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			FOREWORD
 
			from
			
			EducateYourself Website
 
			"John Doe," as I will call him in this 
			book for reasons that will be made clear, is a professor at a large 
			university in the Middle West. 
			 
			  
			His field is one of the social 
			sciences, but I will not identify him beyond this. He telephoned me 
			one evening last winter, quite unexpectedly; we had not been in 
			touch for several years. He was in New York for a few days, he said, 
			and there was something important he wanted to discuss with me. He 
			wouldn't say what it was. We met for lunch the next day at a midtown 
			restaurant.
 He was obviously disturbed. He made small talk for half an hour, 
			which was quite out of character, and I didn't press him. Then, 
			apropos of nothing, he mentioned a dispute between a writer and a 
			prominent political family that had been in the headlines. What, he 
			wanted to know, were my views on "freedom of information." How would 
			I qualify them? And so on. My answers were not memorable, but they 
			seemed to satisfy him. Then quite abruptly, he began to tell me the 
			following story:
 
 Early in August of 1963, he said, he found a message on his desk 
			that a "Mrs. Potts" had called him from Washington. When he returned 
			the call, a man answered immediately, and told Doe, among other 
			things, that he had been selected to serve on a commission "of the 
			high importance." Its objective was to determine, accurately and 
			realistically, the nature of the problems that would confront the 
			United States if and when a condition "permanent peace" should 
			arrive, and to draft a program for dealing with this contingency.
   
			The man described the unique procedures 
			that were to govern the commission's work and that were expected to 
			extend its scope far beyond that of any previous examination of the 
			problems.
 Considering that the caller did not precisely identify either 
			himself or his agency, his persuasiveness must have been of a truly 
			remarkable order. Doe entertained no serious doubts of the bona 
			fides of the project, however, chiefly because of his previous 
			experience with excessive secrecy that often surrounds 
			quasi-governmental activities. In addition, the man at the other end 
			of the line demonstrated an impressively complete and surprisingly 
			detailed knowledge of Doe's word and personal life.
   
			He also mentioned the names of others 
			who were to serve with the group; most of them were known to Doe by 
			reputation. Doe agreed to take the assignment --he felt he had no 
			real choice in the matter- -and to appear the second Saturday 
			following at Iron Mountain, New York. An airline ticket arrived in 
			his mail the next morning.
 The cloak-and-dagger tone of this convocation was further enhanced 
			by the meeting place itself. Iron Mountain, located near the town of 
			Hudson, is like something out of Ian Fleming or E. Phillips 
			Oppenheim. It is an underground nuclear hideout for hundreds of 
			large American corporations. Most of them use it as am emergency 
			storage vault for important documents. But a number of them maintain 
			substitute corporate headquarters as well where essential
 personnel could presumably survive and continue to work after an 
			attack. This latter group included such firms as Standard Oil of New 
			Jersey, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, and Shell.
 
 I will leave most of the story of the operations of the Special 
			Study Group, as the commission was formerly called, for Doe to 
			tell in his own words ("Background Information"). At this point it 
			is necessary to say only that it met and worked regularly for over 
			two and a half years, after which it produced a report. It was this 
			document, and what to do about it, that Doe wanted to talk to me 
			about.
 
 The Report, he said, had been suppressed--both by the Special 
			Study Group itself and by the government interagency committee 
			to which it had been submitted. After months of agonizing, Doe had 
			decided that he would no longer be party to keeping it secret. What 
			he wanted from me was advice and assistance in having it published. 
			He gave me his copy to read, with the express understanding that if 
			for any reason I were unwilling to become involved, I would say 
			nothing about it to anyone else.
 
 I read the Report that same night. I will pass over my own reactions 
			to it, except to say that the unwillingness of Doe's associates to 
			publicize their findings became readily understandable. What had 
			happened was that they had been so tenacious in their determination 
			to deal comprehensively with the many problems of transition to 
			peace that the original questions asked of them were never quite 
			answered. Instead, this is what they concluded:
 
 Lasting peace, while not theoretically impossible, is probably 
			unattainable; even if it could be achieved it would almost certainly 
			not be in the best interests of a stable society to achieve it.
 
 That is the gist of what they say. Behind their qualified academic 
			language runs this general argument: War fills certain functions 
			essential to the stability of our society; until other ways of 
			filling them are developed, the war system must be maintained--and 
			improved in effectiveness.
 
 It is not surprising that the Group, in its Letter of Transmittal, 
			did not choose to justify its work to "the lay reader, unexposed to 
			the exigencies of higher political or military responsibility." Its 
			Report was addressed, deliberately, to unnamed government 
			administrators of high rank; it assumed considerable political 
			sophistication from this select audience. To the general reader, 
			therefore, the substance of the document may be even more unsettling 
			than its conclusions.
   
			He may not be prepared for some of its 
			assumptions--for instance, that most medical advances are viewed 
			more as problems than as progress; or that poverty is necessary and 
			desirable, public posture by politicians to the contrary 
			notwithstanding; or that standing armies are, among other things, 
			social-welfare institutions in exactly the same sense as are 
			old-people's bones and mental hospitals. It may strike him as odd to 
			find the probable explanation of "flying saucer" incidents disposed 
			of en passant in less than a sentence.    
			He may be less surprised to find that 
			the space program and the controversial antimissile missile and 
			fallout shelter programs are understood to have the spending of vast 
			sums of money, not the advancement of science or national defense, 
			as their principal goals, and to learn that "military" draft 
			policies are only remotely concerned with defense.
 He may be offended to find the organized repression of minority 
			groups, and even the re-establishment of slavery, seriously (and on 
			the whole favorably) discussed as possible aspects of a world at 
			peace. He is not likely to take kindly to the notion of the 
			deliberate intensification of air and water pollution (as part of a 
			program leading to peace), even when the reason for considering it 
			is made clear.
   
			That a world without war will have to 
			turn sooner rather than later to universal test-tube procreation 
			will be less disturbing, if no more appealing. But few readers will 
			not be taken aback, at least, by a few lines in the Report's 
			conclusions, repeated in its for recommendations, that suggest that 
			the long-range planning--and "budgeting"--of the "optimum" number 
			lives to be destroyed annually in overt warfare is high on the 
			Group's list of priorities for government action.
 I cite these few examples primarily to warn the general reader what 
			he can expect. The statesmen and strategists for whose eyes the 
			Report was intended obviously need no such protective admonition.
 
 This book of course, is evidence of my response to Doe's request. 
			After carefully considering the problems that might confront the 
			publisher of the Report, we took it to The Dial Press. There, its 
			significance was immediately recognized, and, more important, we 
			were given firm assurances that no outside pressures of any sort 
			would be permitted to interfere with its publication.
 
 It should be made clear that Doe does not disagree with the 
			substance of the Report, which represents a genuine consensus in all 
			important respects. He constituted a minority of one--but only on 
			the issue of disclosing it to the general public. A look at how the 
			Group dealt with this question will be illuminating.
 
 The debate took place at the Group's last full meeting before the 
			report was written, late in March, 1966, and again at Iron Mountain. 
			Two facts must be kept in mind, by way of background. The first is 
			that the Special Study Croup had never been explicitly charged with 
			or sworn to secrecy, either when it was convened or at any time 
			thereafter.
   
			The second is that the Group had 
			nevertheless operated as if it had been. This was assumed from the 
			circumstances of its inception and from the tone of its 
			instructions. (The Group's acknowledgment of help from "the many 
			persons . . . who contributed so greatly to our work" is somewhat 
			equivocal; these persons were not told the nature of the project for 
			which their special resources of information were solicited. )
 Those who argued the case for keeping the Report secret were 
			admittedly motivated by fear of the explosive political effects that 
			could be expected from publicity. For evidence, they pointed to the 
			suppression of the far less controversial report of then- Senator 
			Hubert Humphrey's subcommittee on disarmament in l962. (Subcommittee 
			members had reportedly feared that it might be used by Communist 
			propagandists, as Senator Stuart Symington put it, to "back up the 
			Marxian theory that war production was the reason for the success of 
			capitalism.") Similar political precautions had been taken with the 
			better-known Gaither Report in 1957, and even with the so-called 
			Moynihan Report in 1965.
 
 Furthermore, they insisted, a distinction must be made between 
			serious studies, which are normally classified unless and until 
			policy makers decide to release them, and conventional "showcase" 
			projects, organized to demonstrate a political leadership's concern 
			about an issue and to deflect the energy of those pressing for 
			action on it. (The example used, because some of the Croup had 
			participated in it, was a "White House Conference" on international 
			cooperation, disarmament, etc., which had been staged late in 1965 
			to offset complaints about escalation of the Vietnam war.)
 
 Doe acknowledges this distinction, as well as the strong possibility 
			of public misunderstanding. But he feels that if the sponsoring 
			agency had wanted to mandate secrecy it could have done so at the 
			outset. It could also have assigned the project to one of the 
			government's established "think tanks," which normally work on a 
			classified basis.
   
			He scoffed at fear of public reaction, 
			which could have no lasting effect on long-range measures that might 
			be taken to implement the Group's proposals, and derided the Group's 
			abdication of responsibility for its opinions and conclusions. So 
			far as he was concerned, there was such a thing as a public right to 
			know what was being done on its behalf; the burden of proof was on 
			those who would abridge it.
 If my account seems to give Doe the better of the argument, despite 
			his failure to convince his colleagues, so be it. My participation 
			in this book testifies that I am not neutral. In my opinion, the 
			decision of the Special Study Group to censor its own 
			findings was not merely timid but presumptuous. But the refusal, as 
			of this writing, of the agencies for which the Report was prepared 
			to release it themselves raises broader questions of public policy. 
			Such questions center on the continuing use of self-serving 
			definitions of "security" to avoid possible political embarrassment. 
			It is ironic how often this practice backfires.
 
 I should state, for the record, that I do not share the attitudes 
			toward war and peace, life and death, and survival of the species 
			manifested in the Report. Few readers will. In human terms, it is an 
			outrageous document. But it does represent a serious and challenging 
			effort to define an enormous problem. And it explains, or certainly 
			appears to explain, aspects of American policy otherwise 
			incomprehensible by the ordinary standards of common sense. What we 
			may think of these explanations is something else, but it seems to 
			me that we are entitled to know not only what they are but whose 
			they are.
 
 By "whose" I don't mean merely the names of the authors of the 
			Report. Much more important, we have a right to know to what extent 
			their assumptions of social necessity are shared by the 
			decision-makers in our government. Which do they accept and which do 
			they reject. However disturbing the answers, only full and frank 
			discussion offers any conceivable hope of solving the problems 
			raised by the Special Study Croup in their Report from Iron 
			Mountain.
 
 L.C.L.
 New York, June 1967
 
 
			
			
			Back to Contents 
			 
			
 
			  
			
			
 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
 
			from
			
			EducateYourself Website
 [The following account of the workings of the Special Study Group is 
			taken verbatim from a series of tape-recorded interviews I had with 
			"John Doe." The transcript has been edited to minimize the intrusion 
			of my questions and comments, as well as for length, and the 
			sequence has been revised in the interest of continuity. L.C.L]
 
			  
				
				How was the Group formed?
 .,, The general idea for it, for this kind of study, dates back 
				at least to l96l. It started with some of the new people who 
				came in with the Kennedy administration, mostly, I think, with 
				McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk. They were impatient about many 
				things.... One of them was that no really serious work had been 
				done about planning for peace--a long-range peace, that is, with 
				long- range planning.
 
 Everything that had been written on the subject [before l96l] 
				was superficial. There was insufficient appreciation of the 
				scope of the problem. The main reason for this, of course, was 
				that the idea a of a real peace in the world, general 
				disarmament and so on, was looked on as utopian. Or even 
				crackpot. This is still true, and it's easy enough to understand 
				when you look at what's going on in the world today.... It was 
				reflected in the studies that had been made up to that time. 
				They were not realistic.. . .
 
 The idea of the Special Study, the exact form it would take, was 
				worked out early in '63.... The settlement of the Cuban missile 
				affair had something to do with it, but what helped most to get 
				it moving were the big changes in military spending that were 
				being planned.... Plants being closed, relocations, and so 
				forth. Most of it wasn't made public until much later....
 
 [I understand] it took a long time to select the people for the 
				Group. The calls didn't go out until the summer....
 
				
 Who made the selection?
 
 That's something I can't tell you. I wasn't involved with the 
				preliminary planning. The first I knew of it was when I was 
				called myself. But three of the people had been in on it, and 
				what the rest of us know we learned from them, about what went 
				on earlier. I do know that it started very informally. I don't 
				know what particular government agency approved' the project.
 
				
 Would you care to make a guess?
 
 All right--I think it was an ad hoc committee, at the cabinet 
				level, or near it. It had to be. I suppose they gave the 
				organizational job--making arrangements, paying the bills, and 
				so on--to somebody from State or Defense or the National 
				Security Council. Only one of us was in touch with Washington, 
				and I wasn't the one. But I can tell you that very, very few 
				people knew about us. ., . For instance, there was the Ackley 
				Committee. It was set up after we were. If you read their 
				report-- the same old tune-- economic re conversion, turning 
				sword plants into plowshare factories--I think you'll wonder if 
				even the President knew about our Group. The Ackley Committee 
				certainly didn't.
 
				
 Is that possible, really? I mean that not even the President 
				knew of your commission?
 
 Well, I don't think there's anything odd about the government 
				attacking a problem at two different levels. Or even about two 
				or three government agencies working at cross- purposes. It 
				happens all the time. Perhaps the President did know. And I 
				don't mean to denigrate the Ackley Committee1, but it was 
				exactly that narrowness of approach that we were supposed to get 
				away from. .
 
 You have to remember-- you've read the Report-- that what they 
				wanted from us was a different kind thinking. It was a matter of 
				approach. Herman Kal calls it "Byzantine"--no agonizing over 
				cultural and (1) religious values. No moral posturing. It's the 
				kind of thinking that Rand and the Hudson Institute and I.D.A.(2) 
				brought into war planning.... What they asked us to do, and I 
				think; we did it, was to give the same kind of treatment to the 
				hypothetical problems of peace as they give to a hypothetical 
				nuclear war....We may have gone further than they expected, but 
				once you establish your premises and your logic you can't turn 
				back....
 
 Kahn's books (3), for example, are misunderstood, at least by 
				laymen. They shock people. But you see, what's important about 
				them is not his conclusions, or his opinions. It's the method. 
				He has done more than anyone else I can think of to get the 
				general public accustomed to the style of modern military 
				thinking....Today it's possible for a columnist to write about 
				"counter force strategy" and "minimum deterrence" and "credible 
				first-strike capability" without having to explain every other 
				word. He can write about war and strategy without getting bogged 
				down in questions of morality....
 
 The other big difference about our work is breadth. The Report 
				speaks for itself. I can't say that we took every relevant 
				aspect of life and society into account, but I don't think we 
				missed anything essential...
 
				
 Why was the project given to an outside commission? Why 
				couldn't it have been handled directly by an appropriate 
				government agency?
 
 I think that's obvious, or should be. The kind of thinking 
				wanted from our Group just isn't to be had in a formal 
				government operation. Too many constraints. Too many 
				inhibitions. This isn't a new problem. Why else would outfits 
				like Rand and Ingersol stay in business? Any assignment that's 
				at all sophisticated is almost always given to an outside group. 
				This is true even in the State Department, in the "gray" 
				operations, those that arc supposed to be unofficial, but are 
				really as official as can be. Also with the C.l.A....
 
 For our study, even the private research centers were too 
				institutional.... A lot of thought went into making sure that 
				our thinking would be unrestricted. All kinds of little things. 
				The way we were called into the Group, the places we met, all 
				kinds of subtle devices to remind us. For instance, even our 
				name, the Special Study Group. You know government names. 
				Wouldn't you think we'd have been called "Operation Olive 
				Branch," or "Project Pacifica," or something like that? Nothing 
				like that for us--too allusive, too suggestive. And no minutes 
				of our--meetings--too inhibiting.... About who might be reading 
				them. Of course, we took notes for our own use. And among 
				ourselves, we usually called ourselves "The Iron Mountain Boys' 
				or "Our Thing," or whatever came to mind...
 
				
 What can you tell me about the members of the Group ?
 
 I'll have to stick to generalities.... There were fifteen of us. 
				The important thing was that we represented a very wide range of 
				disciplines. And not all academic. People from the natural 
				sciences, the social sciences, even the humanities. We had a 
				lawyer and a businessman. Also, a professional war planner. 
				Also, you should know that everyone in the Group had done work 
				of distinction in at least two different fields. The 
				interdisciplinary element was built in....
 
 It's true that there were no women in the Group, but I don't 
				think that was significant.... We were all American citizens, of 
				course. And all, I can say, in very good health, at least when 
				we began.... You see, the first order of business, at the first 
				meeting, was the reading of dossiers. They were very detailed, 
				and not just professional, but also personal. They included 
				medical histories. I remember one very curious thing, for 
				whatever it's worth. Most of us, and that includes me, had a 
				record of abnormally high uric acid concentrations in the 
				blood... None of us had ever had this experience, of a public 
				inspection of credentials, or medical reports. It was very 
				disturbing....
 
 But it was deliberate. The reason for it was to emphasize that 
				we were supposed to make all our own decisions on procedure, 
				without outside rules. This include judging each others 
				qualifications and making allowances for possible bias. I don't 
				think it affected our work directly, but it made the point it 
				was supposed to make...
 
				  
				That we should ignore absolutely nothing 
				that might conceivably affect our objectivity. 
				  
       
			[At this point, I persuaded Doe that a 
			brief occupational description of the individual members of the 
			Group would serve a useful purpose for readers of the Report.  
			  
			The 
			list which follows was worked out on paper. (It might be more 
			accurate to say it was negotiated.) The problem was to give as much 
			relevant information as possible without violating Doe's commitment 
			to protect his colleagues' anonymity. It turned out to be very 
			difficult, especially in the cases of those members who are very 
			well known. For this reason, secondary areas of achievement or 
			reputation are usually not shown,
 The simple alphabetical "names" were assigned by Doe for convenient 
			reference; they bear no intended relation to actual names. "Able" 
			was the Camp's Washington contact. It was he who brought and read 
			the dossiers, and who most often acted as chairman. He, "Baker" and 
			"Cox" were the three who had been involved in the preliminary 
			planning
   
			There is no other significance to the 
			order of listing. 
				
					
						
						
						"Arthus Able" is an 
						historian and political theorist, who has served in 
						government.
						
						"Bernard Baker" is a 
						professor of international law and a consultant on 
						government operations.
						
						"Charles Cox" is an 
						economist, social critic; and biographer.
						
						"John Doe."
						
						"Edward Ellis" is a 
						sociologist often involved in public affairs.
						
						"Frank Fox" is a cultural 
						anthropologist
						
						"George Green" is a 
						psychologist, educator, and developer of personnel 
						testing systems.
						
						"Harold Hill" is a 
						psychiatrist, the has conducted extensive studies of the 
						relationship between individual and group behavior.
						
						"John Jones is a scholar and 
						literary critic.
						
						'Martin Miller" is a 
						physical chemist, whose work has received international 
						recognition at the highest level.
						
						"Paul Peters" is a 
						biochemist, who has made important discoveries bearing 
						on reproductive processes.
						
						"Richard Roe" is a 
						mathematician affiliated withan independent West Coast 
						research institution.
						
						"Samuel Smith" is an 
						astronomer, physicist, and communications theorist.
						
						"Thomas Taylor" is a systems 
						analyst and war planner, who has written extensively on 
						war, peace, and international relations.
						
						"William White" is an 
						industrialist, who has under-taken many special 
						government assignments.]     
				
   
				  
				  
				How did the Group operate? I 
				mean, where and when did you meet, and so forth?
 We met on the average of once a month. Usually was on weekends, 
				and usually for two days. We had few longer sessions, and one 
				that lasted only four hours... We met all over the country, 
				always at a different place, except for the first and last 
				times, which were a Iron Mountain. It was like a traveling 
				seminar.... Sometimes at hotels, sometimes at universities. 
				Twice we met at summer camps, and once at a private estate, in 
				Virginia. We used a usiness place in Pittsburgh, and another in 
				Poughkeepsie [New York].... We never met in Washington, or on 
				government property anywhere... Able would announce the times 
				and places two meetings ahead. They were never changed....
 
 We didn't divide into subcommittees, or anything else that 
				formal. But we all took individual assignments between meetings. 
				A lot of it involved getting information from other people.... 
				Among the fifteen of us, I don-t think there was anybody in the 
				academic or professional world we couldn't call on if we wanted 
				to, and we took advantage of it.... We were paid a very modest 
				per diem. All of it was called "expenses" on the vouchers. We 
				were told not to report it on our tax returns.... The checks 
				were drawn on a special account of Able's at a New York bank. He 
				signed them.... I don't know what the study cost. So far as our 
				time and travel were concerned, it couldn't have come to more 
				than the low tax-figure range. But the big item must have been 
				computer time, and I have no idea how high this ran....
 
 
				
				You say that you don't think your work was affected by 
				professional bias. What about political and philosophical bias? 
				Is it possible to deal with questions of war and peace without 
				reflecting personal values?
 
 Yes, it is. I can understand your skepticism. But if you had 
				been at any of our meetings you'd have had a very hard time 
				figuring out who were the liberals and who were the 
				conservatives, or who were hawks and who were doves. There is 
				such a thing as objectivity, and I think we had it.... I don't 
				say no one had any emotional reaction to what we were doing. We 
				all did, to some extent. As a matter of fact, two members had 
				heart attacks after we were 
				finished, and I'll be the first to admit it probably wasn't a 
				coincidence.
 
 
				
				You said you made your own ground rules. What were these 
				ground rules?
 
 The most important were informality and unanimity. By 
				informality I mean that our discussions were open ended. We went 
				as far afield as any one of us thought we had to. For instance, 
				we spent a lot of time on the relationship between military 
				recruitment policies and industrial employment. Before we were 
				finished with it, we'd one through the history of western penal 
				codes and any number of comparative psychiatric studies [of 
				draftees and volunteers]. We looked over the organization of the 
				Inca empire. We determined the effects of automation on 
				underdeveloped societies.... It was all relevant...
 
 By unanimity, I don't mean that we kept taking votes; like a 
				jury. I mean that we stayed with every issue until we had what 
				the Quakers call a "sense of the meeting " It was 
				time-consuming. But in the long run it saved time. Eventually we 
				all got on the same wavelength, so to speak....
 
 Of course we had differences, and big ones especially in the 
				beginning.... For instance, in Section 1 you might think we were 
				merely clarifying our instructions. Not so; it took a long time 
				before we all agreed to a strict interpretation....Roe and 
				Taylor deserve most of the credit for this.... There are many 
				things in the Report that look obvious now, but didn't seem so 
				obvious then. For instance, on the relationship of war to social 
				systems. The original premise was conventional, from Clausewitz. 
				. . That war was an "instrument" of broader political values. 
				Able was the only one who challenged this, at first. Fox called 
				his position "perverse." Yet it was Fox who furnished most of 
				the data that led us all to agree with Able eventually. I 
				mention this because I think it's good example of the way we 
				worked. A triumph of method over cliché.... I certainly don't 
				intend to go into details about who took what side about what, 
				and when. But I will say, to give credit where due, that only 
				Roe, Able, Hill, and Taylor were able to see, at the beginning, 
				where our method was taking us.
 
 
				
				But you always reached agreement, eventually.
 
 Yes. It's a unanimous report.... I don't mean that our sessions 
				were always harmonious. Some of them were rough. The last six 
				months there was a lot of quibbling about small points.... We'd 
				been under pressure for a long time, we'd been working together 
				too long. It was natural . . . that we got on each other's 
				nerves. For a while Able and Taylor weren't speaking to each 
				other. Miller threatened to quit. But this all passed. There 
				were no important differences....
 
 
				
				How was the Report actually written? Who did the writing?
 
 We all had a hand in the first draft. Jones and Able put it 
				together, and then mailed it around for review before working 
				out a final version.... The only problems were the form it 
				should take and whom we were writing it for. And, of course, the 
				question of disclosure....[Doe's comments on this point are 
				summarized in the introduction.]
 
 
				
				You mentioned a "peace games" manual. What are peace games?
 
 I wanted to say something about that. The Report barely mentions 
				it. "Peace games' is a method we developed during the course of 
				the study. It's a forecast technique, an information system. I'm 
				very excited about it. Even if nothing is done about our 
				recommendations--which is conceivable--this is something that 
				can't be ignored. It will revolutionize the study social 
				problems. It's a by-product of the study. We needed a fast, 
				dependable procedure to approximate the effects of disparate 
				social phenomena on other social phenomena. We got it. It's in a 
				primitive phase, but works.
 
 
				
				How are peace games played? Are they like Rand's war games?
 
 You don't "play" peace games, like chess or Monopoly any more 
				than you play war games with toy soldiers. You use computers. 
				Its a programming system. A compute "language," like FORTRAN, or 
				ALGOL, or Jovial.... Its advantage is its superior capacity to 
				interrelate data with no apparent common points of reference.... 
				A simple analogy is likely to be misleading. But I can give you 
				some examples. For instance, supposing I asked you to figure out 
				what effect a moon landing by U.S. astronauts would have on an 
				election in, say, Sweden. Or what effect a change in the draft 
				law--a specific change-- would have on the value of real estate 
				in downtown Manhattan? Or a certain change in college entrance 
				requirements in the United States on the British shipping 
				industry?
 
 You would probably say, first, that there would be no effect to 
				speak of, and second, that there would be no way of telling. But 
				you'd be wrong on both counts. In each case there would be an 
				effect, and the peace games method could tell you what it would 
				be, quantitatively. I didn't take these examples out of the air. 
				We used them working out the method.... Essentially, it's an 
				elaborate, high-speed trial-and-error system for determining 
				working algorithms. Like most sophisticated types of computer 
				problem-solving....
 
 A lot of the "games" of this kind you read about are just 
				glorified conversational exercises. They really are games, and 
				nothing more. I just saw one reported in the Canadian Computer 
				Society Bulletin, called a "Vietnam Peace Game." They use 
				simulation techniques, but the programming hypotheses are 
				speculative....
 
 The idea of a problem-solving system like this is not original 
				with us. ARPA (4) has been working on something like it. So has 
				General Electric, in California. There are others.... We were 
				successful not because we know more than they do about 
				programming, which we don't but because we learned how to 
				formulate the problem accurately. It goes back to the old saw. 
				You can find the answer if you know the right question....
 
 
				
				Supposing you hadn't developed this method. Would you have 
				come to the same conclusions in the Report?
 
 Certainly. But it would have taken many times longer.... But 
				please don't misunderstand my enthusiasm [about the peace games 
				method]. With all due respect to the effects of computer 
				technology on modern thinking, basic judgments must still be 
				made by human beings. The peace games technique isn't 
				responsible for our Report.
 
				  
				We are... 
					
						
						
						This was a "Committee on the 
					Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament," headed by 
					Gardner Ackley, of the Council of Economic Advisers. It was 
					established by Presidential order in December, 1963, and 
					issued a report in July, 1965.
						
						The Institute for Defense 
					Analysis
						
						On Thermonuclear War, Thinking 
					About the Unthinkable, On Escalation
						
						The Advanced Research Projects 
					Agency, of the Department of Defense. 
			
			
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			STATEMENT BY "JOHN DOE" 
			from
			
			EducateYourself Website
 CONTRARY to the decision of the Special Study Croup, of which I was 
			a member, I have arranged for the general release of our Report.
 
			  
			I 
			am grateful to Mr. Leonard C. Lewin for his invaluable 
			assistance in making this possible, and to The Dial Press for 
			accepting the challenge of publication. Responsibility for taking 
			this step, however is mine and mine alone.
 I am well aware that my action may be taken as a breach of faith by 
			some of my former colleagues. But my view my responsibility to the 
			society of which am a part supersedes any self-assumed obligation on 
			the part of fifteen individual men. Since our Report can be 
			considered on its merits, it is not necessary for me to disclose 
			their identity to accomplish my purpose.
 
			  
			Yet I would gladly abandon 
			my own anonymity if it were possible to do so without at the same 
			time compromising theirs, to defend our work publicly if and when 
			they release me from this personal bond.
 But this is secondary. What is needed now, and needed badly, is 
			widespread public discussion and debate about the elements of war 
			and the problems of peace.
 
			  
			I hope that publication of this Report 
			will serve to initiate it.   
			
			
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