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2. COMMENTS ON THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF A NASA SOCIAL, SCIENCE RESEARCH CAPABILITY
IN READING THIS CHAPTER, three general considerations
should be kept in mind.
(1) Certain of the research projects which are now or will later be proposed to NASA might more reasonably and efficiently be supported by other government agencies or by private foundations which perhaps have a long-standing interest in the subject of the research proposal. NASA therefore should establish criteria for deciding whether a project is one it wishes to support directly or jointly, or one which might be better realized within another organization's purview.
(2) Research projects will vary in duration from a few months to several years. Such variations in time span imply variations in financial and personnel support and recruitment philosophy. Generally speaking, the projects of shortest time span are probably the ones that need to be done immediately, and thus will make relatively greater demands upon available personnel and funds. The mode of approval and implementation required for them will be quite different from that required for projects needing less sudden starts. NASA will need to develop a logic of operational procedure for supporting research lasting over a variety of time spans.
(3) Research, broadly conceived, not only discovers and transmits information, but is also a device for training researchers. If a social science research program is to become a continuing part of the NASA establishment, consideration should be given to the extent to which research may need to be supported which has as part of its purpose the training of social science personnel to deal with the specific study problems of the implications for society of space activities.
Organization
In principle there are three organizational possibilities for the kind of research facility contemplated here:
(1) it could be completely in-house;
(2) it could be conducted completely by an outside service organization, as in the arrangements between RAND and the Air Force, or between the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and NASA;
(3) it could be conducted by means of an in-house core, with various parts of the activity arranged through contracts and grants to outside individuals, groups, and service organizations, the amount and kind of such assignments to be determined as the effort evolves over the years ahead.
A complete in-house facility appears impracticable -- first of all because there is no reason to suppose that adequate numbers of high-quality social science personnel would be interested in leaving their present well paid, high status environments to join NASA full time. Moreover, the specific research facilities and competences needed will vary with the type and amount of research under way at any given time; to employ a full-time staff of all the types of personnel and to house all the facilities needed over a period of years would be inefficient.
On the other hand, an arrangement that would contract out the total activity to a service organization which would provide management and research facilities -- or would contract out research but manage the program -- has two profound disadvantages. In the first place, a research program on the social implications of space requires the understanding and cooperation of other NASA personnel, if the research is not to risk being stifled or left unapplied. Institutional rapport can be best developed by making the key personnel of the program an integral part of the NASA institution, identified with it in their own eyes, by their professional colleagues, and by the non-social scientists in NASA.
In the second place, research on the social implications of space needs to be generated fundamentally out of the enlightened interests of NASA. A clear perception of the opportunities for research in the social sciences requires personnel familiar with the interests of both the agency and the social science fraternity. Here a comparison with the RAND-Air Force relationship is instructive. The Air Force has had for a long time an extensive internal social science research and application capability, and thus it has been able to generate its own social science research requirements as well as to evaluate internally the research proposals submitted independently by RAND. NASA has made a commendable start, but understandably does not yet have a similar complete internal social science research capability. It Cannot be expected to develop such a capability soon enough to have the necessary experience to contract out its whole social science research effort, yet still control the quality, direction, coordination, and utility of the products.
Thus, the most practicable initial arrangement would seem to be an in-house staff core of social scientists with the evolving capability to handle certain functions and research itself and to monitor and direct other functions and research through contracts, and through outside service organizations as experience, program demands, and opportunities develop.
Functions To Be Performed by a Research Facility
The functions outlined below were initially assembled in the form of a general exercise to discover what the performance capabilities of any organizational entity should include if it was to realize and extend the kind of research program proposed in this report. Once described, they were reevaluated and to some extent restated in the specific light of NASA's individuality as an agency. It was on the basis of these functions that the organizational recommendations in the preceding section were made.
Identification of research problems
This report will emphasize frequently that an important function of any research program on the social implications of peaceful space activity is an ability to foresee new problems and opportunities and to detect new research areas. Such a capability entails the active seeking out of problem areas arising from trends or changes in various parts of national and world society, due to actual or anticipated developments in space activities; political, social, and economic relations; and in applied physical and social sciences. However, seeking out research areas implies more than merely pointing to them. Two types of research identification tasks devolve: what knowledge is available which can be applied to the problem or opportunity, and what further research is necessary to generate pertinent knowledge?
Selection of high priority research
Once the research areas are identified the question of priorities will confront the research facility. The section in Chapter I on the criteria employed by this report in designating priorities for the projects proposed will be useful here. However, it is possible that the evaluation scale most pertinent to the established research facility would emphasize the payoff significance and feasibility of any given project. Aspects to be considered might include the political and administrative feasibility of a project -- the whole research program could be made impotent if sufficient leadership and commitment are not forthcoming; the availability of the qualified manpower and the requisite research environment for the period of time a study would require; or the extent to which an immediate activity might affect the field situation so that desired research not currently feasible would become feasible later. The selection function will in any event be related to the successful fulfillment of the next function described.
Determination of resource allocation
The allocation of funds, manpower, and time for the support of research on the social implications of space activities is intimately related to NASA budgeting problems. its success depends largely on ability to establish a logic for distributing costs within and between projects, and to assess the availability of funds to p y qualified personnel. Knowledge is necessary, too, concerning the sources and resources of pertinent personnel.
Informing and stimulating potential researchers
With research priorities and time and money allocations outlined, the function of conveying this information to potential researchers becomes most important, When the research facility is first established, and probably for considerable time after that, a great deal of emphasis will need to be put on the task of making clear to research personnel throughout the country the opportunities which are available, within the range of NASA's direct and indirect interests, for creative research, both basic and applied. More is involved here than the simple dispensation of information about problems to be studied; ways should be found to stimulate a direct personal interest in studying them.
Developing and stimulating potential supporting facilities
Supporting facilities include money, professional capabilities other than research, end technological resources (such as computers) that might need to be available to researchers if NASA's resources or those of the researcher are insufficient for the project. This function is intended not only to provide services, but also to generate interest and participation among organizations which might not otherwise realize that they have valuable contributions to make to this research field.
Selecting, developing, and implementing research proposals
It is the experience of those who have observed the selection, development, and implementation of research proposals in new areas that these three tasks generally need to be performed more or less simultaneously and certainly interactively. NASA's interests and criteria as to research suitability and those of the researcher will not necessarily be the same, especially during the early days of the research program. Time will be saved and rapport between the research community and NASA more quickly and firmly established if, beginning at the earliest stages of the development of the research idea, the researcher and NASA's representatives can work out the proposal together.
It is advisable that the in-house staff select the research to be supported by NASA, with the aid of non-binding outside advice. Since assessing the quality and utility of research in progress should b@ the responsibility of others (see below) the in-house staff may in this way feel freer to support imaginative research.
Liaison
Social scientists, at least in the early stages of this program, will not as a rule be familiar with or have easy access to the specialized information associated with space activities which may be important for their research. Here a; specific in-house liaison capability will be necessary to augment the researchers' access to information, persons, and events. It is also likely that there will be space developments about which the researcher will have to depend upon the NASA liaison function to keep him informed.
The nature of the space effort is such that other government branches and agencies have or should have major contributions to make to its development (as this report stresses throughout), and it is probable that there will be both social and technological research conducted and applied which will have important implications for NASA's social science research program. Conversely these activities could be affected by the studies conducted through NASA's efforts. Clearly, NASA's liaison function should encourage coordination of effort and mutuality of interests. At a very minimum, NASA and its potential contractors should know of the work other agencies are doing and these other agencies should know of NASA's work.
Assessing the progress and direction of the research
A specific program for reviewing and assessing the progress and direction of research in process is a vital function of a research facility. The objective view of an outside assessment group -- none of whom have had anything to do with the selection or allotment of the research projects and who are not staffconnected to the contracting parties -- will be especially important to NASA's research for several reasons. (1) The knowledge that the responsibility for assessment of progress will be taken by another group will permit the project selecting group to make bolder initial choices. (2) Developments in space activities, other technologies, and society in general may outmode some of the applied research while it is in process, or at least require a shift in its emphasis. The program of review will keep a project pointed in the optimum direction. (3) A certain amount of unproductive or poor research must be expected. Some means of cutting a project off, when it appears untenable is necessary; the cut-off proposal can much better come from the review group than from the contracting source. This arrangement would lessen the chances of hostility toward the contracting organization and help maintain rapport with the professional resources upon which NASA will be dependent for good research.
Distributing the research findings
A weakness of many research efforts, and indeed at times, of the whole structure of the research process, is a lack of adequate planning for the distribution of findings. NASA's social science research effort should insure that the findings reach (1) those for whom they were specifically developed and (2) other pertinent professional people and organizations. Disseminating findings to the latter group is an important way not only of maintaining the status of NASA's research facility among its peers but also of suggesting to the research profession that NASA may have projects of interest to them. It is also frequently assumed that the distribution of information to professional personnel somehow insures that it will thereupon get to the appropriate internal agency individuals and groups and external audiences. However, there is ample evidence from many organizational studies that this further dissemination almost never takes care-of itself but must be specifically provided for.
Assisting in the application of the findings
The function of “applying the findings” begins, not with the end of the study, but at the very beginning. One of the surest ways to discourage the application of findings from social science research is to present them to the client for the first time when the project is completed. It is imperative that intentions regarding applicability be arranged for with the participation of the user, during the working out and selecting of the research to be undertaken. Thus the client, the researcher, and NASA's research staff will all be clear as to the project's probable aim and implications.
There are four subfunctions pertaining to the application of the research findings: (1) to keep the client familiar with developments during the progress of the research; (2) to help him to understand the full implications of the findings; (3) to help plan for the implementation of the findings; and (4) to assist with the implementation of the findings. This is the approach used by reliable space “hardware” developers during the application and testing of a product under operational conditions.
Keeping track of pertinent research at large
Research projects will no doubt be conducted by other facilities that may not realize their pertinence to NASA's interests. The contacts established through the above-listed functions should increase the possibilities that NASA will become aware of such studies, but the matter should not be left to chance. The NASA research facility will have a large responsibility to be in the van of all developments concerning social science and space.
Operating Considerations
Growing pains
During the establishment of a program of this sort, interpersonal and intraorganizational adjustment problems are bound to arise. To the often prevailing differences in perspectives and goals between technologically oriented and administratively oriented personnel will be added those differences provided by the social scientist faced with his special mission. The varying images of human nature and society held by administrators, engineers, and natural scientists are sometimes, for a variety of reasons, not necessarily compatible with those of social scientists. If the views differ widely and especially if the social scientist's views or knowledge complicates the task of the engineer or the natural scientist, the hostility, frustration, or anxiety thus aroused may find relief only in the charge that the social scientist doesn't know what's going on -- or, if he does, his knowledge isn't important or relevant. He may also quite innocently present threats to the administrator because his professional mission carries the implication that the categories into which the administrator has divided his operational world are inadequate for coping with the problems that space activities pose or the opportunities they open.
It is likely that each operating subdivision of the organization will at one time or another feel that if a given research project is to be done it ought to be done within the jurisdiction of its division and its interests. This report tries to make it clear that little if any research worth doing would fall so precisely into one division or another and that unless the research office can perform an over-all staff function, its efforts will be frittered away -- split between contending divisions in the organization and forced to constrain research within unrealistic boundaries.
The various potential difficulties can be mainly overcome -- as similar difficulties have been overcome in many other organizations through careful and deliberate efforts by all parties to understand each other's functions and goals. Although such efforts are never easy, it will be helpful if all concerned recognize at the outset that these and similar discomforts maybe a natural accompaniment to the first stage of incorporating social science research into an organization that has thought of its mission chiefly in terms of natural science and engineering.
Persons and procedures
This report has urged that the social science research facility should be a staff function, but it would be inappropriate for us to recommend how the office should be fitted into the formal organization of NASA, since this is a matter which must be viewed in the light of NASA's internal policies. The lines of authority linking the members of the in-house core, other divisional working groups, and administration decision makers are the concern of NASA alone. There are, however, a number of other important operating arrangements for the research program which seem to be within our province to suggest.
1 . We recommend that the professional staff initiating the in-house research effort consist of at least three senior social scientists. A single individual would not be adequate, because a developing program needs the exchange and evolution of ideas which only the day-to-day effort and intimacy of talking problems through provides. A staff of two risks needless impasses in the many decisions that will have to be made. Most important, a staff of three or more can better represent the necessary range of competences and more effectively contend with the array of tasks and functions to be performed,
Among the attributes that would be desirable in the personnel selected to establish the program, the following would obviously be of special importance at the beginnings skill in interpersonal relations, an interest in and some familiarity with space technology, and high professional competence in at least one of the social science disciplines.
2. The new staff will need to undertake at least four tasks at once:
(1) selecting first-order research,
(2) establishing in-house relationships,
(3) establishing outside connections with the research fraternity, and
(4) laying the organizational groundwork for the conduct of specific research, In addition, steps should be taken to establish a library of selected social science materials -- a documentation center covering the type of sources cited in the footnotes of this report, for example, and others that would be recommended by the core group and their advisers.
3. If the research office is to be successfully launched and maintained, it needs the active approval and support of other NASA personnel. it should have direct access to those persons having in their purview the over-all interests of NASA. Further, membership in the divisional deliberative committees should be arranged for the senior social scientists, so that they can become familiar with and appreciate the operating problems of the divisions and sense the research opportunities in them.
4. The liaison function described briefly earlier in the chapter will be of importance from the beginning. Its incumbent (who would be, not one of the senior social scientists, but a member of the supporting staff) needs to have a wide understanding and appreciation of the problems of both the social and natural scientist and a working knowledge of research operations in general. One of his main early and continuing responsibilities will be to facilitate the exchange of information both between divisional groups within NASA and between NASA and the outside professional personnel, agencies, and organizations (governmental and nongovernmental) so that all involved can be kept abreast of each other's activities and findings pertinent to the program.
5. Besides the committee that will assess and review the progress of research projects (as described in the section on functions), at least one other outside committee would be of great value. Acting in a capacity parallel to that of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences and comprised of persons of stature who had a direct and active interest in research and in the impact of technology on society, such a group could establish liaison with the Space Science Board for the mutual enhancement of perspectives.; keep the in-house organization cognizant of on-going or anticipated social developments pertinent to an evaluation of the implications of space activities; and stimulate professional interest in the NASA program by encouraging research proposals and independent support from other organizations with compatible research interests,
6. In connection with the recommendation that the NASA research capability be organized as an in-house core, it was also suggested that a distribution of functions might eventually be made between the in house group and outside contractors and service groups. Which functions aside from liaison should be retained by the NASA core can only be decided in the light of the competencies and interests of the core personnel, the size of the budget NASA assigns to tie research office, and the complexity and anticipated growth rate of the program. (A growing program would seem to be inevitable if the products of space activity increase.)
Clearly, the awarding of contracts and/or grants must be an in-house function, although it could be expedited by assistance from outside services and through formal or informal advisory groups. Whatever the eventual distribution of functions, however, the in-house core will need to keep in close touch with the assisting services and with the personnel carrying out the research projects, both to insure the participation at all stages of those who will most directly use the findings and to maintain its essential role as the spark and drive of the program.
7. It should be recognized at the outset that a program of research to clarify the implications for society of peaceful space activities cannot be accomplished by fits and starts. A great amount of basic research needs to be done; although some projects can be achieved in less time than others, the “crash” approach will seldom be appropriate. Such an approach is usually very costly and for this program especially is unlikely to produce the quality of information that will furnish the wanted understanding and perspective.
This report is intended to emphasize the need for a capability that can deal with the potential of space activities to affect society for better or worse, We believe that such a capability can be developed and maintained only through a planned program of research, originating in a profound appreciation of the problems and opportunities implied in the space effort and with a continuing commitment to contribute to future understanding and action.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF SATELLITE-BASED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
INVOLVED SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS are strongly of the belief that in a relatively short time the world can be wrapped in a communications net based on the several advantages of communications satellites. Communication by spoken or written symbols has been central to every stage of man's attainments and progress. If his attempts to make himself understood have often been less than crystal clear, he has never stopped trying. It is therefore not surprising that in this new sphere of potential attainment--the space effort-one of the first undertakings involves a very bold exploit in communication. Given this ages-old, central concern of mankind, such a world-wide net of inexpensive, rapid, and pervasive communication links can be expected to have significant implications.
However, given the importance of telecommunications to the modern world, strong preconceptions about content, purposes, and format will underlie responses to the problems and opportunities arising from the availability of such a system. The preconceptions will probably be embodied in laws about usage, economic criteria for development, and formalized philosophies about purpose. Patterns of viewing, listening, and responding to communications differ substantially even among countries with a common historical heritage and even within nations--as is evident in our own perennial arguments over the proper function of televisions/ These differences will constitute one major area of the multitude of problems that must be resolved if full advantage is to be taken from the use of a satellite system.
The quick and full realization of the system is also dependent upon costs and technological factors involved in its development. Because of the high costs and the heavy-rocket technology intimately associated with satellites, government support and control is necessary. Yet because the field of telecommunications in the United States has been traditionally the domain of private enterprise, the government's role is especially complex. The national interests-private enterprise relationship becomes all the more important because of the dominating role of governments in the telecommunication systems of most countries of the world and because there is a good chance that the United States system will be matched by a USSR system. 21 A related factor is the possibility that eventually there may be pressures to internationalize radio and television broadcasting is the part of a communication system that holds the greatest potential for international good and evil.
Another major set of problems related to the implications of communication satellites has to do with the uses to which they are put. Because communications have become so salient a part of our interests and activities, we are apt to assume that more is known by authorities in the field about the role, function, and consequences of communication than actually is the case. 31 Considering the magnitude of the question, relatively little has been learned about their specific effects as they impinge upon people in the multifold context of daily life. It is, however, known in considerable detail, that communications in the United States often have effects quite contrary to those that opinion leaders believe they have. In other cultures knowledge of the effects is correspondingly weak. Much more information and insight is needed in this area before the many hopes expressed for the utility of worldwide communications can be fulfilled.
Purely on the basis of the technology there seems to be no good reason to believe that a high-capacity radio telephone and radio broadcasting network could not be realized in a decade or less. Perhaps the many technological problems associated with high-quality, many-channeled TV could also be solved in about the-same period. When the requisite costs and the multinational negotiations (particularly over frequencies, as discussed below) are considered, however, it seems likely that telephony will come first, high fidelity radio second, and many-channeled TV last, and that the development period could easily extend over more than a decade, The farther away in time communication satellites are, the greater the opportunity to assist in the preparation of an environment that would encourage maximum benefit from them. Thus study of these problems should not be delayed--and if certain uses, with their consequent problems, are believed to be imminent, the research suggested for that area should be undertaken and the findings applied with all dispatch.
Technological Characteristics and Their Implications
Communication satellite systems 4/
The utility of a satellite-based communication system largely depends on the operational characteristics of the satellite and the associated ground-based equipment. These characteristics therefore have relevance to the economics of development and operation and to the kind of implications the system would have for society. Research and development efforts have been concentrated mainly on two operational types of systems--the passive reflector (e.g., Project Echo) and the active repeater (e.g., Project Courier).
A passive reflector system is what its name implies--containing no electronics, the satellite reflects, or bounces off, the signal to ground-based receiver antennas. The signal range would be limited, at presently contemplated altitudes, to an area with a radius of about 4,000 miles. Satellite life depends on orbital stability, as affected by air drag, solar deflection, and micrometeors. High-power 100,000-watt transmitters--two to ten times as powerful as any typically used in commercial broadcasting operations in the United States--along with fast-tracking, highly sensitive, receiving antennas, 250 feet in diameter--would be required at the ground installations. Thus, private reception (at least under circumstances presently envisioned) would be via a central distributing facility rather than directly to private receivers. The advantages of passive reflectors include their unlimited two-way channel capacity (between all points which can simultaneously see the satellite), at various wave lengths, and the fact that modification and improvements in the ground equipment could be effected without changes in the satellite. However, to assure general global coverage, at least twelve satellites spaced around the world would be necessary, and for the foreseeable future the large, complex, and costly receiving apparatus rules out direct private set reception.
An active repeater satellite contains its own receiver, transmitter, antenna, and the power supply for the unit; a signal received from the ground is retransmitted to another remote ground receiver. One proposed arrangement for near-complete global coverage would include three satellites in an equatorial orbit at 22,300 miles altitude. Orbiting velocities would in effect fix each of the three relative to a position on the earth. Each satellite, weighing from several hundred to several thousand pounds (depending on the equipment complexity), would need to have a life of two to three years if the system were to be profitable at contemplated payload costs. The number of messages which can be relayed simultaneously and the frequencies which the satellite will receive and transmit are limited by its specific design characteristics. Careful scheduling of messages is required so as not to overload the capacity. To change frequency and capacity characteristics would require changing satellites and, as such, this is an inherent disadvantage of the system. However, among its advantages are the nominal ground transmitter power required -- under 100 watts might suffice -- and the fact that conventional receivers using simple fringe-area antennas could receive messages directly. However, if expensive antennas, are used (in a manner similar to the use with passive satellites), active satellite message capacity could be increased greatly and frequency interference radically reduced.
There are at present a number of gaps in the state of the technology which, while they exist, will affect the relative advantages and disadvantages of-each system for the various uses to which they might be applied. In particular the costs of operating either system are very dependent on the reliability required and available at a given state of development for all components of the system including the launching rockets and precision orbiting systems, as well as the satellites themselves. 5/
Another important technological gap has to do with the design and cost of receivers-and transmitters. As indicated above, passive systems require costly satellite transmitters, receivers, antennas, and a relay system to carry the signal to private sets. While this may not be a great economic or organizational difficulty in areas already having good telecommunications systems, it clearly presents problems for the underdeveloped areas which could especially benefit from satellite communications. Direct reception from active satellites requires sets tuned to the ultra-high frequencies involved and, for TV reception, able to receive a higher number of scanning lines to the inch. Purchases of new sets would be required in any country; in underdeveloped areas the sets would also have to be highly reliable (because of the absence of service personnel) as well as able to work by means of a variety of electric power sources. 6/
An appreciation of the fact that these technological gaps do exist is important to an understanding of such factors as the following: (1) the time involved for development of either of the systems; (2) the possibility that either point-to-point relays or direct broadcast might be the reception method first used--and the different economic and utilization meaning thereof for various nations and regions; (3) the likelihood that the development of the technologies will be gradual and selective-a factor that would influence the social implications of the development as a whole.
Frequency utilization 7/
For satellite propagation, the higher frequencies have the advantage of lower power requirements (due to directional gains 81),atmosphere penetration, and a signal-beaming capability, but the intensity of background noise limits the range of optimal frequency utilization within the “spectrum window” (which for space communications presently lies between 10 to 10,000 megacycles--die range between ionospheric penetration in the lower frequencies and poor signal-to-noise characteristics in the higher frequencies).
For both domestic and international broadcasting operations there has been for some years an ever-growing and urgent need to conserve and reallocate the limited radio-frequency resource; at the same time, world demand for commercial quality signal transmission has usually been ahead of the technical capacity to provide it, especially at the higher frequencies. Hence, to meet the expansion of needs which a satellite system will impose, complex national and international negotiations will be required for frequency allocation assignments. 9/ Allocation implies assignment review and inevitably some evaluation of priority based upon social as well as economic values. These values differ from society to society; therefore resolution of the conflicting demands will depend upon much more than the ease or difficulty of alternative technological approaches, though this too will certainly enter the picture. Since TV uses such large frequency band widths per channel compared to radio an d since the costs of developing TV electronics will be high for the higher frequencies, the contest for preferred frequencies in the satellite “spectrum window” will be all the more intense.
The availability of spectrum space in the 1000 to 15,000 microwave range, is, after all, finite, The extent of the difficulty can be illustrated by the situation in the United States, where increasingly the radio waves have been wanted for various uses. Businesses have been built around land mobile telecommunications services; others have reduced costs by the use of mobile telephones - for example, an oil company has found that eight delivery trucks so equipped can cover an area that twelve trucks formerly were needed to service. To allocate frequencies to an increased demand, the Federal Communications Commission has had to tighten up on technical standards and to restrict band widths--to the point where some services are now required to operate on 25 per cent of previous band width allocations.
The FCC in 1960 extended hearings on allocations in the microwave bands to provide for space satellite needs. Two major bodies of testimony were submitted, one by American Telephone and Telegraph, which asked in effect that certain earth-bound frequencies be discontinued to make way for satellite communications, The Electronics Industries Association, arguing for its hundreds of constituents that now operate systems on microwave allocations, maintained that space satellites can share frequencies with earth-bound systems. (Signal quality was a major point of difference between the two viewpoints. Whereas American Telephone and Telegraph felt it necessary to provide a voice transmission with very limited background noise, EIA constituents could apparently tolerate a considerably higher noise level.) If the resolution of this difference should be on the basis of sharing frequencies with earthbound systems, rather than displacing them, this must be done by further investment in advancing the technological state-of-the-art, rather than through sole use of choice frequencies.
The frequency allocation problem has notable international ramifications. At the Geneva Conference, August-December 1959, three nations among the eighty five represented asked for frequency allocations for satellite communications--the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, The United States request was for tracking and telemetry channels, not for any international commercial wave lengths. Six bands of frequencies totaling about 225 mc/s were allocated in the 890-16,000 mc range for experimental purposes, effective May 1, 1961. The issue of sharing earthbound systems was postponed for future resolution. Even if the FCC were to allocate domestic bands for space communications, they would be of little or no value unless other countries were willing to accept that same allocation. 10/
Factors Affecting Application, Organization, and Control
Problems concerning the economics, technology, and utilization of satellite communications obviously cannot be resolved within the framework of the operating methods and values of the United State- alone. The areas of utility of such a system would clearly be world wide, and therefore the implications must be examined in that light. If potential global needs are to be met, such problems as the following must be resolved: frequency allocation and/or sharing; equipment comparability; satellite use privileges and priorities and means of cost sharing; 11/ receiver antenna control and sharing, and, in some cases, transmitter antenna; access to audience; control of program content--eg., amount and type of propaganda or advertising, entertainment, and education.
Basically, a nation's philosophy concerning the purpose and proper use of radio and television defines the structure of its operational procedures and organization for telecommunications. 12/ The differences between national philosophies will have substantial implications for the way a satellite communication system might be used. Meshing the philosophies with each other and further, with other competing national and international interests will involve a multitude of economic and organizational problems.
Economic, organization. and control problems for the United States
The implications of a satellite communication system have already raised many questions about government-industry cost sharing and control relationships, Involved are such problems as the need to use as boosters expensive government-owned rockets. fired from government-operated installations; the high investment costs of research and development of reliable satellite components; the risk of rapid obsolescence, at least in the early period of development; and the potential costs of system maintenance, operation, and replacement.
How far should the government pursue programs to evolve equipment and a system for eventual commercial use? Industry has not yet been willing to carry alone the huge burden of research and development in satellite technology (including contingent developments in rocketry and electronics) to an operational stage. The issues have given a new urgency to the whole broad question of government-industry relations on multipurpose, jointlyfinanced projects. 13/
The government also must make vital decisions about frequency allocations between satellite systems and conventional systems. Even at the domestic level there are profound problems connected with assigning the control of or a share in desirable frequencies. Efficient and fair assignments will require detailed attention to the philosophical and political problems involved in recognizing and resolving not only the conflicts between competing private interests but also those between private and public interests, 14/
The huge capital investments for initial research and later application might be undertaken through pooling or merging corporate entities, but this raises serious problems, given existing anti-trust provisions On the other hand, if federal funds are used entirely or even in part, the government is faced with the consequences of subsidizing a form of communication which potentially threatens present private investments in wire, cable, microwave, and coaxial cable systems and which might reduce the amount of printed matter which presently helps to support various transportation organizations,
If taxpayers are to finance the major technological development of communication satellites, what provision is to be made for patent ownership and satellite utilization in a competitive economic system? There are two issues involved here-. should public funds be expended to finance eventual private patent exploitation, and does the constitutional intent to advance science under the patent system apply to evolving government industry relationships for technological development? 15/
The entire question of public versus private interests will bear rethinking in terms of the political and economic consequences of alternative solutions to these problems. 16/
From the standpoint of private and public interests, all of the above problems take on especially complex aspects in relation to the following considerations:
1. Presently estimated requirements for a world-wide weather prediction system include communication satellites for transmitting the vast amount of data anticipated, The United States government is likely to continue to support major research on weather, and major developments in meteorological theory evidently require a global system for data collecting and processing. What then should or can be the respective roles of government and private industry in the development of communication satellites, given this special demand for them?
2. Many observers believe (for reasons which we will discuss subsequently) that a satellite communications system will eventually have to be controlled in whole or in part by, an international or multinational agency. If, after study, it appears that this is likely to be the eventual disposition of such a system, what is the appropriate philosophy for government-industry financing and system ownership?
3. The USSR may also be planning a communication satellite system. The complications of adjusting the various systems involved in the shift in communication methods might possibly be fewer in countries where the presently utilized systems are publicly owned. Thus Russia, with its different economic and political philosophy, might be able to move ahead rapidly in meeting the technology requirements, If it becomes clearly evident that Russia is planning a communication satellite system, there will surely be additional pressures on the government to act quickly and decisively in forwarding the United States' efforts. Under such circumstances, government-industry cost and control relations may develop in ways unsatisfactory to one or both parties, unless the pertinent factors have been studied,
Overseas owners of satellites or transmitters (e.g., England, France, USSR) are likely to want to broadcast via their satellites or ours to the United States. Since the United States is known as espousing free speech, it would face philosophical and propaganda problems if it were reluctant to permit these broadcasts. Further questions in such a situation would be: who pays for the time, who sets the price, who arbitrates refusals concerning time and price, who chooses program content? The implications of the problems would probably vary still further, depending upon whether private enterprise or the government operated the channels.
Thus there are a number of complex problems involving economics, sociology, psychology, law, and the underlying, often contradictory values which govern our society and other societies. In summary, research on the following over-all problems is necessary to determine:
• The specific sources of demand for increased communications capability, and the assumptions on which these demands are pre missed. In particular, what are the assumptions -- of those claiming they would pay for the use of satellite services - about the capabilities of the communication system for meeting their needs? **
• The relative cost and benefits of meeting by satellites and by alternate means specific types of demand discovered in the above research proposal. In particular it would be desirable to ex amine the costs and benefits involved for private enterprise and the nation in retiring, displacing, introducing, and maintaining equipment, personnel, and organizational operating, monitoring, and regulating procedures. 17/ **
• Various means the United States government might use to fulfill its obligations to private enterprise, the nation as a whole, and special interest groups with regard to the support of satellite systems development, ownership, frequency assignments, allocation of profits and costs. How can the use of the product in the best interests of the nation be assured? What then are the appropriate and effective roles for government, private enterprise, and the two in combination in: financing, developing, owning, con trolling, using, and negotiating for use of satellite communications domestically and internationally? **
• Alternative means of coping with a prior Russian satellite system development or a competing one. What would be the domestic and inter national costs and benefits of these alternatives?
• Both short-term and long-term cost and benefits for the nation in leasing, giving, or selling part or all of the functions of a communication satellite system to an international or multinational agency. For any combination of these arrangements, what would be the appropriate means for the government and private industry to share in the costs and control of development, if there appears to be merit in some part of international facility?
International and multinational economic, organization, and control problems
As noted earlier, underlying the operation of each national broadcasting system are institutions and philosophies which govern not only the kinds of programs but also the balance between program purposes -information, education, and entertainment. Patterns of financing and control, derived from the public authority, are further determinants. 18/ Other major national variables include physical geography, audience geography, ownership, frequency allocations, equipment and transmission standards, cultural habits, and time-zone position. 19/ Such factors will necessarily have bearing on potential arrangements for multinational use of communication satellites and will also influence the direction emphasized by the United States in its further efforts to develop the technology.
Frequency Allocation.
Central to the international aspects of a satellite communication system is frequency allocation, as discussed earlier, For many reasons there is urgent need for cooperation and agreement on the management and conservation of the band width spectrum 20/ -- and not least of the reasons is the possibility of interference with transmission. Since signals could be bounced off a passive satellite by any transmitter within visual range, two or more transmitters using the same frequency might overlap at least part of the reception area, opening the way to either accidental or willful interference. Solutions to the problems have implications for national sovereignty, and would need therefore to be sought in an international forum. At present, not all nations are members of the International Telecommunications Union, the current arbiter in frequency matters.
As a preliminary to negotiation, research is necessary to
• Compare existing national and multinational regulations for wave length allocation, control, and use with the regulations that would be necessary for effective transmission via communication satellites. The satellite requirements should be derived from the expected transmitting (or reflecting) properties of satellites, expected properties of the ground receivers and transmitters, and the anticipated specific national and multinational applications of the system.
Standardization of Technical Equipment and Transmission Standards.
Satellite communications will be in the higher frequency ranges; most receiving sets now being manufactured are low frequency types. As for TV, there are at least four prevailing standards which are directly interchangeable for broadcasting and receiving, 221 For international systems using wire or local broadcast networks to relay satellite signals, complex and compatible control centers and procedures are necessary.
Related to standardization is a matter which is both legal and technical -a means for registering satellites and controlling their characteristics and numbers. A further serious question arises from the assumption that during the system-development period malfunctions are likely to make necessary rather frequent replacements. What should be done with dead satellites which later ,]come to life” or those in which the malfunction is such as to interfere with other communications? 1-3/ International inspection and registration, replacement or increase procedures, and launching site regulation will involve security problems that may have complex implications for sovereignty and national interests. Again, as a preliminary to negotiations, research is necessary to:
. • Make explicit items, operations, and standards which must be compatible in multinational operations using particular types of communication satellites for specific tasks.
. • Specify the problems involved in registering, controlling, and operating the satellites and the undesirable consequences which would arise if these problems were not solved in advance either through deliberate technological efforts or through organizational and legal arrangements.