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by Timofey Bordachev
Program Director of the Valdai Club
July 17, 2026
from
RT Website
translation by The RT Team
Original version in Russian

© Reuters
The
bloc's future depends
on
offering something
Washington
and Brussels never could:
development without domination...
As
BRICS adjusts to its expansion
in 2024 and 2025, it faces two linked questions.
How can the group stabilize itself
internally?
How can it assume a more important role in
global governance?
The answer shouldn't be to imitate existing
institutions because BRICS will only succeed if it identifies common
objectives that matter to its members and that are also relevant to
the wider international community.

© Wagner Meier
Getty Images
No credible system of global governance
can now be imposed by a small group of powerful states.
It must reflect the interests of the
international majority...!
For BRICS, the most promising basis for such a
role lies in sustainable development.
The United Nations has pursued this
objective for decades, but the continued dominance of Western states
in many global institutions has prevented those goals from being
implemented fairly, so BRICS could offer a different model.
Given that most international organizations are the legal expression
of a particular balance of power, the most absurd course would be
to,
reproduce one of the structures
created by powers whose global influence was built on
military superiority...
Such organizations formalize either the
relationship among their members or their collective intentions
towards the rest of the world.
Some were created after wars, while others
were designed to coordinate the policies of a narrow group of
states.
BRICS is different in that,
it wasn't established to solidify the outcome
of a military conflict, institutionalize the relative strength
of its members or organize a bloc against outside powers, and
it's not based on a common military hierarchy and doesn't seek
to impose a single foreign policy.
For that reason, any attempt to strengthen BRICS
must begin with a more basic question about,
what the shared objectives of its members
are, and how those objectives can connect their domestic
priorities with their international ambitions.
Every successful form of international
cooperation serves the fundamental interests of its participants.
For example,
European integration, now represented by
the European Union, emerged
from the conditions created by the Second World War, where the
major Western continental powers had suffered devastating defeat
or destruction.
Through NATO, they surrendered much
of their independent military role to the United States,
while European integration then helped their political elites
consolidate this new strategic position and strengthen their
economic base by combining markets.
These internal objectives later allowed the
Western European states to exercise an international influence far
greater than the individual geopolitical weight of Germany, France,
Italy or their smaller allies would otherwise have permitted.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)
was created for a different purpose as its founders sought to
prevent conflicts among newly independent states and reduce
damaging competition between them.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO)
also began with the limited but important task of stabilizing
the inner part of Greater Eurasia in an area directly affecting
the security of
Russia and
China.
In each case, the organization was most effective
when pursuing the purpose for which it had originally been created,
but the limits are equally clear.
The European Union failed in its attempts to
become a genuine political union, and ASEAN has struggled to
influence the domestic political development of its members or
formulate a common response to the most important strategic
challenge in Asia, namely the confrontation between China
and the United States.
Meanwhile, the SCO has so far achieved little
beyond its original regional responsibilities.
Organizations created to formulate a common external policy are
often more politically effective.
The G7 is one example.
It cannot be seen as just an expression of
American leadership.
It is an effective organ through which the
collective West coordinates its policies towards the rest of
humanity.
Its emergence in the 1970s was no accident.
Western dominance was beginning to face
structural limits, while the Soviet-led bloc was showing the
first signs of its later crisis.
The G7 allowed the leading Western powers to
coordinate both defensive and offensive policies. In earlier
centuries, historians might have described such a body as the
embryo of a world government.
That position is no longer sustainable, given that,
China's economic rise, Russia's
resurgence and the broader redistribution of global power
have reduced the G7's ability to dictate the international
order, while at the same time its need for internal
discipline has increased.
No serious observer can
now regard the G7 as an institution of global governance, but it
remains, however, an effective military and economic headquarters
for the West, from which campaigns against the rest of the world can
be organized.
BRICS shouldn't seek to become a rival version of the same
structure, because by its nature, BRICS rejects the permanent
division of the world into opposing camps and it can't strengthen
itself by becoming a closed club.
Such a move would contradict its original
political purpose and wouldn't serve the interests of its members.
NATO
offers another warning.
The alliance combines internal and external
functions. Internally it helps preserve the existing political
order in Europe, whereas externally it maintains the cohesion of
the Western military bloc.
Nevertheless, it can't become an institution
of global governance and attempts to present NATO as a global
policeman were only credible during the brief period of Western
euphoria after the Cold War or during the early 2000s, when
Washington's allies were trying to restrain American
unilateralism.
BRICS must follow a different path.
Its next stage should combine the domestic
development goals of its members with practical initiatives that
can benefit the wider international community.
Sustainable development provides the most
obvious foundation.
The BRICS countries differ greatly in size,
wealth, political systems and levels of development.
Yet all are united by the need to achieve
economic growth, technological modernization, social stability and
greater national sovereignty, and these priorities are familiar
throughout the global majority.
The group could therefore develop mechanisms for,
-
financing infrastructure
-
supporting industrialization
-
improving food and energy security
-
expanding access to technology
-
reducing dependence on Western-controlled
financial institutions,
...and such policies wouldn't require BRICS to
become a supranational organization or impose common political
values on its members.
Nor would they require the creation of a military
bloc:
they would instead demonstrate that
international cooperation can produce practical results without
political tutelage from the West.
This would also make BRICS more attractive to
countries outside the group, given that many states are not looking
for a new ideological center or another system of discipline but for
investment, technology, infrastructure, and greater freedom in
choosing their own path of development.
A joint BRICS initiative in West Africa could provide a useful
starting point as few regions have been exploited more extensively
by Western powers, and few have received less in return.
A serious program focused on infrastructure,
energy, agriculture, education, and industrial capacity would
show what BRICS can offer in practice.
Its success would depend on whether,
roads were built, electricity supplied, food
production increased, and national economies made more resilient
and not rhetoric about a "new world order."
That is how BRICS can move towards global
governance, by creating forms of cooperation that reflect the
interests of the global majority and not by copying the institutions
of Western dominance.
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