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8. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN POLICY
THIS CHAPTER IS CONCERNED with the interactive relationships of the planning, requirements, and achievements of space programs with the policies and organizational arrangements of nations and international bodies. Attention is especially directed to the international implications of space activity and of its control, regulation, inspection, and operation that are of broader aspect than those specifically pertinent to such potential space events as global communications and weather prediction discussed in earlier chapters.
Participation in space exploration for peaceful purposes may not give any one nation or group of nations many positive advantages over equally serious participants, but each nation or group would probably enhance its position relative to those nations which cannot participate or do not choose to do so. However, the consequence for a major power of participating fully, slightly, or not at all is still largely a matter of conjecture. Some informed observers believe that, should the major powers decide on all out competition in their space programs, the social, economic, and military effects of the activities (aside from the effects that the operational status of intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads is already judged to have had) would not significantly alter the existing relations among the powers, although, according to one observer, “the prestige effects may indeed turn out to be the major consequence of outer space activities in the international system.” 1/ But it has also been surmised that “foreseeable technological developments will sharpen existing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and provide fruitful sources of new ones .... Certainly the competitive exploitation of space opens a new arena for the conduct of cold, limited, and even hot warfare.” 2/
The findings of the research that will be suggested here may contribute to an understanding of how the impact of a nation's peaceful space program can be analyzed. 3/ The studies are primarily related, however, to the opportunities for positive advances in the United States policy of achieving a securely peaceful world through novel forms of international cooperation or unilateral operation in the space field. Although it is possible that space activity may eventually be totally internationalized, the assumption is made here that in the first instance the United States will have a major space program which will be substantially operated and financed domestically and matched in size and variety only by the Soviet program and possibly one or two others. (The implications of an exclusively internationalized or supranationalized program would call for studies similar to those suggested here, in that they should be designed to increase understanding of the way in which space activities may contribute to a peaceful world politics.)
Space Policy and Its Implementation
The guidelines for space policy as laid down in 1958 by national and international groups implied these outstanding stipulations-. (1) that outer space be used for nonmilitary purposes only, (2) that outer space should especially be used for genuine scientific exploration, that the contributions of both domestic and foreign nongovernmental organizations to space activities should be encouraged, and (4) that international organizations and other forms of international cooperation should play a major role in the use of outer space. 4/ For a variety of reasons, these four stipulations have not been fully heeded since 1958. The military interest in missiles was already well established at that time and has not yet been the subject of serious arms control negotiation. 5-/ It has extended to some specific satellite systems and to an unspecifiable number of basic experiments employing rockets and satellites. The organization and implementation of the United States space program now emphasizes a duality NASA and its rocket and satellite activities are dedicated to a policy of “openness” and essentially peaceful endeavor, whereas the experiments and satellite systems of the Department of Defense are kept secret -- to the extent that this is possible or militarily desirable and are intended to serve military purposes. 6/ The inherent difficulty of maintaining this duality in the international context is reflected in the occasional interpretations of scientific and technical feats as demonstrations of military prowess and of military testing and operations as innocent scientific inquiries. Scientific space exploration has been to some extent mixed with activities of two other types: those that primarily have military applications, and those that primarily are propaganda efforts designed to maintain a popular image of our national stature as impressive and forward looking. 7/
The opportunities for private initiative which existed during the IGY and which some competent observers regarded as an essential contribution to the distinctive success of the IGY and the organization of its early satellite and rocket programs are either no longer present to the same extent or are kept within stricter bounds by the interests of both national and international governmental agencies. Prior to the creation of NASA, the scientific aspects of our earth satellite programs were the responsibility of the U.S. National Committee for the IGY, operating under the nongovernmental National Academy of Sciences. 8/ NASA now has the responsibility for satellite and rocket programs , and the Space Science Board of the National Academy makes recommendations to NASA and otherwise acts in an important advisory capacity to operating agencies. There has thus been some shift of planning and operations from nongovernmental to governmental organizations.
The trend toward governmental responsibility is supplemented by a further trend toward national and bilateral activities-as compared with the use of international organizations or multilateral mechanisms of international cooperation, The ad hoc committee which the United Nations established to consider the peaceful uses of space concluded that the United Nations should not play an active role in space operations. An early suggestion that the United States might launch complete scientific payloads that would be recommended by the Committee for Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) appears to have been neglected in favor of bilateral arrangements, about which COSPAR is kept informed and its advice and comment sought. 9/ The plans of the International Astronautical Federation to establish an Academy of Astronautics and an Institute of Space Law have had no cooperation from Soviet and certain other participants, who stated that existing international arrangements in the space field were adequate. 10/
It was the hope of many who were involved in the IGY and the early stages of our space program that important nongovernmental and international groups would play a significant part in furthering the United States' policy of espousing the peaceful and scientific use of space. That the hope has not been fulfilled to any large degree is undoubtedly owing in part to the sizable physical and economic requirements of many space activities and the rapid incorporation of space strategy into military strategy (compared to the rate of its incorporation into nonmilitary planning) as well as to the mutual suspicions of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, it is increasingly clear that the original publicly stated guidelines for space policy were incapable of being maintained undiluted -- because detailed knowledge of how to maintain them was lacking. 11/
Good intentions alone cannot meet the challenges inherent in this complex field. They must be supported by a detailed working knowledge of the bearing of international affairs on the design and operation of experiments, equipment, and organization concerned with technical matters; on the drafting and negotiation of enforceable agreements about technical subjects; and on the accurate and timely assessment of social and material impacts of scientific and technological developments. The technological and social complexity of these problems will also require the systematic application of the findings of intensive research in the behavioral sciences, such as anthropology, social psychology, and sociology.
One of the science advisers to the President has stated the need for general research in respect to the whole of science in relation to foreign affairs: “Essential to these efforts is the development of an academic field of teaching and research in the interrelationship of science and foreign affairs, in order to provide education in and better understanding of the underlying significance and opportunities of this relationship.” 12/
Research on Potential International Aspects of Space Technology and Science
Sharing of costs
The equipment systems for a space program involve missiles, sounding rockets, earth satellites, deep space probes, and ground-based resources such as tracking, communications, launching, and recovery facilities, telescopes, and centers for data reduction and analysis. The cost of such systems is so large that few nations can support a major program, and at present only the United States and the Soviet Union do so, although there has been discussion of a multinational European program. 13/ The vast resources required for the United States' effort -- and those even more vast foreseen for the future -have prompted suggestions that world-wide cooperation be sought. 14/ How the costs might be shared, however, or what the consequences might be for the control of policies and program has not been made clear. The economic costs of any space program must ultimately be translated in terms of allocating specialized and therefore fairly limited materials and manpower.
Thus, supplementary background research is desirable to determine:
• What are the size and nature of sharable costs of individual facilities or pieces of hardware and of separate units of world wide networks associated with space activities. (Relevant estimates of the technical feasibility of having separate nations provide components for each system might be assisted by the experience of NASA and the Department of Defense with the system of prime contractors and subcontractors.) This general inquiry would provide one basis for assessing the significance of such sharing arrangements as those among NATO powers and the possibility that the domestic savings could be used effectively for other purposes. 15/ **
• Which nations are potential suppliers of personnel talents, special pieces of hardware, and the more routine “housekeeping” needs of a large enterprise. This inquiry could provide a basis for estimating the extent to which the U.S. program might be shared and also the viability of possible regional programs in Europe and Asia. 16/
• Who would be the potential beneficiaries from the benefits gained by sharing costs. (From an international point of view, the potential users of specific direct and indirect products of a space program may well be more limited than the universe of potential specific contributors.)
Clear examples of intranational payment arrangements are furnished by the hourly rental use by NASA of the Jodrell Bank radio telescope in England and related-equipment and the purchase by various European nations of the Asp and similar U.S. sounding rockets. 17/ The experience of American scientists, government agencies, and businesses in hiring foreign personnel to carry on technical investigations or to process data in their own countries could also be informative. It would be appropriate to study:
• Existing arrangements for international payments for space science or related activities and the indicated opportunities for further specifying the costs and returns of international space activities on an economic basis.
The technical operations on which various nations cooperated during the IGY included many of special pertinence to space programs, among them the provision of satellite tracking devices and launching of sounding rockets. The total experience -- including the economic benefits that may have resulted directly from the space technology and activities of the IGY -- in this multinational cost sharing should provide useful insights into some of the problems of a shared space program. 18/ It would be appropriate to study:
• The costs and benefits of various IGY programs, and, in the light of those, the ability of different nations and their scientific groups to support such work on a continuing basis.
The imaginations of the engineers and scientists involved in space programs have demonstrated their capacity to strain the human resources and purse strings of even the mightiest nations. The enormous scale of the human and economic activities thus created has produced major administrative problems and a pressing need to establish mechanisms for coordinated and cooperative efforts. It is obvious that the international factors inherent in space operations magnify such problems; for example, the increase of science activities on an international scale prompted the inclusion of an arbitration clause for the first time in the charter of ICSU special committee. 19/ The problems involved in sharing equipment and operations with friendly nations, let alone with suspicious political competitors, and in estimating the ultimate benefits and cost of such sharing cannot be efficiently defined or solved on an ad hoc basis. Very carefully designed studies are necessary to determine:
• The economic, managerial, legal, and political aspects of specific (albeit hypothetical), economically motivated proposals for booster, data center, or tracking station sharing by, for instance, NATO nations ' or other groups of nations, or the United States and the Soviet. 20/
At the present time the United States is providing financial support in one form or another for a very large portion of the free world's space program. (The consequences of this for the United States are not entirely clear at present, but they apparently include the development of a unilateral space policy on our part and -- possibly -- a reluctance to give financial support to some other scientific or nonscientific projects which might also further our international objectives.) There are a variety of ways in which support is given to foreign space enterprises. For example, certain U.S. facilities abroad provide for local participation and free use of equipment when it is not otherwise needed. We also, as noted earlier, contract for the use by the hour of an existing laboratory installation.
To some extent the potentialities for new space discoveries by scientists in foreign laboratories thus depend on the breadth of the mandate of funding agencies such as NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Defense. Other consequences of the situation are not known, but should be known. Research is necessary to determine:
• The various ways in which financial support is now given to foreign space enterprises and possible means of broadening the range of available methods. The similarities and differences between the various domestic and foreign approaches to financing research should be examined. (A domestic equivalent of this same problem is the manner in which government agencies support academic and industrial research and development work. 21/)
• The ways in which foreign currencies resulting from the sale of U.S. surplus foods abroad, special tax provisions, other mechanisms for encouraging public or private expenditures and investments abroad might aid international cooperation on our space program. 22/
• The influence U.S. economic support in its various forms can have on the character, quality, and quantity of scientific and technical work done abroad.
Although the direct cost of supporting leading space scientists and engineers and their intellectual exchanges of ideas and information is small compared with the over-all cost of a space program, the implications of such support in respect to the international aspects of a space program should not be overlooked. Scientists in every country are, for instance, dependent on modest but nevertheless tangible financial support merely to keep themselves and others informed of the current state of knowledge. It has been suggested by responsible persons that the rules of COSPAR and its parent organization, ICSU, governing the expenses for staff and travel might limit the usefulness of COSPAR as a representative body which can maintain and encourage interest in space research. 23/
Relevant knowledge and understanding of the interplay of financing, administration, program planning, and operations in the context of international scientific and technical activities could be gained from case studies of:
• The International Atomic Energy Agency and the mariner in which economic arrangements have influenced its policies and technical character. 24/
• The administration and financing of the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN). The Center has been discussed as the model for a European Space Research Organization. 25/
• The arrangement whereby the federal government participated in the United States IGY program with especial attention to the satellite and rocket program as designed and carried out by the National Academy of Sciences. This arrangement deserves special study because of the novelty of this mechanism on the American scene, the approval which it appears to have had among a considerable number of scientists, and the direct bearing of the program on our subsequent space policies and programs.
• The proposals for public or private financial support of the activities of the World Meteorological Organization, The International Telecommunication Union, COSPAR, a NATO Space Science group, and the IAF Academy of Astronautics and Institute of Space Law. These should be examined to discover the likely roles of the financial supporters and the possible implications for internal controls over financing and financial. decision making. 26/
The need for special skills
The extraordinary variety of special skill, talents, and interests required for a space program. may exhaust the specialized manpower reservoir of any one nation; the need suggests many opportunities for cooperation. NASA operates -- alone or jointly -- a number of overseas optical tracking and minitrack stations which employ other than American personnel in technical positions. 27/ Although the tasks to be performed in such positions are quite clearly defined, there appear to be considerable room for resourcefulness -- for instance, where research stations may have opportunities for independent space research. 28/
A space program imposes unusual demands for close coordination between scientists and engineers and the developments of “teams” of participants. It may also demand the -retraining of individuals and the introduction of new and exotic skills. In the international context these demands pose additional problems. Possible frictional divisions of labor exist between basic design work, the preparation of necessary hardware (including instrumentation) for satellites or rocket-probe launchings, and the processes of recording, analyzing, or applying the resulting information. 29/If, as seems possible in terms of available manpower resources, few individuals and groups here or abroad will be able to make a balanced contribution covering all functions, it would be desirable to study the significant political and social factors having to do with the allocation of controls and responsibility and with the distribution of benefits and prestige associated with the final product.
Professional scientists, engineers, and other specially interested persons may participate in the United States' program directly rather than as representatives of the interests of other countries or of international organizations. Such participants could be of varying advantage or disadvantage for the program. It is possible that they would have differing ideas about the relationship of a space program to other competing endeavors. They may have conflicting national loyalties; be looked upon with special respect or suspicion by their countrymen; embarrass efforts at secrecy whether or not they are privy to secrets, since a well-trained mind can sometimes produce or analyze technical capabilities without benefit of confidential knowledge. Differing estimates of suitable proportions of emphasis within or between space sciences and space technologies could be a source of disagreement between professionals hailing from variously oriented regions. Such disagreements could easily lead to international friction and hence weakening of our international posture.
If participation of skilled individuals from different regions of the world becomes, as would seem likely, a prerequisite for a comprehensive space program or is desirable also for major policy reasons, research will be necessary concerning:
• The problem of standardizing terminology, procedures, and training.
• Incentives for special training, working conditions, and personal economic security appropriate to different societies. In this context special attention should be given to the tendency of some persons or groups contributing skills to exploit secrecy or gain priority rights over scientific data; ways to counteract this should be sought if the interests of science and the program could better be served by more complete sharing of data and skills.
• Appropriate means for instituting world-wide inventories of technical talents and for measuring interests as they might bear on a space program. Such a study might build upon general investigations already under way of scientific and technical resources and needs.
The complex and costly supporting apparatus for most space science activity makes it particularly important that persons who might provide key ideas be discovered and drawn upon regardless of their country of origin. There is need for a more adequate knowledge of how to develop, use, and coordinate many different talents in many different countries. 31/ One useful approach to this problem would be to study:
• Instances of collaborative international and supranational scientific undertakings, including comparative studies of: foreign trainee and research programs as developed by universities, the AEC, and the Defense Department; the operation of CERN; and various technical aid projects of the IGY program, including such situations as the integration of foreign scientists at IGY stations in the Antarctic that illustrate working relations between local and foreign-trained personnel.
The activities of COSPAR and the IAF contribute on the international level to the recruitment and training of persons with skills needed for space programs. These organizations and perhaps others which may come to surpass them in importance need to be studied to determine:
• The opportunities that are offered by organizations with inter national scientific and engineering interests for the recruitment and training of scientists, and the political, economic or social factors that might facilitate or hinder these opportunities.
Since the end of World War II individuals from many parts of the world have come to the United States for training in nuclear physics and engineering, in relation to atomic energy programs. it has been pointed out by informed persons that these trainees have not always been able to use their new and very specialized talents effectively on returning to their native countries, and that this sometimes results in personal and official frustrations which can have serious consequences for the training programs and the enlargement of the specific technologies involved. In regard to NASA's offer to support foreign scientists on fellowships for training in space technology, it would be desirable, then, to examine the possible parallel in relation to the danger of over specialization. Much basic information could be gained through study of:
• The positions now occupied by foreign scientists who have been trained in nuclear physics since World War II, and the prospective positions for those foreign students who might be encouraged to specialize in some aspect of space science or engineering.
In addition to utilizing already available skills, the opportunities for developing such skills in countries where persons having them are scarce or nonexistent are worth exploring. However, consideration should be given to the following questions. In the light of the specific values and ambitions of such countries, will training personnel in the skills pertinent to space activities be seen as the best way to use their scarce, talented manpower? Can technical participation in space-related activities provide means also of other training and participation that would be useful to these countries for reaching their own goals (e.g., operating hydroelectric installations)? Research is desirable to:
• Provide means for classifying United States space projects in terms of the contributions they might make to the economic or other development of specific nation- 32/
• Design and use means for measuring long-run and short-run benefits which a nation might derive from the exploitation of its various capabilities in the sciences and technology.
• Determine the cost and benefits to the United States of encouraging the participation of other nations by training technologists for them in space activities.
The use of technological by-products abroad
The discussion in Chapter 5 of the possible by-products of the space program included several that might have use abroad. One special form of b@ product which may have particularly important international implications is the equipment that has been outmoded by the rapid technological advances during the developmental phases of various space projects.
The innovations needed in some regions of the world may differ radically in kinds and degree from those needed in others. A technological device that has been rendered obsolescent for the needs of a demanding development program by the program's own rapid pace may very well meet a pressing need in another setting. The high degree of automation, miniaturization, and high reliability that is necessary in space technology suggests, for instance, that “surplus” devices with these characteristics might have special usefulness in regions where, due to present lack of technical knowledge, maintenance services are rudimentary. Thus it would be appropriate to examine:
• Prospects and problems in the distribution and peaceful use of surplus space equipment in technically “backward” parts of the world.
• Possible ways of identifying in advance specific surpluses of usable and adaptable first, second, and subsequent generation rockets, payload instruments, ground support equipment, and communications systems which could create a viable “foreign market.” 33/
• Possible analogies between the disposition of surplus space equipment and the disposition overseas of World War II and more recent surplus military and civilian equipment.
• The bearing of past experience on how both government agencies and private industry can and should arrange overseas disposal. of such surpluses and utilize other by-products of the space program.
Geographical factors and their effects on space operations as and national prerogatives
A country's location may lend it special importance with respect to one or another aspect of a space project. For example, to put satellites into special orbits -- such as equatorial or polar -- some locations are more advantageous for launchings than others. 34/ Tracking and recovery requirements for various operations necessitate cooperation from nations whose sites and terrainal features make them important to these tasks. Rocket soundings of the atmosphere may also put a premium on the use of certain sites.
National efforts to be independent of international cooperation and coordination in relation to these considerations may not only add to the expense of a program, but also restrict it in various ways. The technological feasibility of some programs could depend on multinational cooperation. 35/ And of course the extent of cooperation will affect both the opportunities for involvement of scientists and engineers from different countries and the kinds of scientific work undertaken in a given project. 36/
Because each geographical location is typically under the control of only one nation if it is not part of the high seas, important international aspects are thus built into many space projects. These may possibly be anticipated with the aid of research concerned with:
• Problems and opportunities likely to arise from geographical assets or liabilities for particular space activities and the range of political legal means available for suitable national responses. 37/
• Specific compilations and evaluations of the legal and political factors affecting the status of testing ranges in the oceans, globe-circling reconnaissance devices of all types, and similarly identifiable problems. 38/
• Retrospective examination of haw international legal and political problems were posed and disposed of in connection with some of the IGY activities.
Contributions to science
Characteristically, major scientific discoveries and developments have ultimately transcended national boundaries, and there is no reason to suppose that those resulting from space programs will be exceptions. However, such a space discovery may also have short-term advantages for the one nation or another that can exploit it soonest. In such case, cooperation might then be effaced by a severe struggle, which the scientists themselves would either participate in or be helpless to modify, and which would disrupt the program development of the nations involved. It seems obvious that a well-established and firmly regulated plan for global data sharing is the preventive measure that might best guard against such situations. Thus the progress of science would benefit from studies that developed:
• Comparisons and evaluations, from the standpoints of scientific, national, and commercial concerns, of the relative utility and applicability to expected space-derived data of practices developed for international science data sharing. A study of the formal and actual arrangements for depositing data in the IGY World Data Centers, with special reference to the space sciences, .might well reveal the particular problems and interests confronting scientific groups in different nations in their attempts to participate in the global scientific community.
Of special importance for the advance of space science is the possibility that some scientific discoveries or experiments may be temporarily or permanently impaired by unilateral national activities. Even assuming that an agreeable definition of purely peaceful scientific exploration could be arrived at, careful study will be required to determine;
• The suitability of possible controls over the launching and operation of scientific satellites and the means by which these satellites, or other space vehicles and activities, could be protected from interference or destruction.
The danger that space discoveries might be impaired by indiscriminate activities has been foreseen. Some of the requirements for protecting radio astronomy and investigations of the existence of biological organisms in outer space have been delineated; 39/ other activities, however, which might effectively hinder future scientific inquiry must be expected. (The proposed orbiting of a belt of tiny wires as part of a communications system is a case in point; according to some scientists this could “block the passage of signals employed in other vital space projects.” 40/)
Because of the global and all-encompassing nature of space science experiments, the actions of one nation or group could have an enduring detrimental effect on all scientific investigations of a certain sort. COSPAR has now assumed the obligation to protect the interests of science insofar as it can by alerting scientific communities to the possible consequences of rash space explorations and by stimulating voluntary agreements to take standardized precautionary measures. It cannot be assumed, however, that those scientists whose work would be most affected are necessarily in the best position to recognize the danger and effectively enforce the behavior which their science requires. 41/ There is a need to initiate research to determine:
• Appropriate means for identifying and weighing the consequences for science and for society of irrevocable acts related to space exploration and exploitation.
• Various means -- available and further required -- for inter national regulation of scientifically undesirable space activities.
The Status of Space Programs in International Affairs
Within the foreign affairs context, a
space program accelerates the blurring of the well-developed administrative and
diplomatic distinctions between private and official activities and between
military and peaceful activities. In the United States the distinction between
the private and official activities of any citizen has been an important one,
but it may now have to be reinterpreted as the space program is developed and
executed as an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.
Traditionally the private aspects of a scientist's work have been emphasized, but as scientific research increasingly requires more cooperative effort and financial support and produces information of obvious and direct national importance it takes on public and even official aspects. There is a question of both the manner and extent to which scientists here and abroad have been “instructed” in the interests of their countries and the extent to which governments have preserved domains set aside for the exercise of private and unofficial initiative on scientific and technological matters having international implications. These intangibles need to be identified and studied.
Many international rules and regulations are based on clear distinctions between military and peaceful activities and equipment. 42/ The components of a full space program are not, however, inherently amenable to simple classification on this basis, as the following comment of a former leading scientific adviser to the government indicates: “I find it just as difficult to differentiate between military and nonmilitary science as I do between national and foreign policy in this contracting universe. The electronicnuclear, micro-organic-astronautical age in which we live is only a military age if we choose to apply these scientific areas to military activities and becomes a peaceful age if we create peaceful applications for these scientific developments.” 43/
There are many potential international ramifications of this lack of clear separation of military and nonmilitary aspects of space exploitation, some of which pose problems while others offer opportunities. Overtly peaceful explorations of space may conceal military preparations or else serve as demonstrations of potential military might, whether or not this is intended; L4/ some military space activities may possess considerable inherent technical and scientific interest and receive assistance and approval on that basis. However, nations may have an increasing interest in demonstrating, with the aid of objective standards, the exclusively peaceful nature of particular space projects. 45/ If we plan to make major efforts to convince ourselves and the world of the distinction between our peaceful and military activities in space, it is desirable to understand the attitudes toward these two types of space activity held by those in other nations. 46/
Popular and leadership attitudes in other countries toward United States reconnaissance satellites and toward statements concerning the orbiting of weapons merit careful. evaluation. Although no definitive data have been collected on the matter, there is evidence of a widespread feeling that satellites can fall out of orbit, reach the ground, and do great damage. This feeling would not be eased by the realization that orbited weapons would be designed to return to earth in fully operative “combat” condition. Persistent research on and testing of military space systems may generate an attitude of hostility toward all space activities, no matter how much their scientific nature was proclaimed. There has been speculation that some nations will encourage the development of observation satellites, since their existence could reduce the incentive for surprise attack and therefore for preemptive nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, the same nations might well resent careful surveying of their own sovereign activities.
Claims of the legitimacy and peaceful value of navigation, communication, and weather satellites may be questioned, since the value of these to military operations is also obvious; the claims may be especially jeopardized it civilian and military users share satellites and ground facilities. It would seem to be most Important to insure that activities undertaken in the process of developing precision. satellites of all sorts and in planning for the international cooperation that will be necessary to their maintenance and use are not construed by world publics and their leaders as threats-in-disguise against security and sovereignty.
On these various matters, research is appropriate to:
• Ascertain now and over time the extent to which pertinent publics and persons in nations (including Eastern Bloc) subscribe to and believe in our distinction between military and peaceful. space activities,
• Determine what characteristics of our space activities, under what circumstances, are perceived by them as within their definition of military or peaceful, and which are held to be ambiguous.
• Determine what effects specific military space activities can be expected to have on foreign inclinations to be supportive of scientific and peaceful space activities.
• Develop means for anticipating difficulties in this area and over coming them. if possible by adequate advanced explanations and plans for inspection and control arrangements in which the international community is encouraged to participate,
Although technological advances have injected many complexities into the wide range of foreign policy concerns of the United States, it is reasonable to assume that ad hoc solutions are not necessary (and might be harmful) and that optimum solutions can be arrived at. It seems certain, however, that the solutions will not be found without careful study directly concerned with international affairs and involving technical details of space programs.
International cooperation on organization and control
One pillar of United States foreign policy has been the support and encouragement of international cooperation and the control of aggression and armaments through the development of world-wide and regional international agreements and rule making, law enforcement, or operating organizations. An increasing number of expensive international scientific enterprises, including the IGY, the Antarctic and oceanic programs, and CERN, are being justified in part by their contributions to peaceful constructive cooperation. A space program might make unique contributions to this policy (1) because of the global nature of many of its activities, (2) because of world-wide interest in the exploration and exploitation of outer space even though only two nations now have major space programs, and (3) because of the most significant new role being played by private or quasiprivate international and transnational scientific organizations.
Realistic emphasis upon the uses of outer space to further peaceful ends necessitates the recognition that the potential military and other aggressive uses of space may have to be actively controlled, by peaceful space means. Radio frequency interference, for instance, and the development and use of anti-satellite missiles can be forms of aggression in space, although they have little to do with direct military threats. On the other hand, satellite systems may contribute to arms control by helping to survey nuclear explosions in outer space or even those near the earth's surface. @7/
Past experience with the development of international negotiations and organizations concerned with technical matters indicates that identification of the exact need and opportunity for control mechanisms of this sort requires considerable original study and accumulation of new knowledge. It has been suggested, for instance, that “long before any agreement becomes possible on regulating or eliminating the use of outer space for military purposes, a design for the management of this region, under the auspices of the United Nations, could be set before world opinion, with the psychological and ideological benefits inevitably redounding thereto. 48/ It has also been asserted that “lawyers can contribute significantly to the solution of legal problems arising from known and predictable contingencies; they cannot sensibly recommend in detail rules to deal with contingencies wholly or largely unknown and beyond human experience. A viable Law of Space must be based on the facts of space.” 49/
On this matter there is much to be learned which would provide a needed background for interpreting more specific studies. Such a study would be concerned with:
• The circumstances under which international rules (1) anticipate or (2) wait upon technical developments and the accumulation of experience in respect to space matters.
Control over the undesirable uses of outer space would in any case have to be focused on known uses, likely kinds of uses, and effective use capability. There may be significant analogies for the space field in the arguments for and against international provisions for limiting or increasing membership in the “nuclear club.'' Of particular relevance would be studies of:
• The expected capabilities of major powers for the exploitation of outer space and the political implications of an increased number of “space powers. 11/
• The kinds of activities that might be prohibited or subjected to international control or approval, and means for estimating the advantages and disadvantages to nations resulting therefrom.
• The existing or proposed international legal rules covering space activities, and the existing or proposed international machineries for continued promulgation or revision of rules. 50/
• The ways in which the more technically oriented international organizations, including some of the specialized agencies of the UN, might be concerned with the development or management of various continuing space operations. 51-/
• New types of International and supranational organizations which might be created and the special problems which they may face as a result- of the technical, functions to be performed and the sizable budgets involved.
Control of non-space activities with the aid of space projects and the use of space programs for relieving world tensions and creating spheres of confidence may well require the kind of careful planning associated with control over undesirable uses of space. The difference between the two types of controls may be the greater need for inventiveness in the development of the latter, and advances in this area may depend on encouraging the study of:
• Familiar causes of international tensions which may be attenuated by the use of space technology or the findings of space science.
• The design requirements for space systems that are intended to demonstrate or otherwise prove their peaceful purpose. Such a study might explore the possible forms of inspection or multi-group control over facilities, equipment, personnel, operations, and results.
Among areas of revolutionary technical achievement, interest in space activities probably rivaled in some parts of the world only by interest in atomic energy matters. Neither of these areas is now immune to disparagement, however, and other areas of scientific and technological development may come to rival them in capturing the attention of nations. Official national interest in them may well shift from time to time and may or may not parallel the interests of scientific communities.
In the context of human affairs, scientific activity is a means as much as an end in itself. It is not obvious that all nations are equally agreed on the importance of space science and it is not impossible that preoccupation with it by international science organizations or through other channels of foreign policy may alienate those who do not agree with this emphasis. 52/
To better understand the usefulness of a space program in this context it is appropriate to conduct research on:
• The development of means for assessing the importance for nations of exploring and exploiting space as compared with the promotion of alternative technical development. 53/
• The means by which interests in international cooperation can be reconciled with the concern of the sciences and of engineering for objective standards and uncompromised achievement. 54/
Whether or not scientific activities attempt to divorce themselves entirely from international politics, economics, law, and public opinion, under present conditions they do have international implications beyond the nature I science disciplines. International science organizations provide one means for fostering scientific activity or for restricting the spread of space capabilities. The lack of distinctions between private and official activities of scientists and between peaceful and military science activities in the context of a space program have suggested in the minds of some science statesmen a net increase of opportunities for complementary activities by a variety of official and quasi-private international organizations and rule making institutions and hence a greater choice of instruments for implementing the policy of national cooperation
Further understanding of any such unique contributions by a space program, or its planners and implementors, to the promotion of international cooperation could be aided by a study of:
• The distinctive, complementary, or competing space roles played by existing international groups including the United Nations, UNESCO, COSPAR, and IAF, and others in existence or proposed.**
Relations with allies, adversaries, and neutral nations
A nonmilitary space program might contribute to the objectives of (1)strengthening bonds with our allies, (2) gaining the respect, Confidence, and friendship of the governments and lead in groups of selected neutral nations, and (3) achieving direct advantages against hostile powers by nonviolent means, The general foreign policy objective of helping certain nations to help themselves might also be furthered.
To developing nations, programs of aid may be more important than spectacular space events of no direct consequence for them. 55-/ Major space exercises conducted by a rich and powerful nation may be resented it is believed that the nation is at the same time skimping on the resources it allocates to the developing countries. on the other hand, participation in certain space activities of perceived value to such countries could enhance their self-images and/or their international prestige.
We must certainly ask whether or not those space activities which we believe offer many benefits and opportunities are perceived as doing so by persons in other countries. For example, the potential advantages of weather and communication satellites to the developing areas of the world appear to be substantial, yet there are many large problems and potential embarrassments also involved for the national leadership in these areas. As was suggested in the chapters on weather and communication satellites, programs of indoctrination and information will be needed well before the time of realization of a specific activity. These programs might assist materially in developing attitudes and institutions compatible with the benefits to be derived from the activity. 26/ It is recommended, then, that specific studies be undertaken to:
• Determine what activities need to be begun and routines established in various parts of the world to prepare regions and nations to take advantage -- with a minimum of undesirable consequences -- of the uses of space products.
• Develop means for instructing appropriate publics on the significance of contemplated space activities or on-going events to help them understand and use the socially important ideas and ideals implicit in particular products of space activities.
It has been argued, pro and con, that American prestige in the eyes of the rest of the world depends on the success of our space program, and particularly on matching or exceeding the Russian program. 57/ An assessment of the data available from public opinion polls overseas does not provide the basis for deciding to what extent our present and future prestige is indeed a function of our space effort. 58/ Nor is what is meant by prestige at all clear. Do we want people to like us, to emulate us, to send their students to our schools, to buy their heavy equipment and instruments from us, to feel we would win a war if a showdown came, or to turn their back on offers and blandishments from the Communist bloc? “Prestige” means many things and on the specific interpretation rests part of the basis for assessing the possible implications of space activities for enhancing that desired characteristic. 59/
A foreigner's notions of how a country ought to behave vis-a-vis a country which has “prestige” may not coincide with our ideas of how it should behave, and the reasons why specific nationals regard us as a nation with or without prestige may not coincide with the reasons we think they should have for so regarding us. French reasons and responses may be quite different from British, Congolese, German, etc. Thus the role of space activities in forwarding our national image can only be clearly delineated after decisions are made about which aspects of prestige we wish to enhance, in what parts of the world, for what purposes. If the direction and effort of our space activities are to be partially a function of their prestige-generating consequences -- or at least are not supposed to adversely affect behavior and attitudes toward us -- it is necessary to conduct studies to learn:
• In various countries how do particular types of space activity influence specific people and institutions involved in the governmental decision making process? 60/ What other factors enter into the decision making process which may vitiate or amplify the contribution of particular space activities to our benefit or detriment?**
Because a space program, unlike many other programs in science and technology, includes a great many rather dramatic planned events, an unusual opportunity exists for understanding the consequences of these events for intergovernmental relations by comparing international conditions before and after the events. For this reason there is need for:
• Retrospective and prospective studies of the measurable beneficial and adverse effects, for United States and Soviet influence on other nations, of particular space events.
In addition to the matter of prestige, it would appear that there are qualitative as well as quantitative aspects to competition with Russia in the space area. Such factors as secrecy vs. publicity, feasible space programs, effective internal competitors for funds, relations with scientists in other nations, and access to other nations' territory may variously provide certain advantages or disadvantages to one side or the other. Without a serious research effort which considers the technical details of possible space projects, as well as their inherent merits, it is unlikely that the United States can understand, take full advantage of, or guard against the built-in imbalances or differences in U.S.-USSR postures. 61/ Specific studies contributing to this understanding and the development of possible opportunities include:
• A systematic and comprehensive identification of significant political, legal, and other social, as well. as technical, differences in the postures of the United States and the Soviet Union as they may affect the international implementation and effectiveness of possible space projects. Such a study should include historical and theoretical analyses of the concept of political parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, which appears to have particular significance in international programs for the peaceful uses of space.**
• An analysis of the geographic differences in the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union which may affect particular space projects. In this connection consideration might be given to the technical, and corresponding political or other social significance if any, of physical characteristics such as the equatorial belt; the poles of rotation; pairs of magnetic conjugate points; the relation of various land masses to the seas in terms of launching, landing, or surface station network requirements; and the general movement of weather from west to east or of daylight from east to west.