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by Fyodor Lukyanov
November 05, 2026
from
RossiyskayaGazeta Website
translation by The RT team
November 09, 2026
from
RT-English Website
Original version in Russian
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Fyodor Lukyanov
the editor-in-chief
of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium
of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and
research director of the Valdai International Discussion
Club. |

© Maksim Blinov / Sputnik
The
Soviet leadership's
attempts
to save the USSR
helped
hasten its collapse,
but
today's Western leaders
are
mistaken if they expect
history to
repeat itself...
Thirty-five years ago, in August 1991, the Soviet Union was living
through its final summer.
The crisis was obvious, yet even then, few
imagined that within months one of the world's two superpowers would
disappear from the map.
The USSR had been a pillar of the international order established
after 1945 and its collapse set off a restructuring of world
politics that is still underway. The attempt to replace the old
balance with an American-led order has failed to produce lasting
stability, while what comes next remains uncertain.
For Russia, as for the other former Soviet republics, the years
since 1991 have been a difficult exercise in self-definition.
At first, independence appeared straightforward:
just declare a new state and begin a new
life.
In reality, creating a new political identity has
proved far more complicated.
The Ukraine conflict is also part
of this process, as however painful and contentious for Russia, it
raises questions about borders that cannot be resolved simply by
referring to the Soviet Union's peculiar system of administrative
divisions.
It also forces the country to define its place in
the world, a place necessarily different from that of the
ideological superpower it once was.
Russia takes pride in its centuries of continuous statehood.
Although its political forms have changed dramatically,
from empire to the Soviet Union to the
present federation, the state has endured.
Continuity, however, has never meant standing
still and each stage of Russian history has involved adapting to
internal pressures and changes in the surrounding world.
For a country of Russia's size and diversity,
finding the right balance between preservation and renewal is
especially difficult and that search continues.
The Soviet collapse also left a legacy that still shapes relations
with the West. Many Western leaders, particularly in Europe, remain
reluctant to negotiate seriously with Moscow on security.
One reason, I believe, is the precedent of 1991
when they saw a formidable adversary disappear, seemingly almost
overnight.
Today, the end of the Cold War is often presented as
inevitable as the Soviet Union supposedly lost its contest with the
"free world" and was destined to collapse, but this interpretation
owes more to hindsight than to what people believed at the time.
For four decades,
Western governments had regarded the USSR as
a dangerous, even existential, opponent, so its disappearance
was an outcome they welcomed, but one that even committed
anti-communists had scarcely dared to expect.
Until almost the final moment, the speed and
scale of the collapse seemed unimaginable.
Certainly, the Soviet system had been in trouble
for years and its economic weaknesses and failure to
respond to global changes had become increasingly serious, but
decline didn't automatically mean extinction and the USSR might have
survived in another form, or at least for much longer.
Instead, the measures introduced by its last leadership to arrest
that decline helped accelerate it, while reforms undertaken without
sufficient understanding of the system's internal contradictions
weakened the very institutions they were intended to save.
It's impossible to prove that a different course
would have preserved the Union, but the policies actually pursued
produced consequences that its opponents could hardly have hoped to
achieve themselves.
Were these the results of deliberate betrayal or honest mistakes?
The anniversary will doubtless revive that
argument, but my own view is that the catastrophe owed more to
misplaced idealism and incompetence, not to mention a failure to
grasp political realities, than to a carefully organized conspiracy.
The USSR's adversaries didn't need to engineer
its demise, but they were delighted to claim the credit afterwards
and that experience encouraged a dangerous Western confidence.
When politicians in Western capitals now demand
Russia's "strategic defeat" and reject compromise with Moscow, they
appear to be relying on,
the same historical script in that
they assume that relentless pressure will eventually destabilize
Russia internally, just as they believe Ronald Reagan's
confrontation with Moscow helped bring down the Soviet Union.
The reasoning is simple:
escalate, refuse concessions, place pressure
and wait for the Russian state to crack, and eventually its
leaders will be forced to accept Western terms, or the system
itself will give way...
But history doesn't provide such convenient
guarantees and today's Russia,
isn't the late Soviet Union because its
economy and social structure are different, as is the
international environment.
The wider world is no longer organized around two
opposing blocs, and Western governments no longer possess the same
ability to dictate the terms of global affairs.
Above all, Russia has learned from 1991,
but still its leadership must remember that
misjudged reforms and ignored problems can destroy a state from
within while society must understand that bitter internal
divisions can bring losses to everyone, not victory to any one
faction.
Western "leaders", meanwhile, need
to recognize that,
the Soviet collapse was a tragic and
exceptional event, but not a reliable model for dealing with
Russia and the extraordinary gift their predecessors received at
the end of the Cold War will not be repeated simply because they
wish it.
Russia's future is still being shaped, but Russia
itself isn't going anywhere...
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