by Michel Chossudovsky
10 August 2004
"We Have Some Planes"
The 9/11 Commission's Report provides an almost visual description of the
Arab hijackers. It depicts in minute detail events occurring inside the
cabin of the four hijacked planes.
In the absence of surviving passengers, this "corroborating evidence", was
based on passengers' cell and air phone conversations with their loved ones.
According to the Report, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was only recovered
in the case of one of the flights (UAL 93).
Focusing on the personal drama of the passengers,
the Commission has built
much of its narrative around the phone conversations. The Arabs
are portrayed with their knives and box cutters, scheming in the name of
Allah, to bring down the planes and turn them "into large guided missiles"
The Technology of
The Report conveys the impression that cell phone ground-to-air
communication from high altitude was of reasonably good quality, and that
there was no major impediment or obstruction in wireless transmission.
Some of the conversations were with onboard air phones, which contrary to
the cell phones provide for good quality transmission. The report does not
draw a clear demarcation between the two types of calls.
More significantly, what this carefully drafted script fails to mention is
that, given the prevailing technology in September 2001, it was extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to place a wireless cell call from an aircraft
traveling at high speed above 8000 feet:
"Wireless communications networks weren't designed for ground-to-air
communication. Cellular experts privately admit that they're surprised the
calls were able to be placed from the hijacked planes, and that they lasted
as long as they did. They speculate that the only reason that the calls went
through in the first place is that the aircraft were flying so close to the
Expert opinion within the wireless telecom industry casts serious doubt on
"the findings" of the 9/11 Commission. According to Alexa Graf, a spokesman
of AT&T, commenting in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks:
"it was almost a fluke that the [9/11] calls reached their destinations...
From high altitudes, the call quality is not very good, and most callers
will experience drops. Although calls are not reliable, callers can pick up
and hold calls for a little while below a certain altitude"
While serious doubts regarding the cell calls were expressed in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, a new landmark in the wireless telecom industry
has further contributed to upsetting the Commission's credibility.
days of the release of the 9/11 Commission Report in July, American Airlines
and Qualcomm, proudly announced the development of a new wireless technology
- which will at some future date allow airline passengers using their cell
phones to contact family and friends from a commercial aircraft (no doubt at
a special rate aerial roaming charge):
"Travelers could be talking on their personal cellphones as early as 2006.
Earlier this month [July 2004], American Airlines conducted a trial run on a
modified aircraft that permitted cell phone calls."
(WP, July 27, 2004)
Aviation Week (07/20/04) described this new technology in an authoritative
report published in July 2004:
"Qualcomm and American Airlines are exploring [July 2004] ways for
passengers to use commercial cell phones in-flight for air-to-ground
communication. In a recent 2-hr. proof-of-concept flight, representatives
from government and the media used commercial Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) third-generation cell phones to place and receive calls and text
messages from friends on the ground.
For the test flight from Dallas-Fort Worth, the aircraft was equipped with
an antenna in the front and rear of the cabin to transmit cell phone calls
to a small in-cabin CDMA cellular base station. This "pico cell" transmitted
cell phone calls from the aircraft via a Globalstar satellite to the
worldwide terrestrial phone network"
Needless to say, neither the service, nor the "third generation" hardware,
nor the "Picco cell" CDMA base station inside the cabin (which so to speak
mimics a cell phone communication tower inside the plane) were available on
the morning of September 11, 2001.
The 911 Commission points to the clarity and detail of these telephone
In substance, the Aviation Week report creates yet another embarrassing
hitch in the official story.
The untimely July American Airlines / Qualcomm announcement acted as a cold
shower. Barely acknowledged in press reports, it confirms that the Bush
administration had embroidered the cell phone narrative (similar to what
they did with WMDs) and that the 9/11 Commission's account was either flawed
or grossly exaggerated.
Altitude and Cellphone
According to industry experts, the crucial link in wireless cell phone
transmission from an aircraft is altitude. Beyond a certain altitude which
is usually reached within a few minutes after takeoff, cell phone calls are
no longer possible.
In other words, given the wireless technology available on September 11
2001, these cell calls could not have been placed from high altitude.
The only way passengers could have got through to family and friends using
their cell phones, is if the planes were flying below 8000 feet. Yet even at
low altitude, below 8000 feet, cell phone communication is of poor quality.
The crucial question: at what altitude were the planes traveling, when the
calls were placed?
While the information provided by the Commission is scanty, the Report's
timeline does not suggest that the planes were consistently traveling at low
altitude. In fact the Report confirms that a fair number of the cell phone
calls were placed while the plane was traveling at altitudes above 8000
feet, which is considered as the cutoff altitude for cell phone
Let us review the timeline of these calls in relation to the information
provided by the Report on flight paths and altitude.
United Airlines Flight
United Airlines Flight 175 departed for Los Angeles at 8:00:
"It pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airport at 8:14."
The Report confirms that by 8:33, "it had reached its assigned cruising
altitude of 31,000 feet."
According to the Report, it maintained this
cruising altitude until 8.51, when it "deviated from its assigned altitude":
"The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United 175
came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute.
At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute later
New York air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully trying
to contact it."
And one minute later at 8.52, Lee Hanson receives a call from his son Peter.
[Flight UAL 175] "At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson
received a phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son
told him: “I think they’ve taken over the cockpit—An attendant has been
stabbed— and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making
strange moves. Call United Airlines—Tell them it’s Flight 175, Boston to LA.
Press reports confirm that Peter Hanson was using his cell (i.e. it was not
an air phone). Unless the plane had suddenly nose-dived, the plane was still
at high altitude at 8.52. (Moreover, Hanson's call could have been initiated
at least a minute prior to his father Lee Hanson picking up the phone.)
Another call was received at 8.52 (one minute after it deviated from its
assigned altitude of 31,000 feet). The Report does not say whether this is
an air phone or a cell phone call:
Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San
Francisco, reaching Marc Policastro. The flight attendant reported that the
flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant
had been stabbed, and the hijackers were probably flying the plane. The call
lasted about two minutes, after which Policastro and a colleague tried
unsuccessfully to contact the flight.
It is not clear whether this was a call to Policastro's cell phone or to the
At 8:58, UAL 175 "took a heading toward New York City.":
"At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wife,
Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that the plane had
been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the
flight had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about
storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers.
At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter:
It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have knives and
Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting very bad on the
plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The plane is making jerky
movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—I think we are going
down—I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a
building—Don’t worry, Dad— If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God.
The call ended abruptly.
Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before it
cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did Louise Sweeney.
Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center.50 At 9:03:11,
United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center.
All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower, were
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles
for Los Angeles at 8:10...
"At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned
cruising altitude of 35,000 feet."
At 8:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. The
hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11 and United 175, the
hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) and moved all the
passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one
flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier flights, the Flight
77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a
passenger reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot” that
the plane had been hijacked....
On flight AA 77, which allegedly crashed into the Pentagon, the transponder
was turned off at 8:56am; the recorded altitude at the time the transponder
was turned off is not mentioned.
According to the Commission's Report, cell
calls started 16 minutes later, at 9:12am, twenty minutes before it
(allegedly) crashed into the Pentagon at 9.32am:
" [at 9.12] Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said
her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the
rear of the plane."
According to the Report, when the autopilot was disengaged at 9:29am, the
aircraft was at 7,000 feet and some 38 miles west of the Pentagon. This
happened two minutes before the crash.
Most of the calls on Flight 77 were placed between 9.12am and 9.26am, prior
to the disengagement of automatic piloting at 9.29am. The plane could indeed
have been traveling at either a higher or a lower altitude to that reached
Yet, at the same time there is no indication in the Report that the
plane had been traveling below the 7000 feet level, which it reached at
At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband, Ted
Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. [using an airphone]
(Report p 7)
United Airlines Flight
UAL flight 93 was the only one of the four planes that, according to the
official story, did not crash into a building.
Flight 93 passengers,
"alerted through phone calls, attempted to subdue the hijackers.
and the hijackers crashed the plane [in Pennsylvania] to prevent the
passengers gaining control."
Another version of events, was that UAL 93 was shot down.
According to the Commission's account:
"the first 46 minutes of Flight 93’s cross-country trip proceeded routinely.
Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed, and
altitude ran according to plan. At 9:24, Ballinger’s warning to United 93
was received in the cockpit. Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason
Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement:
“Ed, confirm latest mssg plz—Jason.”
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern
Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent,
the FAA’s air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two
radio transmissions from the aircraft...."
At least ten cell calls are reported to have taken place on flight 93.
The Report confirms that passengers started placing calls with cell and air
phones shortly after 9.32am, four minutes after the Report's confirmation of
the plane's attitude of 35,000 feet. In other words, the calls started some
9 minutes before the Cleveland Center lost UAL 93’s transponder signal
(9.41) and approximately 30 minutes before the crash in Pennsylvania (10.03)
"At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93’s transponder signal. The
controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual
sightings from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as it turned east,
then south.164 "
This suggests that the altitude was known to air traffic control up until
the time when the transponder signal was lost by the Cleveland Center.
(Radar and visual sightings provided information on its flight path from
9.41 to 10.03.)
Moreover, there was no indication from the Report that the aircraft had
swooped down to a lower level of altitude, apart from the 700 feet drop
recorded at 9.28. from a cruising altitude of 35,000 feet:
"At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the
following announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:
“Ladies and Gentlemen:
Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.
We have a bomb on board. So, sit.”
The flight data recorder (also recovered)
indicates that Jarrah then instructed the plane’s autopilot to turn the
aircraft around and head east. The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that
a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the
cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise
Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls
from GTE air-phones and cellular phones. These calls between family, friends,
and colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on
the ground with firsthand accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain
critical information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into
the World Trade Center.77...At least two callers from the flight reported
that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem
The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passengers to
the back of the aircraft.80 Callers reported that a passenger had been
stabbed and that two people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or
dead—possibly the captain and first officer. One caller reported that a
flight attendant had been killed.81 One of the callers from United 93 also
reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the
other callers reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call
from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the
hijackers had guns.
The passenger replied that he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of
their identifiable remains was found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the
cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned
at any time.
We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used
it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought back.82 Passengers
on three flights reported the hijackers’ claim of having a bomb. The FBI
told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One of the
passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real.
Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal
items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were
probably fake. During at least five of the passengers’ phone calls,
information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that
morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the intent of
passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the hijackers.
According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an
attempt to retake the plane.
They decided, and acted. At 9:57, the passenger
assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones
in order to join the revolt.
One of the callers ended her message as
“Everyone’s running up to first class. I’ve got to go. Bye.”
voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by the
intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording
report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din.
We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and
right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah
told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to
roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At
9:59, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and
down to disrupt the assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud
thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates.
At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane. Five seconds later, Jarrah
“Is that it? Shall we finish it off?” A hijacker responded, “No. Not
yet. When they all come, we finish it off.”
The sounds of fighting continued
outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and
down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said,
“In the cockpit. If we
don’t we’ll die!”
Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, “Roll it!”
Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said,
the greatest! Allah is the greatest!”
He then asked another hijacker in the
“Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the other
replied, “Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”
The passengers continued
their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said,
“Pull it down! Pull it
The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the
passengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The airplane headed down;
the control wheel was turned hard to the right.
The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting,
“Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.”
With the sounds of the
passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes’
flying time from Washington D.C. Jarrah’s objective was to crash his
airliner into symbols of the American Republic, the Capitol or the White
He was defeated by the alerted, unarmed passengers of United"
The Mysterious Call of
Edward Felt from UAL 93
Earlier coverage of the fate of UAL 93 was based in part on a reported cell
call from a passenger named Edward Felt, who managed to reach an emergency
official in Pennsylvania. How he got the emergency supervisor's number and
managed to reach him remains unclear.
The call was apparently received at 9.58 am, eight minutes before the
reported time of the crash at 10.06 am in Pennsylvania:
"Local emergency officials said they received a cell phone call at 9.58 am
from a man who said he was a passenger aboard the flight. The man said he
had locked himself in the bathroom and told emergency dispatchers that the
plane had been hijacked.
"We are being hijacked! We are being hijacked!" he
was quoted as saying.
A California man identified as Tom Burnett reportedly
called his wife and told her that somebody on the plane had been stabbed.
"We're all going to die, but three of us are going to do something," he told
her. "I love you honey."
The alleged call by Edward Felt from the toilet of the aircraft of UAL 93
was answered by Glenn Cramer, the emergency supervisor in Pennsylvania who
took the call.
It is worth noting that Glenn Cramer was subsequently gagged by the FBI."
Robert Wallace's incisive analysis
published in Sept 2002 by the Daily Mirror).
Ironically, this high profile cell call by Ed Felt, which would have
provided crucial evidence to the 9/11 Commission was, for some reason, not
mentioned in the Report.
Flight 11 took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14. The Report outlines an
airphone conversation of flight attendant Betty Ong and much of the
narrative hinges upon this airphone conversation
There are no clear-cut reports on the use of cell phones on Flight AA11.
According to the Report, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the
World Trade Center at 8.46.
A large part of the description, regarding the 19 hijackers relies on cell
phone conversations with family and friends.
While a few of these calls (placed at low altitude) could have got through,
the wireless technology was not available. On this issue, expert opinion
within the wireless telecom industry is unequivocal.
In other words, at least part of the Commission's script in Chapter 1 on the
cell phone conversations, is fabricated.
According to the American Airline / Qualcomm announcement, the technology
for cell phone transmission at high altitude will only be available aboard
commercial aircraft in 2006. This is an inescapable fact.
In the eyes of public opinion, the cell phone conversations on the Arab
hijackers is needed to sustain the illusion that America is under attack.
The "war on terrorism" underlying the National Security doctrine relies on
real time "evidence" concerning the Arab hijackers. The latter personify, so
to speak, this illusive "outside enemy" (Al Qaeda), which is threatening the
Embodied into the Commission's "script" of 911, the narrative of what
happened on the plane with the Arab hijackers is therefore crucial. It is an
integral part of the Administration's disinformation and propaganda program.
It constitutes a justification for the anti-terror legislation under the
Patriot acts and the waging of America's pre-emptive wars against
Afghanistan and Iraq.
The 9/11 Report's Footnotes on the Cell Phone
70. On FDR, see NTSB report, “Specialist’s
Factual Report of Investigation—Digital Flight Data Recorder” for United
Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report, “CVR from UA
Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003; Commission review of Aircraft Communication
and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight 93 (which
indicate time of message transmission and receipt); see UAL record, Ed
Ballinger ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001. At 9:22, after learning of the
events at the World Trade Center, Melody Homer, the wife of co-pilot
Leroy Homer, had an ACARS message sent to her husband in the cockpit
asking if he was okay. See UAL record, ACARS message, Sept. 11, 2001.
71. On FDR, see NTSB report, “Specialist’s Factual Report of
Investigation—Digital Flight Data Recorder” for United Airlines Flight
93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report, “CVR from UA Flight #93,” Dec.
4, 2003; FAA report, “Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11,
2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—United
Airlines Flight 93, Dec. 21, 2001.
72.The 37 passengers represented a load factor of 20.33 percent of the
plane’s seating capacity of 182, considerably below the 52.09 percent
for Flight 93 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September
11 (June 11–September 4, 2001). See UAL report, Flight 93 EWR-SFO load
factors, undated. Five passengers holding reservations for Flight 93 did
not show for the flight. All five were interviewed and cleared by the
FBI. FBI report, “Flight #93 ‘No Show’ Passengers from 9/11/01,” Sept.
73. INS record, Withdrawal of Application for Admission for Mohamed al
Kahtani,Aug. 4, 2001.
74. See FAA regulations, Admission to flight deck, 14 C.F.R. § 121.547
(2001);UAL records, copies of boarding passes for United 93, Sept.
11,2001.One passenger reported that ten first-class passengers were
aboard the flight. If that number is accurate, it would include the four
hijackers. FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson,
Sept. 11, 2001;UAL record, Flight 93 passenger manifest, Sept. 11,
2001.All but one of the six passengers seated in the first-class cabin
communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned
anyone from their cabin having gone into the cockpit before the
hijacking. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly regarded and
experienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 would have allowed an
observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who had not obtained
the proper permission. See UAL records, personnel files of Flight 93
pilots. For jumpseat information, see UAL record, Weight and Balance
Information for Flight 93 and Flight 175, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL records,
Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11 and
Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001.
75. Like Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to
operate the communication radios; thus his attempts to communicate with
the passengers were broadcast on the ATC channel. See FBI report, “CVR
from UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003.Also, by 9:32 FAA notified United’s
headquarters that the flight was not responding to radio calls. According
to United, the flight’s non-response and its turn to the east led the
airline to believe by 9:36 that the plane was hijacked. See Rich Miles
interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, “United dispatch SMFDO
activities—terrorist crisis,” Sept. 11, 2001.
76. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93’s cockpit voice
recorder recorded the last 31 minutes of sounds from the cockpit via
microphones in the pilots’ headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of
the flight deck. This is the only recorder from the four hijacked
airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire. The CVRs and FDRs from
American 11 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from American
Flight 77 was badly burned and not recoverable. See FBI report, “CVR from
UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003; see also FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§
25.1457, 91.609, 91.1045, 121.359; Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of
the CVR recording was prepared by the NTSB and the FBI.
77. All calls placed on airphones were from the rear of the aircraft.
There was one airphone installed in each row of seats on both sides of
the aisle. The airphone system was capable of transmitting only eight
calls at any one time. See FBI report of investigation, airphone records
for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001, Sept. 18, 2001.
78.FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, position Lorain Radar; Flight 93
CVR data; FBI report, “CVR from UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003.
79. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from
Todd Beamer, Sept. 11, 2001, through June 11, 2002; FBI reports of
investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Sandy Bradshaw,
Sept. 11, 2001, through Oct. 4, 2001.Text messages warning the cockpit
of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by Ed Ballinger at 9:24. See UAL
record, Ed Ballinger’s ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001.
80.We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people
who received calls. The FBI interviews were conducted while memories
were still fresh and were less likely to have been affected by reading
the accounts of others or hearing stories in the media. In some cases we
have conducted our own interviews to supplement or verify the record.
See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from
Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Sandy Bradshaw, Marion Britton, Thomas Burnett,
Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Jeremy Glick, Lauren
Grandcolas, Linda Gronlund, CeeCee Lyles, Honor Wainio.
81. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from
Thomas Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI reports of investigation, interviews
of recipients of calls from Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001, through Nov.
8, 2001; Lisa Jefferson interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report of
investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; Richard
Belme interview (Nov. 21, 2003).
82. See Jere Longman, Among the Heroes—United Flight 93 and the
Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back (Harper-Collins, 2002), p. 107;
Deena Burnett interview (Apr. 26, 2004); FBI reports of investigation,
interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001,
through Sept. 12, 2001; Lyzbeth Glick interview (Apr. 22, 2004). Experts
told us that a gunshot would definitely be audible on the CVR. The FBI
found no evidence of a firearm at the crash site of Flight 93. See FBI
response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).The
FBI collected 14 knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash
site. FBI report, “Knives Found at the UA Flight 93 Crash Site,”
83. FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic
11); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls
from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001.
84. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls
from United 93.
85. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from
United 93. For quote, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
Philip Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001; Philip Bradshaw interview (June 15,
2004); Flight 93 FDR and CVR data. At 9:55:11 Jarrah dialed in the VHF
Omni-directional Range (VOR) frequency for the VOR navigational aid at
Washington Reagan National Airport, further indicating that the attack
was planned for the nation’s capital.