by Andrew Gavin Marshall
from
AndrewGavinMarshall Website
Andrew Gavin Marshall is an
independent researcher and writer based in Montreal, Canada, writing
on a number of social, political, economic, and historical issues.
He is also Project Manager of The People’s Book Project. He also
hosts a weekly podcast show, “Empire, Power, and People,” on
BoilingFrogsPost.com. |
Part 1
The Decline of The Roman Democracy and Rise of The ‘Super
Mario’ Technocracy
July 2, 2012
The “Super-Marios”:
Mario Draghi (left), President of the European Central Bank,
and Mario Monti (right), the
Technocratic Prime Minister of Italy.
[photo credit: Silvia Azzari
/ Milestone Media / ZUMAPRESS.com]
The European debt crisis continues into its third year, with four government
bailouts - of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain - and having imposed
harsh austerity measures upon the people of Europe, forcing them to pay -
through reduced standards of living and increased poverty - for the excesses
of their political and financial rulers.
Italy, as Europe’s third largest economy, with
one of the largest debt-to-GDP ratios, plays a central role in the unfolding
debt crisis across Europe.
Part 1 of this excerpt from a chapter on the
economic crisis in my upcoming book covers the “suspension” of democracy in
Italy and the imposition of a ‘Technocracy’ - an unelected government led by
academics and bankers - with a mandate to punish the people, facilitate the
financial elite, and serve the interests of the supranational, unelected,
technocratic European Union.
Power centralized, power globalizes, power
plunders and profits on the punishment and impoverishment of people
everywhere. This is the story of Italy’s debt crisis.
This is an unedited, rough draft excerpt from my upcoming book - the Preface
to the People’s Book Project - which is due to be finished by the end of the
summer, and covers the following subjects:
-
the origins, evolution, and consequences
of the global economic crisis
-
the expansion and effects of global
imperialism and war
-
the elite-driven social engineering
project of establishing an institutional structure of ‘global
governance’
-
the rising resistance of people around
the world to this system, as well as the attempts of the imperial
powers to co-opt, control, or destroy these socio-political
movements - the embodiment of the ‘Global Political Awakening’ -
from the Arab Spring, to the anti-austerity movements across Europe,
the Indignados in Spain, the Occupy Movement, the Chilean Winter and
the Maple Spring in Quebec, among others
Bilderberg,
Berlusconi, and Italian Austerity
The Italian Finance Minister, Giulio Tremonti had attended the Bilderberg
meeting in early June of 2011, alongside other notable Italian participants,
including,
-
Franco Bernabe, CEO of Telecom Italia
(and Vice Chairman of Rothschild Europe)
-
John Elkann, the Chairman of Fiat
-
Mario Monti, the president of Bocconi
university and a former EU Commissioner
-
Paolo Scaroni, the CEO of Eni, an oil
and gas company and Italy’s largest industrial corporation
The Bilderberg meeting for 2011 took place from
June 9-12 in Switzerland, and of course was attended by a host of other
major European elites, including:
-
Josef Ackermann, Chairman and CEO of
Deutsche Bank
-
Marcus Agius, Chairman of Barclays Bank
-
the Swedish Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and Trade
-
Luc Coene, the Governor of the National
Bank of Belgium
-
Frans van Daele, Chief of Staff to the
President of the European Council
-
Werner Faymann, the Federal Chancellor
of Austria
-
Douglas J. Flint, Group Chairman of HSBC
Holdings
-
Neelie Kroes, Vice President of the
European Commission
-
Bernardino Leon Gross, Secretary General
of the Spanish Presidency
-
George Papaconstantinou, the Greek
Minister of Finance
-
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the
European Council
-
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the
European Central Bank, among many others [1]
In July of 2011, Silvio Berlusconi’s government
announced a package of austerity measures hoping to calm markets, seeking to
reduce the deficit by 40 billion Euros.
The package, largely designed by finance
minister Giulio Tremonti, only attempted to address Italy’s debt, but
markets were also concerned about the country’s “ultra-low-growth,” which
has been consistent since Berlusconi returned to office in 2001. Once the
austerity measures would be signed into law, several opposition politicians
were suggesting the formation of a cross-party “technical government”
without Berlusconi in office.[2]
The Finance Minister Tremonti announced a wave
of privatizations. Apparently, the privatizations and various
liberalizations were urged into the austerity package by the main opposition
party, the Democratic Party (PD), not Berlusconi’s Freedom People Party. The
central bank governor of Italy, Mario Draghi, who was poised to become the
next President of the European Central Bank (ECB) following the end of the
term of Jean-Claude Trichet, warned the Italian government that “it would
have to raise taxes or make further spending cuts” if it wanted to calm
markets.[3]
By July 14, the Italian Senate approved an
increased austerity package worth 70 billion Euros (or $99 billion), “aimed
at convincing investors that the Eurozone’s third-largest economy won’t be
swept into the debt crisis.” Italy’s bonds (government debt) saw its
borrowing rates (interest) hit record highs as investors were not calmed by
the proposed austerity measures.[4]
Even as the austerity measures were being passed, market confidence was
still lacking, which was largely credited to the fact that a rift emerged
between Berlusconi and his Finance Minister Tremonti, who as a Bilderberg
attendee, no doubt has the confidence of markets.
Berlusconi reportedly viewed Tremonti as a
“rival” and has,
“repeatedly attacked [Tremonti] as a traitor
in newspapers owned by the Berlusconi family.” [5]
After Tremonti, who was facing his own
corruption charges, was caught on camera calling a colleague a “cretin,”
Berlusconi told an Italian newspaper,
“You know, he thinks he’s a genius and that
everyone else is stupid… I put up with him because I’ve known him for a
long time and one has to accept the way he is. But he’s the only one who
is not a team player.”
It was opined, then, that markets reacted to
this rift between the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, as
articulated by an official at F&C Investments, who stated that markets view
Tremonti as the “steady counterweight to the unpredictable and capricious”
Berlusconi.[6]
In July of 2011, Nichi Vendola, a popular leftist opposition political
figure in Italy, wrote an article for the Guardian, in which he critiqued
the austerity measures imposed by the Berlusconi government.
Vendola wrote that,
“Italy will not survive this crisis by
listening to the very people who got us into it, especially not when
they demand that the middle class and poor foot the bill for their
failures.”
Vendola also put blame on the European managing
of the crisis, as,
“governments now have an obsessive fixation
on employing tighter control of budget deficits to satisfy the European
stability pact.”
Vendola referred to Tremonti’s austerity package
as a,
“social catastrophe,” and that instead, he
suggested, what Italy must do “is turn this policy on its head,” noting
that, “Italy’s problem is as much about growth as it is debt.”
To do this, Vendola wrote, it,
“will require a new government,” and that,
“Italy needs elections, because only a completely new governing class
can achieve the political consensus to design and implement a plan to
tackle the crisis.”
He suggested that the European stability pact
would need to be re-negotiated, and concluded:
“It does us little good to please the
out-of-touch elite of our capitals while the people have to tighten
their belts and our youth are robbed of their future.” [7]
Mario Monti, President of Bocconi University and
a former European Commissioner, also agreed that Italy needed a new
government, though for different reasons (and a different type of
government).
He wrote an article in a major Italian paper in
August of 2011 in which he advocated - as a solution to Italy’s problems -
the formation of a “supranational technical government” which would make all
the major decisions in order to,
“remove the structural constraints to
growth,” and opined that “an Italy respected and authoritative… would be
of great help to Europe.” [8]
Vendola wanted a new government to help the
people, and Monti wanted a new government to help “Europe” (read: banks and
elites).
Guess who became the next leader of Italy!?
Berlusconi Bows Down
to the Bankers and Punishes the People
In August, Silvio Berlusconi had to approve a new austerity package, the
second in less than a month.
In a letter which was leaked to the Italian
press, it was revealed that Jean-Claude Trichet, the President of the
European Central Bank, and Mario Draghi, the President of the Italian
Central bank (from 2006 to 2011, who was set to secede Trichet at the ECB in
October of 2011), put pressure on Berlusconi to “implement significant
austerity measures.”
The letter, written by the two central bankers,
demanded “pressing action… to restore the confidence of investors.”
Dated August 5, 2011, it was issued just days
before the ECB announced its new program to buy Italian bonds (debt),
designed to reduce the country’s borrowing costs (interest on future debt).
One of the measures mentioned in the letter instructed Berlusconi to take
“immediate and bold measures to ensuring the sustainability of public
finances,” to achieve a balanced budget in 2013. This was adopted in the
subsequent austerity package put forward by Berlusconi in August.
The letter also stated that,
“it is possible to intervene further in the
pension system, making more stringent the eligibility criteria for
seniority pensions and rapidly aligning the retirement age of women in
the private sector to that established for public employees.”
Further, the,
“borrowing, including commercial debt and
expenditures of regional and local governments should be placed under
tight control, in line with the principles of the ongoing reform of
intergovernmental fiscal relations.”[9]
In economic-speak, the letter asked for
privatizations of public services:
“Key challenges are to increase competition,
particularly in services to improve the quality of public services and
to design regulatory and fiscal systems better suited to support firms’
competitiveness and efficiency of the labour market.”
This would require three key actions, the first
of which was that,
“a comprehensive, far-reaching and credible
reform strategy, including the full liberalization of local public
services and of professional services is needed,” and that, “this should
apply particularly to the provision of local services through
large-scale privatizations.”
The second major step was,
“a need to further reform the collective
wage bargaining system [meaning: undermine unions] allowing firm-level
agreements to tailor wages and working conditions to firms’ specific
needs and increasing their relevance with respect to other layers of
negotiations.”
In other words, destroy the unions so that
companies can exploit labour to whatever degree they choose.
And thirdly, according to Trichet and Draghi,
what was needed was a,
“thorough review of the rules regulating the
hiring and dismissal of employees [which] should be adopted in
conjunction with the establishment of an unemployment insurance system
and a set of active labour market policies capable of easing the
reallocation of resources towards the more competitive firms and
sectors.” [10]
In other words, labour rights and laws and the
rights of workers need to be dismantled so that companies can do as they
please. It’s not simply the unions that need to be destroyed, but the laws
for worker security in general.
Of course, no advice from central bankers would
be complete if it didn’t advocate that the government,
“immediately take measures to ensure a major
overhaul of the public administration in order to improve administrative
efficiency and business friendliness.”
Trichet and Draghi wrote that it was “crucial”
that the government take these actions “as soon as possible with
decree-laws, followed by parliamentary ratification,” or, in other words:
skip the democratic process because it takes too long, rule by decree,
something Italy has a “proud” history of.
All of this was demanded to be done before the
end of September 2011. In an interview with an Italian paper, Trichet
admitted that this was not the first time the ECB had sent such letters to
governments (such as Greece), saying,
“We have sent messages and we do that on a
permanent basis, through various means, addressed to individual
governments. We do not make them public.” [11]
Indeed, the European Central Bank had demanded
austerity measures be implemented by the governments of Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Italy, and when Berlusconi submitted to the mandate from the
central bankers, he complained that it made his administration look like “an
occupied government.”
A leading liberal MP in Italy, Antonio Di Pietro,
said that,
“Italy is under the tutelage of the EU, and
a country under tutelage is not a free and democratic one.”
An Irish MEP (Member of the European
Parliament), Paul Murphy, stated that there had been a “massive shift away
from democratic accountability since the start of the crisis,” and that:
“There needs to be a check on the enormous
power of the ECB, which is unelected, and has basically held a
government to ransom.”
Europe’s largest trade union federation, the
European Public Sector Union,
“accused the ECB of directing Italian fiscal
and labour policy in secret,” which is, of course, true.
The Deputy General Secretary of the federation,
Jan Willem Goudriaan, said,
“Europe cannot be governed through secret
letters of bankers, officials or an unaccountable body.”
EU officials, from Angela Merkel, Nicolas
Sarkozy, to Herman Van Rompuy and Jean-Claude Trichet, have been increasing
their calls for an “economic government” of Europe, tightening and deepening
fiscal integration and proposing the creation of new council’s and
organizations to impose sanctions on countries and “police the austerity
measures of governments,” and even the creation of a European finance
ministry.
Paul Murphy stated that,
“All these proposals, discussions about
economic government, are about undermining democracy in order to impose
a European shock doctrine… EU elites need to remove points of pressure
that can be mounted on governments. If the mass of people are opposed to
austerity, they can mount pressure on governments to hold that in check.
So the only way it can then be imposed s undemocratically.”
The head of a Belgian pro-transparency group
stated that,
“European powers [are] distancing themselves
from voters while at the same time [there is] a growing tendency towards
building closer relationships with corporate and specifically financial
lobbies… These two trends are explosive and can only lead to a loss of
legitimacy for the EU institutions.” [12]
Shortly after, on August 12, the Berlusconi
government was meeting to approve the new austerity package to meet the
ultimatum from the ECB, amounting to a package of “fiscal adjustments”
(i.e., spending cuts) of 20 billion Euros in 2012 and 25 billion Euros in
2013, with the spending cuts and tax increases to be,
“enacted immediately by decree, but subject
to approval by parliament later,” just as Draghi and Trichet instructed.
The rapid tax increases did much to damage even
long-time supporters of Berlusconi who had promised that he would “never put
their hands in the pockets of the Italian people.”
Fiscal federalism was the policy of giving the
various regions in Italy more control over their finances. With the new
austerity package, the governor of Lombardy, Roberto Formigoni, stated,
“It seems clear [fiscal] federalism has
vanished.” [13]
In mid-September, Berlusconi won final
parliamentary approval for the 54 billion euro ($74 billion) austerity
package, while police outside the parliament in Rome had to disperse
protesters with tear gas.
The German Economy Minister Phillip Roesler told
a news briefing in Rome that,
“The approval of the austerity package sends
a signal of stability… I have respect for what Italy has done with its
budget adjustment as this will benefit the whole euro area.”
The legislation simply made legal the measures
that Berlusconi’s government enacted through un-democratic decree the month
before, and were formalized in exchange for the European Central Bank bond
purchases which helped to reduce Italy’s borrowing costs.
Silvio Peruzzo, an economist at the Royal Bank
of Scotland, stated that the plan’s passage is a “very welcome step,” but
that the slowing global economy still cast doubts on whether Italy could,
“meet its fiscal targets and will also
render additional corrective measures [austerity packages] very likely.”
Even with the endorsement and backing of the ECB,
said Peruzzo, Italy’s debt remained,
“under pressure, which is indicative of a
well-rooted lack of confidence in Italy and in the European policies to
tackle the crisis.”
One the plan was approved, said Italian Finance
Minister Tremonti on September 10,
“If there are things to change in our growth
measures we will, and if there are things to add, we will.” [14]
The Economist reported on the new austerity
package, noting that while Berlusconi had approved the austerity package in
Italy, designed to cut roughly 45.5 billion Euros from the deficit by the
end of 2013, he almost immediately back-peddled on 7 billion Euros worth of
spending cuts and tax increases,
“notably a tax on high earners that would
have hurt his natural supporters,” meaning, rich people.
Thus, even as the package went to the Senate in
early September, Berlusconi was fine-tuning the details.
Thus, noted the Economist,
“the markets [were] again registering
alarm,” and at the same time, Italy’s largest and most militant trade
union federation, the CGIL, called for a one-day strike in opposition to
the austerity package, “protesting over a clause making it easier to
dismiss workers and, more generally, over a budget that the CGIL’s
leader, Susanna Camusso,” referred to as “unjust because it attacks the
weakest.”
This further worried “the market” and
“investors.”
The Economist wrote that:
“Mr. Berlusconi had consistently failed to
react unless bullied. His first emergency budget in July followed a
telephone call from the German chancellor, Angela Merkel,” while the
second was of course at the prompting of the ECB.[15]
By October of 2011, the austerity measures in
Italy had been wreaking havoc, as non-profit organizations lose their
funding and had major bureaucratic obstacles put in their way for community
projects, such as the Associazione Obiettivo Napoli, which ran two programs
working with children in difficulty in Naples since 1998, helping them clean
up local communities and provide counseling.
As central government funding to town halls had
been cut, organizations like Obiettivo Napoli,
“which sit uneasily somewhere between
education, welfare and rehabilitation budgets, have been the first to
suffer.”
Pietro Varriale, who works with the
organization, commented on further obstacles put in their way:
“They’re saying we need a second degree in
education science to be able to do this work… It’s crazy. I have 15
years experience in this field, most of the team likewise, and we all
have first degrees. A second degree is going to cost people a fortune,
really a lot of money, and there’s no help or grant for that kind of
thing. We’ve been given till 2013 to conform.”
To add to that, the city of Naples simply
stopped paying the bills for the organization, which had to then borrow
money from a bank, forcing the employees such as Pietro to have to take on
jobs working at bars, waiting tables, picking tomatoes and other piecemeal
projects while they continue to work with the association being unpaid:
“You keep going because of the kids, the
relationships you build up.” [16]
Giancarlo Di Maio, a 23-year old university
graduate in Naples working at a secondhand bookshop told the Guardian that,
“University here is like a car park. You
stay there as long as you can, because there’ll be nothing to do when
you come out,” referring to the lack of jobs for youth.
As he was employed, he explained:
“Every morning, I wake up with a smile… How
fortunate am I? Because otherwise, the only other work around here is
black. The black economy is a huge, monumental issue for Italy.”
His friends might make 30 Euros for 10 hours
working in a bar, or 20 Euros for a night waiting tables in a restaurant.
Di Maio, who works at a bookshop owned by his
father, said that,
“I know plenty of people in their 30s, even
some in their 40s, still living with their parents… That’s not normal.
For me, that’s one of the biggest problem [sic] in Italy -
opportunities, any kind of prospects for young people.”
When asked about Italian politics, he replied,
“We have the worst political class in
Europe, no question… Twenty years of Berlusconi, and not a single
reform, nothing for the unemployed, nothing to address the economic
crisis. Instead we talk about his sex life… we have a political class
who do nothing. They don’t have solutions, and even if they did they
wouldn’t try to do anything. They just speak air, it’s all they can do.
Posturing.”
Expressing some hope at the Occupy movement,
though lamenting how it turned to violence in Italy, he explained that
people were,
“finally starting to get angry. They are
beginning to see that really, we can’t carry on like this. Italy really
is sick. We can’t pretend to be the doctor any more; we need curing
ourselves.” [17]
The Technocratic Coup
By early October 2011, it was clear that the “markets” were not satisfied
with Berlusconi’s efforts at implementing a program of social genocide
(fiscal austerity) which was to their liking.
Thus, on October 5, the international ratings
agency Moody’s cut Italy’s credit rating for the first time in two decades,
adding to the downgrading from Standard & Poor’s two weeks prior. The
Italian government responded that the actions of the ratings agencies were
“politically motivated.” Even Moody’s acknowledged that the political
situation within Italy played a part in its decision, including Berlusconi’s
sex scandals, and the growing protests against the austerity measures.[18]
The effect of the downgrades is to make Italian bonds (government debt) less
attractive to buy (as it is a riskier investment), and thus, Italy would
have to pay higher interest rates.
As a result of that, as we have seen with
Greece, this makes the country’s overall debt larger (as it amounts to
borrowing money to pay back borrowed money), except with the higher yields
(interest rates), the future payments will be even more costly, likely to
create potential for a bailout (again, just taking more debt to pay interest
on older debts).
All the while, the overall debt to GDP ratio
increases, and austerity measures become the “conditions” for receiving
bailouts, and the country is essentially taken over by the IMF, the ECB, and
the EC (named the “Troika”), as occurred in Greece. This creates a permanent
spiral of expanded debt, economic crisis, and social genocide. This is what
is often called “market discipline.”
In mid-October, opposition to Berlusconi’s harsh austerity measures from
within Italy was increasing, just as “market pressure” and EU-opposition
from outside Italy was building against Berlusconi for his austerity
measures being perceived as ‘too little, too late.’
Nine members of Berlusconi’s own coalition said
the austerity package,
“unfairly targets the middle class and fails
to tackle Italy’s massive tax evasion problem.”
Susanna Camusso, the head of Italy’s largest and
most militant labour federation, CGIL, said that a strike is the only way to
“change the inequity of this package.” [19]
During a global “day of rage” partly inspired by
the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States and the Indignados
movement in Spain, October 15 saw various Occupy and other protests erupt
around the world, in 950 cities in 80 different countries. In Italy, Rome
saw roughly 200,000 protesters come out into the streets, protesting against
the austerity measures, the government, the EU, the ECB and the IMF.
The protests erupted into violence as hundreds
of those assembled began fighting with riot police, who were using tear gas
and water cannons against the protesters, and several hundred erupted in
urban rebellion (what is often called “riots”) in which banks were
destroyed, they set cars and garbage bins on fire, hurled rocks, bottles,
and fireworks at the police who continually charged the crowd.
Roughly two dozen demonstrators were injured,
with one reported to be put in critical condition, and at least 30 riot
police were injured.[20]
As Berlusconi’s own government began to fracture in the face of the
austerity package, disagreeing on what and how and if to cut, one of
Berlusconi’s main coalition partners, the center-right Northern League,
hinted that new elections were a possibility. Considering the popularity of
the anti-austerity leftist leader Nichi Vendola, this was perhaps too much
to bear. European leaders Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy lost their
patience, and in late October, demanded that Berlusconi move forward with
the austerity package.
In a series of EU summits in late October on
handling the economic crisis, discussing specifically the plan to boost the
funds of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), there was
concern, reported Der Spiegel,
“that the current size of the (recently
expanded) fund isn’t sufficient should additional countries,
particularly Spain and Italy, be infected with debt contagion.”
[21]
Following these meetings, it was made
“abundantly clear” to the Italians that their “leadership is no longer taken
seriously.”
Italian papers and TV shows were overwhelmed
with covering the “condescending smile” of Angela Merkel to Berlusconi, and
comments made by Sarkozy. Merkel and Sarkozy and other EU leaders told
Berlusconi in the talks that he had to present a plan within three days “for
reducing Italian debt more quickly than current plans call for.”
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy
said that Berlusconi had “promised to do so.”
The following evening, Berlusconi stated,
“No one is in a position to be giving
lessons to their partners.”
European leaders were frustrated that even the
austerity package passed earlier in the summer had not been fully
implemented, and the government’s stability was continually threatened over
debating each new measure.
The European Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs, Olli Rhen, said that all the details of the new plan were
“unclear.” With the EU summits proposing increasing the EFSF bailout fund
from 440 billion Euros to 1 trillion, a central feature to the demands of
the EU leaders was that countries like Italy impose more stringent austerity
measures.
As Der Spiegel reported,
“A clear Italian commitment to austerity is
a key component of that plan.” There was then a good deal of conjecture
over the possible departure of Berlusconi. The Italian paper Corriere
della Serra reported that Angela Merkel called the Italian President
Giorgio Napolitano the previous week “to discuss concerns about Italy’s
political leadership.” [22]
In fact, Angela Merkel did make such a phone
call to Italy’s president Napolitano in October, violating “an unwritten
rule” for Europe’s leaders “not to intervene in one another’s domestic
politics.”
But this is a new, changing EU, one in which
democracy - even the withering façade Western governments maintain - simply
no longer matters.
Merkel was,
“gently prodding Italy to change its prime
minister, if the incumbent - Silvio Berlusconi - couldn’t change Italy.”
The Wall Street Journal reported on the events
that led to this incident, explaining that at the annual meeting of the IMF
in September, China, Brazil, and the U.S. “berated” Europe for its small
bailout fund, and told Europe to borrow “hundreds of billions of Euros from
the ECB,” something Merkel had long been against, and which was refused by
Jens Weidmann of the German central bank, explaining that the bailout fund,
“was an arm of the governments… and lending
to governments was against the ECB’s charter.”
On October 19, Sarkozy left his wife who was in
labor at a clinic in Paris to fly to Frankfurt to confront Jean-Claude
Trichet at a party being held for the President of the ECB to honor him as
he prepared to leave the ECB at the end of the month (to be replaced by the
president of the Central Bank of Italy, Mario Draghi).
Sarkozy argued that the ECB needed to intervene
in the bond markets (buying government debt), stating that,
“Everything else is too small.”
Trichet said that it wasn’t,
“the ECB’s job to finance governments.”
[23]
The ECB had engaged already in certain bond
purchases, which,
“had caused a political backlash in
Germany,” and as Trichet said, “I did a bit, and I was massively
criticized in Germany.”
Merkel, who was present during the shouting
match between Trichet and Sarkozy, was frustrated at Sarkozy’s pressure on
Trichet, as she had always opposed the ECB printing money to handle the
crisis, telling Trichet,
“You’re a friend of Germany.”
It was the following day, on October 20, that
Merkel made her “confidential” phone call to the Italian President in Rome,
“the man with authority to name a new prime
minister if the incumbent were to lose parliament’s support.”
President Napolitano informed Merkel that it
was,
“not reassuring” that Berlusconi had only
“recently survived a parliamentary vote of confidence by just one vote.”
Merkel then thanked Napolitano for doing what
was “within your powers” in promoting reform.
Within days, Napolitano began,
“sounding out Italy’s political parties to
test the support for a new government if Mr. Berlusconi couldn’t satisfy
Europe and the markets.”[24]
It no doubt did not help Berlusconi when he
wrote in an Italian paper in late October that the word austerity,
“isn’t in my vocabulary.” [25]
In early November, at a G20 meeting in Cannes,
President Obama and other leaders were,
“effectively ordering Silvio Berlusconi to
accept surveillance of Italy’s austerity measures by the International
Monetary Fund,” reported the Guardian.
Berlusconi was advised by Merkel, Sarkozy,
Herman Van Rompuy and other EU leaders the previous week to come to the G20
with “a specific austerity package,” but due to divisions within his
cabinet, Berlusconi “arrived empty-handed.”
It was reported that Berlusconi would likely not
survive a vote of confidence in the Italian parliament set for the following
week. The ECB had been purchasing Italian bonds since August in order to
push the yields lower, which dropped to below 5%, but by early November they
had been driven up to 6.5%, “levels that make it difficult to pay back
debt.”
Italian President Napolitano had been holding
meetings with party leaders to discuss the possibility of “constructing an
interim government if Berlusconi’s collapses.”
The G20, which was discussing the possibility of
adding $300 billion to the IMF’s bailout fund of $950 billion, and G20
leaders pressured Italy,
“to sign up to a more specific austerity
package or else the US and other countries would not put extra funds
into the IMF.” [26]
Just prior to heading to the G20 meeting,
Berlusconi had attempted to issue a decree which would pass various
austerity measures,
“thus bypassing the parliament,” but,
reported the EUobserver, he “was held back by [President] Giorgio
Napolitano,” as well as the Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti.
Instead, Berlusconi was pressured to attempt an
amendment to a “law for stability” to be approved the following week, at
which time he would likely face a vote of confidence.
Enrico Letta, the deputy general secretary of
the center-left Democratic Party (PD), the main opposition party, said that,
“We think that next week will be a week in
parliament where we try to force the situation if Berlusconi does not
resign before.” [27]
As Jean-Claude Trichet retired from the ECB at
the end of October, and Mario Draghi left the Bank of Italy to take up his
new job as President of the ECB, the newly-appointed governor of the Bank of
Italy, Ignazio Vasco, said that Italy,
“needed to take urgent action to boost
confidence in the economy and initiate structural reforms,” insisting
that the commitments already given to the EU in a “letter of intent” in
late October (following Berlusconi being castigated by Merkel and
Sarkozy), “must be honoured quickly and consistently.” [28]
At the G20 conference, Berlusconi agreed under
pressure to have the IMF oversee Italy’s implementation of austerity
measures, following late-night talks with G20 leaders.
Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European
Commission (EC), said that,
“Italy had decided on its own initiative to
ask the IMF to monitor. I see this as evidence of how important Italy’s
commitment to reform is.”
The EC would also monitor Italy’s progress, and
was set to visit Italy the following week to undertake a more detailed
study. One EU source told the Telegraph that,
“We need to make sure there is credibility
with Italy’s targets - that it is going to meet them. We decided to have
the IMF involved on the monitoring, using their own methodology, and the
Italians say they can live with that.”
The chief financial officer of Commerzbank, Eric
Strutz, said that,
“The whole stability of Europe depends on
whether Italy gets its act together.” [29]
On November 8, Berlusconi suffered a party
revolt in parliament which failed to deliver him a majority, and would
likely lead to a vote of non-confidence a few days later.
Upon this defeat, Berlusconi announced that he
would resign as Prime Minister “as soon as parliament passed urgent budget
reforms demanded by European leaders.” President Napolitano announced that
he would begin consultations on the formation of a new government, and
stated that he would prefer a “technocrat or national unity government.”
At the same time, the “markets” had pushed
Italy’s bond yields (debt interest) to nearly 7%, figures that saw Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal getting bailouts.
The leader of the main opposition Democratic
Party (PD), Pier Luigi Bersani, said,
“I ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, with all my
strength, to finally take account of the situation… and resign.”
Berlusconi and some of his close allies,
however, warned that appointing a technocratic government, the option which
was said to be favoured by “markets,” would amount to an “undemocratic
coup.” [30]
Naturally, that’s just what happened.
Writing for the Guardian, John Hooper suggested that one of four scenarios
would take place upon the event of Berlusconi’s resignation:
-
one envisions Berlusconi leaving but the
right gaining a broader majority, specifically under Umberto Bossi’s
Northern League, who was in Berlusconi’s coalition but had advised
him to resign, and was pushing for him to be replaced with the next
in command in Berlusconi’s party, Angelino Alfano
-
another scenario envisioned a “grand
coalition,” or a “government of national emergency or salvation,”
bringing together all the parties
-
a third scenario had Italy calling an
election, urged by both Berlusconi and Bossi
-
or the fourth option, “a cabinet of
technocrats,” which Hooper wrote was “favoured by the markets and
the Italian centre left,” which would consist of “a government
filled with specialists who could pass the unpalatable legislation
needed to revive Italy’s flagging economy without having to worry
about re-election”
This happened before in Italy, when Berlusconi’s
government fell in 1994, at which time he was replaced by Lamberto Dini, a
central banker, who headed a government of “professors, generals and
judges.”
In this scenario, suggested Hooper, the likely
prime minister would be Mario Monti.[31]
Upon Berlusconi’s failure to achieve a minority during the budget vote on
November 8, many officials from the financial community began making their
observations, such as Jan Randolph, the head of sovereign risk analysis at
HIS Global Insight, who said that,
“Berlusconi has effectively lost political
capital to carry the country through a period of austerity and
structural reform,” and that, “Berlusconi will have to resign.”
He went on to suggest that it was possible,
“that a broad National Unity government
headed by a respected technocrat like ex-EU commissioner Mario Monti
could be formed.” [32]
As Berlusconi officially resigned on the night
of November 12, 2011, he left the president’s palace through a side door as
a crowd of over 1,000 people outside yelled, “buffoon,” “Mafioso,” and for
him to “face trial.”
A poll from early November reported that 71% of
Italians favoured his resignation, and upon hearing of his official
resignation, the crowd erupted in roars of “Halleluja.” [33]
On November 16 of 2011, Mario Monti was appointed as Prime Minister of
Italy. Monti accepted the mandate to form a new government, and was expected
to appoint technical experts as opposed to politicians to his cabinet.
President Napolitano told Italian politicians
that,
“it is a responsibility we perceive from the
entire international community to protect the stability of the single
currency as well as the European frame work.”
Berlusconi’s political party, the People of
Liberty, said it would accept a Monti government for a short while before
elections would have to be scheduled, and Berlusconi referred to his
resignation as “an act of generosity.” [34]
Mario Monti is an economist and academic who served as European Commissioner
for the Internal Market, Services, Customs and Taxation from 1995 to 1999,
and European Commissioner for Competition from 1999 to 2004. Monti is
founder and Honorary President of Bruegel, a European think tank he launched
in 2005, based in Belgium, and which represents the interests of key
European elites.
Monti has also been a member of the advisory
board of the Coca-Cola Company, and was an international advisor to Goldman
Sachs, was a former member of the Steering Committee of the Bilderberg
Group, having previously attended the meeting in Switzerland in June of
2011, and was European Chairman of the Trilateral Commission until he
resigned when he became Prime Minister of Italy.
Monti’s think tank, Bruegel, represents key elite European interests.
The Chairman of the Board of Bruegel is
Jean-Claude Trichet, the former President of the European Central Bank (ECB)
from 2003 to 2011, who is also a member of the board of directors of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and has joined the boards of a
number of major corporations, including EADS.
Other board members of Bruegel include:
-
Jose Manuel Campa Fernandez, who was the
Spanish Secretary of State for Economic Affairs at the Ministry of
Economy and Finance from 2009 to 2011, and has been a consultant for
the European Commission, the Bank of Spain, the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank
-
Anna Ekström, the president of the
Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, Saco, and
formerly the Swedish State Secretary for the Ministry of Industry,
Employment and Communication
-
Jan Fisher, Vice President of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), former
Prime Minister of the Czech Republic
-
Vittorio Grilli, the Deputy Minister of
the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Italy (whom Monti appointed
to his technocratic government in November of 2011), and a former
Managing Director at Credit Suisse First Boston
-
Wolfgang Kopf, Vice President at
Deutsche Telekom AG
-
Rainer Münz, head of Research and
Development at Erste Group and Senior Fellow at the Hamburg
Institute of International Economics (HWWI), former consultant to
the European Commission, the OECD, and the World Bank
-
Jim O’Neill, Chairman of Goldman Sachs
Asset Management
-
Lars-Hendrik Röller, the Director
General of the Economic and Financial Policy Division of the German
Federal Chancellery, and is President of the German Economic
Association
-
Dariusz Rosati, former consultant
economist at Citibank, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for
Poland, former adviser to the President of the European Commission,
and was a member of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2009
-
Helen Wallace, a British academic expert
on European integration
In October of 2009, Mario Monti was asked by the
President of the European Commission Manuel Barroso to draw up a report on
how the EU should re-launch its single market.
Barroso advised that the report, “should address
the growing tide of economic nationalism and outline measures to complete
the EU’s currently patchy single market.” Mario Monti was President of the
Bocconi University at the time he was asked to write the report.[35]
In May of 2010, Monti produced the report and
officially handed it in to European Commission President Barroso.
The report recommended ways to fight the
potential of economic nationalism and to preserve and protect the regional
bloc and to advance the process of integration, with Monti arguing that,
“There is now a window of opportunity to
bring back the political focus of the single market.” [36]
The report eventually became the EU’s Single
Market Act of 2011.[37]
After becoming the technocratic and unelected Prime Minister of Italy, Monti
quickly appointed his new cabinet, of which more than a third of the
17-member cabinet consisted of professors and other technocrats.
The cabinet position of Minister of Economic
Development, Infrastructure and Transport was given to Corrado Passera, the
chief executive of Italy’s largest bank, Intesa Sanpaolo. Passera told the
Financial Times upon his appointment as “superminister” that,
“If you want to build the wide consensus
that is needed, we have to share sacrifices and benefits among all the
segments of society with a balanced set of actions and with the right
mix of austerity and development programmes.”
British hedge fund manager Davide Serra stated,
“Monti and Passera are the right guys for
the job. They are the dream team.”[38]
Upon appointing his new technocratic government,
Monti declared:
“We feel sure of what we have done and we
have received many signals of encouragement from our European partners
and the international world. All this will, I trust, translate into a
calming of that part of the market difficulty which concerns our
country.”
On the lack of party representatives in his
cabinet, Monti commented,
“The absence of political personalities in
the government will help rather than hinder a solid base of support for
the government in parliament and in the political parties because it
will remove one ground for disagreement.”[39]
A former ambassador who worked with Monti when
he was an EU Commissioner recalled Mario’s style of governance, stating,
“He didn’t have a very Italian way of going
about things… His nickname in those days was ‘The Italian Prussian’.”
An article in Reuters described Monti as,
“a convinced free marketeer with close
connections to the European and global policy making elite, Monti has
always backed a more closely integrated euro zone,” and went on to
mention his leadership positions within the Bilderberg Group of
“business leaders” and “leading citizens” and the Trilateral Commission,
which “brings together the power elites of the United States, Europe and
Japan.”
Monti’s government would be given roughly 18
months to push through “reforms” and austerity measures, as another election
would not be due until 2013.
However, as one outgoing minister commented in
November of 2011,
“The decisions which Monti will take must
pass in parliament and I think that with such a heterogeneous majority
he will have many problems. I believe this solution will lead to many
problems.” [40]
Monti of course received abundant praise from
Europe’s leaders on becoming the new unelected technocratic Prime Minister
of Italy.
An article by Tony Barber in the Financial Times
explained that Italian party politics was simply too problematic, as:
“Even a centre-left government with a
mandate from the voters would find it hard to maintain the unity and
resolution required to implement the unpopular austerity measures and
structural economic reforms demanded by Germany, France, the European
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary
Fund.”
And with the prospect of labour resistance from
workers and pensioners,
“it is easy to see why Europe’s leaders were
eager for Mr Monti to inherit the premiership.”
Thus, wrote Barber,
“technocracy has an irresistible appeal.”
[41]
Mario Monti himself had acknowledged that
“irresistible appeal” in August of 2011, when he wrote an article in a major
Italian paper advocating the formation of a,
“supranational technical government” which
would make all the major decisions in order to “remove the structural
constraints to growth,” and opined that “an Italy respected and
authoritative… would be of great help to Europe.” [42]
And as it turned out, a great help to Monti.
In early December of 2011, after forming his cabinet and being approved by
Italy’s lower chamber of Parliament with a rare majority, Mario Monti
received the endorsement of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, declaring
their “absolute trust” in Monti and in “his structural changes” to his
governing of Italy.
Monti, upon assuming power, warned Italians in a
speech that,
“It is not going to be easy, sacrifice will
be required.”
As Monti’s “technocratic government” is full of
appointments from the ruling class, including bankers and other executives,
many in Italy were raising concerns that this suggested an inherent conflict
of interest in his government, as those who helped create the crisis are
brought in to solve it, a highly political government, despite all the
claims of an apolitical ‘technocracy’ (technocracies are always political
entities, but instead of pushing party ideologies, they push ultra-elite
ideologies in the management and maintenance of society).
Monti replied that,
“There is no conflict of interests… The fact
that many of us have played a role in the institutions before doesn’t
mean that we will not be totally transparent.”
And with that note, Monti appointed Carlo
Malinconic as undersecretary for publishing affairs, after having previously
served as president of the Italian Federation of Publishing and Newspapers.[43]
Writing in the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs,
Jonathan Hopkin, a professor of comparative politics at the London School of
Economics, commented that the replacement of Berlusconi with Monti,
“marks a new stage in the European financial
crisis,” in which “the crisis now seems to be wiping out democratically
elected governments.”
Largely under pressure from bond markets,
“Italian politicians have opted to hand
power to technocrats, expecting that they will somehow enjoy greater
legitimacy as they impose painful measures on an angry population.”
Hopkin stated:
“This will not work.” [44]
In early November, as democratically-elected
governments in Greece and Italy were replaced with unelected and
unaccountable technocratic governments, essentially run by and for the
European Union and global banks, Tony Barber, writing in the Financial
Times, suggested that this is but one of several responses to the economic
crisis.
Specifically, this response,
“involves the surgical removal of elected
leaders in Greece and Italy and their replacement with technocratic
experts, trusted within the EU to pass economic reforms deemed
appropriate by policymakers in Berlin, the bloc’s top paymaster, and at
EU headquarters in Brussels.”
Barber referred to the “sidelining of elected
politicians in the continent that exported democracy to the world” as a
“momentous development.”
In short,
“Eurozone policymakers have decided to
suspend politics as normal in two countries because they judge it to be
a mortal threat to Europe’s monetary union.”
Thus, these policymakers,
“have ruled that European unity, a project
more than 50 years in the making, is of such overriding importance that
politicians accountable to the people must give way to unelected experts
who can keep the show on the road.”
In Greece, the government was put under the
technocratic leadership of Lucas Papademos, a former vice president of the
European Central Bank, and upon accepting his appointment, stated:
“I am confident that the country’s
participation in the Eurozone is a guarantee of monetary stability.”
In Italy, Mario Monti came to power, a
technocrat who,
“is revered in Brussels as one of the most
effective commissioners for competition and the internal market that the
EU has known.”
One prominent Italian banker commented:
“We need a strong national unity government
for one to one and a half years to do what the politicians haven’t had
the courage to do.” [45]
Running the ECB can be such a
‘Draghi’
In late October of 2011, at a gala event to mark the end of Jean-Claude
Trichet’s eight years as president of the European Central Bank, Mario
Draghi, the governor of the Bank of Italy, who was selected to take over for
Trichet at the start of November, was “working the room” of high-powered
European elites, including Angeal Merkel, and IMF Managing Director
Christine Lagarde.
Between 1984 and 1990, Draghi was the Italian
Executive Director at the World Bank, and in 1991, he became the director
general of the Italian Treasury until 2001.
Between 2002 and 2005, Draghi was the Vice
Chairman and Managing Director of Goldman Sachs International, thereafter
becoming the governor of the Bank of Italy from 2006 until 2011, also
putting him on the Governing Board of the European Central Bank and the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS).
Draghi is not simply one of the individuals who
has been most responsible for handling and managing the economic crisis, but
he also played an important role in causing it.
As Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs, and in Italy
at the Treasury and the central bank,
“Draghi was a proponent of nations and other
institutions like pension funds using derivatives to more efficiently
manage their liabilities.”
This means that Draghi advised that governments
should essentially hide their debts in the derivatives market, where they
would not be viewed as liabilities, but rather, transactions.
These “transactions” were very popular in Greece
and Italy, and had a great deal to do with accumulating and hiding the
massive debts of these countries.[46]
When Draghi led the Italian Treasury in the 1990s, he,
“oversaw one of the largest European
privatization efforts ever and paved the way for Italy’s entry into the
euro,” earning him the nickname, “Super Mario.”
Italy liberalized its financial markets,
allowing for massive speculation, derivatives, and other banking excesses,
and he privatized roughly 15% of Italy’s economy.
While Italian governments came and went during
this period, Draghi always remained.
While both Draghi and Goldman Sachs said that
“Super Mario” did not have anything to do with the especially controversial
Greece-Goldman Sachs transactions, one Goldman Sachs executive in Europe,
“who was not authorized to speak publicly,”
told the New York Times that, “Mr. Draghi had discussed similar
initiatives with other European governments.”
When asked about his involvement at Goldman
Sachs, Draghi once replied,
“I was not in charge of selling stuff to the
governments… In fact, I worked in the private sector even though Goldman
Sachs expected me to work in the public sector when I was hired.”
However, in a paper which Draghi wrote in 2002
just a couple months after being hired by Goldman Sachs, at which his job
description was,
“to win investment banking business from
European governments,” Draghi argued in favour of governments using
derivatives “to stabilize tax revenue and avoid the sudden accumulation
of debt,” which the New York Times politely described as “faithful to
the spirit” of the Goldman-Greece deal.[47]
In an interview with the Financial Times in
December of 2011, European Central Bank president Mario Draghi reflected
upon the financial crisis and the actions taken to manage it.
He explained that the ECB’s long-term
refinancing operation (a half-trillion euro bank bailout) was not designed
to give banks an incentive to buy government bonds from the “periphery”
nations, but rather, that,
“the objective is to ease the funding
pressures that banks are experiencing,” and that the banks “will then
decide what the best use of these funds is.”
Draghi stated that, “we don’t know exactly” what
banks were doing with the money, but that,
“the important thing was to relax the
funding pressures.”
Draghi reiterated that the banks,
“will decide in total independence what they
want to do.”[48]
It’s interesting to note that when governments
get bailouts, they are told what and how to spend the money, and are forced
to impose austerity measures that destroy the social fabric and punish the
populations of their countries, and then, of course, have to pay back the
money at exorbitant interest rates; but when banks get a half-trillion euro
bailout, the banks will “decide what the best use” of the money is, and
where it goes is not important, it’s only important to “relax” the pressure
on the banks, who will repay the debt over a long-term period (3 years) with
extremely low interest (averaging 1%).
So people get pressure, and banks get pressure
“relaxed.”
Draghi told the Financial Times that what is needed most is to “restore
confidence,” and for this, there are four answers.
-
The first one “lies with national
economic policies, because this crisis and this loss of confidence
started from budgets that had got completely out of control.”
-
The second answer, explained Draghi, “is
that we have to restore fiscal discipline to the euro area,” which
means to impose austerity, “and this is in a sense what last week’s
EU summit started [in mid-December 2011], with the redesign of the
fiscal compact.”
-
The third answer “is to have a firewall
in place which is fully equipped and operational,” meaning a massive
bailout fund, which “was meant to be provided by the EFSF.”
-
The fourth answer, according to Draghi,
is for countries “to undergo significant structural reforms that
would revamp growth,” implying things like liberalization,
privatization, and further deregulaiton.
When Draghi was asked about the critics of the
fiscal compact who suggest that it amounts to a “stagnation and austerity
union,” Draghi replied that,
“they are right and wrong at the same time.”
Draghi repeated the mantra of pro-austerity
voices, who always suggest with no historical evidence to support, that
there is “no trade-off between fiscal austerity, and growth and
competitiveness.”
However, Draghi contended,
“I would not dispute that fiscal
consolidation [austerity] leads to a contraction in the short run.”
The correspondent with the Financial Times
asked:
“But these austerity programs are very
harsh. Don’t [you] think that some countries are really in effect in a
debtor’s prison?” Draghi replied: “Do you see any alternative?”
[49]
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal in
February, Mario Draghi warned European countries,
“that there is no escape from tough
austerity measures and that the continent’s traditional social contract
is obsolete.”
Draghi said that Europe’s social model was
“already gone,” and that the only way to return to “long-term prosperity”
was,
“continuing economic shocks [that] would
force countries into structural changes in labor markets and other
aspects of the economy.”
As European people were suffering through the
increased austerity measures, Draghi warned that,
“Backtracking on fiscal targets would elicit
an immediate reaction by the market.”
This of course implies that the market has the
‘right’ to determine the fate of Europe’s people.
For Draghi,
“austerity, coupled with structural change,
is the only option for economic renewal.”
The European Commission, headed by Jose Manuel
Barroso, agreed with Draghi, stating that despite forecasting a deepened
recession brought on by austerity measures, governments “should be ready to
meet budgetary targets.”
Simon Johnson, the former chief economist of the
IMF, said that Draghi was “just sugarcoating the message.”
Johnson explained:
“A lot of this structural reform talk is
illusory at best in the short run… but it’s a better story than saying
you’re going to have a terrible 10 years.” [50]
In the interview, Draghi commented on the
“positive changes” which had been taking place in the previous few months:
“There is greater stability in financial
markets. Many government shave taken decisions on both fiscal
consolidation and structural reforms. We have a fiscal compact where the
European governments are starting to release national sovereignty for
the common intent of being together.”
When Draghi was asked what his view was,
“of these austerity policies in the larger
strategy right now, forcing austerity at all costs,” Draghi replied:
“There was no alternative to fiscal consolidation, and we should not
deny that this is contractionary in the short term.”
Then, he added, it was necessary to promote
growth, “and that’s why structural reforms are so important.” The
interviewer asked Draghi what the “most important structural reforms” were
for Europe at that time.
Draghi replied:
In Europe first is the product and services
market reform. And the second is the labour market reform which takes
different shapes in different countries.
In some of them one has to make labour
markets more flexible and also fairer than they are today [in other
words: more easily exploited]. In these countries there is a dual labour
market: highly flexible for the young part of the population where
labour contracts are three-month, six-month contracts that may be
renewed for years.
The same market is highly inflexible for the
protected part of the population where salaries follows seniority rather
than productivity. In a sense labour markets at the present time are
unfair in such a setting because they put all the weight of flexibility
on the young part of the population.[51]
When central bankers and politicians and others
talk about “labour flexibility,” what they really mean is “worker
insecurity.”
This was bluntly stated by Alan Greenspan back
when he was Governor of the Board of the Federal Reserve System, when in
testimony before the US Senate in 1997, he discussed how America’s
“favorable” economy was constructed. Greenspan discussed how wage increases
for workers did not keep pace with inflation, which was, he explained,
“mainly the consequence of greater worker insecurity.”
He elaborated:
“the willingness of workers in recent years
to trade off smaller increases in wages for greater job security seems
to be reasonably well documented.”
Greenspan credited the creation of “worker
insecurity” with technological changes, corporate restructuring and
downsizing, as well as “domestic deregulation.”[52]
The New York Times reported on this, stating
that Greenspan described “job insecurity” as,
“a powerful recent force in the American
economy,” and that Greenspan, “clearly elevated this insecurity to major
status in central bank policy.”
How does worker insecurity influence central
bank policy?
The article explained:
“Workers have been too worried about keeping
their jobs to push for higher wages… and this has been sufficient to
hold down inflation without the added restraint of higher interest
rates.”
However, Greenspan warned that even though job
insecurity continues to rise, once,
“workers become accustomed to their new
level of uncertainty, their confidence may revive and the upward
pressure on wages resume.” [53]
In his interview with the Wall Street Journal,
Mario Draghi was asked if “Europe will become less of the social model that
has defined it,” to which Draghi replied:
“The European social model has already
gone.”
Draghi, repeating the mantra of so many in
power, stated that,
“there is no feasible trade-off between”
austerity and growth: “Fiscal consolidation is unavoidable in the
present set up, and it buys time needed for the structural reforms.
Backtracking on fiscal targets would elicit an immediate reaction by the
market.”
In terms of “progress” - as Draghi defines it -
throughout the crisis, he praised the fiscal compact treaty as,
“a major political achievement because it’s
the first step towards a fiscal union. It’s a treaty whereby countries
release national sovereignty in order to accept common fiscal rules that
are especially binding, and accept monitoring and accept to have these
rules in their primary legislation so they are not easy to change. So
that’s a beginning.” [54]
In further testimony in 2000, Alan Greenspan
again addressed the issue of “worker insecurity,” which he stipulated was
the,
“consequence of rapid economic and
technological change,” which in turn created a “fear of potential job
skill obsolescence.”
Greenspan stated that,
“more workers currently report they are
fearful of losing their jobs than similar surveys found in 1991 at the
bottom of the last recession,” and that, “greater workers insecurities
are creating political pressures to reduce fierce global competition
that has emerged in the wake of our 1990s technology boom.”
While Greenspan admitted that “protectionist
policies” would,
“temporarily reduce some worker anxieties,”
he felt this was a bad idea, as “over the longer run such actions would
slow innovation and impede the rise in living standards.”
Greenspan elaborated:
Protectionism might enable a worker in a
declining industry to hold onto his job longer.
But would it not be better for that worker
to seek a new career in a more viable industry at age 35 than hang on
until age 50, when job opportunities would be far scarcer and when the
lifetime benefits of additional education and training would be
necessarily smaller?
These years of extraordinary innovation are
enhancing the standard of living for a large majority of Americans. We
should be thankful for that and persevere in policies that enlarge the
scope for competition and innovation and thereby foster greater
opportunities for everyone.[55]
This is called “labour market flexibility.”
Of course, as Greenspan was full of praise for
the fact that “job insecurity” is a necessary factor in “enhancing the
standard of living for a large majority of Americans,” which “fosters
greater opportunities for everyone,” what he really meant was that it
benefits a tiny minority and creates better opportunities for exploitation.
Ironically, this wonderful “boom” in the economy
turned out to be a bubble, and it popped within a year of his giving this
speech, and then of course, he resorted to building up the housing bubble
thereafter… and we know how that went: more worker insecurity, more labour
market flexibility, and thus, more benefits to a tiny minority and more
opportunities for exploitation and profits.
Isn’t the “free market” wonderful?
In April of 2012, Mario Draghi advised the Eurozone to adopt a,
“growth compact” in order to boost economic
prospects as he “scaled back his hopes for an early economic rebound,”
stating that the Eurozone bloc was “probably in the most difficult
phases” in which the austerity measures were “starting to reverberate
its contractionary effects,” he told the European Parliament.
Austerity had, according to Draghi,
“taken a larger than expected toll.”
A “growth pact” was promoted by the front-runner
in the French presidential elections, Francois Hollande, who would go on to
win the May 6 elections against Sarkozy.
Hollande had called for a “new Europe” stressing
“solidarity, progress and protection,” warning against a North-South split
in the EU countries. Angela Merkel also approved of Draghi’s call for a
“growth pact,” agreeing that austerity was not “the whole answer” to the
crisis, but insisted that growth would be “in the form of structural
reforms,” which implies liberalization and privatization.
She added:
“We need growth in the form of sustainable
initiatives, not simply economic stimulus programmes that just increase
government debt.”
While acknowledging the “economic weakness”
created by the austerity packages across Europe, Draghi continued to say
that,
“Europe’s leaders should stay the course on
fiscal consolidation.” [56]
European leaders were quick to endorse the calls
from Draghi for a “growth pact” for Europe, including Angela Merkel in
Germany, and France’s new Socialist president, Fancois Hollande, as well as
EC President José Manuel Barroso.
Following Draghi’s suggestion, Barroso stated
that,
“Growth is the key, growth is the answer.”
Francois Hollande commented in references to
Draghi’s proposal,
“He doesn’t necessarily have the same
measures in mind as me to foster growth,” as Draghi’s position was
closer to that of Angela Merkel, who viewed the pact as consisting of
“structural reforms,” not a stimulus which would “again increase
national debt.”
An analyst at the Cutch bank ING said:
“For the ECB, a growth compact does not mean
more fiscal stimulus,” which is, of course, only reserved for banks, not
people. Instead, stated the analyst, Carsten Brzeski, it entails
“structural reforms with a vision.” [57]
In May, this vision was publicly endorsed by
Jorg Asmussen, the governor of the Bundesbank (the German central bank), and
a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, and was just
previously the deputy finance minister of Germany.
In a speech on May 21, Asmussen stated that, “we
need both” austerity and growth, but that:
“Talking about more growth does not mean
moving away from the fiscal policy strategy pursued so far. It is not a
matter of boosting growth over the next one to two quarters with
credit-financed spending programs, but of increasing potential growth.
No one is against growth. The crucial and rather difficult question to
answer is how, in ageing societies, to increase potential growth.”
As to the question of ‘how’, Asmussen suggested
three main components: product market reforms, labour market reforms, and
financing of reforms.
Product market reforms could include, according
to Asmussen,
“the completion of the internal market for
services… [as] 70% of the EU’s GDP comes from services, but only 20% of
services are provided on a cross-border basis.”
As for labour market reforms, Asmussen suggested
they should be “inspired by the Agenda 2010 programme in Germany,” and that,
ultimately:
“labour mobility needs to be increased in
the euro area (the theory says, we remember, that an optimal currency
area requires full mobility of labour). Mobility could be increased
through broader recognition of qualifications within Europe, greater
portability of pension rights, language courses and a European network
of job centres.” [58]
The Agenda 2010 programme was, explained Der
Spiegel,
“a series of labor market and social welfare
reforms introduced by former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder that completely
restructured Germany’s welfare state,” which included, “easing job
dismissal protections, lowering bureaucratic hurdles for starting
businesses, setting a higher retirement age and lowering non-wage labor
costs,” all of which are “typical examples of structural reforms.”
[59]
The Crisis Continues…
And so the European debt crisis continues, and so the austerity measures
continue to punish the populations of Europe, and so Italy remains at the
forefront of a growing global power grab:
a ‘Technocratic Revolution’ in which even
the trappings of formal democracy are pushed aside in favour of a
government subservient to unelected councils of supranational
institutions and global financial interests.
In Part 2 of this excerpt on the Italian debt
crisis, we examine the austerity programs and structural adjustments
undertaken by the technocratic government of Mario Monti.
Notes
[1] Bilderberg Meetings, Participants, 2011:
http://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/participants_2011.html
[2] John Hooper, “Italy’s politicians rally round to prevent market’s
slide,” The Guardian, 12 July 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jul/12/italy-rallies-financial-meltdown-austerity
[3] Phillip Inman and John Hooper, “Italy hopes privatisations will calm
markets,” The Guardian, 13 July 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jul/13/italy-hopes-privatisations-will-end-run-on-shares
[4] AP, “Italian Senate passes key austerity package,” The Independent,
14 July 2011:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italian-senate-passes-key-austerity-package-2313765.html
[5] Rachel Donadio, “Italy to Adopt Austerity Plan to Fend Off a Debt
Crisis,” The New York Times, 14 July 2011:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/world/europe/15italy.html
[6] Emma Rowley, “Silvio Berlusconi v. Giulio Tremonti: a clash that
spooked the markets,” The Telegraph, 14 July 2011:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8637058/Silvio-Berlusconi-v.-Giulio-Tremonti-a-clash-that-spooked-the-markets.html
[7] Nichi Vendola, “Italian debt: Austerity economics? That’s dead wrong
for us,” The Guardian, 14 July 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/italian-debt-austerity-berlusconi
[8] Mario Monti, “Il podestà forestiero,” Corriere della Sera, 7 August
2011, [original in Italian, translation provided by Google Translate]:
http://www.corriere.it/editoriali/11_agosto_07/monti-podesta_1a5c6670-c0c4-11e0-a989-deff7adce857.shtml
[9] Central Banking Newsdesk, “Leaked letter reveals ECB austerity
demands on Italy,” Central Banking, 29 September 2011:
http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking/news/2113272/leaked-letter-reveals-ecb-austerity-demands-italy
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Leigh Phillips, “ECB austerity drive raises fears for democratic
accountability in Europe,” The Guardian, 22 August 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/22/debt-crisis-europe
[13] John Hooper, “Italy’s government meets to approve new austerity
package,” The Guardian, 12 August 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/12/berlusconi-italy-austerity-cuts-protest
[14] Lorenzo Totaro, “Berlusconi’s Austerity Package Wins Final Approval
in Italian Parliament,” Bloomberg, 14 September 2011:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-14/berlusconi-s-austerity-package-wins-final-approval-in-italian-parliament.html
[15] “Italy’s Austerity Budget - Needed: A New Broom,” The Economist, 10
September 2011:
http://www.economist.com/node/21528674
[16] Jon Henley, “Austerity in Italy: cuts compound bureaucratic
obstacles,” The Guardian, 18 October 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/oct/18/austerity-italy-cuts-bureaucratic-obstacles
[17] Jon Henley, “Europe on the breadline: hopelessness and Berlusconi,”
The Guardian, 18 October 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/oct/18/jon-henley-breadline-europ-hopelessness-berlusconi
[18] Bruno Mascitelli, “As Moody’s trashes Italy, voters can’t count on
Berlusconi,” The Conversation, 5 October 2011:
http://theconversation.edu.au/as-moodys-trashes-italy-voters-cant-count-on-berlusconi-3486
[19] The Canadian Press, “Italy Debt Crisis: Berlusconi Austerity
Package Sets Up Showdown With Labour,” The Huffington Post, 14 October
2011:
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/08/14/italy-austerity-showdown_n_926389.html
[20] Reuters, “Violent protests in Italian capital,” The Irish Times, 15
October 2011:
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2011/1015/breaking23.html;
Antonio Padellaro, “Come previsto,” Il Fatto Quotidiano, 16 October
2011, (original in Italian, translation courtesy of Google Translate):
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2011/10/16/come-previsto/164205/;
“Rome counts cost of violence after global protests,” BBC News, 16
October 2011:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15326561;
Alessandra Rizzo and Meera Selva, “Rioters hijack Rome protests; police
fire tear gas,” The Denver Post, 16 October 2011:
http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_19123516
[21] Spiegel Online, “German Parliament Expected To Hold Full Vote on
EFSF,” Der Spiegel, 24 October 2011:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/controversial-leveraging-plan-german-parliament-expected-to-hold-full-vote-on-efsf-a-793656.html
[22] Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, “Berlusconi’s Government Wobbles in Face of EU
Pressure,” Der Spiegel, 25 October 2011:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/crumbling-coalition-berlusconi-s-government-wobbles-in-face-of-eu-pressure-a-793884.html
[23] MARCUS WALKER, CHARLES FORELLE, and STACY MEICHTRY, “Deepening
Crisis Over Euro Pits Leader Against Leader,” The Wall Street Journal,
30 December 2011:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203391104577124480046463576.html
[24] Ibid.
[25] Armorel Kenna, “Austerity ‘Isn’t in My Vocabulary,’ Berlusconi
Tells Il Foglio,” Bloomberg, 29 October 2011:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-29/austerity-isn-t-in-my-vocabulary-berlusconi-tells-il-foglio.html
[26] Patrick Wintour and Larry Elliott, “G20 leaders press Italy to
accept IMF checks on cuts programme,” The Guardian, 4 November 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/04/g20-italy-imf-checks-cuts
[27] Philip Ebels, “Berlusconi heads to G20 amid mutiny at home,”
EUObserver, 3 November 2011:
http://euobserver.com/9/114156
[28] Nick Squires, “Eurozone crisis: Italian coalition fails to reach
austerity deal,” The Telegraph, 3 November 2011:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/8866954/PIC-AND-PUB-PLEASE-Eurozone-crisis-Italian-coalition-fails-to-reach-austerity-deal.html
[29] Emily Gosden, “Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi agrees to
IMF oversight of austerity measures,” The Telegraph, 4 November 2011:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8869346/Italian-Prime-Minister-Silvio-Berlusconi-agrees-to-IMF-oversight-of-austerity-measures.html
[30] Barry Moody and James Mackenzie, “Berlusconi to resign after
parliamentary setback,” Reuters, 8 November 2011:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/08/us-italy-idUSTRE7A72NG20111108
[31] John Hooper, “What happens if Berlusconi resigns?” The Guardian, 8
November 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/08/italy-after-berlusconi-scenarios
[32] Graeme Wearden and Alex Hawkes, “Eurozone debt crisis: Berlusconi
to resign after austerity budget passed,” The Guardian, 8 November 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2011/nov/08/berlusconi-debt-greece#block-35
[33] “The end of Berlusconi: Hallelujah,” The Economist, 13 November
2011:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/11/end-berlusconi
[34] Rachel Donadino, “With Clock Ticking, an Economist Accepts a
Mandate to Rescue Italy,” The New York Times, 13 November 2011:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/world/europe/mario-monti-asked-to-form-a-new-government-in-italy.html
[35] Andrew Willis, “Mario Monti to draw up single market report,”
EUObserver, 21 October 2009:
http://euobserver.com/19/28856
[36] “EU must put single market ‘back on stage’, says Monti,” EurActiv,
11 May 2010:
http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/eu-put-single-market-back-stage-news-494013
[37] “Twelve projects for the 2012 Single Market: together for new
growth,” The European Commission, 13 April 2011:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/469
[38] Rachel Sanderson, “‘Superminister’ emerges from Italy’s business
elite,” The Financial Times, 16 November 2011:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22c46df8-1060-11e1-8010-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[39] John Hooper, “Mario Monti appoints technocrats to steer Italy out
of economic crisis,” The Guardian, 16 November 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/16/mario-monti-technocratic-cabinet-italy
[40] James Mackenzie, “”Italian Prussian” Monti enters political storm,”
Reuters, 13 November 2011:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/13/italy-monti-idUSL5E7MD0DO20111113
[41] Tony Barber, “Why Europe’s leaders welcome Monti,” The Financial
Times, 23 November 2011:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ce6f96cc-15bb-11e1-8db8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[42] Mario Monti, “Il podestà forestiero,” Corriere della Sera, 7 August
2011, [original in Italian, translation provided by Google Translate]:
http://www.corriere.it/editoriali/11_agosto_07/monti-podesta_1a5c6670-c0c4-11e0-a989-deff7adce857.shtml
[43] Viola Caon, “Mario Monti’s Italian technocracy reveals its true
political colours,” The Guardian, 6 December 2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/06/mario-monti-technocracy-europe
[44] Jonathan Hopkin, “How Italy’s Democracy Leads to Financial Crisis,”
Foreign Affairs 21 November 2011:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136688/jonathan-hopkin/how-italys-democracy-leads-to-financial-crisis
[45] Tony Barber, “Eurozone turmoil: Enter the technocrats,” The
Financial Times, 11 November 2011:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93c5cb36-0c92-11e1-a45b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[46] Landon Thomas Jr. and Jack Ewing, “Can Super Mario Save the Day for
Europe?” The New York Times, 29 October 2011:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/business/mario-draghi-into-the-eye-of-europes-financial-storm.html?pagewanted=all
[47] Ibid.
[48] Lionel Barber and Ralph Atkins, “FT interview transcript: Mario
Draghi,” The Financial Times, 18 December 2011:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/25d553ec-2972-11e1-a066-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[49] Ibid.
[50] Brian Blackstone, Matthew Karnitsching and Robert Thomson,
“Europe’s Banker Talks Tough,” The Wall Street Journal, 24 February
2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203960804577241221244896782.html
[51] Brian Blackstone, Matthew Karnitschnig and Robert Thomson, “Q&A:
ECB President Mario Draghi,” The Wall Street Journal, 23 February 2012:
http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2012/02/23/qa-ecb-president-mario-draghi/
[52] Alan Greenspan, “Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan: The Federal
Reserve’s semiannual monetary policy report,” Before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 26, 1997:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/1997/february/testimony.htm
[53] Louis Uchitelle, “Job Insecurity of Workers Is a Big Factor in Fed
Policy,” The New York Times, 27 February 1997:
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/27/business/job-insecurity-of-workers-is-a-big-factor-in-fed-policy.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
[54] Brian Blackstone, Matthew Karnitschnig and Robert Thomson, “Q&A:
ECB President Mario Draghi,” The Wall Street Journal, 23 February 2012:
http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2012/02/23/qa-ecb-president-mario-draghi/
[55] Alan Greenspan, “Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan: The revolution
in information technology,” Before the Boston College Conference on the
New Economy, Boston, Massachusetts, March 6, 2000:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000306.htm
[56] Ralph Atkins, Hugh Carnegy, and Quentin Peel, “Draghi calls for
Europe ‘growth compact’,” The Financial Times, 25 April 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fc894164-8ead-11e1-ac13-00144feab49a.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[57] Stefan Kaiser, “Austerity Backlash Unites European Leaders,”
Spiegel Online, 17 April 2012:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-austerity-backlash-leaders-back-draghi-s-growth-pact-a-830185.html
[58] Jörg Asmussen, “WELT-Währungskonferenz,” Berlin, 21 May 2012:
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120521.en.html
[59] Stefan Kaiser, “Austerity Backlash
Unites European Leaders,” Spiegel Online, 17 April 2012:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-austerity-backlash-leaders-back-draghi-s-growth-pact-a-830185.html
Part 2
Super Mario Monti and the Dictatorship of Austerity in
Italy
July 9, 2012
The following is Part 2
of a two-part excerpt on ‘Italy in Crisis.’ These excerpts
are rough-draft, unedited samples of a chapter on the
European debt crisis to be featured in my upcoming book (as
yet ‘Untitled’), to be done by the end of the summer.
The book covers the
following: the origins, evolution, and effects of the global
economic crisis; the acceleration of international
imperialism; the elite global social engineering project of
constructing a system of ‘global governance’; emerging
resistance and revolutionary movements (and elite attempts
to co-opt, control, or crush them), including the Arab
Spring, European anti-austerity protests, the Spanish
Indignados, the Chilean student movement, the Occupy
movement, the Quebec ‘Maple Spring’, and the Mexican student
movement, among others.
This sample allows you
to see the research that is going into this book, and if you
would like to see the book come to completion, please
consider making a generous donation to The People’s Book
Project. With a fundraising goal of $2,500 the Project has
raised $810, and just $1,690 to go!
In above Part 1 of this series (The Decline of the Roman Democracy
and Rise of the ‘Super Mario’ Technocracy), I examined the
Technocratic coup in Italy, which removed the
democratically-elected Berlusconi and replaced him with an
unelected technocrat, Mario Monti, an economist, Bilderberg
member, former European Chairman of the Trilateral
Commission, former European Commissioner for Competition,
and a former adviser to Goldman Sachs International, was
also on the board of the Coca-Cola Company, and founded the
European think tank, Bruegel.
Mario Monti was
installed by the European elites with one purpose: punish
the population of Italy through ‘fiscal austerity’ and
‘structural adjustment.’
The Technocracy of
Austerity
Monti wasted no time in punishing the people of Italy for the crimes and
excesses of Europe and the world’s elite.
On December 2, 2011, Monti announced a 30
billion euro ($40.3 billion) package of austerity measures, which included
“raising taxes and increasing the pension age.” Monti described the measures
as “painful, but necessary.”
He told a press conference that,
“We have had
to share the sacrifices, but we have made great efforts to share them
fairly.”
Monti, who is both Prime Minister and Economy Minister, said he had
renounced his own salaries from those positions. Considering that he was -
until taking those positions - an adviser to Coca-Cola and Goldman Sachs,
among other prominent jobs, those salaries likely would not make much of a
difference to Monti’s bank account, anyway.
The Deputy Economy Minister Vittorio Grilli (who is still on the board of the Monti-founded think tank
Bruegel), said that, “the package should ensure that Italy meet its target
of a balanced budget by 2013.”
The Welfare Minister Elsa Fornero broke down
into tears as she announced an end to inflation indexing on many pension
bands, which would essentially amount to “an effective income cut for many
retired people.” Unions spoke out against the cuts, stating that they would
“hit poorer workers and pensioners disproportionately hard.”
Deputy Economy
Minister Grilli said that 12-13 billion Euros of the package would come from
spending cuts, and the rest of the 30 billion euro package would come from
tax increases. The minimum age for pensioners (that is, the retirement age)
was set to be raised for both men and women to 66 by 2018, as well as
providing “incentives” to keep people in the workforce until the age of
70.[1]
The austerity package was passed by an undemocratic decree which Monti named
the “Save Italy” decree, and while the union leaders denounced the package,
the main business lobby in Italy, Confindustria, praised the package as
vital “for the salvation of Italy and the euro.”
As Elsa Fornero, the
Minister for Welfare, began crying as she announced the austerity measures,
she explained,
“We know we are asking for sacrifices, but we hope they will
be understood in the name of growth and to avoid collective
impoverishment.” [2]
Of course, austerity is just that: “collective
impoverishment.”
In response to the austerity package, Italy’s three largest labour unions
began a week of strikes on December 12, with port, highway, and haulage
workers stopping work for three hours on the 12th, while metalworkers,
including employees of Fiat, put down their tools for eight hours. Printing
press operators stopped working for a full shift, and most newspapers were
expected to not publish the following day.
Public transport strikes took
place on December 15-16, and bank employees were set to stop work in the
afternoon of December 16, while the public administration closed down for
the entire day of December 19.
Susanna Camusso, the head of the largest and
most militant labour federation, CGIL, said,
“We’re not giving up on the
idea that the austerity package must be changed… It hurts workers, pensions
and the country as a whole.”
Mario Monti held a last-minute meeting with the
union leaders to unsuccessfully attempt to stop the strikes that were set to
begin the following day.[3]
CGIL leader Camusso said that as a result of the austerity measures,
“We see
every risk of a social explosion.” CGIL, which represents six million
members, half of whom are pensioners, stated that, “We are flexible in the
face of the emergency but we are not willing to accept everything… You can’t
ride roughshod over people.”
With only 57% of Italians working, raising the
retirement age, as dictated by the austerity package, would amount to,
“closing the door on the young unemployed,” warned Camusso, adding that
Monti had done nothing for “young people and women who can’t find work, and
when they do it is badly paid.” [4]
In late December, the Italian Senate passed a vote of confidence on Mario
Monti’s government when they approved the new austerity package.
Monti
commented:
“Today this chamber concludes a rapid, responsible, complex job…
on a decree that was passed in extreme emergency and that enables Italy to
hold its head high as it faces the very serious European crisis.” [5]
Prior to the European Summit held at the end of January 2012, Mario Monti
was holding meetings with Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, British Prime
Minister David Cameron, and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy.
Italy, wrote the Economist,
“it seems fair to say, is back at the top table
after being quietly shoved off under the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi.”
Monti emphasized to Merkel, Sarkozy, and other leaders that the EU needs to
not simply “enforce fiscal discipline,” but to stimulate growth.
This would
mean, according to Monti, “not only finding ways to lower interest rates,
but encouraging liberalisation wherever possible.” Monti even suggested that
Germany should “liberalize” (meaning: privatize) some of its services.
Monti,
in an interview with the Economist, stated that,
“It is rather unusual for
Italy to be at the forefront of pro-market initiatives,” but that he planned
to undertake a major liberalization of Italy, saying, “I am convinced that
it is also in Italy’s national interest.”
Acknowledging that his government
is “unelected,” Monti told the Economist that,
“there was in Italy a hidden
demand for a boring government which would try to tell the truth in
non-political jargon.”
Monti warned, however, that,
“Austerity is not
enough, even for budgetary discipline, if economic activity does not pick up
a decent rate of growth… A lowering in interest rates does not depend only
on Italy’s efforts but also, and essentially, on Europe’s ability to
confront the crisis in a more decisive way.”
Monti stated that Italy’s
domestic political situation is getting problematic for the EU, with a
growing appeal to ‘Euroscepticism,’ warning:
“What I see now, week after
week, in parliament is a widening of the spread of this attitude… The degree
of impatience-cum-hostility to the EU, to Germany and to the ECB is
mounting.” [6]
Monti warned Merkel and other EU leaders that Italian sacrifices alone would
not get Italy out of crisis, that Italy needed some form of outside support,
without which, he warned:
“a protest against Europe will develop in Italy,
also against Germany, which is viewed as the ringleader of E.U. intolerance,
and against the European Central Bank… I cannot have success with my
policies if the E.U.’s policies don’t change.”
In particular, he was
referring to the need to bring down Italy’s interest rates, something that
could likely only be achieved through the ECB purchasing large amounts of
Italian bonds, which would increase “market confidence” in Italy and bring
down interest rates.
Otherwise, Monti lamented, the popular discontent of
the people with the economic situation could push Italy to “flee into the
arms of populists.” [7]
Spoken like a true unelected technocrat. Imagine
that, a government which dares to serve the interests of the people over
whom it rules! Not in the ‘New Europe.’
In late January, Philip Stephens, writing for the Financial Times, stated
that,
“Italy is back,” and that while Merkel “sits at the top of Europe’s
power list,” and Sarkozy “can lay claim to be the continent’s most energetic
leader,” it is Mario Monti who “is its most interesting.”
Stephens declared
that,
“Mr. Monti’s fate may turn out to be Europe’s.”
Barack Obama’s White
House announced that in a future meeting between Obama and Monti, the two
leaders would discuss,
“the comprehensive steps the Italian government is
taking to restore market confidence and reinvigorate growth through
structural reform, as well as the prospect of an expansion of Europe’s
financial firewall.”
Stephens translated this as:
“Mr. Obama is behind Mr. Monti all the way - including when he puts pressure on Ms. Merkel.”
Lamenting the Italy of Berlusconi, who was “shunned by his European Union
peers,” though always embraced as a friend by Russia’s Putin, Stephens wrote
that Monti,
“a serious-minded academic with a serious plan, is different in
every dimension.”
He also noted that there was “a second Italian at the top
table,” meaning Mario Draghi, the new President of the European Central
Bank, “the other Mario,” who in terms of economic orthodoxy, “styles himself
an honorary German.”
Stephens wrote that Monti is so important because
“it
is in Italy that the euro’s long-term prospects will be decided,” as Italy
is the euro-area’s third largest economy (after Germany and France), and if
Italy, “cannot chart a credible economic course, the euro does not have a
future as a pan-European project.”
While praising Monti’s austerity package,
Stephens said that,
“the real test will come in liberalizing the economy,”
which “will not be easy,” but “the choices are unavoidable.”[8]
Mario Monti, upon unveiling his “liberalization” plans in late January,
stated:
“Italy’s economy has been slowed down for decades by three
constraints: insufficient competition; an inadequate infrastructure; and
complicated administrative procedures.”
Thus, Monti passed a decree opening
the occupation of taxi drivers up to “competition,” prompting taxi drivers
to block central streets in Rome. As liberalization brings in higher petrol
prices (which were previously under more control), truck drivers and
agricultural workers set up barricades in Sicily.
One Italian paper (owned
by the Berlusconi family) headlined:
“Half of Italy is ready to wage war on
the government.”
Once decrees are issued, they go into effect immediately,
but require parliamentary approval within two months.
Monti’s liberalization
decrees of January (following the austerity decrees of December) also
targeted the gas and electricity markets, as well as the insurance sector
and public services. Next in Monti’s target: the labour market.
One analyst
at Roubini Global Economics told the Financial Times:
“Although structural
reforms are necessary to boost long-term growth, they will take several
years to bear fruit and, in a period of economic contraction and government
retrenchment, will have an adverse effect on short-term output, deepening
the recession which will last through 2013.” [9]
In his first interview since resigning as Prime Minister, Berlusconi told
the Financial Times in early February that he was “stepping aside” from
frontline Italian politics and had no intention of running for prime
minister again.
Berlusconi gave his,
“strongest endorsement to date of the
technocratic government led by Mario Monti,” specifically in “its intention
to implement labour market reforms opposed by trade unions.”
Berlusconi
declared:
“I have now stepped aside, even in my party.”
He explained that he
resigned the previous November because he had been attacked,
“by an obsessive
campaign by the national and foreign media that blamed me personally and the
government for the high spread of Italian state bonds and the crisis on the
stock market.”
Thus, he contended:
“After having evaluated the causes of the
crisis, which did not rest in Italy but in Europe and the euro, I believed
that if I had stayed in government I would have damaged Italy as we would
have had more terrible media campaigns… With a sense of responsibility,
though having a majority in both houses of parliament… I stepped aside and
with elegance.”
One can always rely upon a politician to sing their own
praises, especially if they are undeserving.
He did suggest, however, that
he would consider running for parliament, quipping:
“I still have strong
popular backing, almost twice as much as my colleagues Merkel and Sarkozy…
In opinion polls, I personally have 36 per cent support. If I walk out in
the street I stop the traffic. I am a public danger and I cannot go out to
do the shopping.”
Berlusconi concluded:
The hope is that this government, which is supported for the first time by
the whole of parliament, will have the chance to propose great structural
reforms, starting from the state’s institutional architecture, without which
we cannot think of having a modern and truly free and democratic
country.[10]
Martin Wolf, perhaps the most influential financial columnist in the world,
writing for the Financial Times in January of 2012, asked if the two Marios
- nicknamed by the media as the “Super-Marios” - will be able to “save the
Eurozone?”
Wolf wrote that they,
“bring sophisticated pragmatism to the
table,” and hoped that they would “shift policy in a more productive
direction.”
Wolf referred to the ECB’s new long-term refinancing operation
announced in December of 2011, which is essentially a bank bailout with a
three-year yield at the ECB’s average interest rate (which stands at 1%
currently).
When the ECB began this new program, roughly 523 banks took 489
billion Euros, described by Wolf as,
“a bold and cunning move by Mr. Draghi
and probably the most he could get away with right now.”
Wolf also referred
to Monti’s willingness to argue that the creditor countries “do more to
lower his country’s borrowing costs,” or interest rates, warning in the
Financial Times against a “powerful backlash” among voters in the EU
periphery states.
Wolf wrote that,
“Mr. Monti is in a strong position to
make this argument,” as Monti “is a well-respected official with staunchly
pro-European views and a strong sympathy for German attitudes to competition
and fiscal and monetary stability.”
Wolf explained that,
“Draghi and Monti
are addressing two interlinked fragilities: the vulnerability of the banking
system and the unsustainable terms on which weaker countries can now
borrow.”
While praising the “Super-Marios,” Martin Wolf said that they alone
could not save the Eurozone, whose problems run very deep, and where even
the ‘solutions’ to the crises felt by various EU states can make larger,
structural reforms even more challenging.
As Wolf correctly noted:
“In
Italy’s case, for example, the combination of high interest rates and
vulnerable banks with fiscal austerity is likely to lead to a lengthy and
deep recession and so to a rise in cyclical fiscal deficits [debt incurred
during and because of the economic crisis at the time] as the structural
deficit falls [the debt acquired by spending more than what is brought in
through revenue].”
Naturally, though, this simply means that the overall
debt will increase. Wolf wrote, ultimately, that if “break-up [of the euro]
is ruled out, one must choose reforms, however painful.”
This is because,
according to Wolf,
“the costs of failure are so large that the possibility
of domestic and Eurozone reform must be kept alive.”
On this, the
“Super-Marios” can be leaders.[11]
When the credit ratings agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded Italy’s debt in
January by two notches to BBB,
“with a warning of more to come,” Mario Monti
stated that he “agrees with almost everything in S&P’s analysis,” and “jokes
that he could almost have written it himself.”
He told the Financial Times
that,
“If I ever dictated anything, it must have been what S&P had to say
about domestic Italian economic policy,” and then laughed.
As a result of
the downgrade, Italy had the lowest credit rating of any Eurozone country
which did not receive a bailout, apart from Cyprus.
Why was Monti so pleased
with the downgrade? He quoted the report to the interviewer from the
Financial Times, going through the risk factors associated with Italy, but
adding:
“Nevertheless, we have not changed our political risk score for
Italy. We believe that the weakening policy environment at European level is
to a certain degree offset by a strong domestic Italian capacity.”
In other
words:
“Mr. Monti’s 60 days in office have been enough to convince the
agency that his government is on a path of reform that could return the
country to growth and shrink its debt levels, but that European Union
mismanagement of the Eurozone debt crisis is dragging down struggling
countries, including Italy.”
Mr. Monti stated,
“I think I’m the only one in
Europe not to have criticized the rating agencies.” [12]
In discussing how his government came into existence, as in, not through
democratic means, Monti told the Financial Times that he agreed that he
could be helping to bring a “revolution,” referring to the number and extent
of measures he intended to pass before democratic elections take place.
He
explained that if Italy’s borrowing costs (interest rates) fall,
“the
political parties will not dare stop the experiment [in technocracy] before
it has to stop… And in my view the political parties will not dare go back
to the acrimonious, superficial and tough confrontation that animated
parliament. The image and style of public debate has changed.”
He added:
“If
and when success comes, you will find us not really taking credit… My
ambition is that Italy becomes a boring country, in relative terms. It is
really in the hands of Europe.” [13]
In February of 2012, Mario Monti gave an interview with PBS Newshour in
which he continued to heap praise upon austerity measures, saying that
because Greece’s debt had been so high,
“it would have been hard - let’s
face realities - to have a soft landing from those excesses of deficit
without a recession.”
He added,
“I think there is a valid point if we say
that Europe needed to be put under a safe place as regards the public
finances of each member state.”
Monti thanked “German and other pressures”
for pushing countries in that direction of austerity.
And now, he claimed,
“the time has come to focus more energies on how collectively we can achieve
more growth in Europe.” [14]
Growth, of course, simply means growth of
profits for big banks and multinational corporations.
Super Mario’s ‘Structural Adjustment’
The Meaning of “Growth”
When Europe’s political and financial elite discuss “growth” in the current
context as an added “solution” on top of austerity, what they really mean is
to implement major structural changes: to liberalize the economy, privatize
all assets, state subsidies, services, industries, and resources.
This will
allow corporations and banks to come in and purchase all of these assets and
industries, and since this process takes place in the midst of a deep
crisis, they are able to take control of all the assets for very cheap
prices.
This is called “foreign direct investment.”
The major corporations of Europe, of North America, and elsewhere, will be
able to control directly a much larger share of the economy. Their purchases
provide short-term funds for the state, thus increasing short-term revenue.
However, since state industries are privatized and sold for pennies on the
dollar, they are actually losing long-term revenue, but that isn’t
mentioned.
Markets respond to the short-term, not the long-term, and of
course, we want to have our world and its social, political, and economic
stability determined by forces that theoretically do not look more than a
couple months ahead. The process of liberalization and privatization is also
sold on the prospect of “creating jobs,” because the theory goes that
corporations will enter the market with the ability to invest and thus,
create jobs for workers.
The reality is that the corporations buy up the
industries, and generally shut them down to relocate elsewhere for cheaper labour. This means mass firings. This also means that unions and labour
rights in general have to be dismantled and people have to be kept in line,
under control.
Austerity measures are aimed at redistributing wealth from the mass of
society to the very top percentiles, which is achieved through increased
taxation, mass firing of public sector workers, cuts to social spending,
health care, welfare, education and other areas.
This, quite predictably,
creates a massive social crisis.
Many austerity packages - such as Monti’s
in Italy - also include efforts to undermine labour and unions. This
prepares the work force for the period and programs of “growth,” in which
workers will be forced to submit to exploitative working conditions with no
collective bargaining rights, or else the industries will simply fire them
all, close up shop, and go elsewhere.
This is why we hear all the Eurocrats
and politicians in Europe and elsewhere explain that austerity and growth
are not mutually exclusive, that they can and should co-exist together.
Indeed, from the view of the ‘effects’ of these policies, a joint program of
“austerity” and “growth” makes perfect sense: commit social genocide
(through fiscal austerity), and exploit, plunder, and profit from the spoils
of economic war (growth through structural adjustments).
In the ‘Third World’ over the past three decades, these policies were
imposed by the IMF, World Bank, Western imperial powers, and Western banks
and corporations.
With the primary engine being the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, which were in the
midst of a major debt crisis in the 1980s, were forced to sign what were
called ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ (SAPs) with the IMF and World Bank
if they wanted to get any loans or aid from Western banks or institutions.
The SAPs would be a set of conditions that the countries would have to
adhere to if they were to get a loan, and the conditions included a mix of
‘fiscal austerity’ and ‘structural adjustment’:
-
devalue the currency to make
it cheaper to invest in the country (but which creates inflation and
increases the costs of food, fuel, and other commodities, hurting the poor
and middle classes)
-
cut social spending to reduce the deficit (but which
saw the destruction of education, health care, welfare and social programs,
as well as mass firings from the public sector)
-
trade liberalization, to
allow for foreign countries and corporations to more easily invest in the
country, and thus, bring in revenue (which meant dismantling all tariffs,
trade barriers, price controls, state subsidies, and resulted in the easy
exploitation and cheap purchase of the country’s wealth by foreign
corporations and banks)
-
privatization, meant to encourage
investment and allow for the market to make state-owned industries
and asset more “efficient” (but which resulted in mass firings,
closing of entire industries, mass corruption, and total control of
the economy being handed to foreign banks and corporations)
The result of SAPs - the combination of “austerity” and “growth” - over
three decades has been devastating:
-
poverty has rapidly accelerated and
expanded
-
wealth becomes heavily polarized, with a tiny minority owning the
economy, and everyone else with next to nothing
-
the small elite become
increasingly dependent upon and integrated with a global elite (based
primarily in the West), and disassociated from their fellow citizens
-
mortality rates go up as health care and social services are dismantled or
made incredibly expensive at a time of deepening poverty in which more
people need the services more than ever before
-
social unrest and repression become
rampant, as the people rise up against ‘Structural Adjustment,’ the
state resorts to increasingly authoritarian and brutal measures to
control or crush resistance to the programs and to protect the
dominance of the tiny minority, locally and internationally
This, essentially, is the fate of Europe and the rest of the industrialized
world.
Europe, simply being the most integrated region of the world (a trend
which is accelerating everywhere in the world), is experiencing the brunt of
this crisis before the rest of the industrialized nations of the world. So
when politicians and financial elites say that Europe needs “growth” in
conjunction with austerity, and this will lead to “recovery”, remember what
“growth” means: exploitation, plundering, and profits.
When you remember
this, suddenly everything the politicians and pundits have been saying for
years, suddenly makes sense.
When asked if he felt that there was a danger of “a backlash” in Italy
against what people,
“may see as E.U. imposed changes to their way of life
that are very, very painful,” Monti replied that, “there was such a risk of
backlash,” but he explained:
“I try to avoid that backlash by always
presenting the necessary sacrifices that Italians have to go through not as
an imposition from Brussels or Germany or the European Central Bank, but
rather as a necessary step that Italians have to undertaking - to undertake
also at the suggestion of Europe, but basically for their own interests, for
the interests of ourselves and of future generations of Italians. This is
precisely meant to avoid backlashes.”
Interesting statement: saying that
austerity is for the interests of Italians and “future generations” is done
not to speak truth, but “to avoid backlashes” against the E.U.
Monti
emphasized that,
“it is very, very important” to ensure that the single
currency, “which was meant to be the culminating point of the European
construction,” does not become, “through psychological negative effects, a
factor of disintegration of Europe.” [15]
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal in early February, Mario Monti
publicly outlined his strategy for “growth” in Europe, which he proposed
privately to other European governments the previous month, pushing Europe
beyond austerity and suggesting,
“tougher European rules aimed at prying open
member states’ national industries,” of course to “encourage economic growth
and competition in the euro zone.”
Monti explained that if this is not done,
“Europe will not be a nice place to live in five years from now if we
haven’t solved the problem of how to grow… We have to say what growth will
look like in a fiscally compacted union.”
His proposal,
“would speed up the
process by which European authorities sanction nations that violate the
tenets of the EU’s single market.”
For Monti and other technocrats like
himself, this “growth” does not include government spending.
Since Italy is
supposed to knock off 30 billion Euros ($39.8 billion) - 2% of its GDP -
from its public debt “every year for decades,” this means, explained Monti,
that “any thought of budget-stimulated growth ideas will have to go away.”
Instead, Monti suggested that the European Union,
“should back single markets
more forcefully to support economic growth,” which instead of having Berlin
sign off on the EU spending its way to prosperity, would mean “to push
Germany to liberalize its own economy,” which, claimed Monti, “would have a
trickle-down effect.” [16]
Monti was undertaking various programs of “liberalization” in Italy, such as
liberalizing major professions and sectors, such as pharmacies, taxis, and
notaries.
To handle Italy’s “unemployment” issue, which is significant to
say the least, Monti was seeking to “introduce new measures aimed at making
it easier for companies to hire and fire workers,” which, he said, “will
increase the overall flexibility of the labor market,” [17] meaning that it
will allow for cheaper and more easily-exploited labour by corporations.
Monti even stated that the changes he was making in the labour market were
aimed at,
“reducing the segmentation of Italy’s labor market between those
who are protected, sometimes hyper-protected, and those, particularly the
young, who can’t really get into the labor market.” [18]
So, instead of
having various work forces that are “protected” (or “hyper-protected” in Monti’s words), it would be better to simply bring everyone down to the same
level to allow for “flexibility,” or in other words, easy exploitative
capacity.
For “Super Mario,” no protection is better than any protection
when it comes to workers. Imagine if there were politicians who thought the
same thing about bankers.
While Europe agreed to a ‘Fiscal Compact’ to ensure austerity, Monti felt
that the EU should add to this a growth pact, and felt that the
supranational and undemocratic European Union should have “an efficient
mechanism to swiftly sanction countries that don’t open up their economies
to competition,” meaning exploitation and plundering.
Thus, the previous
month, Monti submitted a proposal “aimed at giving the European Commission -
the EU’s governing body - greater power over sanctioning member states.”
This proposal, which had not been reported prior to this interview,
“could
speed up the process by years, by making it easier for the commission to
impose rulings rather than having to take member states to court, as it
often does now.”
When asked what this has to do with growth, Monti replied:
“A lot, because if you give more teeth to the commission to remove national
obstacles to the functioning of the single market, we’ll create a large
level playing field, which the business community always insists is a key
component of growth.” [19]
Well that answers that: it will lead to “growth”
because the business community says so. Thank you, Prime Minister.
Monti acknowledged that this creates obvious concerns, especially with
countries like the U.K. and France which would likely oppose the proposal
for fear of its encroachment on their sovereignty, and the existence of a
“democratic deficit” which will continue “as member states gradually hand
over more of their fiscal and economic policies to the central oversight of
European institutions.”
But for this, Monti has a solution:
“Much of the
reconciliation between more centralized governance and the scope for
democracy will be resolved through an even stronger role of the European
Parliament,” [20] which is, in effect, utterly useless.
The Most Important Man in Europe?
In late February, Time Magazine published an article reporting on an
interview they conducted with Monti in which they referred to him as “the
most important man in Europe.”
The article described Monti as,
“the tough
taskmaster Italy so desperately needs,” though he “has the aura of a
gentlemanly grandfather.”
Time reported that Monti was “fixing a deadlocked
democracy,” no doubt by ruling as an unelected technocrat, “and charging
forward with greater European integration,” in a “wholesale overhaul of
Italian society.”
Monti told Time,
“I believe that reforms will not really
take hold if they do not gradually come into the culture of the people.”
Time declared that for the problem of Italy’s partisan politics, “the
solution was Monti.”
Monti said that the request to rule came,
“at such a
severe time of crisis for Italy that I could not refuse.”
Thus, declared
Time Magazine:
“Today he reigns over Rome like a new Caesar.”
In effect,
“the democratic process has been suspended to allow an unelected technocrat
to implement policies that elected politicians could not.”
Monti himself
refers to this as a “temporary mutual disarmament” of the left and
right,[21] a technocratic euphemism for “dictatorship of austerity.”
The publication praised Monti’s austerity package in December, his
liberalization program in January, and his new plan to overhaul the labour
market; then lamented that Monti is taking on “entrenched interest groups,”
such as taxi drivers (no joke, the article referred to taxi drivers as
“entrenched interest groups”), who staged strikes in Rome and other Italian
cities, and pharmacists who were threatening to do the same thing, or
truckers that blocked roadways in protest of a fuel-tax hike.
The president
of a national taxi union stated,
“In Italy, the economy was more based on
rules that used to be applied to create wealth for the general public… I
don’t understand why suddenly the only solution is to get rid of the rules.”
He added: “Monti has always lived in the salons… He really doesn’t know the
problems of ordinary people.”
To this, Monti replied,
“Maybe they’re right,”
but he felt this was an advantage: “Italy has piled up huge public debt
because the successive governments were too close to the life of ordinary
citizens, too willing to please the requests of everybody, thereby acting
against the interests of future generations.”
Monti earned a reputation -
and the nickname “Super Mario” - back when he was an EU Commissioner, where
he came into conflict with some major global corporations, such as blocking
a merger between GE and Honeywell, which prompted the then-CEO of GE, Jack
Welch, to refer to Monti as “cold-blooded.”
Monti acknowledged that as he is
more successful in pushing “reforms,” the effects of those reforms would put
pressure on the political parties to abandon him, and make it more difficult
for him to continue his programs before he leaves office in 2013.
“The
point,” explained Monti, “is how to keep this pressure even once the most
visible elements of emergency hopefully are over.”
This would largely be
left to accelerating the process of European integration:
“I think there is
a genuine wish on the part of the E.U. and Germany and France to again play
an active game with Italy for a relaunch of European integration… I think we
will be seeing an acceleration of the good news.” [22]
Apparently,
accelerating the integration and institutionalization of an undemocratic,
technocratic, supranational structure is “good news.”
When Mario Monti went to visit Wall Street on the seventh floor of the New
York Stock Exchange (to visit his actual ‘constituents’), he received a
long, standing ovation when he entered the room with an audience of 200
people.
Charlie Himmelberg, a managing director at Goldman Sachs, commented
that,
“It’s been impressive how quickly the sentiment has changed on Italy.”
Blaise Antin, the head of sovereign research at TCW said,
“It is a good
thing Monti visits investors… But plenty will ultimately depend on the
Italian parliament” in the tough choices ahead.[23]
Monti told the crowd of
Wall Street financiers that,
“What’s important is that this improved
governance of the euro zone is almost there and the euro zone crisis is
almost overcome, I believe.”
Monti later reflected at a new conference in
New York that he was “warmly greeted by the financial community” on Wall
Street.[24]
No doubt.
Super Mario Wages War on Workers
After making the rounds in interviews, state visits, meeting Obama, and
visiting his constituents at Wall Street, Mario Monti went back to Italy in
late February to push forward on his “labour reforms” to undermine and
destroy unions and workers’ rights.
By March, the effects were being felt
among Italians. Monti went to great pains to denounce what he described as
Italy’s “two-tier labour market,” dividing generations and leaving the young
out to dry. The New York Times wasted no time in supporting Monti’s calls to
dismantle this system.
Framing the discourse around the generational divide,
in which,
“older workers came of age with guaranteed jobs and ironclad
contracts granting generous pensions and full benefits,” the younger
Italians, “the best-educated in the country’s history… are lucky to find
temporary work, which offers few benefits or stability.” Thus, one of Monti’s “solutions” was to “make it easier for companies to hire and
fire.” [25]
Very typical of the neoliberal economic discourse, is to draw conclusions
based upon these facts alone: older workers have benefits, younger workers
have few opportunities; thus, older workers are destroying future
generations with their “entitlements.”
Solution: dismantle entitlements and
benefits so all can work on an “equal playing field.”
The discourse divides
workers and people against each other, meanwhile, there is no mention of the
fact that the reason why the youth have so few job opportunities has more to
do with the lack of state and business investment, the deregulation and
privatization of industries over the 1990s (while Mario Draghi was head of
the Treasury), the effects of the euro (creating an economic hierarchy
between the Northern nations of the EU and the Southern states), or the very
obvious fact that Italy is in a severe crisis because its corrupt government
colluded with global banks and suffered under the institutions and rules of
the E.U., which promote elite interests and undermine democracy and
self-determination.
No, mentioning the massive - and elite-driven - causes
for the crisis Italy faces, and the unemployment issues which are
symptomatic of that crisis, is too inconvenient for the New York Times.
Instead, it is simply easier and more acceptable in the popular discourse to
pit workers against each other, in an effort to undermine them all,
collectively.
An economist at Bocconi University, of which Mario Monti was president until
he became Prime Minister of Italy, supported this discourse for Italy,
arguing:
“Reforming contracts, unemployment benefits and salary levels would
permit labor productivity to rise, which would in turn permit the country to
grow… It’s a central theme for improving a country like Italy.” [26]
Undertaking all of these labour “reforms,” in actuality, would allow for
youth to enter the job market to a certain degree, as it would mean that
other “hyper-protected” workers no longer have protection, and all of
Italy’s workforce is left vulnerable to exploitation.
Thus, youth could be
hired as extremely cheap labour, since for them, some work - even horrible
work with little pay - is better than nothing at all. If workers who had
protections attempt to organize and salvage various labour rights, companies
can simply fire them and hire cheap, young workers with no benefits as
replacements. This is called “youth opportunity.”
This is how sweatshops
became so popular in the ‘developing’ world over the past several decades,
which were also brought about through fiscal austerity and structural
adjustment: undermine labour/worker rights for easy exploitation, and if
they attempt to organize, strike, or obtain rights, foreign corporations can
fire them all and hire cheaper labour, close their factories and outsource
elsewhere, or ship in cheaper immigrant labour forces.
This has the effect
of bringing the standards and conditions of the entire work force, and
indeed, the global labour market, down to a more easily exploitative
position: equality of exploitation (what economists and bankers call “labour
flexibility”).
Monti declared:
“We have to get away from a dual labor market where some are
overly protected, while others totally lack protection and benefits when
unemployed.”
Thus, he said, “equity and growth” would be the “watchwords” of
his government.
Since “growth” means profits, plunder, and exploitation,
“equity” is a logical addition to this: equity in exploitation.
The New York
Times, reporting on a 33-year old graduate without job opportunities, said
she would “welcome” such changes, as she,
“like so many in her generation,
feels thwarted, overly reliant on her parents and uncertain of her future.”
Amazingly, in the same article, it was acknowledged that the two-tier labour
system was not created by “entitlements,” but rather as a result of policies
the government undertook nearly a decade previous (in facilitating Italy’s
entry into the euro-zone), in which the state made it easier for Italian
corporations “to hire younger workers on a range of temporary contracts and
internships,” while many of the early-retirement benefits for older workers
were put in place during the mass privatizations (undertaken by Mario Draghi),
in order to facilitate the reduction of staff “and cutting costs in the
period before Italy joined the euro zone.”
The article then went on to blame
the unions, claiming that,
“younger Italians have come to see them as part of
the problem.” [27]
One must actually pause in appreciation of the intellectual gymnastics
displayed by the New York Times in publishing an article which quietly
acknowledges that the causes of Italy’s two-tiered labour and employment
issues were the result of demands and policies put in place in order to join
the single-currency, yet still concluded that the main problem was
“overly-protected workers,” and thus, that the solutions lie in undermining
labour and workers’ rights.
The article even acknowledged that the
government’s policies of making it easy for Italian corporations to exploit
youth labour were designed “to make the market more flexible,” yet does not
question the logic in Monti’s program of solving the crisis brought on by
this “flexibility” by implementing measures to make it “more flexible.”
The Monti-logic, which the New York Times readily endorses, is to look at
policies that didn’t work (in terms of what people were ‘told’ they were
meant to achieve), and then to advance and accelerate those same policies in
the hopes that it will have the opposite effect as to that which it has
always had before. Einstein once said that the definition of insanity is
doing the same thing over again, expecting different results.
If we actually
apply that definition, almost the entire discipline of economics - and most
especially neoliberal economics - is absolutely insane.
Either that, or they
simply use coded rhetoric which sounds like one thing, means another, and is
done so to promote a global social, political, and economic agenda which
would otherwise be impossible to publicly justify: preserving and
accumulating for a tiny minority, and exploiting and punishing the vast
majority.
Right on cue, the effects of the economic crisis over the previous year,
exacerbated by Monti’s labour reforms and austerity package, was being felt
across Italy.
In Naples, one of Europe’s poorest cities, by late March it
was reported that child labour has returned, as,
“thousands of children are
leaving school to help their families make ends meet,” an increasing trend
in the country, in which children work in the black market or “are recruited
for sinister purposes by the mafia.”
The most common job for child workers
is as a “shop assistant,” earning less than a euro an hour.
This trend had
been developing in Italy over a number of years, as one local government
report in the Campania region revealed that between 2005 and 2009, more than
54,000 children left school to join the work force, with 38% of them under
the age of 13.
The deputy mayor of Naples, located in the Campania region,
commented:
“Of course, we were the poorest region in Italy. But we haven’t
seen a situation like this since the end of the Second World War… At age 10,
these kids are already working 12 hours a day, which is a clear breach of
their right to development.”
The succession of financial reforms put in
place by the Italian government since 2008 introduced drastic cuts, and in
June of 2010, the Campania region had to end its minimum welfare program,
“plunging more than 130,000 families into poverty.”
Children from poor
families face three options: struggle to stay in school, drop out to work in
the black economy, or “join the ranks of the Camorra, the Neapolitan mafia.”
Since the beginning of the crisis, support for youth and their families has
been cut by 87%, and roughly 20,000 educators in the Campania region had not
been paid for two years.[28]
Perhaps this is what Mario Monti means by
“labour flexibility.”
In late March, reported the Economist, as Mario Monti was engaged in talks
with employers and unions, trying to get them to accept labour-market
reforms,
“when it became clear that unanimity was impossible, Mr. Monti
declared the talks over and said his government would press ahead
regardless.”
It is quite appropriate, one must acknowledge, that for a
government which was created through undemocratic means, it should only
continue to act and rule undemocratically as well.
Such is the path Mario Monti has taken with Italy. On March 16, the Italian parliament’s three
largest parties endorsed Monti’s reforms, on the warning from President
Napolitano that,
“failure to agree would have serious consequences.”
The
main problem for Monti came from the largest union federation, the CGIL, an
historic ally of the Democratic Party (PD), which had endorsed Monti and his
austerity packages, leading one senior leader in the PD to suggest that the
party leader, Pier Luigi Bersani,
“could face a backbench revolt or a party
split.” [29]
The Wall Street Journal naturally congratulated Monti, in an article
entitled, “Monti pulls a Thatcher,” for showing “political courage” in
walking away from negotiations with Italy’s labour unions, announcing that
he was,
“going to move ahead with reforming the country’s notorious
employment laws - with or without union consent.”
Italy had stringent rules
regarding the ability of employers to fire workers, what the Wall Street
Journal referred to as a “job-for-life scheme,” which Monti’s reforms will
replace with a “generous system of guaranteed severance when employees are
dismissed” for what are called, “economic reasons.”
The Journal heaped
praise upon Monti, as “standing up to Italy’s labor unions takes courage,
and not only of the political sort,” noting how there was an economist ten
years prior who was shot and killed “for his role in designing a previous
attempt at labor reform.” Monti had been ruling by decree since December,
but announced in late March that the labour reform proposals would be voted
through the National Assembly.
The WSJ wrote that as a former economics
professor, Mario Monti “has a rare opportunity to educate Italians on the
consequences of opposing reform,” to which the Journal suggested, they need
only to look at Greece:
“If that doesn’t scare them sober, then nothing will
help.” [30]
Within a week, Monti allowed for a very slight change to his labour reform
bill, which would give judges,
“greater leeway in determining whether
companies were justified in laying off a worker.”
The Wall Street Journal
then referred to this, in an article entitled, “Surrender, Italian Style,”
as a,
“cave-in to the left side of his political coalition,” and noted that,
“Monti was brought in as Prime Minister to retrieve his country from the
edge of a Greek abyss,” and that this “labor bill is a surrender to those
who are bringing” that abyss to Italy.[31]
For the WSJ, any capitulation -
no matter how minor (and this particular one was very minor) - to unions and labour, is deemed an absolute “surrender” or “cave-in.”
Monti defended
himself in a letter to the Wall Street Journal in which he explained that
this “surrender” was still a move in the right direction of reform, as it,
“introduces a more predictable [i.e., controllable] and speedier [i.e.,
systematic] procedure to handle dismissals for economic or other objective
reasons.”
He elaborated:
“First, a fast, compulsory, out-of-court settlement
procedure at local level; then, if conciliation fails, the worker can take
the case to a judge as happens in other countries.”
In “extreme cases” where
the “economic or other reason” for firing the worker is deemed “manifestly
inexistent,” the judge then has the ability to decide “for reinstatement
instead of compensation.”
When the “economic dismissal” is “not justified”
in other cases (i.e., not an “extreme case”), compensation will be given
with a cap at 24 months of wages. Monti said that it was a “complex reform”
and deserves “serious analysis rather than snap judgments.”
He then wrote:
“I would suggest that perhaps the fact that it has been attacked by both the
main employers association and the metalworkers union, part of the leading
trade union confederation [CGIL], indicates that we have got the balance
right.”
This reform, claimed Monti,
“will make the Italian labor market more
flexible” which “lays the foundation for increase productivity, economic
growth and employment.” [32]
In mid-April, Italy’s major unions took to the streets of Rome in protest
against Mario Monti’s pension-system reforms put in place in January,
“saying it traps hundreds of thousands of workers in a legal limbo without
retirement pay.”
The reform that raised the retirement age affects those who
are already retired.
Bloomberg gave the example of Maria Dinelli, who had an
early-retirement deal in 2008, in which her former employer provided
benefits until her pension was to begin in 2015.
Under Monti’s reforms, her
pension won’t begin until 2017, upon which she commented,
“I’ll be without a
salary or pension for two full years before the retirement age, and will
have to put money aside… You were told you had guarantees, then you lose it
all because a new government takes power and changes the rules.”
Tens of
thousands of Italians took to the streets of Rome on April 13 as the Italian
Labor Ministry said the night before that,
“there are 65,000 Italians who
may be left without support between when they leave work and when their
pension kick in as the higher retirement age delays their payout,” while
unions say the amount of people affected is five times that size, at roughly
300,000, prompting one union leader to state, “If these figures were
correct,” referring to the Labor Ministry numbers, “then we’d have to say
that the thousands of workers who’ve turned to the union for help are not
real and just ghosts.”
A labor law professor in Rome estimated the number
may actually be as high as 450,000.[33]
Monti referred to this plan as “cutting edge.” Well, it certainly ‘cuts.’
Meanwhile, Italians are facing increased taxes and record-high gasoline
prices, thus producing a “slump in consumer demand” which pushed Italy into
a deeper recession.
Nicola Marinelli of Glendevon King Asset Management in
London stated:
“An overhaul of the pension system was unavoidable because
the old scheme was too generous compared to the country’s possibilities and
the European standards… That said, the protest of these workers may be a
harbinger of future social tensions. I don’t think the younger workers have
really realized they will have starvation-level pensions.”
Just another
“cutting edge” facet of Monti’s reforms. Interestingly, though perhaps not
surprisingly, Monti’s reforms had not yet included “a heavy hand with the
richest taxpayers,” prompting a labor law professor to opine,
“I think it’s
about time for those who have more to contribute to the needs of the
country.” [34]
But such is not the nature of austerity.
In fact, in April it was reported that the political class in Italy, the,
“army of politicians and senior officials” who support Monti and his reforms
in Parliament, “are clinging to fat salaries that far outstrip those of
their peers abroad.”
Monti had issued a decree which aimed to “prevent
public servants earning more than U.S. President Barack Obama,” many of whom
“earn considerably more.”
Italy’s wealthy, however, not simply the top
politicians and bureaucrats alone,
“are hardly carrying their share of the
burden.”
One economist noted:
“There has not been an equal distribution of
sacrifices… In proportion to their salaries, higher incomes are paying
less.”
Italy has roughly 1,000 lawmakers across the nation, who earn more
than their counterparts in the United States, with a base salary of 11,283
Euros per month, while the lowest-earning households in Italy,
“hurt most by
rising fuel, property and sales taxes,” live “on less than 8,000 Euros per
year, or 667 Euros per month, after taxes.”
Between 2006 and 2010, Italy’s
poorest families already lost almost 12 percent of their real income,
according to data from the Bank of Italy.
Unlike the political class, most
Italian families are “traditionally thrifty,” however, under austerity in
2011,
“households saved only 12 percent of their gross income, the lowest
level since 1995.”
That is the nature of austerity: when you need to save
more than ever before, the ability to do so becomes harder than ever before.
In March, a Moroccan worker in Italy set himself on fire in protest, and an
Italian businessman did the same.
Polls in Italy have shown that the people
are,
“increasingly dissatisfied with the parties and politicians that led the
country for the past two decades,” as more than 40% of respondents said that
they wouldn’t vote for any of them if there were an election today.[35]
Italy Under Austerity
The Wall Street Journal reported in early April that figures from the
Italian Treasury revealed that Monti’s austerity measures were,
“stunting
activity in the euro-zone’s third-largest economy,” and while “recent tax
increases are helping Italy cut its fiscal shortfall,” they are also
“pushing economic activity to contract even faster.”
Industry Minister Corrado Passera stated:
“With austerity one doesn’t grow.”
The majority of
tax increases are on the income of workers, though they also include taxes
on consumption (such as Value Added Taxes - VAT) and on property assets.
As
Italy’s GDP contracted by 1% in the first quarter of 2012, yields on Italian
government bonds rose, making it more expensive for Italy to borrow.
Former
prime minister Berlusconi commented:
“The cure that the European Union has
prescribed for our country is the one that has already caused a disaster in
Greece and is beginning to do so again in Spain,” though he continued to
throw his support behind the technocratic government.
One businessman in
Italy warned that,
“Consumers have insurmountable obstacles ahead of them,
with higher income-tax rates from March, higher property taxes as of June
and a value-added tax increase in September.” [36]
By late April, unemployment in Italy had reached nearly 10%, according to
“official” statistics (meaning, it’s actually much higher), and in Sardinia,
one in two young people were out of work.
The construction industry in Italy
has been hard hit, leading to one industry businessman killing himself,
adding to a wave of “austerity suicides” across Italy, reaching 25 by April
for the year of 2012.[37]
In May of 2012, the Italian anarchist group which had claimed responsibility
for shooting a nuclear engineering firm chief threatened to target Mario
Monti.
The group, referring to itself as the Olga Nucleus of the
Informal
Anarchist Federation - International Revolutionary Front, sent a statement
to a newspaper in southern Italy, warning that,
“Monti was among seven
remaining targets after Roberto Adinolfi, chief executive of Ansaldo
Nucleare, was shot in the leg last week.”
The statement read:
“We say to Monti that he is one of the seven remaining and that the people have no
interest in staying in Europe, saving the banks and helping to balance the
accounts of a state that squandered money for its own interests.”
The
statement explained that any suicide connected to tax difficulties brought
about by the austerity measures would be punished as a “state murder.”
This
referred to a series of suicides in Italy by businessmen and others,
“despairing at the collapse of their livelihoods because of the crisis.” It
was the same anarchist group that in the previous year, claimed
responsibility for sending letter bombs to several banks, including to Josef
Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, while the director-general of Equitalia
in Italy lost a finger opening one of the letter bombs in December.
One of
the members of the group, facing prosecution in court,
“called for armed
revolution… when asked about the Adinolfi shooting.” [38]
Mario Monti had been pushing himself into European politics as a “mediator”
between Germany and the weaker euro-zone economies, to seemingly “broaden”
decision-making in Europe beyond the Franco-German axis.
In the first few
weeks of May, Monti’s technocratic administration had been “courting Berlin
on two fronts,” trying to draw the parliaments of both countries closer
together, and in term of ideology, they had been,
“trying to convince German
officials - in both private meetings and public speeches - that the
compromise solution to stoking growth in Europe’s weaker economies is
investment in big public projects, such as transportation, Internet networks
or electricity grids, while maintaining fiscal discipline.”
Some spending,
claimed Monti, should be “exempted” from fiscal austerity, something which
Germany had long opposed.
But with the French elections in early May getting
rid of Nicolas Sarkozy and bringing in the Socialist President Francois
Hollande, who favored a strategy of spending on growth, Monti was seeking
to find a common ground between Germany and France, but in a way that
ultimately was supportive of the European Union, specifically.
Nicholas
Spiro, who heads a London-based sovereign debt consultancy, stated,
“If
there’s one European leader whose policies can appeal to both Chancellor
Merkel and President-elect Hollande, it’s Monti.”
The refined “growth”
program promoted by Monti would be based on,
“creating bonds to fund European
Union infrastructure projects and boosting the firepower of the European
Investment Bank to fund public investments.”
Thus, it would be based upon
European spending, not individual nations spending, and so the debt would be
pan-European, and controlled by the EU.[39]
In late April, Mario Monti announced that he would be making more cuts to
spending by the end of the year,
“and appointed an expert from the private
sector as a special commissioner to oversee the spending review.”
The cuts,
amounting to some 4.2 billion Euros (or $5.6 billion),
“would allow him to
avoid proceeding with a plan to raise the national sales tax to 23 percent
in October from 21 percent, a move that could hurt consumer spending and
slow a return to growth,” reported the New York Times. Monti stated, “Today
we are faced with the necessity of making up for the time lost… And not in
years, but in months.” [40]
The new special commissioner from the private
sector to review the process was Enrico Bondi, known as “Mr. Fix-it” for
having successfully restructured the bankrupt Parmalat group.
The change in
austerity measures followed intense pressure from the business community in
Italy to push the burden from increased taxation to more government spending
cuts.[41]
In mid-May, yields on Italian debt jumped up to nearly 6%, as evidence
emerged that Italy was sliding into an even deeper recession, brought on by
Monti’s austerity measures and ‘structural adjustments.’
The government in
Italy was openly discussing using troops to protect various targets after a
wave of violent actions, claimed by various anarchist groups, such as the
shooting of the nuclear industry executive, as well as petrol bombs being
thrown at tax offices in early May.
An Italian banker warned that unless the
European Central Bank was converted into a lender of last resort, Italy
faces,
“massive devaluation, three to five years of hyperinflation, and
unbearable unemployment.”
Moody’s ratings agency downgraded 26 Italian banks
in May, evoking the anger of the Italian Banking Association, which called
the downgrade,
“irresponsible, incomprehensible, and unjustifiable,” and
said it was “an attack on Italy, its companies, its families and its
citizens.” [42]
Italy held a series of local elections in early May, in which the Italian
comedian, Beppe Grillo, who is also leading a political party, the Five Star
Movement, which “rode a wave of protest against austerity politics” and
suggested, “We will see you in parliament.”
Grillo had been increasingly
critical of Monti’s tax hikes, and in one local election forced a run-off
with the Democratic Party (PD), and managed to “trounce” Silvio Berlusconi’s
Freedom People party in all the local elections, while the right-wing
Northern League party, which has also criticized Monti’s reforms, “was
humiliated at the polls.”
The major Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera,
said, following the elections,
“As of yesterday, it seems Monti is now more
alone.” [43]
In mid-June, police in Italy, Switzerland and Germany arrested 10 people
suspected of involvement in “leftwing terrorist activity” in Italy and
elsewhere over the previous three years, connected to one of two
organizations, the Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI) and the International
Revolutionary Front (FRI).
A general in Italy’s semi-militarized Carabinieri
police force said that,
“the two groups were in contact with the Greek
anarchist movement.”
The individuals who were arrested, however, were not
suspected of being involved in the major act associated with the groups, the
shooting of Roberto Adinolfi in Italy, though the General claimed, “The
origin is the same.”
The arrests did, however, include suspected involvement
in the failed letter bomb sent to former Deutsche Bank CEO Josef
Ackermann.[44]
In mid-June, as the G20 meeting unfolded in Mexico, Italian Prime Minister
Mario Monti said that the euro area needs a “road map with concrete
interventions to make the euro more stably credible,” as well as a
“pro-growth plan,” stating, “the two things are strictly complementary.”
[45]
Even though Monti had imposed his brutal austerity measures upon the people
of Italy, the bond rates for the country remained high, prompting Monti to
comment,
“There must be something wrong if a country that complies still has
such high interest rates.”
Monti noted that through the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF), the European bail out fund, Italy had supplied
loans to Greece, Ireland and Portugal amounting to 31.5 billion Euros,
commenting,
“Italy has not until now asked for loans… She has made a lot of
them and every day that passes, is in fact subsidizing others with the high
interest rates she pays in the market.” [46]
In late June, following the G20 summit, Mario Monti announced a “growth
decree” for Italy, which included,
“discount loans for corporate R&D
[Research & Development], tax credits for businesses that hire employees
with advanced degrees, and reduced headcount at select government
ministries.” [47]
Also in late June, Italy, Germany, France and Spain agreed
to a “growth pact” for Europe with the total value of 130 billion Euros
($163 billion), noting that, “austerity alone will not be enough to pull the
euro zone out of its deep crisis.”
The total sum represents 1% of the
European Union’s GDP. Also envisioned are “project bonds” which would be
financed through the EU’s budget, and issued “for private-sector
infrastructure projects,” or in other words, corporate subsidies.[48]
At the end of June, it was reported that Italy’s economic crisis was
deepening, due in large part to the austerity measures, but also as a result
of the increasingly high yields (interest rates) on Italian bonds, as Italy
had to pay the highest interest rates since December in a 5.24 billion euro
auction of 5 and 10 year government bonds (meaning that the country pays
high interest rates to the financial institutions which purchased these
bonds until they expire in a 5-or-10 year term).
The ten-year bonds sold at
an average rate of 6.19 percent, while the five-year bonds were at an
average rate of 5.84 percent.
This, the Financial Times warned, “is the
latest sign of a deepening double-dip recession in Italy and will add
urgency to prime minister Mario Monti’s demands for short-term measures” to
reduce interest rates (such as the ECB purchasing bonds on the market).
An
Italian business lobby, however, went on to praise the,
“huge steps,
unthinkable only a year ago,” which were implemented by Monti’s technocratic
government, though adding, “the process is far from being completed.” [49]
In late June, a bickering Italian parliament passed Monti’s labour reform
package, just ahead of the EU summit.
Angela Merkel said that Italy had,
“taken the road towards solid public finances, growth, jobs and
competitiveness.”
The reform of the labour market has been a major demand of
the European Commission and the European Central Bank, and thus, Brussels
praised the passing of the reforms, and even the IMF chimed in to cheer on
Monti.
The reform package was passed in parliament as protests led by the labour unions, took place outside, with police helicopters overhead and
demonstrators clashing with security forces blocking the way to the
parliament building.[50]
At the EU summit at the end of June, Italy and Spain forced leaders to
remain at the summit overnight, forcing an agreement to restructure Spain’s
100 billion euro bank recapitalization plan (the Spanish bailout), allowing
funds to be injected directly into banks in Spain,
“meaning Madrid can sweep
the burden of the bailouts off its sovereign books.”
Though this, in turn,
requires the “creation of a single banking supervisor to be run by the
European Central Bank,” likely as a precursor to a European banking union.
Italy also received concessions, though less than Spain received, yet was
the main driving force behind the revised rules for the Eurozone bailout
fund - the EFSF (and later the ESM) - which would have it purchasing
sovereign bonds in order to lower the borrowing costs, as it would increase
confidence in Italian bonds and thus, lower the interest rates, Monti’s key
demand in the previous months.
The countries that have their bonds purchased
by the bailout fund,
“will no longer be subject to Greek-style monitoring programs,” but instead, “they would simply have to maintain their EU debt
and deficit commitments.”
Monti declared,
“It is a double satisfaction for
Italy.”
For Angela Merkel, who had for months refused to support any
short-term rescue measures, “the deal was a significant concession.” Though,
of course, every concession comes with a condition:
“a German-led group of
northern creditor countries will gain more control over all of the Eurozone
banks through the new single supervisor,” the mechanism through which to
establish the banking union.[51]
Upon this news, Spanish and Italian government bond yields fell sharply,
with a Deutsche Bank economist commenting,
“There was so little expectation
and since there was a breakthrough at least on bank recapitalizations, the
markets salute that.” [52]
The German media reported that,
“Italy and Spain
broke the will of the iron chancellor by out-negotiating her in the early
hours of Friday morning,” on June 29. Der Spiegel reported that, “Monti
emerged from the late-night negotiations as a clear victor.”
Merkel had to
concede to Monti, and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, specifically on
the issue of “demands” for the bailouts, as Merkel has been the reigning
Queen of austerity.
Faced up to Monti, however, the permanent European
bailout fund - the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) - can loan to
countries,
“which fulfill the budgetary rules laid down by the European
Commission… without agreeing to tough additional austerity measures.”
Thus,
strict oversight by the troika - the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the IMF - would no longer apply.[53]
Monti’s uprising at the summit began at 7:00 p.m. on Thursday evening, when
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy wanted to conclude the first
working session and announce the growth pact to the press.
Monti, furious,
asked Van Rompuy where he was going, and then refused to agree to the growth
pact until resolving the issue of establishing,
“concrete measures to fight
the high interest rates on Italian government bonds.”
Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy supported Monti, adding that he could not support the growth pact
either until such an issue had been resolved.
Danish Prime Minister Helle
Thorning-Schmidt asked if the attendees “were now all hostages,” and Van
Rompuy remained seated. After midnight, representatives from the ten
non-euro EU countries left for their hotel rooms, while the 17 Eurozone
countries “remained in their seats and began a decisive round of
negotiations.”
After a few hours, Monti and Rajoy convinced Merkel,
“that
countries would in the future be able to receive funds from the ESM without
having to submit to troika oversight.”
Thus,
“only the European Commission’s
annual targets will have to be met.”
The session ended at 4:20 a.m. on
Friday morning, with European Commission President Barroso and Council
President Van Rompuy announcing it at a press conference.[54]
This is not to say that austerity and structural adjustment would not be
pursued, but simply that the ‘Troika’ (the EC, ECB, and IMF) monitoring and
imposition of austerity would cede in favor of general targets set by the
European Commission. Those targets, however, would still demand fiscal
austerity and structural adjustment, but would not be subject to the same
oversight or schedule with which the demands must be met.
Ultimately, it was
a deal that was not aimed at reducing the imposition and effects of
austerity, but rather, was designed to institutionalize more effectively the
domination of the European Commission itself (an unelected technocratic
institution), as opposed to a more ad-hoc Troika system of oversight.
In the Italy of Mario Monti - and in the European Union at large - austerity
is poverty, growth is plundering, labour reform is exploitation, and
democracy… is Technocracy.
Welcome to Italy, welcome to the new Europe in
the age of austerity.
Notes
[1] Giuseppe Fonte, “Italy PM unveils
sweeping austerity package,” Reuters, 4 December 2011:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/04/us-italy-idUSTRE7B20I220111204
[2] Guy Dinmore and Giulia Segreti and Joshua Chaffin, “Monti cabinet
agrees Italy austerity plans,” The Financial Times, 5 December 2011:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef821ec4-1dc8-11e1-9fd4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[3] Steve Scherer, “Italy starts strikes against Monti’s austerity,”
Reuters, 12 December 2011:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/12/us-italy-austerity-strikes-idUSTRE7BB0O120111212
[4] Gavin Jones, “Italy risks “social explosion” over austerity: union
chief,” Reuters, 14 December 2011:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-italy-camusso-interview-idUSTRE7BD1EC20111214
[5] Reuters, “Italian Senate backs Monti austerity package,” The
Telegraph, 22 December 2011:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8973397/Italian-Senate-backs-Monti-austerity-package.html
[6] “An interview with Mario Monti: Italy’s great liberaliser?” The
Economist, 17 January 2012:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/01/interview-mario-monti
[7] Nicholas Kulish, “Monti, in Berlin, Calls for Growth Policies in
Europe,” The New York Times, 11 January 2012:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/world/europe/italys-mario-monti-in-germany-calls-for-growth-policies-in-europe.html?pagewanted=all
[8] Philip Stephens, “Europe rests on Monti’s shoulders,” The Financial
Times, 26 January 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a209e0b2-4769-11e1-b847-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[9] Guy Dinmore and Giulia Segreti, “Monti unveils liberalisation
plans,” The Financial Times, 20 January 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b13df170-4392-11e1-adda-00144feab49a.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[10] Guy Dinmore and Giulia Segreti, “Berlusconi to abandon frontline
politics,” The Financial Times, 3 February 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65784254-4e6e-11e1-8670-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[11] Martin Wolf, “Why the super-Marios need help,” The Financial Times,
19 January 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c608d3fa-4035-11e1-82f6-00144feab49a.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[12] Peter Spiegel and Guy Dinmore, “The wishes and worries of a
parenthetic revolutionary,” The Financial Times, 18 January 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/faaef4aa-4101-11e1-b521-00144feab49a.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[13] Ibid.
[14] PBS, “Italy’s Premier Mario Monti: Time to Focus on Growth in
Europe,” PBS Newshour, 7 February 2012:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june12/monti2intervie_02-07.html
[15] Ibid.
[16] Alessandra Gallioni, Christopher Emsden and Stacy Meichtry, “Italy
Pushes for Europe Growth Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, 8 February
2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204136404577209243247008110.html
[17] Ibid.
[18] Alessandra Galloni, Christopher Emsden and Stacy Meichtry, “Q&A
With Mario Monti,” The Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203315804577209341047730830.html
[19] Alessandra Gallioni, Christopher Emsden and Stacy Meichtry, “Italy
Pushes for Europe Growth Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, 8 February
2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204136404577209243247008110.html
[20] Ibid.
[21] Michael Schuman, “The Most Important Man in Europe,” Time Magazine,
20 February 2012:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2106489-1,00.html
[22] Ibid.
[23] Tiziana Barghini, “Wall Street likes Monti, but still wary of
Italy,” Reuters, 13 February 2012:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-italy-economy-investment-idUSTRE81C1OP20120213
[24] Tiziana Barghini and Walter Brandimarte, “Italy doesn’t need
firewalls, Europe does: Monti,” Reuters, 10 February 2012:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/11/us-Eurozone-monti-firewall-idUSTRE81A01820120211
[25] Rachel Donaldio, “Stuck in Recession, Italy Takes on Labor Laws
That Divide the Generations,” The New York Times, 19 March 2012:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/world/europe/italy-tackles-labor-laws-that-divide-young-and-old.html?pagewanted=all
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Cécile Allegra, “Child labour re-emerges in Naples,” Le Monde, 30
March 2012:
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1722081-child-labour-re-emerges-naples
[29] “Italy’s reforms: Monti’s labour-law tangle,” The Economist, 24
March 2012:
http://www.economist.com/node/21551046
[30] WSJ, “Monti Pulls a Thatcher,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 March
2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577305240774653740.html
[31] WSJ, “Surrender, Italian Style,” The Wall Street Journal, 5 April
2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303299604577325902816241654.html
[32] Mario Monti, “Italy’s Labor Reforms Are Serious and Will Be
Effective,” The Wall Street Journal, 6 April 2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303299604577327822449450802.html
[33] Flavia Rotondi and Lorenzo Totaro, “Italians Rally in Rome Against
Monti’s Pension-Revamp Gap,” Bloomberg, 13 April 2012:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-12/italians-rally-against-monti-s-pension-overhaul-limbo.html
[34] Ibid.
[35] Steve Scherer, “Analysis: Fat cat Italian politicians dodge Monti’s
austerity,” Reuters, 11 April 2012:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/11/us-italy-politicians-idUSBRE83A0TD20120411
[36] Christopher Emsden, “Italy Austerity Poses Threat to Economy,” The
Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304023504577321200213474194.html
[37] Nick Squires, Italian businessman becomes country’s 25th ‘austerity
suicide’ of the year,” The Telegraph, 30 April 2012:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9236231/Italian-businessman-becomes-countrys-25th-austerity-suicide-of-the-year.html
[38] Reuters, “Anarchists threaten Mario Monti,” The Financial Times, 16
May 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ffa158f4-9f7f-11e1-a255-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1yY37v49b
[39] Stacy Meichtry and Marcus Walker, “Monti Seeks Mediator Role in
Europe,” The Wall Street Journal, 10 May 2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304543904577396363981261898.html
[40] Gaia Pianigiani, “Monti Selects Areas to Cut to Reduce Italy’s
Budget,” The New York Times, 1 May 2012:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/business/global/monti-selects-areas-to-cut-to-reduce-italys-budget.html
[41] Guy Dinmore and Giulia Segreti, “Italy to cut spending and avoid
VAT rise,” Financial Times, 30 April 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d85faf4-92eb-11e1-aa60-00144feab49a.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[42] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Italy’s banks shaken as economic slump
deepens,” The Telegraph, 15 May 2012:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9268330/Italys-banks-shaken-as-economic-slump-deepens.html
[43] Tom Klington, “Anti-austerity parties ride protest vote in Italian
local elections,” The Guardian, 8 May 2012:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/08/anti-austerity-italian-local-elections
[44] John Hooper, “Italian police arrest leftwing terror suspects,” The
Guardian, 13 June 2012:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/13/italian-police-arrest-terror-suspects
[45] Christopher Emsden, “Monti Wants EU to Solve Own Problems,” The
Wall Street Journal, 18 June 2012:
http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2012/06/18/monti-wants-eu-to-solve-own-problems/
[46] John Hooper, “Eurozone crisis: Mario Monti defends Italy’s record,”
The Guardian, 22 June 2012:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jun/22/Eurozone-crisis-mario-monti-italy?newsfeed=true
[47] WSJ, “Employment, Italian Style,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 June
2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304898704577478111174204768.html
[48] Spiegel Online, “Merkel, Monti and Co. Agree to European Growth
Pact,” Der Spiegel, 22 June 2012:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-france-italy-and-spain-agree-to-growth-pact-a-840495.html
[49] Giulia Segreti, “Italy’s economic crisis deepens,” The Financial
Times, 28 June 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/668f816a-c106-11e1-8179-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[50] Guy Dinmore, “Monti gets approval for labour reforms,” The
Financial Times, 27 June 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8d2cf956-c070-11e1-9372-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[51] Peter Spiegel and Joshua Chaffin, “Europe agrees crisis-fighting
measures,” The Financial Times, 29 June 2012:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5513d3d4-c19f-11e1-8eca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1z1dPgKJf
[52] Ana Nicolaci da Costa and Marius Zaharia, “EU summit moves push
Italian, Spanish yields lower,” Reuters, 29 June 2012:
http://news.yahoo.com/eu-summit-moves-push-italian-spanish-yields-lower-164226104–finance.html
[53] Carsten Volkery, “Monti’s Uprising: How Italy and Spain Defeated
Merkel at EU Summit,” Der Spiegel, 29 June 2012:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/merkel-makes-concessions-at-eu-summit-a-841663.html
[54] Ibid.