
	
	
	by Tyler Durden 
	January 26, 2013
	
	from
	
	ZeroHedge Website
	
	 
						
						
	 
	
	While little has been said in the mainstream 
	western press about the ongoing fiasco surrounding
	
	Siena's Banca Monte dei Paschi, Italy's 
	third largest bank and the world's oldest which may get its
	third bailout in three years
	- or even be nationalized - as soon as today, for fears that it may 
	break the thin veneer of "recovery" in the European financial system, the 
	situation on the ground in Italy is getting more serious by the minute, and 
	will have implications on both next month's general election, 
	
		
	
	
	...and reach as far up as the head of the ECB 
	- Mario Draghi.
	 
	
	Several hours ago, on Saturday morning, the 
	four-member board of the Bank of Italy - this time without its prior 
	president Mario Draghi - met to consider the position of scandal-hit bank 
	Monte dei Paschi di Siena and decide whether to authorize its request for 
	3.9 billion Euros ($5.3 billion) of state loans.
	 
	
	As we reported previously, it has emerged over 
	the past week that due to previously undisclosed derivative contracts first 
	exposed by Bloomberg, the Siena bank has hid as much as $1 billion in 
	losses. 
	 
	
	However as was explained in "Will 
	The Super Goldman Mario Brothers Succeed In Covering Up The Latest Italian 
	Bailout Scandal", this discovery has far greater implications for both 
	the bank's future viability, as well as the implied credibility of both the 
	Bank of Italy, and especially the man who headed it for five years before 
	becoming head of the ECB (where he now demands the same supervisory 
	authority over all European banks that he had in Italy, only to supposedly 
	let countless derivative fiascos slip through his fingers).
	 
	
	As Zero Hedge
	
	first connected the dots, it is not so much a question of why BMPS 
	engaged in a variety of derivative deals, of which only three have emerged 
	so far and likely has many more on the books, but how or rather why, the 
	then-Draghi led Bank of Italy allowed this to happen not once, not twice, 
	but at least three times.
	
		
		What the ultimate purpose of these deals was 
		is still unclear and will likely become apparent eventually, however it 
		will likely require the former Chairman of the bank, Giuseppe Mussari,
		who served as Chair from 2006 until April 2012, and who 
		officially quit his post as Italy's top banking lobbyist after today's 
		revelations, to testify. 
		 
		
		One person whom he may testify against
		is none other than current ECB head Mario Draghi, who 
		just happened to be the head of the Bank of Italy from 2006 to 
		2011, or the entire period when Monte Paschi was engaging 
		in what increasingly appears to have been fraudulent activity.
	
	
	The next day, Retuers released "Draghi 
	under fire over Monte Paschi derivatives scandal" continuing where we 
	left off:
	
		
		European Central Bank President Mario Draghi 
		is facing criticism over a scandal involving loss-making derivatives 
		trades made by troubled Italian lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena while 
		he was Italy's central bank governor.
		
		 
		
		Former Economy Minister Giulio Tremonti said 
		in a tweet that it was "stupefying" that in his role as supervisor of 
		Italy's banking system Draghi had failed to discover or prevent the 
		trades, which took place between 2006 and 2009.
		
		 
		
		An ECB spokeswoman declined to comment on 
		the matter, saying that it was "the responsibility of national 
		authorities."
		
		 
		
		Current Economy Minister Vittorio Grilli 
		avoided mentioning Draghi directly but stressed that it was not the 
		government but the central bank that was responsible for bank 
		supervision.
		
		 
		
		"It wasn't us that did the controlling," he 
		told reporters. "On the checks, all I will say is that it is the 
		responsibility of the Bank of Italy."
	
	
	Draghi saw no evil, smelled no evil, and 
	certainly heard no evil:
	
		
		On Wednesday the central bank tried to 
		deflect any criticism, saying the nature of the trades had been "kept 
		hidden" and were only recently divulged by new management appointed last 
		year to turn the bank around.
		
		 
		
		Draghi, who has won wide plaudits as ECB 
		president, left the Bank of Italy in late 2011 after a five-year stint 
		as governor.
		
		 
		
		During this time he was also president of 
		the Financial Stability Board, an international body charged with 
		improving financial supervision and regulation.
		
		 
		
		The deals under scrutiny are the so-called 
		"Alexandria" trade with Japanese bank Nomura, the "Santorini" trade with 
		Deutsche Bank and a derivative called "Nota Italia", with an unspecified 
		bank.
		
		 
		
		...
		
		 
		
		One of the roots of 
		its problems - the 2007 acquisition of smaller rival Antonveneta for a 
		whopping 9 billion Euros in cash just months before the beginning of the 
		financial crisis - was also done under Draghi's watch.
		
		 
		
		...
		
			
			"One has to wonder what the Bank of Italy 
		was doing given all the visits they've paid to Monte dei Paschi in 
		recent months," said a source close to the situation.
			
			 
			
			"If what they came here to look at was only 
		the information publicly available in the bank's financial statements, 
		they could have done that from Rome."
		
	
	
	If only Mario Draghi could threaten to print 
	countless lira, as he has effectively done as head of the ECB, to contain, 
	for now, the European banking implosion, all would be well, however he 
	can't, and for now at least the problem is contained to Italy.
	 
	
	Of course, the Bank of Italy could punt, and 
	effectively push the problem to the ECB's plate, but the second that happens 
	the fragile alliance between surreality and outright idiocy that has gripped 
	European pundits and "analysts", who claim Europe is fixed, when in reality
	nobody knows what the banks have on their balance 
	sheets, or how many more trillions in liquidity they collectively need 
	before their capitalization is fixed (that is a trick statement, of course, 
	because excess liquidity will never, ever help with capitalization 
	issues, as much as the ECB pretends otherwise) will crash and burn.
	 
	
	The problem for the ECB in coming to an indirect 
	cash bailout of BMPS would be its own historical record from as recently as 
	a month ago, when the second bailout of Monte Paschi was being finalized.
	 
	
	
	
	From Reuters:
	
		
		The terms of a state bailout scheme 
		for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Italy's third biggest lender, could 
		pose more challenges to the bank's performance, the European Central 
		Bank said. 
		
		 
		
		The ECB, which will supervise euro zone's lenders from March 
		2014, also said on Thursday it was told by 
		the Italian government too late into the process about the details of 
		the rescue.
		
		 
		
		Monte dei Paschi was forced to request state 
		aid after failing to meet tougher capital requirements set by the 
		European Banking Authority.
		
		 
		
		the ECB said issuing more bonds to pay for 
		the coupon would add to the bank's debt burden in an already difficult 
		economic environment.
		
			
			"This could pose further challenges to the 
		bank's performance in the near term and impair its capacity to redeem 
		(the bonds) in a timely manner," the ECB said in an opinion posted on 
		its website. 
		
		
		It said it would be preferable for the bank to issue new 
		shares to the treasury to help pay interest - an option that is possible 
		under the scheme but is not favored by the treasury or by the bank.
	
	
	So the Italian head of the ECB was told by the 
	Italian government headed by Monti, both former workers of Goldman Sachs 
	about the terms of the second Monte Paschi bailout, "too late"? 
	 
	
	And upon hearing of said bailout, it was the 
	ECB's determination that a more feasible bailout structure would be to issue 
	equity - equity from an entity that one short month later would need 
	another bailout and possibly nationalization 
	(hint: equity 
	value = zero)? 
	 
	 
	
	
 
	 
	
	One couldn't make this up!
	 
	
	But if it was only a question of implicating 
	Draghi, we are confident that the BMPS scandal would promptly go away after 
	the Frankfurt-based central bank slipped a few billion €s under the table to 
	the current head of the BOI - Ignazio Visco - delaying the eruption of the 
	problem for another year. 
	 
	
	However, what is unique this time is that the 
	BMPS fallout has far broader political implications due to BMPS' historical 
	links to the centre-left, and the fact that Bersani's Democratic Party runs 
	the local government in Siena where Monte Paschi is based, and controls the 
	banking foundation that is the lender's biggest shareholder.
	 
	
	As a reminder Bersani is the frontrunner to 
	replace Mario Monti as Italian PM. Which means the immediate involvement of 
	the entire media empire apparatus of who else but...
	 
	 
	
	
	 
	 
	
	Yup - Silvio, who is also running in next 
	month's election, is now on the case, and where Silvio goes, the public is 
	sure to follow.
	 
	
	As
	
	Bloomberg reports:
	
		
		Berlusconi and his allies have slammed Monti 
		over the bailout by linking the aid to an unpopular real estate levy on 
		first homes, known as the IMU, which raised from Italian taxpayers an 
		amount similar to the emergency loans designated for Monte Paschi.
		
			
			“We paid the IMU to Monti so that he 
		could save the bank” of the Democratic Party, read yesterday’s 
		front-page headline in newspaper Il Giornale, owned by Berlusconi’s 
		brother Paolo. 
			 
			
			“What has been said about interventions and comparisons 
		between the amount used for aid and the revenue from taxes is a complete 
		fantasy,” Monti said.
		
		
		Monti said today in an Italian radio 
		interview that the election campaign shouldn’t affect the bailout timing 
		because it’s being carried out under European rules. Still, he 
		acknowledged that the Monte Paschi case “has a lot to do with the ugly 
		beast of mixing banks and politics.”
	
	
	The irony of course, is that the first bailout 
	that Monte Paschi received was when Berlusconi was still PM:
	
		
		Monte Paschi, the world’s oldest bank, 
		received a first bailout from Berlusconi’s government in 2009, and has 
		now added 500 million Euros to its aid request to cover potential losses 
		linked to the structured-finance deals, bringing the total cost of the 
		rescue to 3.9 billion Euros
	
	
	However, to distract from his involvement, 
	Silvio will be more than happy to throw none other than Draghi under the bus 
	for having been the BOI's head at the time, and after all - it was Draghi's 
	decision to bail out BMPS, not the Prime Minister's.
	 
	
	Ah, the plot thickens:
	
		
			
			“We want to know the truth, we’re tired of 
		being taken advantage of,” said shareholder Gianni Acciughi, 60, who 
		took early retirement from Monte Paschi in 2009. 
			 
			
			“How 
		is possible that nobody knew anything about this? If that’s the case, 
		then legal action has to be taken immediately against those responsible.”
		
		
		Members of the Northern League party, a 
		partner in Berlusconi’s previous government, demonstrated at today’s 
		investor meeting. They distributed leaflets criticizing Mussari’s 
		management and his ties to the Democratic Party.
	
	
	And for those who still believe this is a 
	non-issue, Beppe Grillo, the leader of the 5 Star Movement running in the 
	campaign, and a very popular grass roots candidate among voters disenchanted 
	by both parties, 
	
		
		"said the bank’s case will turn into a scandal 
	worse than the collapse of food company Parmalat SpA in 2003."
	
	
	Needless to say the scramble by everyone to 
	cover their backsides ahead of what is sure to be an epic media, publicity 
	and political scandal has
	
	started:
	
		
		[Bank of Italy head] Visco attended the 
		World Economic Forum in Davos on Friday where he gave a spate of 
		interviews to try to  deflect accusations that the BOI had not 
		done its job properly.
		
		 
		
		"It is wrong to insinuate that there was a 
		lack of supervision by the Bank of Italy," he told CNBC television, 
		adding that his institution had nothing to hide and would cooperate with 
		prosecutors probing the Tuscan lender.
		
		 
		
		Visco told reporters on Friday that "there 
		is no question that the bank is stable."
	
	
	Actually, there is:
	
		
		Outgoing Prime Minister Mario Monti said 
		late on Friday he considered it a "remote hypothesis" that the bank 
		would end up  needing to be nationalized.
	
	
	So... there is "a question"?
	
	 
	
	It only gets better:
	
		
		In Davos, Visco sidestepped questions about 
		whether Draghi knew about the derivatives trades, which were conducted 
		between 2006 and 2009 and involved Japanese bank Nomura and Deutsche 
		Bank.
		
		 
		
		Internal auditors at Monte 
		Paschi already detected anomalies at the bank's finance department 
		responsible for derivative operations three years ago, 
		daily Il Sole 24 Ore reported on Saturday, quoting parts of the audit 
		dated November 26, 2009.
		
		 
		
		However, the outcome of the audit was 
		"partially favorable" for the Siena-based bank, contrasting with 
		"partially unfavorable" rating given by Bank of Italy inspectors led by 
		Vincenzo Cantarella at the end of an inspection from May-August 2010.
		
		 
		
		
		Press reports on Saturday suggest the 
		scandal around Monte Paschi is widening.
	
	
	Yes it is. And it is "widening" at a time when 
	former Bundesbank head Weber said in Davos that everyone in Europe has 
	succeeded in sticking their
	
	heads in the sand:
	
		
		“Central banks can buy time, but 
		they cannot fix issues long-term,” former Bundesbank President 
		Axel Weber, now chairman of UBS AG, said in the Swiss ski resort 
		yesterday. 
		
		 
		
		“There’s a perception that they are the only game in town.”
	
	
	This coming from the former head of the one 
	European central bank which several days ago requested that all of its Paris 
	gold, and much of its New York-based gold, be repatriated.
	 
	
	And when the next leg of the financial crisis 
	flares up, which it will as nothing at all has been fixed, unless one 
	considers stuffing all outstanding issues under the rug "fixing", nobody 
	will have been able to foresee any of it. As always.
	 
	
	And it will be, naturally, "someone else's 
	fault."