by Israel Shahak
February 1982
published on
GlobalResearch Website
June 13, 2014
The Infamous "Oded Yinon Plan"
Global Research Editor's Note
The following document pertaining to the formation of
"Greater Israel" constitutes the cornerstone of powerful
Zionist factions within the current Netanyahu government,
the Likud party, as well as within the Israeli military and
intelligence establishment.
According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl,
"the area of the Jewish
State stretches 'From the Brook of Egypt to the
Euphrates'."
According to Rabbi Fischmann,
"The Promised Land extends
from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes
parts of Syria and Lebanon."
When viewed in the current context, the war on Iraq, the
2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011 war on Libya, the ongoing war
on Syria, not to mention the process of regime change in
Egypt, must be understood in relation to the Zionist Plan
for the Middle East.
The latter consists in weakening and eventually fracturing
neighboring Arab states as part of an Israeli expansionist
project.
"Greater Israel" consists in an area extending from the Nile
Valley to the Euphrates.
The Zionist project supports the Jewish settlement movement.
More broadly it involves a policy of excluding Palestinians
from Palestine leading to the eventual annexation of both
the West Bank and Gaza to the State of Israel.
Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It
would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as
well as parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (See map).
According to
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya in a 2011 Global Research article,
the 'Yinon Plan' was a continuation of Britain's colonial
design in the Middle East:
"[The Yinon plan] is an Israeli strategic plan to ensure
Israeli regional superiority. It insists and stipulates that
Israel must reconfigure its geo-political environment
through the balkanization of the surrounding Arab states
into smaller and weaker states.
Israeli strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic
challenge from an Arab state. This is why Iraq was outlined
as the centerpiece to the balkanization of the Middle East
and the Arab World.
In Iraq, on the basis of the concepts of the Yinon Plan,
Israeli strategists have called for the division of Iraq
into a Kurdish state and two Arab states, one for Shiite
Muslims and the other for Sunni Muslims.
The first step towards establishing this was a war between
Iraq and Iran, which the Yinon Plan discusses.
The Atlantic, in 2008, and the U.S. military's Armed Forces
Journal, in 2006, both published widely circulated maps that
closely followed the outline of the Yinon Plan.
Aside from a divided Iraq, which the Biden Plan also calls
for, the Yinon Plan calls for a divided Lebanon, Egypt, and
Syria. The partitioning of Iran, Turkey, Somalia, and
Pakistan also all fall into line with these views.
The Yinon Plan also calls for dissolution in North Africa
and forecasts it as starting from Egypt and then spilling
over into Sudan, Libya, and the rest of the region.
Greater Israel" requires the breaking up of the existing
Arab states into small states.
"The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive,
Israel must,
1)
become an imperial regional power
2) must effect the division
of the whole area into small states by the dissolution
of all existing Arab states
Small here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian
composition of each state.
Consequently, the Zionist hope is
that sectarian-based states become Israel's satellites and,
ironically, its source of moral legitimation…
This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first
time in Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all
Arab states into smaller units has been a recurrent theme."
(Yinon Plan, see below)
Viewed in this context, the war on Syria is part of the
process of Israeli territorial expansion.
Israeli
intelligence working hand in glove with the US, Turkey and
NATO is directly supportive of the Al Qaeda terrorist
mercenaries inside Syria.
The Zionist Project also requires the destabilization of
Egypt, the creation of factional divisions within Egypt as
instrumented by the "Arab Spring" leading to the formation
of a sectarian based State dominated by the
Muslim
Brotherhood.
Michel Chossudovsky
Global Research
April 29, 2013
translated and edited by
Israel Shahak
from
RoundtableTexts Website
PDF format
|
About the Translator
Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistry at Hebrew
University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli
League for Human and Civil Rights.
He published The Shahak
Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew press,
and is the author of numerous articles and books, among them
Non-Jew in the Jewish State.
His latest book is
Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by
the AAUG in 1982.
Israel Shahak:
(1933-2001) |
The Israel of Theodore Herzl (1904)
and of Rabbi Fischmann (1947)
from
Oded Yinon's
Published by the
Association of Arab-American
University Graduates, Inc.
Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982
Special Document No. 1
(ISBN 0-937694-56-8)
Publisher's
Note
1
The
Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds it
compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special
Documents, with Oded Yinon's article which appeared in Kivunim
(Directions), the journal of the Department of Information of the
World Zionist Organization.
Oded
Yinon is an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the
Foreign Ministry of Israel. To our knowledge, this document is the
most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of the
Zionist strategy in the Middle East.
Furthermore, it stands as an accurate representation of the "vision"
for the entire Middle East of the presently ruling Zionist regime of
Begin, Sharon and Eitan. Its importance, hence, lies not in its
historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.
2
The plan
operates on two essential premises.
To
survive, Israel must,
1)
become an imperial regional power
2)
must effect the division of the whole area into small states by
the dissolution of all existing Arab states
Small
here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each
state. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states
become Israel's satellites and, ironically, its source of moral
legitimation.
3
This is
not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist
strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller
units has been a recurrent theme.
This
theme has been documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG
publication,
Israel's Sacred
Terrorism
(1980), by Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett,
former Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach's study documents, in
convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon and as
it was prepared in the mid-fifties.
4
The first
massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out to
the minutest detail.
The
second and more barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of
Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan
which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well,
in fragments.
This
ought to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding their
desire for a strong and independent Lebanese central government.
More accurately, they want a Lebanese central government that
sanctions their regional imperialist designs by signing a peace
treaty with them. They also seek acquiescence in their designs by
the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as
by the Palestinian people.
What they
want and what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a
world of Arab fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli
hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay,
"A
Strategy for Israel in the 1980′s," talks about "far-reaching
opportunities for the first time since 1967″ that are created by
the "very stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel."
5
The
Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very
much an active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times of
conflict, such as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war.
An
appendix entitled "Israel
Talks of a New Exodus"
is included in this publication to demonstrate past Zionist
dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides
the main Zionist document we present, other Zionist planning for the
de-Palestinization of Palestine.
6
It is
clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982, that
the "far-reaching opportunities" of which Zionist strategists have
been thinking are the same "opportunities" of which they are trying
to convince the world and which they claim were generated by their
June, 1982 invasion.
It is
also clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of
Zionist plans, but the priority target since their viable and
independent presence as a people negates the essence of the Zionist
state.
Every
Arab state, however, especially those with cohesive and clear
nationalist directions, is a real target sooner or later.
7
Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy
elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian strategy,
unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and incoherence.
There is
no indication that Arab strategists have internalized the Zionist
plan in its full ramifications. Instead, they react with incredulity
and shock whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This is apparent in
Arab reaction, albeit muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut.
The sad
fact is that as long as the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is
not taken seriously Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab
capitals will be the same.
Khalil Nakhleh
July 23, 1982
Foreward
by
Israel Shahak
1
The following essay represents, in my
opinion, the accurate and detailed plan of the present Zionist regime
(of Sharon and Eitan) for the Middle East which is based on the division
of the whole area into small states, and the dissolution of
all the existing Arab states.
I will comment on the military aspect of
this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the attention
of the readers to several important points:
2
1. The idea that all the Arab
states should be broken down, by Israel, into small units, occurs again
and again in Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze'ev Schiff, the
military correspondent of Ha'aretz (and probably the most
knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the "best" that can
happen for Israeli interests in Iraq:
"The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite
state, a Sunni state and the separation of the Kurdish part".
(Ha'aretz
6/2/1982).
Actually, this aspect of the plan is very
old.
3
2. The strong connection with
Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is very prominent, especially in the
author's notes.
But, while lip service is paid to
the idea of the "defense of the West" from Soviet power, the real aim of
the author, and of the present Israeli establishment is clear:
To make an Imperial Israel into a world
power. In other words, the aim of Sharon is to deceive the Americans
after he has deceived all the rest.
4
3. It is obvious that much of the relevant
data, both in the notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such
as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel. Much of it is pure
fantasy.
But, the plan is not to be
regarded as not influential, or as not capable of realization for a
short time. The plan follows faithfully the geopolitical ideas
current in Germany of 1890-1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler
and the Nazi movement, and determined their aims for East Europe.
Those aims, especially the division of the
existing states, were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on
the global scale prevented their consolidation for a period of time.
5
The notes by the author follow the text.
To avoid confusion, I did not add any notes of my own, but have put
the substance of them into this foreward and the conclusion at the
end. I have, however, emphasized some portions of the text.
Israel Shahak
June 13, 1982
by
Oded Yinon
This essay
originally appeared in Hebrew in
KIVUNIM
(Directions), A Journal for Judaism and
Zionism:
Issue No,
14 - Winter, 5742, February 1982
Editor:
Yoram Beck.
Editorial
Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari,
Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid.
Published
by the Department
of
Publicity/The World Zionist Organization,
Jerusalem.
1
At the outset of the nineteen
eighties the State of Israel is in need of a new perspective
as to its place, its aims and national targets, at home and
abroad.
This need has become even more
vital due to a number of central processes which the
country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are
living today in the early stages of a new epoch in human
history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and
its characteristics are totally different from what we have
hitherto known.
That is why we need an
understanding of the central processes which typify this
historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we
need a world outlook and an operational strategy in
accordance with the new conditions. The existence,
prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend
upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic
and foreign affairs.
2
This epoch is characterized by
several traits which we can already diagnose, and which
symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle.
The dominant process is the
breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major
cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western
civilization since the Renaissance. The political, social and
economic views which have emanated from this foundation have
been based on several "truths" which are presently disappearing
- for example, the view that man as an individual is the center
of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his
basic material needs.
This position is being invalidated
in the present when it has become clear that the amount of
resources in the cosmos does not meet Man's requirements, his
economic needs or his demographic constraints.
In a world in which there are four
billion human beings and economic and energy resources which do
not grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is
unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of Western
Society,1 i.e., the wish and aspiration for
boundless consumption.
The view that ethics plays no part
in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his material
needs do - that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a
world in which nearly all values are disappearing.
We are losing the ability to assess
the simplest things, especially when they concern the simple
question of what is Good and what is Evil.
3
The vision of man's
limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face
of the sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up
of world order around us.
The view which promises
liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of
the sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives
under totalitarian regimes. The views concerning
equality and social justice have been transformed by
socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing
stock.
There is no argument as to
the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear that they
have not been put into practice properly and the
majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom
and the opportunity for equality and justice.
In this nuclear world
in which we are (still) living in relative peace for
thirty years, the concept of peace and coexistence among
nations has no meaning when a superpower like the USSR
holds a military and political doctrine of the sort it
has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and
necessary in order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but
that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak of
the fact that one can be victorious in it. 2
4
The essential concepts of
human society, especially those of the West, are
undergoing a change due to political, military and
economic transformations.
Thus, the nuclear and
conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch
that has just ended into the last respite before the
great saga that will demolish a large part of our world
in a multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with
which the past world wars will have been mere child's
play.
The power of nuclear as well
as of conventional weapons, their quantity, their
precision and quality will turn most of our world upside
down within a few years, and we must align ourselves so
as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main
threat to our existence and that of the Western world.
3
The war over resources in
the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the need of the
West to import most of its raw materials from the Third
World, are transforming the world we know, given that
one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West
by gaining control over the gigantic resources in the
Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in
which the majority of world minerals are located.
We can imagine the
dimensions of the global confrontation which will face
us in the future.
5
The Gorshkov doctrine
calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich
areas of the Third World.
That together with the
present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is
possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in
the course of which the West's military might well be
destroyed and its inhabitants made slaves in the service
of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger to world peace
and to our own existence.
Since 1967, the
Soviets have transformed Clausewitz' dictum into "War is
the continuation of policy in nuclear means," and made
it the motto which guides all their policies. Already
today they are busy carrying out their aims in our
region and throughout the world, and the need to face
them becomes the major element in our country's security
policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World.
That is our major
foreign challenge. 4
6
The Arab Moslem world,
therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we
shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it
carries the main threat against Israel, due to its
growing military might.
This world, with its ethnic
minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is
astonishingly self-destructive, as we can see in
Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria, is
unable to deal successfully with its fundamental
problems and does not therefore constitute a real threat
against the State of Israel in the long run, but only in
the short run where its immediate military power has
great import. In the long run, this world will be unable
to exist within its present framework in the areas
around us without having to go through genuine
revolutionary changes.
The Moslem Arab World is
built like a temporary house of cards put together by
foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen
Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the
inhabitants having been taken into account. It was
arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of
combinations of minorities and ethnic groups which are
hostile to one another, so that every Arab Moslem state
nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within,
and in some a civil war is already raging. 5
Most of the Arabs, 118
million out of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in
Egypt (45 million today).
7
Apart from Egypt, all the
Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and
non-Arab Berbers.
In Algeria there is already
a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between the
two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at
war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to
the internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam
endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes
wars which are destructive from the Arab point of view,
from a country which is sparsely populated and which
cannot become a powerful nation.
That is why he has been
attempting unifications in the past with states that are
more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn
apart state in the Arab Moslem world today is built upon
four groups hostile to each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni
minority which rules over a majority of non-Arab
Africans, Pagans, and Christians.
In Egypt there is a Sunni
Moslem majority facing a large minority of Christians
which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7 million of
them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8,
expressed the fear that they will want a state of their
own, something like a "second" Christian Lebanon in
Egypt.
8
All the Arab States east of
Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner
conflict even more than those of the Maghreb.
Syria is fundamentally no
different from Lebanon except in the strong military
regime which rules it. But the real civil war taking
place nowadays between the Sunni majority and the
Shi'ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the
population) testifies to the severity of the domestic
trouble.
9
Iraq is, once again, no
different in essence from its neighbors, although its
majority is Shi'ite and the ruling minority Sunni.
Sixty-five percent of the
population has no say in politics, in which an elite of
20 percent holds the power. In addition there is a large
Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren't for the
strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil
revenues, Iraq's future state would be no different than
that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today.
The seeds of inner conflict
and civil war are apparent today already, especially
after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader
whom the Shi'ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.
10
All the Gulf principalities
and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate house of sand
in which there is only oil.
In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis
constitute only a quarter of the population. In Bahrain,
the Shi'ites are the majority but are deprived of power.
In the UAE, Shi'ites are once again the majority but the
Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and North
Yemen.
Even in the Marxist South
Yemen there is a sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi
Arabia half the population is foreign, Egyptian and
Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds power.
11
Jordan is in reality
Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin
minority, but most of the army and certainly the
bureaucracy is now Palestinian.
As a matter of fact Amman is
as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have
powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a
problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni
with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi'ite with
Sunni commanders.
This has great significance
in the long run, and that is why it will not be possible
to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time except
where it comes to the only common denominator: The
hostility towards Israel, and today even that is
insufficient.
12
Alongside the Arabs, split
as they are, the other Moslem states share a similar
predicament.
Half of Iran's population is
comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half
of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey's population
comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and
two large minorities, 12 million Shi'ite Alawis and 6
million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million
Shi'ites who constitute one third of the population.
In Sunni Pakistan there are
15 million Shi'ites who endanger the existence of that
state.
13
This national ethnic
minority picture extending from Morocco to India and
from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of
stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region.
When this picture is added
to the economic one, we see how the entire region is
built like a house of cards, unable to withstand its
severe problems.
14
In this giant and
fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a
huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an
average yearly income of 300 dollars. That is the
situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries
except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and
its economy is falling to pieces.
It is a state in which
there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto
sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported
by the Syrians and under the rule of the Franjieh clan,
in the East an area of direct Syrian conquest, in the
center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the
south and up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian
region controlled by the PLO and Major Haddad's state of
Christians and half a million Shi'ites).
Syria is in an even
graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain
in the future after the unification with Libya will not
be sufficient for dealing with the basic problems of
existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is
in the worst situation: Millions are on the verge of
hunger, half the labor force is unemployed, and housing
is scarce in this most densely populated area of the
world.
Except for the army,
there is not a single department operating efficiently
and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and
depends entirely on American foreign assistance granted
since the peace. 6
15
In the Gulf states, Saudi
Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest
accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those
enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of
support and self-confidence, something that no army can
guarantee. 7
The Saudi army with all its
equipment cannot defend the regime from real dangers at
home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is
only an example. A sad and very stormy situation
surrounds Israel and creates challenges for it,
problems, risks but also far-reaching opportunities
for the first time since 1967.
Chances are that
opportunities missed at that time will become
achievable in the Eighties to an extent and along
dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.
16
The "peace" policy and the
return of territories, through a dependence upon the US,
precludes the realization of the new option created for
us.
Since 1967, all the
governments of Israel have tied our national aims down
to narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on the
other to destructive opinions at home which neutralized
our capacities both at home and abroad.
Failing to take steps
towards the Arab population in the new territories,
acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is the
major strategic error committed by Israel on the morning
after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all
the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had
given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west of the
Jordan river.
By doing that we would have
neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays
face, and to which we have found solutions that are
really no solutions at all, such as territorial
compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the
same thing. 8
Today, we suddenly face
immense opportunities for transforming the situation
thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade,
otherwise we shall not survive as a state.
17
In the course of the
Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go
through far-reaching changes in its political and
economic regime domestically, along with radical changes
in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the
global and regional challenges of this new epoch.
The loss of the Suez Canal
oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and
other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is
geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing
countries in the region, will result in an energy drain
in the near future and will destroy our domestic
economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well as one
third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil.
9
The search for raw materials
in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near
future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
18
(Regaining) the Sinai
peninsula with its present and potential resources
is therefore a political priority which is
obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements.
The fault for that
lies of course with the present Israeli
government and the governments which paved the road to
the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment
governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to
keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and
they will do all they can to return to the fold of the
Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and
military assistance.
American aid is
guaranteed only for a short while, for the terms of the
peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and
abroad will bring about a reduction in aid.
Without oil and the
income from it, with the present enormous expenditure,
we will not be able to get through 1982 under the
present conditions and we will have to act in order
to return the situation to the status
quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat's visit and
the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March
1979. 10
19
Israel has two major routes
through which to realize this purpose, one direct and
the other indirect.
The direct option is the
less realistic one because of the nature of the regime
and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat
who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next
to the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took
power.
Israel will not unilaterally
break the treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it
is very hard pressed economically and politically
and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse
to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth
time in our short history.
What is left
therefore, is the indirect option. The economic
situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its
pan-Arab
policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in
which Israel will be forced to act directly or
indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as
a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the long
run.
Egypt does not
constitute a military strategic problem due to its
internal conflicts and it could be driven back
to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day.11
20
The myth of Egypt as the
strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in
1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our
policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn
the myth into "fact."
In reality, however, Egypt's
power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest
of the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent since
1967.
Egypt is no longer the
leading political power in the Arab World and is
economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign
assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. 12
In the short run, due to the
return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages
at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982,
and that will not change the balance of power to its
benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall.
Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is
already a corpse, all the more so if we take into
account the growing Moslem-Christian rift.
Breaking Egypt
down territorially into distinct geographical regions is
the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on
its Western front.
21
Egypt is divided and
torn apart into many foci of authority.
If Egypt falls apart,
countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant
states will not continue to exist in their present form
and will join the downfall and dissolution
of Egypt.
The vision of a Christian
Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak
states with very localized power and without a
centralized government as to date, is the key to a
historical development which was only set back by the
peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long
run. 13
22
The Western front,
which on the surface appears more problematic, is in
fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which
most of the events that make the headlines have been
taking place recently.
Lebanon's total
dissolution into five provinces serves as a
precendent for the entire Arab world including
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is
already following that track.
The dissolution of
Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously
unique areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary
target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the
dissolution of the military power of those states serves
as the primary short term target.
Syria will fall apart,
in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure,
into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so
that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its
coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni
state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and
the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in
our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and
in northern Jordan.
This state of affairs
will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area
in the long run, and that aim is already within our
reach today.14
Iraq, rich in oil on
the one hand and internally torn on the other, is
guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's targets.
Its dissolution is even more important for us than that
of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria.
In the short run it is
Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to
Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and
cause its downfall at home even before it is able to
organize a struggle on a wide front against us.
Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in
the short run and will shorten the way to the
more important aim of breaking up Iraq into
denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon.
In Iraq, a division
into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria
during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or
more) states will exist around the three major cities:
Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in the south
will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north.
It is possible that
the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this
polarization.15
24
The entire Arabian
peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to
internal and external pressures, and the matter is
inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia.
Regardless of whether
its economic might based on oil remains intact or
whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal
rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural development
in light of the present political structure.16
25
Jordan constitutes
an immediate strategic target in the short run
but not in the long run, for it does
not constitute a real threat in the long run
after its dissolution, the termination of the
lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power
to the Palestinians in the short run.
26
There is no chance
that Jordan will continue to exist in its present
structure for a long time, and Israel's policy, both in
war and in peace, ought to be directed at the
liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the
transfer of power to the Palestinian majority.
Changing the regime
east of the river will also cause the termination of
the problem of the territories densely populated with
Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or
under conditions of peace, emigration from the
territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are
the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of
the river, and we ought to be active in order to
accelerate this process in the nearest future.
The autonomy plan
ought also to be rejected, as well as any
compromise or division of the territories for, given the
plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli Arabs
themselves, the Shefa'amr plan of September 1980, it is
not possible to go on living in this country in the
present situation without separating the two nations,
the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of
the river.
Genuine coexistence
and peace will reign over the land only when
the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between
the Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence
nor security. A nation of their own and security will be
theirs only in Jordan. 17
27
Within Israel the
distinction between the areas of '67 and the territories
beyond them, those of '48, has always been meaningless
for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance
for us.
The problem should be seen
in its entirety without any divisions as of '67.
It should be clear, under
any future political situation or military
constellation, that the solution of the problem of
the indigenous Arabs will come only when they
recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up
to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our
existential need in this difficult epoch, the
nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter.
It is no longer
possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish
population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous
in a nuclear epoch.
28
Dispersal of the
population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the
highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within
any borders.
Judea, Samaria and the
Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence,
and if we do not become the majority in the mountain
areas, we shall not rule in the country and we shall be
like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not
theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to
begin with. Rebalancing the country demographically,
strategically and economically is the highest and most
central aim today.
Taking hold of the
mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee
is the national aim generated by the major strategic
consideration which is settling the mountainous part of
the country that is empty of Jews today.
18
29
Realizing our aims on
the Eastern front depends first on the realization of
this internal strategic objective.
The transformation of
the political and economic structure, so as to enable
the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to
achieving the entire change. We need to change from a
centralized economy in which the government is
extensively involved, to an open and free market as well
as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to
developing, with our own hands, of a genuine productive
economic infrastructure.
If we are not able to
make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be
forced into it by world developments, especially in the
areas of economics, energy, and politics, and by our own
growing isolation.19
30
From a military and
strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is
unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR
throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand
alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance,
military or economic, and
this is within our capacities today, with no
compromises.
20
Rapid changes in
the world will also bring about a change in the
condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not
only a last resort but the only existential option.
We cannot assume that
U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin
America will continue to exist in the present
form in the future.21
31
Our existence in this
country itself is certain, and there is no force that
could remove us from here either forcefully or by
treachery (Sadat's method).
Despite the difficulties of
the mistaken "peace" policy and the problem of
the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can
effectively deal with these problems in the foreseeable
future.
Conclusion
1
Three important points have
to be clarified in order to be able to understand the
significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist
plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be
published.
2
The Military
Background of The Plan
The military conditions of
this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many
occasions where something very like it is being
"explained" in closed meetings to members of the Israeli
Establishment, this point is clarified.
It is assumed that the
Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are
insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such
wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in
times of intense Palestinian "unrest" on the West Bank,
the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too
much.
The answer to that is the
method of ruling by means of "Haddad forces" or of
"Village Associations" (also known as "Village
Leagues"): local forces under "leaders" completely
dissociated from the population, not having even any
feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have,
for example).
The "states" proposed by
Yinon are "Haddadland" and "Village Associations," and
their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar.
In addition, Israeli
military superiority in such a situation will be much
greater than it is even now, so that any movement of
revolt will be "punished" either by mass humiliation as
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and
obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982),
or by both.
In order to ensure this,
the plan, as explained orally, calls for the
establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places
between the mini states, equipped with the necessary
mobile destructive forces.
In fact, we have seen
something like this in Haddadland and we will almost
certainly soon see the first example of this system
functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
3
It is obvious that the above
military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend
also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided
than they are now, and on the lack of any truly
progressive mass movement among them.
It may be that those two
conditions will be removed only when the plan will be
well advanced, with consequences which can not be
foreseen.
4
Why it is necessary
to publish this in Israel?
The reason for publication
is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society:
A very great measure of
freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined
with expansionism and racist discrimination.
In such a situation the
Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and
Begin's speeches) has to be persuaded.
The first steps in the
process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but
a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient.
Written material must be produced for the benefit of the
more stupid "persuaders" and "explainers" (for example
medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably
stupid).
They then "learn it," more
or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked
that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, has
always functioned in this way.
I myself well remember how
(before I was "in opposition") the necessity of war with
was explained to me and others a year before the 1956
war, and the necessity of conquering "the rest of
Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity" was
explained in the years 1965-67.
5
Why is it assumed
that there is no special risk from the outside in the
publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two
sources, so long as the principled opposition inside
Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a
consequence of the war on Lebanon):
The Arab World has shown
itself so far quite incapable of a detailed and rational
analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians
have been, on the average, no better than the rest. In
such a situation, even those who are shouting about the
dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real enough)
are doing this not because of factual and detailed
knowledge, but because of belief in myth.
A good example is the very
persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the
wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile
and the Euphrates.
Another example is the
persistent, and completely false declarations, which
were made by some of the most important Arab leaders,
that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize
the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken
from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit).
The Israeli specialists
assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no
attention to their serious discussions of the future,
and the Lebanon war has proved them right.
So why should they not
continue with their old methods of persuading other
Israelis?
6
In the United States a very
similar situation exists, at least until now.
The more or less serious
commentators take their information about Israel, and
much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The
first is from articles in the "liberal" American press,
written almost totally by Jewish admirers of Israel who,
even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli
state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call "the
constructive criticism."
(In fact those among them
who claim also to be "Anti-Stalinist" are in reality
more Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god
which has not yet failed).
In the framework of such
critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has
always "good intentions" and only "makes mistakes," and
therefore such a plan would not be a matter for
discussion - exactly as the Biblical genocides committed
by Jews are not mentioned.
The other source of
information, The Jerusalem Post, has
similar policies.
So long, therefore, as the
situation exists in which Israel is really a "closed
society" to the rest of the world, because the world
wants to close its eyes, the publication and even
the beginning of the realization of such a plan is
realistic and feasible.
Israel Shahak
June 17, 1982
Jerusalem
Notes
1. American Universities
Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979. According to this
research, the population of the world will be 6
billion in the year 2000. Today's world population
can be broken down as follows: China, 958 million;
India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218
million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan,
110 million each. According to the figures of the
U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in
2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million
each. The population ofthp;Third World will then be
80% of the world population. According to Justin
Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world
population will not reach 6 billion because of
hunger.
2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by
two American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and
Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War,
(Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the
Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books
are published each year which detail the Soviet
doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal
of documentation translated into English and
published by the U.S. Air Force, including USAF:
Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet
View, Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of the
Soviet State. Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko.
The basic Soviet approach to the matter is presented
in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962
in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military
Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts(New York,
Praeger, 1963).
3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas
of the world can be drawn from the book by Douglas
and Hoeber, ibid. For additional material see:
Michael Morgan, "USSR's Minerals as Strategic Weapon
in the Future," Defense and Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power
and the State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit.
General George S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to
the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United
States For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National
Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy,
(Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The New
York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
5. Elie Kedourie, "The End of the Ottoman Empire,"
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al
Ba'ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years
old and younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa,
55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed, 33% live
in urban areas, Oded Yinon, "Egypt's Population
Problem," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15, Spring
1980.
7. E. Kanovsky, "Arab Haves and Have Nots," The
Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba'ath,
Syria, 5/6/79.
8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
said that the Israeli government is in fact
responsible for the design of American policy in the
Middle East, after June '67, because of its own
indecisiveness as to the future of the territories
and the inconsistency in its positions since it
established the background for Resolution 242 and
certainly twelve years later for the Camp David
agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt.
According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President
Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in
which he did not mention anything about withdrawal
from the new territories but exactly on the same day
the government resolved to return territories in
exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in
Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its
position but contrary to its decision of June 19,
did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the
U.S. continued to support 242 in the Security
Council on the basis of its earlier understanding
that Israel is prepared to return territories. At
that point it was already too late to change the
U.S. position and Israel's policy. From here the way
was opened to peace agreements on the basis of 242
as was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak
Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma'ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.
9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof.
Moshe Arens argued in an interview (Ma
‘ariv,10/3/80) that the Israeli government failed to
prepare an economic plan before the Camp David
agreements and was itself surprised by the cost of
the agreements, although already during the
negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy
price and the serious error involved in not having
prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz,
stated that if it were not for the withdrawal from
the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance
of payments (9/17/80). That same person said two
years earlier that the government of Israel (from
which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his
neck. He was referring to the Camp David agreements
(Ha'aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole
peace negotiations neither an expert nor an
economics advisor was consulted, and the Prime
Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and expertise
in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the
U.S. to give us a loan rather than a grant, due to
his wish to maintain our respect and the respect of
the U.S. towards us. See Ha'aretz1/5/79. Jerusalem
Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior
consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the
conduct of the negotiations; Ha'aretz, 5/5/79.
Ma'ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil
fields and Israel's energy crisis, see the interview
with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government advisor on
these matters, Ma'arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The Energy
Minister, who personally signed the Camp David
agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has
since emphasized the seriousness of our condition
from the point of view of oil supplies more than
once…see Yediot Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister
Modai even admitted that the government did not
consult him at all on the subject of oil during the
Camp David and Blair House negotiations. Ha'aretz,
8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the
armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give
the army preference in a peace epoch budget over
domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly
obtained. See former Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in
an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El
Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al
Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the
military budget will receive first priority, despite
the peace. This is what former Prime Minister
Mustafa Khalil has stated in his cabinet's
programmatic document which was presented to
Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA,
FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10.
According to these sources, Egypt's military budget
increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and
the process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged
that the Egyptians plan to increase their militmy
budget by 100% in the next two years; Ha'aretz,
2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post, 1/14/79.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on
Egypt's ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982.
See Economic Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement,
"The Arab Republic of Egypt"; E. Kanovsky, "Recent
Economic Developments in the Middle East,"
Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June
1977; Kanovsky, "The Egyptian Economy Since the
Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors," Occasional Papers,
June 1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank,
as reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and
research camed out in the Center for Strategic
Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the
research by the British scientist, Denis Champlin,
Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military
Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in
Sinai…by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS;
The Military Balance and the Military Options after
the Peace Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y.
Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press
reports including El Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El
Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the
relations between Copts and Moslems see the series
of articles published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas,
9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on
the rift between Moslems and Copts, see: Irene
Beeson, Guardian, London, 6/24/80, and Desmond
Stewart, Middle East Internmational, London 6/6/80.
For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian,
London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor
12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El
Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New
Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha'aretz,
3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80;
Robert Fisk, Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth
Jones, Sunday Times, 3/30/80.
15. J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80;
Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979;
Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas
Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha'aretz, 9/21/79) Economist
Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian Affairs,
London, July 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, "The Rich Arab States in
Trouble," The New York Review of Books, 5/15/80;
Arab Press Service, Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News
and World Report, 11/5/79 as well as El Ahram,
11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, Paris 9/7/79;
El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly Review,
IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan's policies and problems see El
Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof.
Elie Kedouri, Ma'ariv 6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar
7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post, 5/31/79; El Watan
El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas, 11/19/79. As for PLO
positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth
Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa'amr
program of the Israeli Arabs was published in
Ha'aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80.
For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to
Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha'aretz, 2/16/77;
Yossef Zuriel, Ma'ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO's
position towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly
Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an interview, Al
Rai Al'Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, "The
Palestinian Problem," Survival, ISS, London Jan.
Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, "The Palestinian Myth,"
Commentary, Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, "The
Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary Jan. 75;
Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of
Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, "Samaria - The Basis for
Israel's Security," Ma'arakhot 272-273, May/June
1980; Ya'akov Hasdai, "Peace, the Way and the Right
to Know," Dvar Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv,
"Strategic Depth - An Israeli Perspective,"
Ma'arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak Rabin,
"Israel's Defense Problems in the Eighties,"
Ma'arakhot October 1979.
19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime's Pliers (Shikmona,
1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel,
Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, "The Lessons of the Past," The
Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross,
"OPEC's Challenge to the West," The Washington
Quarterly, Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, "Oil and the
Decline of the West," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980;
Special Report - "Our Armed Forees-Ready or Not?"
U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; Stanley
Hoffman, "Reflections on the Present Danger," The
New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80;
Leopold Lavedez "The illusions of SALT" Commentary
Sept. 79; Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger,"
Commentary March 1980; Robert Tucker, "Oil and
American Power Six Years Later," Commentary Sept.
1979; Norman Podhoretz, "The Abandonment of Israel,"
Commentary July 1976; Elie Kedourie, "Misreading the
Middle East," Commentary July 1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya'akov Karoz,
Yediot Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of
anti-Semitic incidents recorded in the world in 1979
was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany,
France, and Britain the number of anti-Semitic
incidents was many times greater in that year. In
the U.S. as well there has been a sharp increase in
anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that
article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon,
"The New Anti-Semitism," The New Republic,
9/18/1976; Barbara Tuchman, "They poisoned the
Wells," Newsweek 2/3/75.
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