by Mayor
Ed Rouse (Ret.)
2002
from
PsyWarrior Website
Spanish version
"Capture their minds
and their hearts and souls
will follow"
Psychological Operations or
PSYOP
are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators
to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of organizations, groups, and
individuals.
Used in all aspects of war, it is a
weapon whose effectiveness is limited only by the ingenuity of the
commander using it.
A proven winner in combat and peacetime,
PSYOP is one of the oldest weapons in the arsenal of man. It is an
important force protector/combat multiplier and a non-lethal weapons
system.
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
or Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) is simply learning
everything about your target enemy, their beliefs, likes, dislikes,
strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Once you know what
motivates your target, you are ready to begin psychological
operations.
Psychological operations may be defined
broadly as the planned use of communications to influence human
attitudes and behavior ... to create in target groups behavior,
emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of national
objectives.
The form of communication can be as simple as spreading
information covertly by word of mouth or through any means of
multimedia.
A psychological warfare campaign is a
war of the mind. Your primary weapons are sight and sound. PSYOP can
be disseminated
by face-to-face communication, audio visual means (television),
audio media (radio or loudspeaker),
visual media
(leaflets, newspapers, books, magazines and/or posters).
The weapon is not how its sent, but the
message it carries and how that message affects the recipient.
For instance, our American flag, when it
goes by in a parade,
-
Do you feel a sense of pride?
-
How about when you hear our
national anthem played?
-
How about "God Bless the USA",
Lee Greenwood's song which became popular during Desert
Storm?
Music or sound can be a major factor in
motivating emotion if it is associated with the right message. How
many of you think about the pottery wheel scene with Patrick Swaytze
and Demi Moore in the movie "Ghost" when you hear the theme song
"Unchained Melody"?
It has long been said that:
"The pen is mightier than the
sword".
That is because, if used properly, words
can be an inspiration to motivate others.
Some examples:
"Remember the Alamo"
"Give me liberty or give me death"
"I regret I have but one life to give for my country"
"Ask not what your country can do for you? Ask what you can
do for your country"
Now for psychological operations to be
effective, you must carefully
plan your propaganda. You must make sure that you know
everything about your enemy and that you are targeting his beliefs
and not using your own.
For example, at the very beginning of
Desert Shield, just after Iraq invaded Kuwait,
Bush referred
to
Saddam Hussein as being "just like Adolph Hitler".
For Americans and most of Europe
that was an insulting comparison. However, looking at it through the
eyes of an Iraqi soldier Adolph Hitler tried to exterminate all the
Jews. Iraq has long hated Israel.
Hitler drove out the British and
French forces that had long occupied the middle east. So with the
right propaganda, the comparison could be interpreted that Saddam,
like Hitler, hates Israel and wants to keep the western infidel
influence from contaminating the middle east. This would be a
compliment not an insult.
On the reverse side, knowing your
enemy's beliefs can work for you.
For example, remember when Saddam
Hussein broadcasted live images of his "Human Shields," the woman and
children of westerners that were in Iraq when the war broke out?
The Koran, states that you can do what you
do with with
your enemy, but that you must not harm his family, (wife and
children). Saddam's actions allowed us to show that he was a coward,
hiding behind innocent people and ignoring the Moslem laws he was so
quick to say he was defending.
How do you get to know your enemy?
Intelligence reports, Area studies, in country research, defectors,
native help, and even the enemy prisoners of war all are sources of
information.
As leaflets were developed during Desert Storm, they
were tested on cooperative EPWs (enemy prisoners of war.)
Some of the
recommendations for changes to the leaflet's illustrations made by
these EPWs were: remove any trace of the color red (a danger signal
to Iraqis), show Allied soldiers with chin beards rather than
clean-shaven faces (beards convey trust and brotherhood in Iraqi
culture), and add bananas to a bowl of fruit shown being offered to
surrendering Iraqis (bananas are a great delicacy in Iraq).
Also, an illustration
depicting a surrendering Iraqi thinking of his family back home
confused the EPWs. "Thought bubbles" are well-known in Western
culture, but virtually unknown to Iraqis. The illustration was
dropped.
In a memo written to then-Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles on 24 October 1953, former U.S. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower defined psychological warfare as anything,
"from the singing of a beautiful
anthem up to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage."
Used during peacetime, contingencies and
declared war, these activities are not a form of force, but are
force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often violent
environments.
Persuading rather than compelling physically, they
rely on logic, fear, desire or other mental factors to promote
specific emotions, attitudes or behaviors. The ultimate objective of
U.S. military psychological operations is the dissemination of
truthful information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. policy
and national objectives to convince enemy, neutral, and friendly
nations and forces to take action favorable to the United States and
its allies.
Now please note that I stated above that
Psychological Operations as conducted by the US Military is the
dissemination of "truthful" information, not propaganda which is
categorized as "white, gray, or black".
Now what is the difference
between PSYOP and propaganda?
A memorandum prepared by the Chief of
Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia in September of 1953
briefly explained the difference between "gray" propaganda, messages
broadcast with the goal of,
"avoiding identification," and
"black" propaganda, which involves "attribution to a source
other than the true one."
A more recent set of definitions,
reportedly used by former CIA chief William Colby and cited in at
least one commercial publication, calls truthfully-attributed and
non- attributed messages "white" propaganda, whereas messages
falsely attributed to a third party are considered "gray."
The term "black propaganda" is reserved
for those materials "planted by the United States but in such as way
that it seems to be the product or even an internal document of the
target group."
In other words, "black propaganda" is nothing less
than a form of intellectual and political subversion.
Historically, the application of
psychological operations in one form or another has proven to be
almost as essential to the successful waging of war as the use of
manpower and weaponry.
However, in spite of its long history of
successful employment, the potential for using the power of
persuasion through psychological operations as a force multiplier to
achieve national objectives with a minimum of destruction, has been
recognized by only the most perceptive of military leaders and
statesmen.
Furthermore, it has been since World War II that PSYOP
has come into its own as an effective weapon system.
The giant strides made in the area of
behavioral sciences, which can now enable us to know and understand
why people behave as they do, combined with the development and
perfection of mass media communications, have greatly multiplied the
capability and value of PSYOP as a means of achieving our own
national objectives without needless bloodshed.
An analysis of recent conflicts has
demonstrated the value of psychological operations/warfare on and
off the battlefield.
As a result, military authorities are now
beginning to accept the fact that psychological operations is a very
special combat weapon…one that every military commander must
consider employing, and defending against, if he is to accomplish
his mission with minimum losses.
This recognition of the important
role of PSYOP has resulted in its integration into many training
programs and tactical exercises, as well as the consideration of
PSYOP employment in all future military operations.
United States psychological operations
consist of three distinct types:
-
Tactical PSYOP
-
Strategic PSYOP
-
Consolidation PSYOP
Tactical PSYOP is addressed to a
specific enemy combat group, to induce them to perform a specific
action that will affect the current or short-range combat situation.
Aimed at a larger audience, Strategic
PSYOP is put into effect by a carefully planned campaign against a
larger target audience than that toward which Tactical PSYOP is
directed.
Consolidation PSYOP's mission is to
assist the civil and military authorities in consolidating their
gains, by establishing and maintaining law and order, and by
re-establishing civil government in an occupied or liberated area.
All three types of psychological
operations - Tactical, Strategic and Consolidation - can be employed
to produce the following desired effects:
-
Reduce moral and combat
efficiency within the enemy's ranks.
-
Promote mass dissension within
and defections from enemy combat units and/or revolutionary
cadre.
-
Support our own and allied
forces cover and deception operations.
-
Promote cooperation, unity and
morale within one's own and allied units, as well as within
resistance forces behind enemy lines.
Now Psychological Operations (PSYOP)is
not a new military tactic by any means. There are numerous examples
of the use of psychological warfare throughout history.
The following are some historical
examples which illustrate the attainment of each of these four
objectives.
Perhaps one of the earliest examples of
Psychological Warfare was attributed to Alexander the Great of
Macedonia.
Alexander had conquered most of the known world during
his reign. With each region he conquered he left behind soldiers to
keep control of the newly conquered area.
Eventually, there came a
point when Alexander realized that he had stretched his army too
thin and was now in danger of losing to a large opposing force.
Alexander's only option was to retreat and regroup forces with the
armies he left behind. However, to do so would certainly incite the
opposing force to pursue him and very possibly capture or defeat his
now smaller army.
Alexander knew that if he could
intimidate the opposing force they would be scared to follow his
army.
Alexander instructed his armorers to make several oversized
armor breastplates and helmets that would fit "giants", men 7 to 8
feet tall. As Alexander and his forces withdrew during the night
they left behind the oversized armor.
The oversized armor was of
course found by the opposing force who then believed that they had
come close to engaging in a battle with giants. A battle that they
surely would have lost.
The oversized armor coupled with the stories
they had heard from travelers of the savagery of Alexander's army
caused enough doubt and fear that they elected not to pursue
Alexander's army.
Sun Tsu, recognized as one
of the greatest military tacticians of all times, strongly advocated
the use of psychological warfare as a force multiplier.
Sun Tsu
wrote (page 8) that:
To capture the enemy's entire army
is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a
company, or a squad is better than to destroy them.
For to win
one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of
skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme
excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to
attack the enemy's strategy.
Next best is to disrupt his
alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And
the worst policy is to attack cities.
Sun Tzu understood that given the
opportunity, an adversary will surrender to a superior commander
prior to conflict.
In order to have a chance to be that superior
leader, PSYOP must be coordinated and included in initial planning
and implemented prior to conflict. If hostilities begin, proper
PSYOP implementation can end the conflict earlier than otherwise
expected.
PSYOP is a force multiplier and resource saver.
Mongol leader Genghis Khan was widely
known for leading hordes of savage horsemen across Russia and into
Europe.
While not totally unfounded, the Mongols' image of total,
barbaric domination was greatly enhanced by Khan's use of PSYOP,
deception, operational security (OPSEC), and targeting his
adversaries' decision-making process.
"Agents of influence" were
sent in advance of his armies to do face-to-face PSYOP, telling of
brutality and large numbers in the Mongol army. Khan also used
deception to create the illusion of invincible numbers by using
rapid troop maneuver, making his army look larger than it really
was.
He had a network of horsemen called "arrow riders" to
communicate quickly with his commanders, and he targeted enemy
messengers to prevent enemy commanders from communicating with each
other.
All these actions caused a weakness in their enemy's psyche,
and the Mongols were feared wherever they went.
World War II
Psychological operations were used
extensively by all sides during
World War II.
Adolf Hitler rose to power by exploiting the dissatisfaction of
supporters of the traditional left and right wing parties, by
dwelling on the failure of these parties to solve the problems
created by the conditions imposed on Germany under the Treaty of
Versailles.
He then presented National Socialism as the one movement
capable of uniting conservative nationalists with international
socialists, the professional classes with the working classes in the
service of the nation. The speeches he
delivered urged national pride and unity and placed the blame for
all of Germany's problems on others.
His oratory techniques and use
of propaganda gave him a truly hypnotic grip over the German masses.
After taking over as dictator, the Germans continued to use
propaganda both to unite Germany and to intimidate their enemies.
Radio broadcasts became a major means of
passing propaganda to the enemy. Japan used the notorious "Tokyo
Rose" to broadcast music, propaganda, and words of
discouragement to our allied forces.
The Germans used Mildred Gillar,
better remembered as "Axis
Sally". The Americans used deception and psychological
operations to convince the German high command that the D-Day
invasion was not going to be launched at Normandy but at Calais.
However the best and most innovative use
of psychological warfare must be attributed to a radio broadcast by
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). During the period May
through September 1940, when the German invasion of England seemed
imminent, a regular BBC radio program, easily heard and often
listened to by the Germans, began a series of English language
lessons for the would-be invaders.
These broadcasts of course were
presented in flawless German.
The British announcer stated the purpose
of these broadcasts like this:
"…and so it will be best if you learn a few useful phrases
in English before visiting us. For your first lesson, we
take ‘DIE KANALUEBERFAHRT'. The channel crossing."
"Now, just repeat after me: ‘DAS BOOT SINKT.' The boat is
sinking. The boat is sinking"
"DAS WASSER IST KALT. The water is cold. SER KALT. Very
cold"
"Now I will give you a verb that should be very useful.
Again, please repeat after me. ICH BRENNE. I am burning. Du
Brennst. You are burning. ER BRENNT. He is burning. WIR
BRENNEN. We burn. IHR BRENNT. You are burning. SIR BRENNEN.
They are burning."
This was rather crude material: but it
proved effective.
The phrases about burning in the English Channel
seemed to confirm the intensive rumors already being spread by
British agents on the continent that the British had perfected an
apparatus with which they were going to set fires in the Channel and
on the English beaches whenever Hitler launched his invasion.
Although not true, the rumors were so well planned and cleverly
spread that to this day, many Germans believe them. Documents found
after the war confirmed that the German High Command believed that
the British had a workable plan to set fire to the English Channel.
Cover and deception operations are
complex and intricate affairs, invariably involving many talents,
techniques and resources.
Perhaps the most ambitious and spectacular
cover and deception operation of modern times was the effort of the
Allies to convince the German high command that the upcoming Allied
invasion of Europe would occur across the beaches near the Pas de
Calais, rather than the narrow sand strips and cliffs of Normandy
nearly 100 hundred miles away.
Through imaginative employment of
psychological operations the Allies created the fictitious "Army
Group Patton," which was poised to strike across the English Channel
at the Germans 15th Panzer Army defending the Pas de
Calais.
This ruse convinced the German strategists and planners that
the Allied assault would be spearheaded at the Pas de Calais by an
army under the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton, whom
many considered our best combat command.
As a result, the heaviest
concentration of German combat power in France was positioned at the
Pas de Calais, waiting for Patton.
Even after the Allied invasion came at
Normandy, Hitler would not allow for the deployment of the 15th
Panzer Army from the Pas de Calais. Hitler was still convinced that
the Normandy invasion was only a prelude to the real invasion. The
15th Panzer Army waited in vain at the Pas de Calais for
nearly seven weeks for Army Group Patton, an invasion that was never
to come.
General of the Army Omar Bradley later referred to this
operation as "the biggest hoax of the war". As for the German Army,
they never fully recovered from the reversals set in motion by their
delay in releasing the 15th Panzer Army.
The next example concerns the fourth
objective of psychological operations, that is, its use to promote
cooperation, unity and morale within friendly units and people as
well as within resistance forces behind enemy lines.
During World War II, the very survival
of the Soviet Union was due in large part to Stalin's ability to
appeal to and mobilize the emotional patriotism of the Russian
people.
With his regime reeling under the blows of the German blitz
in 1941, Stalin sensed that the ideological abstractions and
Communist platitudes, which the Party had driven into the minds of
its captive domestic audience since its take over in 1918, were
relatively barren and did not have the emotional and spiritual
impact necessary to fortify the Russian people for their struggle
against Hitler's armies.
Therefore, in one of the most dramatic
policy turn-about in modern history, Stalin systematically set
about identifying his Communist regime with "Holy Russia" (and
"Mother Russia") its ancient heritage and its accompanying
symbolism.
The two Russian institutions with the
deepest roots in the past, the Army and the Church, were cultivated
by Stalin's propagandists as never before in Soviet history. The
historic accomplishments of Russian armies were glorified. The
church hierarchy and class distinctions were returned to
pre-revolution standards.
Even the official newspaper, "PRAVDA,"
dropped its Marxist motto, "WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE," and
substituted the openly nationalistic slogan, "DEATH TO THE GERMAN
INVADER."
The ensuing struggle became and is still officially known
in Soviet history as "The Great Patriotic War".
Thus we see how even Josef Stalin, one
of the most hard-headed dictators of the 20th Century,
realized that his conventional military weapons alone, were not
enough to meet the challenge of the German armies.
In retrospect, we
can see that his choice of utilizing psychological operations to
augment his conventional military forces, would prove to play a
major role in maintaining the survival of his communist regime for
so many years.
Korea
Having learned the effectiveness of
radio broadcasts and leaflets during World War II, the U.S. Army Far
East Command's small Special Projects Branch of the Headquarters G-2
(Intelligence) Division, began radio broadcasts and leaflet drops
over the Republic of South Korea immediately after North Korea's
invasion across the 38th Parallel in June 1950.
Later during the
fall of that year, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived
in South Korea. This unit would serve as the 8th Army's tactical
psychological warfare unit to the end of the war in 1952.
The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company
used both vehicle and aircraft mounted loudspeakers to get their
verbal messages across. However, as in previous U.S. wars, leaflets
were still the major medium.
Korean War leaflets themes center
around the,
"happy POW," "good soldier-bad leaders," "surrender and
you will be well-treated," "we can crush you," and nostalgia for
home, family and women.
Vietnam
Psychological Operations were used by
both sides.
Many G.I.'s may remember the notorious "Hanoi
Hannah", who like "Tokyo Rose" of WW II broadcasted a daily
radio program where she played music, coupled with the North's view
of the news and messages of discouragement to our troops.
The Americans countered with their own
radio broadcasts, and
leaflet programs.
In Vietnam, the United States conducted
air attacks against military and military-related strategic targets
partly for psychological effect. The principal psychological
objective of these attacks was to persuade enemy leaders to
negotiate an early end to the conflicts on terms acceptable to the
United States.
These air attacks failed to deter the
communists from protracting the fighting for over eight years in
Vietnam. In addition to the humanitarian and other constraints the
United States imposed on its air operations, various conditions and
attitudes in the enemy camp diluted the coercive effects of the U.S.
strategic attacks.
These included the enemy government's:
After having already made what it
considered to be its maximum feasible concessions in the Vietnam
peace talks, the United States resorted to escalation or threatened
escalation to bring the negotiations to closure.
Severe U.S. escalation or threatened
escalation was required to extract comparatively modest concessions
from both enemies.
In Vietnam, Washington had to employ massive B-52 and
fighter-bomber strikes on Hanoi and Haiphong to force the communists
to complete a peace agreement, the key provisions of which they had
already accepted.
The communists agreed to terms only
after their military forces on the battlefield had been stalemated.
Prior to the settlements, the communist forces in Vietnam had
mounted major offensives, the defeat of which left them no prospects
for immediate further military gains.
Operation Just Cause -
Panama
At H-Hour, 1-508th
Abn
had the mission
of securing Ft. Amador, an installation shared by the U.S. and
Panama Defense Force - PDF.
Because of the need for OPSEC, American
dependents could not be evacuated in advance of the attack. This
complication, and the requirement to minimize enemy casualties and
physical damage, made PSYOP loudspeaker teams, from the 1st Bn, 4th
PSYOP Gp, a key asset.
The battalion sealed off the PDF portion of
Ft. Amador and ensured that all noncombatants were safe.
After
daylight, the task force set about systematically securing the area.
When initial appeals failed to persuade the PDF to surrender, the
commander modified the broadcasts. The holdouts were warned that
resistance was hopeless in the face of overwhelming firepower and a
series of demonstrations took place, escalating from small arms to
105mm howitzer rounds.
Subsequent broadcasts convinced the PDF to
give up.
The entire process allowed Ft. Amador to be secured with
few casualties and minimal damage.
The Gulf War
The Gulf War brought a whole new meaning
to the use of multimedia in psychological operations.
Radio and TV broadcasts, leaflets, and
loudspeakers used the themes of Arab brotherhood, allied air power,
and Iraqi isolation to induce large numbers of enemy soldiers to
desert. One of the most effective tactics involved the dropping of
leaflets on a particular unit, informing it that it would be bombed
within twenty-four hours and had to surrender to avoid destruction.
Over a seven-week period, 29 million
leaflets of more than 100 different leaflets were disseminated,
reaching approximately 98% of the 300,000 troops.
The 4th PSYOP Group began broadcasting
the "VOICE OF THE GULF" radio network on 19 January 1991. It
operated continuously through 1 April 1991 with more than 210 hours
of live broadcasting and 330 hours of prerecorded programs.
A total
of 2072 news items were aired along with 189 PSYOP messages.
The
VOICE OF THE GULF network consisted of,
-
a 50 KW AM transmitter
located at Abu Ali, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1134
-
a 10KW AM
transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM
1179
-
a 1KW FM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia
broadcasting on FM 87.5
-
two Volant Solo EC-130
aircraft of the
193rd Special Operations Group broadcasting on AM 690 and FM
88.5 and 87.9
Of course like some of the other big
wars, Iraq chose to use a woman, "Baghdad Betty", to conduct
propaganda broadcasts to deter and disillusion their enemy.
Unfortunately for Iraq, they forgot that a truly effective
psychological warfare program must have the input of
highly-qualified clinical psychologists "who specialize in the
unconscious dynamics of human behavior and motivation'' and who are
knowledgeable about the "values and customs of different cultures.''
Such expertise is essential to the "selection of a culturally
appropriate and effectively persuasive concept and value-based
theme" that is the heart of any PSYOP.
In one of her first broadcast
Baghdad Betty warned the American soldiers listening that while they
were in the desert of Saudi Arabia, their wives and girlfriends were
sleeping with Tom Cruise, Tom Selleck and Bart Simpson.
Now it was
ridiculous enough to infer that our wives and girlfriends would be
seduced by two movie stars but by their failure to do thorough
research on the American culture, Betty lost any chance of
credibility by telling our servicemen that a cartoon character was
seducing our women back home.
During Desert Storm the 4th PSYOP Group
fielded 71 Tactical loudspeaker teams.
These teams provided support
to USARCENT (both XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps), USMARCENT and
USSOCCENT. Loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals, harassment
and deception tapes. Most loudspeaker teams had Saudi Arabian,
Egyptian or Kuwaiti linguists attached to execute live broadcasts as
the situation dictated.
Loudspeaker teams were also innovatively
employed for prisoner control at the EPW camps with broadcasts
designed to accomplish prisoner pacification and underscore Military
Police authority.
One of the best examples of the
successful use of loudspeakers occurred during the Gulf War. The
allied coalition effectively isolated, both physically and
psychologically, a large element of Iraqi forces on Faylaka Island.
Rather then reduce the island by direct assault, a tactical PSYOP
team from the 9th PSYOP Battalion, aboard a UH-1N helicopter, flew
aerial loudspeaker missions around the island with cobra gunships
providing escort.
The message told the adversary below to surrender
the next day in formation at the radio tower.
The next day 1,405
Iraqis, including a general officer, waited in formation at the
radio tower to surrender to the Marine forces without a single shot
having been fired.
How successful was the US PSYOP campaign
in Desert Storm? The International Red Cross reported that nearly
87,000 Iraqi soldiers turned themselves over to coalition forces,
most of them clutching the leaflets or hiding them in their
clothing.
All incidents of surrender were bloodless.
Perhaps the
best testimony to the effectiveness of PSYOP was given by an Iraqi
General when he stated that:
"PSYOP...was a great threat to troop
morale, second only to the coalition bombing campaign."
Thus, psychological operations are
coming of age.
We saw from historical examples, how Tactical,
Strategic and Consolidation PSYOP can cover the short-range,
long-range and recuperative phases of warfare,
-
to reduce enemy
morale and combat
-
to promote dissension within and
defections from enemy ranks
-
to support cover and deception
operations
-
to promote unity, cooperation and morale within our
own military and those of our allies
-
to provide meaningful
domestic assistance to less fortunate groups and communities
Why then, you may ask, has the value of
psychological operations taken so long to receive general
recognition, and why is it full potential yet to be realized?
Part of the answer to this question was
covered earlier in our presentation, when it was discussed that
although psychological operations has been utilized by various
military leaders over the centuries, it has only been recently with
the major advances in behavioral sciences and mass communications
that PSYOP has come into its own as an effective weapon system of
great potential.
Another part of the answer to this
question lies in the attitude of people towards psychological
operations. To some, it produces images of government controlled
communications/mass media, telling the people only what the
government wants them to hear.
To others, it raises the horrid
specter of Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's Propaganda Minister, practicing
the technique of the "big lie" which has incorrectly become
synonymous with "propaganda". Still to others, the mere mention of
"psychological" operations or warfare invokes visions of "mind
control" through some mysterious means of brainwashing.
It should be clear that modern
psychological operations, or PSYOP, is none of those things.
On the
contrary PSYOP is not unlike the public advertising that we are all
exposed to wherever we go, every day, through all kinds of mass
media. However the negative connotation that some people attach to
the word psychological" prevents many people from recognizing the
simple truth.
Everyone knows that if you do not have a good product
to sell, people will not continue buying it, no matter how much you
advertise.
The same applies to the points of view advertised through
the use of psychological operations. Thus we have no reason to fear PSYOP, but we do have ample reason to respect it for what it can do.
By the application of sound PSYOP
techniques, through face-to-face communication and mass media
communications, we have demonstrated, time and time again, that we
can appeal to the intelligence, reason, and emotions of our target
audience to get them to think and act as we desire.
-
If these people
are shooting at us, we can persuade them to lay down their arms.
-
If
they fear us, we can convince them that they have nothing to fear.
-
If they are belligerent and uncooperative, we can show them the
value of unity and cooperation.
Lastly and most important, the
utilization of PSYOP can prevent needless bloodshed, destruction and
misery.
That is why we say, with conviction, that psychological
operations, or PSYOP, is truly a humane weapon.
Today, Psychological Operations are a
vital part of the broad range of U.S. political, military, economic
and ideological activities used by the U.S. government to secure
national objectives.
The mission of providing Psychological
Operations for the U.S. Military today rests with the U.S. Army's
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina.
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