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			SECTION 3
 
			Disarmament Scenarios 
			Scenarios, as they have come to be called, are hypothetical 
			constructions of future events.
 
			  
			Inevitably, they are composed of 
			varying proportions of established fact, reasonable inference, and 
			more or less inspired guess-work. Those which have been suggested as 
			model procedures for effectuating international arms control and 
			eventual disarmament are necessarily imaginative, although closely 
			reasoned; in this respect they resemble the "war games" analyses of 
			the Rand Corporation, with which they share a common conceptual 
			origin.
			 
			 All such scenarios that have been seriously put forth imply 
			dependence on bilateral or multilateral agreement between the great 
			powers. In general, they call for a progressive phasing out of gross 
			armaments, military forces, weapons, and weapons technology, 
			coordinated with elaborate matching procedures of verification, 
			inspection, and machinery for the settlement of international 
			disputes. It should be noted that even proponents of unilateral 
			disarmament qualify their proposals with an implied requirement of 
			reciprocity, very much in the manner of a scenario of graduated 
			response in nuclear war.
 
			  
			 The advantage of unilateral initiative lies 
			in its political value as an expression of good faith, as well as in 
			its diplomatic function as a catalyst for formal disarmament 
			negotiations. 
 The READ model for disarmament (developed by the Research Program on 
			Economic Adjustments to Disarmament) is typical of these scenarios. 
			It is a twelve-year-program, divided into three-year stages. Each 
			stage includes a separate phase of: reduction of armed forces; 
			cutbacks of weapons production, inventories, and foreign military 
			bases; development of international inspection procedures and 
			control conventions; and the building up of a sovereign 
			international disarmament organization.
 
			  
			 It anticipates a net 
			matching decline in U.S. defense expenditures of only somewhat more 
			than half the 1965 level, but a necessary redeployment of some 
			five-sixths of the defense-dependent labor force. 
 The economic implications assigned by their authors to various 
			disarmament scenarios diverge widely. The more conservative models, 
			like that cited above, emphasize economic as well as military 
			prudence in postulating elaborate fail-safe disarmament agencies, 
			which themselves require expenditures substantially substituting for 
			those of the displaced war industries. Such programs stress the 
			advantages of the smaller economic adjustment entailed. [11]
 
			  
			Others 
			emphasize, on the contrary, the magnitude (and the opposite 
			advantages) of the savings to be achieved from disarmament. 
			 
			  
			One 
			widely read analysis [12] estimates the annual cost of the 
			inspection function of general disarmament throughout the world as 
			only between two and three percent of current military expenditures. 
			 
			  
			Both types of plan tend to deal with the anticipated problem of 
			economic reinvestment only in the aggregate. We have seen no 
			proposed disarmament sequence that correlates the phasing out of 
			specific kinds of military spending with specific new forms of 
			substitute spending. 
 Without examining disarmament scenarios in greater detail, we may 
			characterize them with these general comments:
 
				
					
					
					Given genuine agreement of intent among the great powers, the 
			scheduling of arms control and elimination presents no inherently 
			insurmountable procedural problems. 
					
					Any of several proposed 
			sequences might serve as the basis for multilateral agreement or for 
			the first step in unilateral arms reduction. 
					
					No major power can proceed with such a program, however, until it 
			has developed an economic conversion plan fully integrated with each 
			phase of disarmament. No such plan has yet been developed in the 
			United States. 
					
					Furthermore, disarmament scenarios, like proposals for economic 
			conversion, make no allowance for the nonmilitary functions of war 
			in modern societies, and offer no surrogate for these necessary 
			functions. 
					
					One partial exception is a proposal for the "unarmed 
			forces of the United States," which we will consider in section 6.
					 
			
			
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