
	by Prof. Alfred W. McCoy
	 November 16, 2009
	from 
	GlobalResearch Website
	
	 
	
	
	 
	
	In his approach to National Security Agency (NSA) 
	surveillance, as well as CIA renditions, drone assassinations, and military 
	detention, President 
	Obama has to a surprising extent 
	embraced the expanded executive powers championed by his conservative 
	predecessor, 
	George W. Bush. 
	
	 
	
	This bipartisan affirmation of the imperial 
	executive 
	
	could "reverberate for generations," warns Jack Balkin, a 
	specialist on First Amendment freedoms at Yale Law School. And consider 
	these but some of the early fruits from the hybrid seeds that the Global 
	War on Terror has planted on American soil. Yet surprisingly few 
	Americans seem aware of the toll that this already endless war has taken on 
	our civil liberties.
	
	Don't be too surprised, then, when, in the midst of some future crisis, 
	advanced surveillance methods and other techniques developed in our recent 
	counterinsurgency wars migrate from Baghdad, Falluja, and Kandahar to 
	your hometown or urban neighborhood. 
	
	 
	
	And don't ever claim that nobody told you this 
	could happen - at least not if you care to read on.
	
	Think of our counterinsurgency wars abroad as so many living laboratories 
	for the undermining of a democratic society at home, a process historians of 
	such American wars can tell you has been going on for a long, long time.
	
	
	 
	
	Counterintelligence innovations like centralized 
	data, covert penetration, and disinformation developed during the Army's 
	first protracted pacification campaigning a foreign land - the Philippines 
	from 1898 to 1913 - were repatriated to the United States during World War 
	I, becoming the blueprint for an invasive internal security apparatus that 
	persisted for the next half century.
	
	Almost 90 years later, 
	
	George W. Bush's Global War on Terror plunged the U.S. 
	military into four simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns, large and small 
	- in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and (once again) the Philippines - 
	transforming a vast swath of the planet into an ad hoc 
	"counterterrorism" laboratory. 
	
	 
	
	The result? Cutting-edge high-tech security and 
	counter-terror techniques that are now slowly migrating homeward.
	
	As the War on Terror enters its ninth year to become one of America's 
	longest overseas conflicts, the time has come to ask an uncomfortable 
	question: 
	
		
		What impact have the wars in Afghanistan and 
		Iraq - and the atmosphere they created domestically - had on the quality 
		of our democracy?
	
	
	Every American knows that we are supposedly 
	fighting elsewhere to defend democracy here at home. 
	
	 
	
	Yet the crusade for democracy abroad, 
	largely unsuccessful in its own right, has proven remarkably 
	effective in building a technological template that could be just a few 
	tweaks away from creating a domestic surveillance state - with omnipresent 
	cameras, deep data-mining, nano-second biometric identification, and drone 
	aircraft patrolling "the homeland."
	
	Even if its name is increasingly anathema in Washington, the ongoing 
	Global War on Terror has helped bring about a massive expansion of 
	domestic surveillance by the FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) 
	whose combined data-mining systems have already swept up several billion 
	private documents from U.S. citizens into classified data banks. 
	
	 
	
	Abroad, after years of failing counterinsurgency 
	efforts in 
	the Middle East, the Pentagon began 
	applying biometrics - the science of identification via facial shape, 
	fingerprints, and retinal or iris patterns - to the pacification of Iraqi 
	cities, as well as the use of electronic intercepts for instant intelligence 
	and the split-second application of satellite imagery to aid an 
	assassination campaign by drone aircraft that reaches from Africa to South 
	Asia.
	
	In the panicky aftermath of some future terrorist attack, Washington 
	could quickly fuse existing foreign and domestic surveillance techniques, as 
	well as others now being developed on distant battlefields, to create an 
	instant digital surveillance state.
	
 
	
	
	The Crucible of 
	Counterinsurgency
	
	For the past six years, confronting a bloody insurgency, the U.S. occupation 
	of Iraq has served as a white-hot crucible of counterinsurgency, forging a 
	new system of biometric surveillance and digital warfare with potentially 
	disturbing domestic implications. 
	
	 
	
	This new
	
	biometric identification system first 
	appeared in the smoking aftermath of "Operation Phantom Fury," a brutal, 
	nine-day battle that U.S. Marines fought in late 2004 to recapture the 
	insurgent-controlled city of Falluja. Bombing, artillery, and mortars 
	destroyed at least half of that city's buildings and sent most of its 
	250,000 residents fleeing into the surrounding countryside. 
	
	 
	
	Marines then forced returning residents to wait 
	endless hours under a desert sun at checkpoints for fingerprints and iris 
	scans. Once inside the city's blast-wall maze, residents had to wear 
	identification tags for compulsory checks to catch infiltrating insurgents.
	
	The first hint that biometrics were helping to pacify Baghdad's far larger 
	population of seven million came in April 2007 when the New York Times 
	
	published an eerie image of American soldiers studiously photographing an 
	Iraqi's eyeball. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	With only a terse caption to go by, we can still 
	infer the technology behind this single record of a retinal scan in Baghdad: 
	
	
		
			- 
			
			digital cameras for U.S. patrols
			 
			- 
			
			wireless data transfer to a mainframe 
	computer
 
			- 
			
			a database to record as many adult Iraqi eyes as could be 
	gathered
 
		
	
	
	Indeed, eight months later, 
	
	the Washington 
	Post reported that the Pentagon had collected over a million Iraqi 
	fingerprints and iris scans. By mid-2008, the U.S. Army had also confined 
	Baghdad's population behind blast-wall cordons and was checking Iraqi 
	identities by satellite link to a biometric database.
	
	Pushing ever closer to the boundaries of what present-day technology can do, 
	by early 2008, U.S. forces were also collecting 
	
	facial images accessible by 
	portable data labs called 
	
	Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facilities, 
	linked by satellite to a biometric database in West Virginia. 
	
		
		"A war fighter needs to know one of three 
		things," explained the inventor of this lab-in-a-box. "Do I let him go? 
		Keep him? Or shoot him on the spot?"
	
	
	A future is already imaginable in which a U.S. 
	sniper could take a bead on the eyeball of a suspected terrorist, pause for 
	a nanosecond to transmit the target's iris or retinal data via 
	backpack-sized laboratory to a computer in West Virginia, and then, after 
	instantaneous feedback, pull the trigger.
	
	Lest such developments seem fanciful, recall that Washington Post 
	reporter Bob Woodward claims the success of George W. Bush's 
	2007 troop surge in Iraq was due less to boots on the ground than to bullets 
	in the head - and these, in turn, were due to a top-secret fusion of 
	electronic intercepts and satellite imagery. 
	
	 
	
	Starting in May 2006, American intelligence 
	agencies 
	
	launched a Special Action Program using, 
	
		
		"the most highly classified techniques and 
		information in the U.S. government" in a successful effort "to locate, 
		target and kill key individuals in extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, 
		the Sunni insurgency and renegade Shia militias."
	
	
	Under General Stanley McChrystal, now 
	U.S. Afghan War commander, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
	deployed, 
	
		
		"every tool available simultaneously, from 
		signals intercepts to human intelligence" for "lightning quick" strikes.
		
	
	
	One intelligence officer reportedly claimed that 
	the program was so effective it gave him "orgasms." President Bush called it 
	"awesome." 
	
	 
	
	Although refusing to divulge details, Woodward 
	himself compared it to the Manhattan Project in World War II. This 
	Iraq-based assassination program relied on the authority Defense 
	Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
	
	granted JSOC in early 2004 to "kill or 
	capture al-Qaeda terrorists" in 20 countries across the Middle East, 
	producing dozens of lethal strikes by airborne Special Operations forces.
	
	Another crucial technological development in Washington's secret war of 
	assassination has been the armed drone, or unmanned aerial vehicle, whose 
	speedy development has been another by-product of Washington's global 
	counterterrorism laboratory. Half a world away from Iraq in the southern 
	Philippines, the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Forces 
	
	conducted an early 
	experiment in the use of aerial surveillance for assassination. 
	
	 
	
	In June 2002, with a specially-equipped CIA 
	aircraft circling overhead offering real-time video surveillance in the 
	pitch dark of a tropical night, Philippine Marines executed a deadly 
	high-seas ambush of Muslim terrorist Aldam Tilao (a.k.a. "Abu Sabaya").
	
	In July 2008, the Pentagon 
	
	proposed an expenditure of $1.2 billion for a 
	fleet of 50 light aircraft loaded with advanced electronics to loiter over 
	battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing "full motion video and 
	electronic eavesdropping to the troops." By late 2008, night flights over 
	Afghanistan from the deck of the USS Theodore Roosevelt were using sensors 
	to give American ground forces real-time images of Taliban targets - some so 
	focused that they could catch just a few warm bodies huddled in darkness 
	behind a wall.
	
	In the first months of Barack Obama's presidency, CIA Predator drone strikes 
	have escalated in the Pakistani tribal borderlands with a macabre 
	efficiency, using a top-secret mix of electronic intercepts, satellite 
	transmission, and digital imaging to kill half of the Agency's 20 
	top-priority al-Qaeda targets in the region. 
	
	 
	
	Just three days before Obama visited Canada last 
	February, Homeland Security launched its first Predator-B drones to patrol 
	the vast, empty North Dakota-Manitoba borderlands that one U.S. 
	senator has called America's "weakest link."
 
	
	
	
	Homeland Security
	
	While those running U.S. combat operations overseas were experimenting with 
	intercepts, satellites, drones, and biometrics, inside Washington the 
	plodding civil servants of internal security at the FBI and the NSA 
	initially began expanding domestic surveillance through thoroughly 
	conventional data sweeps, legal and extra-legal, and - with White House help 
	- several abortive attempts to revive a tradition that dates back to World 
	War I of citizens spying on suspected subversives.
	
		
		"If people see anything suspicious, utility 
		workers, you ought to report it," 
		
		said President George Bush in his 
		April 2002 call for nationwide citizen vigilance. 
	
	
	Within weeks, his Justice Department had 
	launched 
	
	Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information 
	and Prevention System), with plans for, 
	
		
		"millions of American truckers, letter 
		carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employees and others" 
		to aid the government by spying on their fellow Americans. 
	
	
	Such citizen surveillance-sparked strong 
	protests, however, forcing the Justice Department to quietly bury the 
	president's program.
	
	Simultaneously, inside the Pentagon, Admiral 
	
	John Poindexter, President Ronald 
	Reagan's former national security advisor (swept up in the Iran-Contra 
	scandal of that era), was developing a 
	
	Total Information Awareness program which was to contain "detailed 
	electronic dossiers" on millions of Americans. 
	
	
	
	
	When news leaked about this secret Pentagon 
	office with its eerie, all-seeing eye logo, Congress banned the 
	program, and the admiral resigned in 2003. 
	
	 
	
	But the key data extraction technology, the 
	Information Awareness Prototype System, migrated quietly to the NSA. 
	Soon enough, however, the CIA, FBI, and NSA turned to monitoring citizens 
	electronically without the need for human tipsters, rendering the 
	administration's grudging retreats from conventional surveillance at best an 
	ambiguous political victory for civil liberties advocates. 
	
	 
	
	Sometime in 2002, President 
	
	Bush gave the NSA 
	secret, illegal orders to monitor private communications through the 
	nation's telephone companies and its private financial transactions through 
	SWIFT, an international bank clearinghouse.
	
	After the New York Times exposed these wiretaps in 2005, Congress 
	quickly capitulated, first legalizing this illegal executive program and 
	then granting cooperating phone companies immunity from civil suits. Such 
	intelligence excess was, however, intentional. Even after Congress widened 
	the legal parameters for future intercepts in 2008, the NSA continued to 
	push the boundaries of its activities, engaging in what the New York Times 
	politely termed the systematic "over-collection" of electronic 
	communications among American citizens. 
	
	 
	
	Now, for example, thanks to a top-secret NSA 
	database called "Pinwale," 
	analysts routinely scan countless "millions" of domestic electronic 
	communications without much regard for whether they came from foreign or 
	domestic sources.
	
	Starting in 2004, the FBI launched an Investigative Data Warehouse as a 
	"centralized repository for... counterterrorism." Within two years, it 
	
	contained 659 million individual records. This digital archive of 
	intelligence, social security files, drivers' licenses, and records of 
	private finances could be accessed by 13,000 Bureau agents and analysts 
	making a million queries monthly. 
	
	 
	
	By 2009, when digital rights advocates sued for 
	full disclosure, the database had already 
	
	grown to over a billion 
	documents.
	
	And did this sacrifice of civil liberties make the United States a safer 
	place? In July 2009, after a careful review of the electronic surveillance 
	in these years, the inspectors general of the Defense Department, the 
	Justice Department, the CIA, the NSA, and the Office of National 
	Intelligence issued a report sharply critical of these secret efforts.
	
	
	 
	
	Despite George W. Bush's claims that massive 
	electronic surveillance had "helped prevent attacks," these auditors could 
	not find any, 
	
		
		"specific instances" of this, concluding 
		such surveillance had "generally played a limited role in the FBI's 
		overall counterterrorism efforts."
	
	
	Amid the pressures of a generational global war, 
	Congress proved all too ready to offer up civil liberties as a bipartisan 
	burnt offering on the altar of national security. 
	
	 
	
	In April 2007, for instance, in a bid to 
	legalize the Bush administration's warrantless wiretaps, Congressional 
	representative Jane Harman (Dem., California) offered a particularly 
	extreme example of this urge. 
	
	 
	
	She introduced the 
	
	Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism 
	Prevention Act, proposing a powerful national commission, 
	functionally a standing "star chamber," to, 
	
		
		"combat the threat posed by homegrown 
		terrorists based and operating within the United States." 
	
	
	The bill passed the House by an overwhelming 404 
	to 6 vote before stalling, and then dying, in a Senate somewhat more mindful 
	of civil liberties.
	
	Only weeks after 
	Barack Obama entered the Oval Office, 
	Harman's life itself became a cautionary tale about expanding electronic 
	surveillance. According to information leaked to the Congressional 
	Quarterly, in early 2005 an NSA wiretap caught Harman offering to press the
	Bush Justice Department for reduced charges against two pro-Israel 
	lobbyists accused of espionage. 
	
	 
	
	In exchange, an Israeli agent offered to help 
	Harman gain the chairmanship of the House Intelligence Committee by 
	threatening House Democratic majority leader Nancy Pelosi with the 
	loss of a major campaign donor. 
	
	 
	
	As Harman put down the phone, 
	
	she said, 
	
		
		"This conversation doesn't exist."
	
	
	How wrong she was. 
	
	 
	
	An NSA transcript of Harman's every word soon 
	crossed the desk of CIA Director Porter Goss, prompting an FBI 
	investigation that, in turn, was blocked by then-White House Counsel 
	Alberto Gonzales. 
	
	 
	
	As it happened, the White House knew that the 
	New York Times was about to publish its sensational revelation of the 
	NSA's warrantless wiretaps, and felt it desperately needed Harman for damage 
	control among her fellow Democrats. In this commingling of intrigue and 
	irony, an influential legislator's defense of the NSA's illegal wiretapping 
	exempted her from prosecution for a security breach discovered by an NSA 
	wiretap.
	
	Since the arrival of Barack Obama in the White House, the auto-pilot 
	expansion of digital domestic surveillance has in no way been interfered 
	with. As a result, for example, the FBI's "Terrorist Watchlist," with 
	400,000 names and a million entries, 
	
	continues to grow at the rate of 1,600 
	new names daily.
	
	In fact, the Obama administration has even announced plans for a new 
	military cyber-command-staffed by 7,000 Air Force employees at Lackland Air 
	Base in Texas. This command will be tasked with attacking enemy computers 
	and repelling hostile cyber-attacks or counterattacks aimed at U.S. computer 
	networks - with scant respect for what the Pentagon calls "sovereignty in 
	the cyber-domain." 
	
	 
	
	Despite the president's assurances that 
	operations, 
	
		
		"will not - I repeat - will not include 
		monitoring private sector networks or Internet traffic," the Pentagon's 
		top cyber-warrior, General James E. Cartwright, has conceded such 
		intrusions are inevitable.
	
	
	
	
	Sending the Future 
	Home
	
	While U.S. combat forces prepare to draw-down in Iraq (and ramp up in 
	Afghanistan), military intelligence units are coming home to apply their 
	combat-tempered surveillance skills to our expanding homeland security 
	state, while preparing to counter any future domestic civil disturbances 
	here.
	
	Indeed, in September 2008, the Army's Northern Command announced that one of 
	the Third Division's brigades in Iraq would be reassigned as a 
	Consequence Management Response Force (CMRF) 
	inside the U.S. Its new mission: planning for moments when civilian 
	authorities may need help with "civil unrest and crowd control." 
	
	 
	
	According to Colonel Roger Cloutier, his 
	unit's civil-control equipment featured "a new modular package of non-lethal 
	capabilities" designed to subdue unruly or dangerous individuals - including 
	Taser guns, roadblocks, shields, batons, and beanbag bullets.
	
	That same month, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey flew to 
	Fort Stewart, Georgia, for the first full CMRF mission readiness exercise.
	
	
	 
	
	There, he strode across a giant urban battle map 
	filling a gymnasium floor like a conquering Gulliver looming over 
	Lilliputian Americans. With 250 officers from all services participating, 
	the 
	military war-gamed its future coordination with the FBI, the Federal 
	Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
	and local authorities in the event of a domestic terrorist attack or threat.
	
	
	 
	
	Within weeks, the American Civil Liberties Union 
	filed an expedited freedom of information request for details of these 
	deployments, arguing: 
	
		
		"[It] is imperative that the American people 
		know the truth about this new and unprecedented intrusion of the 
		military in domestic affairs."
	
	
	At the outset of the Global War on Terror in 
	2001, memories of early Cold War anti-communist witch-hunts blocked Bush 
	administration plans to create a corps of civilian tipsters and potential 
	vigilantes. 
	
	 
	
	However, far more sophisticated security 
	methods, developed for counterinsurgency warfare overseas, are now coming 
	home to far less public resistance. They promise, sooner or later, to 
	further jeopardize the constitutional freedoms of Americans.
	
	In these same years, under the pressure of War on Terror rhetoric, 
	presidential power has grown relentlessly, opening the way to unchecked 
	electronic surveillance, the endless detention of terror suspects, and a 
	variety of inhumane forms of interrogation. Somewhat more slowly, innovative 
	techniques of biometric identification, aerial surveillance, and civil 
	control are now being repatriated as well.
	
	In a future America, enhanced retinal recognition could be married to 
	omnipresent security cameras as a part of the increasingly routine 
	monitoring of public space. Military surveillance equipment, tempered to a 
	technological cutting edge in counterinsurgency wars, might also one day be 
	married to the swelling domestic databases of the NSA and FBI, sweeping the 
	fiber-optic cables beneath our cities for any sign of subversion. 
	
	 
	
	And in the skies above, loitering aircraft and 
	cruising drones could be checking our borders and peering down on American 
	life.
	
	If that day comes, our cities will be Argus-eyed with countless thousands of 
	digital cameras scanning the faces of passengers at airports, pedestrians on 
	city streets, drivers on highways, ATM customers, mall shoppers, and 
	visitors to any federal facility. 
	
	 
	
	One day, hyper-speed software will be able to 
	match those millions upon millions of facial or retinal scans to photos of 
	suspect subversives inside a biometric database akin to England's current 
	
	National Public Order Intelligence Unit, sending anti-subversion SWAT teams 
	scrambling for an arrest or an armed assault.
	
	By the time the Global War on Terror is declared over in 2020, if then, our 
	American world may be unrecognizable - or rather recognizable only as the 
	stuff of dystopian science fiction. What we are proving today is that, 
	however detached from the wars being fought in their name most Americans may 
	seem, war itself never stays far from home for long. 
	
	 
	
	It's already returning in the form of new 
	security technologies that could one day make a digital surveillance state a 
	reality, changing fundamentally the character of American democracy.