ou clams son voisinage qu'étaient établies
les tabernae argentariae, dont l'existence est indiqué pour la première fois
en 445-399 et plus tard très souvent. C'est par l'intermédiaire des
argentarii que se faisaient la plupart des paiements, comme aussi ils se
chargeaient de l'encaissement des sommes dues, du placement a intérêt des
capitaux, de la vente de marchandises, et particulièrement de la liquidation
des hérédités par la voie de la vente aux enchères, et enfin des placements
de toute nature; les opérations de change, notamment l'échange des monnaies
étrangères et la vente des monnaies Romaines, paraissent avoir été réservés
l'origine aux nummularii.
Sous ce nom, il faut en premier lieu voir des employés de la monnaie, qui
devaient vérifier le titre des monnaies nouvelles; comme tels ils
paraissent avoir une mensa ou ils mettaient en circulation les monnaies
nouvelles, prenant, suivant leurs cours, les monnaies anciennes comme les
monnaies étrangères, et vérifiaient, dans les paiements le titre des
monnaies, en dehors de Rome, des publicae mensae nummulariorum paraissent
avoir existé. En second lieu, ce nom s'applique a des perçons privées, qui
se livraient au des métaux précieux. Ils faisaient concurremment avec les
argentarii toutes les opérations qui rentraient dans le commerce des
banques, acceptaient des capitaux en dépôt, faisaient des paiements pour le
compte d'autrui, plaçaient des capitaux intérêt, et, pour les opérations de
change prélevaient un bénéfice, ou agio. Ces banquiers, les argentarii,
comme les nummularii, étaient placés sous la surveillance de fonctionnaires
de l'Etat, pendant la durée de l'Empire, Rome, du praefectus urbi, et en
province, du Gouverneur. Ils étaient vraisemblablement l'objet d'une
investiture, qui n'étaient accordée qu'a un nombre très limité de personnes; ils étaient obligés, en cas de contestation, de produire leur livres
(rationes edere), qui, pour les paiements effectués et pour les opérations
engagées, faisaient preuve; ils avaient été soumis pour leur tenue une
réglementation légale.
Ces livres étaient de trois sortes: en premier lieu, un livre de caisse,
codex accepti et expensi, sur lequel, par ordre de date, I'on faisait
figurer les entrées et les sorties de l'argentarius, avec mention de la
nature de l'opération et le nom des personnes intéressés.
En second leu, un livre de compte courant (rationes, liber rationum) dans
lequel les opérations de banque de l'argentarius, avec chaque person
déterminée, étaient portées par doit et avoir; grâce auquel, on savait
immédiatement combien le négociant avait a réclamer a chacun de ces
correspondants et combien il avait a lui payer.
En troisième lieu, un livre journal, adversaria sur lequel étaient notées
les opérations encours, et avant même leur inscription au codex. Parmi ces
livres, celui qui est particulier aux argentarii c'est le livre de compte
courant, rendue nécessaire par le grande nombres des opérations; le livre de
caisse au contraire. sur lequel on inscrit par ordre de date, les entrées
et les sorties, expensum ferre, acceptum referre, fut tenue par chaque p re
de famille, jusqu'au IIIieme siècle après Jésus-Christ, époque vers laquelle
cet usage tomba en désuétude. Les mensae scripturae servaient, en ce qui
touche les opérations de banque, tant pour constituer le contrat que pour
fournir une preuve, et plupart des paiement étaient effectués au moyen de
transcriptions et de mentions écrites sur les registres des argentarii; rarement on effectuait un paiement d'une manière direct (domo ex arca sua),
mais très souvent par l'intermédiaire de banquiers(de mensa scriptura), soit
que l'on eut déposé chez eux les sommes dont ils devaient rendre compte
(rationem reddere) soit que l'on se fut fait ouvrir par eux un crédit, sur
lequel ils payaient la suite d une délégation."
Manuel des Antiquités Romaines, pp. 78-85; Tome Dixième; De l'Organisation Financière chez les Romaines. Théodore Mommsen, and Joachim
Marquardt. Paris. 1888.
25. According to A. del Mar in A History of the Precious Metals, (P. 88).
"At that period when the coining press was unknown, the work of coinage was
done altogether by the hammer, shears, and file. A workman could scarcely
finish more than twenty coins a day..."
26. Harpers Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities, P. 1598,
Harry T. Peck, Coopers Square Publishers, New York, 1965.
27. Alexander del Mar: A History of the Precious Metals, P. 105; New York; 1968.
28. Ibid. P. 55. (Pliny, Books iii, xxxiv, 5. and xxiii, 21.)
29. According to Harold Mattingly (Roman Coins, P. 19): " In the second
period c.280-268 B.C., the aes and its parts were issued as before, but a
coinage of silver was added for the purposes of the war in S. Italy. The
chief coin was the Didrachme... the bronze coins of the series are struck at
very variable weights and certainly represent values above their metal..."
30. Harold Mattingly: Roman Coins; P. 91; London; 1923.
31. Footnote P. 183, present work.
32. 216 B.C.; in this terrible battle, 86,000 Romans and Italians were
virtually annihilated and all their equipment lost to Hannibal.
33. R.A.G. Carson: Coins, Ancient, Medieval, and Modern; P. 127; London;
1962.
34. Michael Grant: From Imperium to Auctoritas, P. 19; Cambridge, 1969.
35. An Encyclopedia of World History, P. 100, Boston, 1948.
36. William Smith, LLD: The History of the Bible; P. 550; London,
Ontario; 1885.
37. Michael Grant: From Imperium to Auctoritas; P. 41; Cambridge; 1969.
38. Britannica, 9th Edn.
39. Michael Grant: P. 61-69.
40. Ibid pp. 71-72. C.H.V. Sutherland (Coinage in Imperial Roman Policy)
also makes frequent reference to Nemausen.
41. Italics by present author.
42. Fritz Heichelhiem: Ancient Economic History; P. 243, Volume III,
Leyden; 1958-1970.
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