
	by Robert Poe
	February 24, 2009
	
	from
	
	Voip-News Website 
	
	
	
	Skype Ltd. has long insisted that intercepting bad guys' conversations is 
	not its concern. It's not a real phone company, because it doesn't own its 
	own phone lines, cables or network. 
	
	 
	
	That, Skype claims, makes it exempt from 
	regulations like 
	
	CALEA (Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act), 
	which requires U.S. phone companies to provide law enforcement agencies with 
	the ability to wiretap their users. 
	
	 
	
	Now, however, Skype is under pressure in 
	Europe to help authorities eavesdrop on calls criminals make using its 
	service. One big question remains, though: whether the Internet VoIP company 
	could do so even if it wanted to.
	
	The latest pressure came in the form of an announcement by 
	
	Eurojust, which 
	coordinates efforts to fight cross-border and organized crime in the 
	European Union. The announcement said the organization's Italian division 
	was coordinating a Europe-wide investigation of the use of Internet VoIP 
	systems such as Skype. 
	
	 
	
	The impetus for the effort came from instances of 
	Italian criminals, including arms and drug traffickers, organized crime and 
	prostitution rings, using Skype to avoid detection. The goal of the 
	investigation, which will include all 27 members of Eurojust, is to overcome 
	legal and technical hurdles to interception of Internet telephony systems.
	
	In fact, there is currently no legal basis for intercepting Internet VoIP 
	calls. Law enforcement agencies can get court orders for tapping landline or 
	cellular calls. 
	
	 
	
	And Skype itself agrees that calls by its users that travel 
	to and from the PSTN (public switched telephone network) are subject to 
	wiretap laws, though it claims compliance is solely the responsibility of 
	carriers on whose networks the calls originate or terminate. But there are 
	no such laws covering calls that travel only over the Internet.
	
	Even if efforts like that of Eurojust lead to the enactment of such laws, 
	the technical obstacles to intercepting Skype calls would be considerable. 
	
	
	 
	
	Difficulties in knowing where the Internet caller is physically located 
	might or might not be a problem, depending on whether the laws limited the 
	geographic scope of intercepts. A bigger problem would be Skype's
	
	encryption. According to what little is known about the system, it is 
	difficult to break, and would be even if Skype were actively participating 
	in the effort.
	
	The main difficulty is that the encryption happens only between the two 
	callers' Skype clients, which 
	
	generate encryption keys and pass them to each 
	other. Skype's servers have nothing to do with the actual encryption - their 
	main function is confirm to each caller's client software that the other is 
	a legitimate user. Likewise, the calls themselves don't pass through any Skype equipment or network, and Skype likely wouldn't be able to decrypt 
	them if they did.
	
	Failed attempts to break Skype's encryption in fact contributed to the 
	pressure for action in Europe. In particular, an IT firm that Bavarian 
	authorities hired to try to crack Skype was unable to do so. In its 
	statement, Eurojust claimed that Skype won't share its encryption system 
	with authorities. 
	
	 
	
	Skype stated in response that it has, 
	
		
		"extensively 
	debriefed Eurojust on our law enforcement program and capabilities." It 
	added that it "cooperates with law enforcement where legally and technically 
	possible."