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Training and experience requirements
The scientific and engineering theory necessary for work in space activities can be provided by university courses, and certain developmental and basic research in materials, processes, and space research packages can be conducted in university laboratories, But for specific training in the unique aspects of space activity planning, development, and implementation, field experience and familiarity with the “hardware” are required, An understanding, for example, of the complex interrelations of the space vehicle, its mission, and its payload,,, as well as the processing and use of the obtained information, can be acquired adequately only at the plants, launching pads, and laboratories where research and development for future missions is going forward. The relatively few environments that at present can provide the necessary field training and the rapid rate of obsolescence of the experience thus acquired suggest that special methods of manpower utilization within the government framework are required.
It may be more desirable, for instance, to circulate professional personnel through the laboratories of government agencies performing functions and missions related to space activities, than to restrict , them to the laboratories of the agency with which they are affiliated.'/ And, since the space effort needs and capabilities of government, and those universities and other research organizations carrying on programs are intimately related to each other, there might be merit in developing means for circulating professional personnel between private and government laboratories, to facilitate exchange of perspectives as well as technological know-how. 3/ This exchange may be especially important in the light of the frequent reminder by observers that government personnel should be equal in competence to their nongovernmental counterparts in order to judge the quality and significance of the space activity proposals made by the latter to the government. 4/ (Such arrangements would generate conflict-of-interest problems that would need to be explored and resolved. 5/
in the general interests of effective and efficient use of manpower, the whole concept of scientific and engineering careers in government space efforts might be explored from the standpoint of the special relationships existing now, and those that can be foreseen for the future, between government and its major private contractors in the space field. 6 /
Another potential problem to be faced by government is implicit both in the taxing demands made on the creativity and productive capacity of the typically young scientific personnel and in the rapid pace of developmental change and even obsolescence, What can be done with high-salaried personnel who are still capable but may have outlived their creative usefulness specifically for the productive purposes of space activity?
The problems set forth above illustrate the many that are involved in the effective use of personnel for the federal government’s space programs. Research, then, is desirable to determine
• The present and foreseeable experience and training required for scientific personnel affiliated with government space programs so that they will be
(1) effectively incorporated into the space activity field,
(2) capable of efficient coordination of-technical operations, and
(3) able to make highly competent judgments on pertinent programssubmitted from out side the organization.
• The advantages and disadvantages for the program of varying time involvements of personnel in the government space program. If there are advantages to short or medium periods of involvement, at what stage of the person's career is there the greatest likely payoff for the program?
• Legal and procedural means for exposing personnel to the requisite experience and training in such ways as mutually to benefit them and the government's activities in the space field, including means for encouraging or discouraging turnover and circulation of personnel between and outside of government agencies appropriate to the findings of the studies proposed above.
Motivation
Various aspects of the motivations for recruitment into the space program, the length of involvement with it, and exodus from it suggest important research areas. The above-stated problems in manpower utilization could, of course, also be seen in this light.
The following statement indicates what NASA believes to be the main source of its turnover: “During calendar year 1959, out of an average number of 2,355 research and development professional personnel, NASA had 171 leave the organization voluntarily. This is a turnover of 7.2 per cent. It is our belief that the large majority of research and development personnel left because of pay. Our studies in the past have shown that in only a few cases did the individual leave for less or the same salary, and those who went to industry usually received substantially higher pay.” 7/
At present there are few or no comparable and detailed data on the motivations to leave or join government science activities in general. In view of the many alternative opportunities open to scientists and engineers who might choose to work in the space field, it is especially important, if the government is to have its necessary share of high quality personnel, that insight into the motives and opportunities of those who leave or join its efforts be as clear as possible. 8/ (In this regard, Chapter 9's sections on the attitudes of such personnel are especially pertinent.)
Thus, research concerning motivation of NASA space scientists and engineers is necessary to determine:
• What are perceived by those working in government as the advantages and disadvantages of government employment in the space field? How does this compare with their perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of industrial space employment? How are the perceptions related to professional interests, status, aspirations, competence, etc.? What are the corresponding images held by persons in industry and in non-profit institutions?-”
• What are the perceived specific factors which now (and might in the future) cause professional people to leave or join NASA space activities? 9/
• If working in NASA space activities were more or less attractive compared to working for
(1) other space organizations in government or
(2) other space organizations out of government, or
(3) projects entirely outside of the space field, what would be, for theNASA program, the specific consequences of reductions or increases in the numbers of specific types and qualities of personnel and In the levels of competence under each of these three conditions of alternative employment?
• In what ways does NASA is favorable salary position affect other space programs? What are the feedback effects on NASA? What are the over-all effects on the national space progxatn? What means can be developed and applied for arranging salary system realignments necessary to correct inequities in top salaries that have no flexibility with which to respond to general pay increases? 10/
Research and development implications for manpower
There is abundant evidence that research and development activities require a different kind of organizational structure and managerial philosophy than that which is traditions” for large-scale undertakings.” 11/ The fact that research is a venture into the unknown, in contrast to such activities as production which involve efficient reproduction of the known, suggests the need for a different system of control and direction in research as opposed to manufacturing, lie values and career aspirations of scientists and engineers -as distinguished for example from those of manual workers or businessmen
-suggest that systems of reward and rules of conduct should be designedwhich would recognize those val@es and aspirations. The fact that the research managers range of relevant knowledge and skill is usually different from, that of the professional group he leads suggests the importance of finding alternatives to a command system for laboratory administration. 12/
Research and development work related to space technology is marked by a degree of complexity unmatched in any other field. Particularly in respect to potential man-in-space or colonization projects, an enormous number of fields of knowledge and experimentation are required. Underestimation of the need for, or economies to be achieved by, a greater investment in research prior to costly engineering experiments, or of the need for integrating scientific and engineering experimentation can lead to delays, anomalies, and inefficiencies. Such occurrences can sometimes be traced to a discounting by the members of one technological field of the potential contribution of other fields, or to the inability of managerial personnel to create the conditions needed for adequate communication and collaboration among the groups involved in the creation of a complex system. It is not enough to recruit persons with appropriate scientific and engineering skills; arranging for the coordination and integration of their efforts is itself a complex and difficult undertaking. This is an area where there is a dearth of the experimental and observational knowledge which would ensure efficient utilization of the human resources and equipment involved in developing space technology.
Subgrouping of research and development personnel according to some principle is a necessity, but different principles appear to be optimal for different undertakings. Scientists and engineers may identify themselves with others in their own field (e.g., solid state physics or astronautical engineering), or with others working on the same large project, or with others interested in particular subject matters (e.g., propulsion systems or vehicles). The organizational structure and procedures of a research and development organization can produce such identification; they can also drive away scientists and engineers whose preferences conflict with them. For example, in one research location the most creative scientists were found to be spending much more time with persons in scientific fields other than their own than did their less creative colleagues. 13/ Again, the length of time members of a group have worked together appears to be related tot he productivity and creativity of the group. 14/ Research to develop methods of determining optimal structures and procedures for the unique organizational problems confronting space technology could provide useful guides to persons charged with organizational administration.
Thus, to ensure that available scientific and engineering intelligence is mobilized most strategically for the tasks confronting space research and development activities within the government, research is needed:
• To develop means for assessing the present level of performance of organizations involved in space technology, and for estimating their potential for improvement,
• To develop methods for identifying obstacles to improved coordination, communication, and collaboration among the research groups involved, and to develop means for overcoming these obstacles,
• To locate and make use of opportunities for experimenting with novel organizational arrangements to gain the knowledge needed as a basis for establishing optimal conditions for creative collaboration among the scientists, engineers, and ancillary groups involved in space technology.
• To assess the effect of community settings on work in space technology, Does an R&D space community facilitate creative work, or does it produce conformity, squeezing out scientists whose standards are different from community standards? Does it stimulate promotion-by-friendship and preoccupation with status differences? Is a large metropolitan area better or worse As a community setting in regard to the above -than a small isolated area? 44/
Long-Range manpower requirements
A report of the U S Department of Labor on population trends and their manpower implications indicates that, because of the low birth rate of the depression period, no significant change in the size of the 25 to 44 age group will have taken place dating the decade ending in 1965, The age group of men and women between 18 And 24 which decreased in size from 16.8 to 15.1 million during the decade ending in 1955, was expected to increase by almost 5 million persons. The estimated gross national product by 1965 would amount to $560 billion -- as compared with $391 billion in 1955 -- and require a labor force of 74 million persons, representing an increase of 10 million. The report estimated that, in order to meet the needs of the nation's expanding economy in 1965, title professional and technical occupation groups would have to increase in size by more than a third. 15/ Thus, space activities will have to compete even more than at present with other professional, attractions for the highly trained 25 to 44 age group; on the other hand, there will be available a potential work force under 25, well-educated but inexperienced.
In the light of these forecasts it seems obvious that in planning long-range space programs more thought must be given to the availability of skilled manpower to carry them out. Although significant over-all population increases are anticipated, the 25 - 44 skilled group will not increase and the skilled manpower requirements of numerous other sectors of the economy will compete for their share of the total supply. Therefore, the sufficiency of personnel to conduct in-house government space programs should be reckoned not only in numbers and types but also in terms of costs. If the desired personnel are in short supply, salary will be a major device for both NASA and its contractors, to attract personnel and, as such, a major contributor to the costs of space programs. (NASA might thereby find itself in effect competing with itself.) However, through long-range planning of personnel recruitment and training the needed personnel might be provided in sufficient quantity to minimize the contribution of excessive competitive salary scales to over-all costs, thereby possibly permitting allocation of funds thus saved to other aspects of the effort. 16/ Future manpower requirements should be studied with the intention of reducing the chances that they will have a limiting effect on future operations.
Research is desirable, then, to determine:
• What will be the specific manpower needs of NASA by type and by competence for various future time periods and for specific programs?
• On the basis of the above and of the best estimates of career and utilization trends, what is the competitive situation likely to be with regard to these personnel at particular times, and what will be the estimated costs for NASA in competing for these personnel?
• What can be done to encourage and improve career selection by appropriate collegians, along lines compatible with NASA's interests, the welfare of the nation, and the interests of the potential recruits?
• What use can be made by NASA of the professionally inexperienced in the under-25-years age group in the years ahead. Are there space activity tasks which could be so organized that these people can be easily trained to do them? 17/
Through this training can they efficiently gain the needed experience for more sophisticated participation?
Information on scientific manpower
It is evident that planning for future personnel requirements, training, and costs depends on accurate and continuing knowledge of current national levels of competence and types of capabilities. Thus, information on scientific manpower is a logical prerequisite for personnel planning. However, according to the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, the problem of obtaining scientific manpower information is as follows:
“Part of the confusion surrounding the debate concerning the adequacy of our present and future supply of scientists, engineers, and other key manpower is a result of the lack of accurate current occupational information. It is a remarkable fact that we can pick up the Statistical Abstract of the United States and find out that, for example, on January 1, 1958, there were 22,357,000 milk cows in this country. Yet we do not know with the same exactitude, how many physicists we have and how much they earn.” 18/
The National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, an important responsibility of the National Science Foundation, is based upon a National Science Foundation Act directive “to maintain a register of scientific and technical personnel to serve as a central clearing house for information.” Manpower data was to be provided on the supply, utilization, and professional characteristics of American scientists in the major fields, An appraisal of the Foundation a manpower studies and maintenance of the Register was made by house committee during the First Session-of the 86th Congress, and a subsequent report, critical of the Foundation for devoting only a very small percent of its budget to their activities, urged chat the program be strengthened, since “with the need for scientific manpower growing daily, tie need for a superior manpower tabulation” was “likewise accelerating rapidly .” 19/
Research is necessary to determine:
• What information about the competence, distribution, and utilization of United States scientific and engineering personnel would be most useful to NASA in planning its personnel utilization requirements and costs now and in the future? To what extent would data from other countries be useful? 2O/
• How could up-to-date data best be obtained and maintained?
• What are the cost and benefits of more or less precision in the data?
• What are the most efficient ways to use the data for costing, planning, and recruiting purposes in regard to personnel?
• What other government organizations could assist in the accumulation, processing, and up-dating of the data? Who else would benefit from such data? Who has the best functional capability for obtaining and processing it?
• How can the required level of cooperation be obtained from the scientists and engineers who are queried for information?
Career aspirations in the younger generation
Because of their spectacular nature and the great amount of attention paid to them, space activities may represent for the younger generation the essence and direction of a variety of careers. it is possible that too many young people will aspire to careers in the space effort or in related scientific, engineering, and military fields, but there is also a kindred possibility that, with the palling of glamour after a time, indifference to space and related fields may direct first-class young minds into quite other careers. 21/
As of today, parents, their youngsters, teachers, and career advisers are responding to space activities career opportunities in a variety of ways. There is some evidence of a good deal of adolescent interest in current space projects. 22/ Parental and school guidance attitudes toward military or civilian careers, as well as toward science and engineering, presumably will affect the numbers and types of students who choose space-oriented careers, Perceptions about the income and status levels involved in comparison to those of other fields may also contribute in favor of space-related fields, it is important for NASA to consider, develop, and balance its role in stimulating youngsters to careers in space activities. In the first place, NASA will depend for its future personnel on some of those so stimulated, and their attitudes as future voters will also be important to space activities. Further, the space efforts of universities and industries, upon which NASA's program also depends, must obtain their future personnel from among those so stimulated. However, it is vital to the interests of the nation and its citizens that the number of youngsters aspiring to space careers should not be so great that other fields would suffer for want of talent.
For these reasons, then, it is most desirable that the effects of space activity products on career selection be understood and that efforts be made to insure plans for meeting personnel requirements in such a manner that NASA can fulfill its obligations toward space activities as well as toward society at large. Thus a series of studies with regard to career perceptions and aspirations is desirable, in order to determine:
• What, over time, are the evolving images in the minds of parents, teachers, career advisers, and young people of the space scientist and engineer, and how do these compare with the image of other possible career models. 23/ In particular, what values (e.g., craftsmanship, dedication) are perceived as involved in particular careers? Are these seen as attractive or unattractive? What knowledge, ignorance, events, or experiences change or emphasize the nature of the images held? **
• What relationships are discoverable between adolescents' values and career commitments and their later adult attitudes toward life in general and space activities in particular.
• How space activities affect the interests and values of adolescent girls, with regard to their own career aspirations and to the career of the type of man they may wish to marry and the time at which they wish to marry. 24/
• What the effects are of space activities on the knowledge, attitudes, and teaching interests of teachers -- particularly science teachers -- and how the effects in turn affect those taught. 25/
• What methods could be developed for assessing early interests, aptitudes, and values that can be nurtured to provide the needed scientists and engineers for space activities.
• What curriculum requirements will provide the requisite training for space activity careers as well as a flexible intellectual and professional competence applicable to other socially useful activities in the event that the need for space personnel lessens.
Problems of Coordination, Cooperation, and Competition Between Government Agencies
Organizations, to work well, must be adapted to the special nature of their subject matter. Since space activities are unique in many aspects, formal or informal organizational, procedures that are intended to meet the best interests of the space program and the nation should be based on an appreciation of the special implications that the space program has for government organization.
A new government agency such as NASA. with unusual activities that have wide-ranging needs and implications, must inevitably face problems of coordination, competition, and cooperation with other agencies which have, or would like to have, interests in the same activities. The problems arise out of both a commonality of interest and the unique aspects of space activities. Thus organizational functions and procedures must take account of questions which are fundamentally new and at the same time partake of the immemorial conflicts of interest inherent in complex organizations of any kind. 26/
Another complicating factor is the heterogeneity of the various organizations involved. There are vast differences in size, political power, monetary resources, types of functions, and personnel composition nevertheless, these agencies provide the common resource pools for many policy planning committees or specific crash-project tasks. An additional dimension is introduced when membership composition is examined. Members of one agency may be found to be associated with several other, agencies, making it possible for one individual to have two or more different functions on the same project. And there may be common memberships in intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies. 27/
Any research on interagency relationships should include:
• A rigorous inventory of the organizations involved, classified according to organizational characteristics, functions, techniques of operation, objectives, source of manpower, etc.
• A determination of the divisions of responsibility, the extent of authority, the role of competition, the way interrelationships are viewed internally, the degree of “extracurricular” cooperation, and the process of coordination for over-all planning.
• The methods used to maintain And facilitate interagency communications and the problems related thereto. For example, what methods are used -- scheduled coordinating meetings, ad hoc meetings as problems arise, hurried phone calls between old friends? What staff level or working groups are involved? 28/ Are there operational differences between decision making and problem solving groups? What provisions are there for the circulation of reports, etc.? What is the extent and importance of prior individual acquaintanceships? Are there observable and meaningful patterns in the multiple-membership aspect?
The present and potential problems discussed in the rest of this section are typical of the problems that qualified observers think require careful and systematic study.
Salary conflicts
The salaries of the large majority of the government's scientific personnel are regulated by the Classification Act of 1949 (and amendments thereto), which provides for eighteen grades of positions based upon varying levels of difficulty as prescribed in Civil Service Commission grade-level position standards and qualification requirements. Under the National Aeronautics and Space Act, NASA is authorized to hire new government scientists and engineers two grades above normal entrance grades, NASA is also given authority under the Space Act (as distinct from P.L, 313): (2) to appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out such functions. Such officers and employees shall be appointed in accordance with the civil-service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, except that (A) to the extent the Administrator deems such action necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities, he may appoint and fix the compensation (up to a limit of $19,000 a year, or up to the limit of $21,000 a year for a maximum of ten positions) of not more than two hundred and sixty of the scientific, engineering, and administrative personnel of the Administration without regard to such laws,” 29/
Under the Classification Act, the Civil Service Commission is authorized to raise entrance salary rates of professional scientific personnel from the normal base-level grade rate to higher within-grade rates as an aid in recruitment. A request to the Civil Service Commission by the NASA Administrator for authority to raise the minimum rates of pay, under this procedure, stated in part “The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is faced with a serious problem in the recruitment of qualified scientific personnel for the Nation’s space and aeronautical programs. In brief, the problem centers about our inability to meet staffing requirements because of low pay. In order that important programs such as Project Mercury may proceed without delay, authority is requested to raise the minimum rates of pay to the maximum scheduled rates of each grade.' 30/
NASA's request for top-of-the-grade pay for aeronautical research scientists was subsequently withdrawn because of “.,,substantial administrative difficulties in raising aeronautical research scientists to the top of the grade for a single agency, since similar positions exist in other agencies. The Defense Department, which has nearly all such positions outside of NASA, does not support the increase because it does not at present face hiring needs for these skills to the extent NASA does. 31/
Competition for space roles
Direct Agency Participation.
The President's second annual report to the Congress on aeronautics and space activities “details the steps taken during 1959 to establish a firm foundation for a dynamic program of space exploration, and it summarizes the contributions of Federal agencies.” Although the Congress established the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee in the Space Act to provide comprehensive coordination over the space programs, events indicate that the efforts of several space activities are not represented in either of these bodies. The CMLC is, in principle, concerned primarily with Department of Defense and NASA coordination, while the Space Council includes as members the Departments of State and Defense, NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation. However, the President's report also lists as participants in space activities the following additional agencies: the Department of Commerce, Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Federal Communications Commission, and U.S. Information Agency. 32/
It is not clear what the consequences ate of such nonrecognition for the above agencies, but the experience of the Weather Bureau is perhaps indicative. The entire research and development budget for the Weather Bureau in fiscal year 1960 was about $5 million. In the fiscal year 1960, NASA's appropriation for meteorology alone was $7.9 million. The importance of the Weather Bureau for NASA's space program can be seen in one of the consequences of the Tiros I meteorological satellite launched on April 1, 1960: Bureau meteorologists received over 22,000 cloud cover photographs for interpretation. Faced with this additional workload for which inadequate funds were available, the Weather Bureau was forced to request an emergency appropriation from Congress for additional manpower. 33/
Peaceful vs. Military Emphasis of the Space Program
Observers have speculated that the future direction of space activities is by no means clear and that, in spite of frequent declarations that the program (as represented by NASA) is primarily dedicated to peaceful and scientific space activities, it is not impossible that it may become subservient to the military space program -- which was originally conceived of as the proper responsibility of the Department of Defense. NASA's dependence on the military for many technical aspects of its program, the strong support of the military in some segments of Congress and the public, as well as persistent efforts by the military to remain self-sufficient in the space area are all taken as signs that the fight for control of the major space effort is by no means over. 34/
Jurisdiction Over Related Science and Technology
Observers feel that inevitably there will be conflicts over which agency should control certain activities related to the space program. It is felt, for example, that the present jurisdictional arrangement may be temporary between AEC and NASA regarding nuclear space propulsion research and that the interests of the two organizations may become more vested as the project develops and as regulation becomes an important problem. 35/ A recent staff report of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences indicates that in the field of life sciences research there is an area of possible conflict and noncoordination, The Senate report is essentially a complete inventory of the more than $60 million worth of life science facilities existing in the Department of Defense, The central point of the report is not that NASA should not have a life sciences program in connection with its own activities, but rather that in proceeding with its program it should be aware that facilities already exist in this area and therefore its activities in the life sciences area should reflect the best utilization of these facilities. 36/ Related jurisdictional problems may also arise, As space activities develop products having continuing effects for society, there may be problems of jurisdiction over equipment design and regulation. For example, how will control be allocated between NASA and the Weather Bureau regarding data processing by weather satellites and between NASA and the FCC for communication satellites? 37/
Civilian-Military Coordination.
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 authorizes a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee to coordinate space programs between NASA and the Department of Defense. Section 204 (b) of the Act states-. “The Administration and the Department of Defense, through the Liaison Committee, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions relating to aeronautical and space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” But in the testimony before Congress, the chairman of the CMLC revealed, as follows, the plight of his organization and the reasons why its role as space program coordinator was essentially neglected by NASA and the Department of Defense:
“Since the passage of the Space Act on July 29, 1958, the Civilian-Military Committee has met 13 times....For the most part, the items of business brought before the Committee at the formal meetings are of the information type to keep the committee, as a whole, informed on the activities of NASA and DOD... the role of the Committee has been of relative minor importance. This status of the Committee, I might add, had caused some concern on the part of the members ....
“This Committee, because of its composition, that is, a membership made up of representatives who are subject to a higher internal authority, is incapable of making firm decisions.” 38/
Further evidence of the neglect of CMLC is provided by the announcement by NASA and the Department of Defense on September 13, 1960, of the establishment of a joint Aeronautics Coordinating Board, unofficially to replace the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee. The agreement provided, as co-chairmen of the new board, the Deputy Administrator of NASA and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The announced objectives of the board, consisting of panels in various technical areas, were to:
“(1) review planning to avoid duplication;
(2) coordinate activities of common interest;
(3) identify problems requiring solution by either NASA or DOD and insure a steady exchange of information.”
To the extent that coordination of both competition and cooperation between agencies is ineffective or inadequate, there is, on the face of it, reason to suspect that scarce personnel and production and research resources, as well as money, are probably being used inefficiently. In view of the costs of space activities and the shortages of qualified personnel it would be in the interests of NASA and the nation to determine through detailed and continuing research:
• What would be the advantages and disadvantages of specific cooperative and coordinated arrangements for the use of manpower, money, and physical resources between specific agencies having interests in present and anticipated space research, developments, and applications? **
• To what extent do NASA and other space organizations compete for the same resources and facilities, and what are the costs and benefits of such competition?
• What are the foreseeable competitive and cooperative trends, and what are the estimated costs and benefits of continued cooperation and/or competition in these areas?
• In the light of the three above problems, what means can be devised and implemented for coordinating and utilizing effectively the interests and capabilities of other agencies for the advancement of space programs, either through selective cooperation or selective competition?
• What are the specific present and foreseeable jurisdictional problems, both administrative and regulatory, which will con front NASA? What studies can be undertaken now to anticipate future problems and lay the basis for efficacious resolution?
Science vs. Engineering, and Basic vs. Applied Research
There are indications, sometimes subtle, that competition is growing within the science hierarchy of the federal government between space activities and the more traditional science programs; manifestations include competition for funds, manpower, and space roles -- as well as the breakdown or neglect of coordination between agencies, While compelling needs sometimes dictate the urgency with which particular programs must progress, it is usually within a relatively static federal budget that such changes take place, sometimes at the expense of related programs. There is a well-documented history of the relationship and to some extent the rivalry between so-called basic and applied research. 39 / Other forms of competition between scientific fields are usually reflected in the private attitudes of scientists engaged in competing fields. 40/ Some organizations and their representatives appeal to Congress and the general public by emphasizing applied research and calling engineering “science”; others, appealing to other publics as well as their own self-images, try to keep the traditional distinction between science and engineering and basic and applied research, Space activities have been defined as any and all of these by various groups in and out of government with various vested interests at stake. 41/ But, at the same time, qualified observers have noted that in “big science,” and especially in space activities, the lines between engineering and science and between basic and applied research are exceedingly difficult to maintain, given the intimate interdependence of engineering and science, the rapid pace of applying basic research, and the tendency to carry out what traditionally would have been basic research as a prerequisite for anticipated applications. 42/
Organizational problems arise when who is to get what funds and privileges for conducting which programs depends -- or is perceived to depend-on the semantics of the appeals made to fund sources and on which organizations are traditionally viewed as the proper ones for conducting science Or engineering, basic research or applied. Since both the definitions and the interests are flexible, even though frequently perceived as rigid or “real,” the problems of priorities and jurisdiction become vexing to the science and engineering communities in and out of government and to nonscientific administrators in government. (Other facets of this problem are discussed in the last section of this chapter.)
It is worth questioning, then, what would be the organizational advantages and disadvantages of updating the concepts of science, engineering, basic or pure, and applied research, within the scientific and engineering communities, Congress, the mass media, general public, and opinion leaders. Until this is done, many argue, competition for federal funds, priorities, and jurisdiction will be based on and will appeal to semantically invalid distinctions. This is believed to be especially so with regard to the many faceted space programs.
Research is desirable, then, to determine:
• The extent to which competition for space funds and task jurisdiction is based on misperceptions, within the competing organizations and/or misperceptions in those appealed to, about the distinctions between science, engineering, basic and applied re search.
• Means for clarifying the interrelationships between these distinctions in operationally meaningful ways -- or means for discarding these distinctions as criteria for assigning priorities, funds, and/or jurisdiction.
• Means for establishing in appropriate places a tolerance for and appreciation of the desirability of space research with no apparent payoff.
• Methods and means for establishing criteria for assigning priori ties, jurisdictions, and funds to space research in concert with other scientific and engineering activities in the government.
Implications for federal-state relations
At present, civilian launching complexes are few, and for the most part are associated with military installations. It is not inconceivable that if the range and variety of civilian space activity increases, NASA will need its own sites. Some of these would be located in various states and might be subject to state regulations. NASA, as a civilian organization, cannot claim military necessity in order to expropriate land. State regulations regarding the siting and control of dangerous operations may require various adjudications and arrangements between NASA and state agencies, which may not be easily compatible.
There may be foreseeable legal, health, and safety problems which make it worthwhile for NASA to study:
• Means for most effectively reconciling the possibly conflicting interests of the sites and the states in which they operate.
There may also be strong pressures on NASA to permit various types of statepromoted participation in the space effort such as already exists in the atomic field, for many states make intensive efforts to bring in organizations to enhance their economy or stature. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that groups of states would have an interest in launching special rockets for local weather tracking and detecting purposes. Groups of states also, as well as individual states, may find it worthwhile investing in training, testing, launching, and research facilities in the space field, as a device for retaining and attracting academic personnel to state universities, as a means of attracting high caliber students, and as an inducement to industry. With the development of solid propellants, some states, having safe launching and flight tracks out to sea or over uninhabited areas, may wish to promote actual rocket launchings.
There would appear to be both opportunities and problems in connection with state participation -- opportunities to expand interest in and contributions to the space program, and problems of regulation and control involving federal-state relationships, Therefore, research seems desirable to determined
• Whether or not and, if so, in what ways states could be involved productively in space activities.
• If state participation is desirable, what incentives might en courage it and how might federal space programs provide the incentives? If undesirable, what restraints on space activities can the federal government impose effectively?
• If participation is desirable, what state-federal coordination and regulation problems need to be solved to permit participation, and what are the means for solving them? 43/
Science Advisory Activities and Government Policy
It is generally conceded that space activities and science in general have become inextricably intertwined at the governmental policy making level, so that policy about one must inevitably affect policy about the other. This intertwining of interests, while not new in degree to science or government, has clearly received special emphasis as a result of the special and spectacular role of space activities in government policies, both domestic and international. Probably more than any other scientific and engineering activity, the space program has emphasized and dramatized the intricate problems of assigning priorities to competing and cooperating scientific and technological efforts and of integrating new men, new ideas, and new technology effectively into the already conflicting and competing operations of a complex democratic government.
Inevitably, then, the significance and priorities of the many roles of the scientist as scientist, government adviser, special pleader, promoter, and everyday citizen have become exceedingly murky in his own perceptions; in the perceptions of the non-scientists, with whom he must work at the policy levels of the government; and in the perceptions of those outside of the government who report on and interpret the interrelated activities of government policy advisors and policy makers, both scientist and nonscientist, It follows that among the major on-going implications of space activities are their effects on the interrelations of scientist and engineer as advisers and administrators at high government levels to the nonscientist administrator and to government organization.
While much has been written from a philosophical point of view since World War II about this new role of science and scientists in government, there has been little evaluation of the operational aspects of the relationship. How, for example, is the relationship working out? Are scientific considerations being used adequately in policy formulation? Do scientists communicate effectively with political experts? What happens to the scientist when he steps into the political arena? And, perhaps more important,, is there consensus among the people involved as to the role science and scientists are -- or should be -- playing at the governmental policy level? 44 1 The recruitment of personnel to fulfill government space goals and the work of agencies in the pursuit of these goals cannot be done at the most effective level unless the role of the scientist and engineer as policy advisers with regard to the goals is clarified and formalized.
Interviews with qualified persons revealed two overlapping areas of controversy about the role of the scientist at the policy level of government. There were varying ideas (1) of what should be the function and organization of government scientific advisory groups in politics, and (2) of what should be the role of the scientific adviser, These ideas will be discussed in the subsections that follow.
What should be the function and organization of government scientific advisory groups?
Views regarding the Office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
The respondents here included staff members of the Office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and members of executive agencies that use the services of the office. Some respondents felt very strongly that the responsibility of a presidential science advisory office was to advance science on a broad front and to integrate the interests of national science policy into public policy. Others felt, also very strongly, that on the contrary the office's function was to bring to bear on current special problems including space activities) that segment of the scientific community most relevant to and informed on the situation, even if the broader interests of the scientific community suffered at the expense of a given program, 45/
Views Regarding Science Advisory Groups in General
Another set of issues had to do with organizational aspects of the advisory role. At what level of policy planning and policy making should the advisory group be introduced? Where should it be located? What working arrangements should be utilized?
Some felt that political agencies needed their own staff-connected technical personnel to act as translators for internal problems concerning technical matters, since it was believed that advice from technical people of other agencies was apt to be couched in the separate interests of that agency, An “objective” science agency was perceived by some to carry the danger of “scientific bias,” and some respondents acknowledged that what they wanted were technical advisers with their own agency's bias. The contrary view was also expressed that in-house technical staffs in nontechnical agencies should be minimized if not eliminated in the search for objective advice. There was little agreement on the level at which advice should be introducted or where the interaction should take place. 46/
Concerning the problems of communication between the technical adviser and the nontechnical advisee views also differed. Among the respondents who saw and felt serious communication difficulties (a few saw this problem area as insignificant, if existing at all), some saw them stemming primarily from semantic differences involving the use of unfamiliar symbols. On the other hand, there were those who denied any semantic conflict whatsoever, seeing the problem as one of differences in basic frames of reference or broad points of view. 47/
Some felt it imperative to include top-level personnel -- departmental secretaries and commissioners -- on science advisory committees if the various factors for a single policy were to be integrated effectively; others were strongly opposed to including such top-level people, on the grounds that it was impossible for them to do the necessary homework and that they were so involved with acting out their institutional roles that they could not get to the heart of other matters.
On the size of the committees, some thought that the twenty to thirty members frequently found in today's advisory committees are essential if all factors and viewpoints are to be taken into consideration. Others were fairly vehement about putting an upper limit of ten on the membership, as an absolute maximum for the type of interaction necessary for the integration of the various factors into policy advice.
The whole question of cue ad hoc advisory panel versus the on-going advisory function (either individual or group) produced a variety of reasons, quite equally divided, why one type was better than the other. Only one respondent listed advantages and drawbacks to both sides, implying that different problems might call for different techniques.
These various conflicting attitudes about the proper role, purpose, degree of success, etc., of scientific advisory groups are important to examine because they indicate profound differences of perception and expectation about a very important and new phenomenon in our political system and in the value context of the scientific ideology. The materials presented indicate only enough of the nature of the problems and opportunities in the relationship of science to policy to demonstrate that far more systematic research is desirable if the nation, science in general, and space activities in particular are to benefit fully from this new arrangement.
The problems referred to are in an important sense not unique to this situation. They are characteristic of the problems facing new groups working out new answers to new questions in a not-so-new larger context of crossinterests, traditions, and goals. The wealth of knowledge acquired in recent years about factors affecting organizational structure, conference procedures, and small-group interaction deserves careful attention for its present utility and for the further research it suggests. 48/ Obviously, as basic research on these problems produces new knowledge, the opportunities of applying it to this particular situation will increase. But the situation in itself also provides many significant opportunities for basic research on these matters if the necessary cooperation is forthcoming.
Clearly the first step in a systematic examination of these problems would be more detailed interviews of the sort on which the above recounting is based. By combining the findings of such interviews with the extant knowledge about organizational structure, the operation of small groups and conferences, and the special factors contributed by the political context, alternative approaches to the resolution of differences could be developed and perhaps even tried. Whether or not they might be tried depends of course on the quality of the suggestions, but, importantly, it also depends on what in fact is and will be the attitude of non-scientists toward the application of scientific advice in a political context. It is by no means clear to what extent the use of scientists is based on (1) sincere commitment to the values of rational science, (2) ritualistic application of a “good thing;” or (3) the desire for an added political tactic. Nor, of course, is it clear under what conditions these different perspectives (and others) pertain.
As a first approach to research in this area more systematic attention should be given to
• A detailed analysis (based on further interviews and observations) of the nature and relationship to each other of each of the differences of opinion regarding the matters discussed in the above paragraphs, Questions useful for this analysis would be, among others: What beliefs, expectations, and concrete experiences have led to and sustain the respondents' opinions on these various matters? What operating procedures and administrative organizations, under what specific circumstances, would the respondents recommend to best accomplish what they believe to be the functions of science advisers? What do respondents believe is wrong with the positions taken by those who disagree with their interpretations and recommendations and what adverse consequences do they perceive as following from implementation of those positions?
• An examination of the effects of scientific advice on policy making. Among the questions to be asked: How do antecedent advisory recommendations compare with actual policies? What are the factors which constitute pressures to accept or reject advisory recommendations? What are the effects on advisory group actions -and on those they advise -- of membership in the group, of scientists who are also doing research under government sponsorship? What factors are involved, resolved, or re- main as persistent sources of conflict for advisers and their clients when scientists are members of more than one advisory panel whose respective interests are in conflict or complementary?
• An attempt to discover the underlying values and goals of science advisory groups in their approaches to problems compared to those involved in the approaches of their clients. Under what specific circumstances (e.g., policy areas, types of decisions, technological problems) and in what ways are these compatible and incompatible?
• The direct and indirect consequences of the matters discussed above for the organization and conduct of space activities policy planning.
What should be the role of the scientific adviser?
The first set of issues here has to do with the dual aspects of the advisory role of the scientist -- dual in the sense that the two spheres of scientific and political activity are involved, There is also a strong tendency to confuse the adviser with the administrator, even though in more traditional governmental activities there are usually clear operational distinctions between these two mutually incompatible roles. In the case of scientific activity however, confusion is justified, since the roles are sometimes fulfilled simultaneously by one man.
There was very little agreement among the interview respondents about the manner in which the scientist should or does adapt to his dual role as adviser, Some felt that the adviser himself should have competency in both scientific and political arenas, while others believed that it was important to have each arena represented separately, with an emphasis on liaison, through the use of a “middle-man translator'' or other improvements in the means for communication. Some saw the desirability -- and inevitability of the emergence of a “new breed” that would incorporate both roles and establish its own norms of expertise; others saw undesirable consequences in this dual role in that it would centralize a function which should involve the blending of various points of view into a valid consensus.
The interviews referred to the importance of defining operational and organizational rules regarding the role of the “expert” (acting in the light of his scientific experience and knowledge) to facilitate the distinction between such an expert and the scientist who gets into the political arena “way over his head by making irresponsible statements.” The potential usefulness of such a definition of rules is illustrated by the presently conflicting attitudes held about scientists who do have quite a bit to say about nontechnical matters. While most respondents agreed on the necessity of viewing such-a man not as an expert but as a citizen, some felt that he could contribute a very fresh, creative and important outlook; others felt that he not only confused the issue, but caused great harm to the scientific community as well.
However, since such “expert” roles have not yet been institutionalized, individual factors play a very important part, not only in the effectiveness of operations during the interim but also in setting patterns for institutionalization, if and when it is established. Some respondents felt that when the government was fortunate enough to find that rare individual with the dual talent, actual operations did indeed “work like a charm,” but the majority disagreed strongly on how this talent related to the adviser's effectiveness as a scientist. 49/
Similar differences of opinion were clearly reflected in responses concerning the utilization of the dual role. Some felt that the scientist should be only familiar enough with the political sphere to know what kinds of advice or scientific contributions will be both acceptable and useful to the scientific community. For others, the minimal requirements for competence in the advisory role involved not only an understanding of the bureaucratic hierarchy in Washington and its infighting techniques but also a working knowledge of the whole political process and a command of good management principles; in other words, the adviser should become an integral part of the policy making process itself, Some termed it naive to think that a technical adviser only advises and has no policy making power; others held the contrary view. In-house training for awareness and sophistication in the “other” fields was suggested by many as a stopgap measure; others talked of developing graduate programs for engineers and scientists in fields of government and policy.
It is a popularly held view that scientists get in trouble when they try to explain their “technical playthings” to political experts. However, these respondents frequently indicated that they had had very little trouble communicating technical points to political people; the nontechnical points were the ones that had produced great difficulty and frustration. 50/ (it may be that it is difficult to perceive the technical man in any nontechnical role. There is considerable evidence that people unconsciously as well as consciously tend to evaluate what a person tells them in terms of the role in which they perceive him. 51/)
Concerning the role of the scientific adviser in international negotiations, respondents ranged widely. Some limited him to quickly placing his scientific findings on the negotiating table, then leaving the room; others would have him sit behind the negotiator to answer technical questions; still others believed he should negotiate as far into the political arena as he could go. Most of the disagreement on this issue was related to confusion on the question “When does a technical issue become a political issue?” Some of the respondents had themselves felt “used” for political negotiations, while others had felt no “pressure” at all, defining their task as the normal function of the adviser -- to bring technical and political requirements together, within the limits of Feasibility. 52/
Most of the conflicts thus discussed were felt to stem, in part, directly from the fact that a clear, strong, institutionalized image of the modern science adviser is lacking. Regardless of the source of the conflicts, however, there was little doubt expressed about the adverse effect they can have on the functioning of the agencies the respondents represented.
It was more or less agreed that an initial conflict over whether or not to “get involved” in government advisory work may interfere with the recruiting of top-notch personnel for key positions. Nearly every respondent cited the recruiting problem as a serious one. Some respondents instanced the lack of stability in the range of possible prospects faced by the science adviser: his efforts may bring him anything from little or no recognition to very special Presidential treatment. Others spoke of the feeling of being in constant jeopardy in the advisory capacity; without institutional protection, an adviser is frequently attacked for causing problems in areas where he does not belong, One verbalized the situation as “accountability without responsibility.”
The prefacing remarks for the research suggestions on the role of the science advisory group are also apropos for the suggestions that follow here. Deserving of considerable study, as well, is the changing role of the scientist in his own eyes. The conflicts and challenges discussed above appear to derive both from the demands made by policy and politics on the traditional values of the scientist and from the changing values of the scientist. A number of observers have remarked that Lord Acton's comments on the corrupting influence of power did not explicitly exclude the scientist. 53/ This observation may be especially pertinent in an area of scientific endeavor such as the apace program, where activities are conducted in an atmosphere rich in circumstances and values not usually confronting the scientist when he is able to bring to bear his traditional value of the disinterested search for truth.
Research based on further and more detailed interviews should examine:
• The differences in viewpoint described above and the bases for them, in terms of values, beliefs, expectations, and experiences, so that these differences can be early understood and related to the role of scientific adviser.
• The operating relationships between the science adviser, the science administrator, and their respective users in the area of space policy. Precisely in what ways do the values and perspectives of the three groups complement or confound operating procedures, policy making, and administration in specific circumstances? **
• The consequences for policy making of a lack of consensus on the image of the technical adviser's function.
• The nature of the dual role. How important is identification with the scientific community? Must a technical adviser be perceived as a scientist to be effective? Are there limitations or restrictions in being viewed as a representative of the scientific community? Under what circumstances is it possible to remain closely identified in role as well as name with the scientific community after competence, skill, and leadership are demonstrated in political and administrative areas?
• The relationship between the advisory technique and the problem area, What are the limitations and advantages of in-house technical advisory personnel? Under what circumstances should an adviser have the “right bias” or “uncouched objectivity”? What are the significant differences in role acceptability between advising for planning compared to advising for operations at the policy level?
• The possibilities of distinguishing between scientific advice and personal biases, especially as the line between the values of the scientist and those of the political policy maker become more diffuse at some levels of organization and-under some very pressing policy circumstances. What organizational means, training, and personal values can be used to keep the distinction clear when it is necessary that it be clear?
• What kind of training, curriculums, and selection techniques might be used to encourage and maintain the quality of politically sophisticated scientists and scientifically sophisticated non-scientists who must work toward the same policy goals?