Klaus Schwab:
[00:00:02] Hello, Dr. Kissinger. Greetings from Geneva - I should
say from Davos. Do you hear us?
Henry Kissinger: [00:00:13] Yes, I hear you very well.
Klaus Schwab: [00:00:15] You know, you have here a great
assembly.
Everybody is interested in hearing your views. And I
don't have to introduce you, Dr. Kissinger. I just would like to
mention that I met you when I was at Harvard over 50 years ago.
And actually, you came to Davos the first time. It was in
(1980), so over 40 years ago. And I looked at your speech, which
you gave in 1980, and I just want to quote one or two things.
In your speech, you focused and I quote:
"It's a constantly
changing world."
Does it sound familiar?
And you said, and I
quote:
"The age of global interdependence."
End of quote.
And you warned of, I quote,
"a delusion of confidence in classic
models, a challenge to the system."
And you concluded your
speech by saying all of those changes are global and would make
ours a period of turmoil, even apart from any specific challenge
that we have to face.
1980, and, wow, we are 42 years later. And
of course, we are very keen to hear how you assess the situation
of today.
And I had the pleasure to visit you just some weeks
ago. And we have chosen, as I mentioned to you at that time,
history at a turning point.
We are really at a turning point. And this is not a speech.
This is a conversation of, I would
say, a young student and an experienced professor.
So, my first
question to you, Henry, is if you listen to the theme "history
at a turning point," would you describe the new world which may
arise after this turning point, which we are living through at
this moment?
Henry Kissinger: [00:02:59] Let me thank you for letting me
return to Davos, because it is such a crucial forum for the
exchange of ideas all over the world.
But the outcome of this
turning point - it's not yet obvious, because there are a number
of issues which are still under consideration within the realm
of the decision-makers and of course, many evolutions that are
going on that will affect the outcome.
Let me sketch the issues.
The most vivid at the moment is the
war in Ukraine, and the outcome of that war, both in the
military and political sense, will affect relations between
groupings of countries, which I will mention in a minute.
And
the outcome of any war and the peace settlement, and the nature
of that peace settlement - it will determine whether the
combatants remain permanent adversaries, or whether it is
possible to fit them into an international framework.
About eight years ago, when the idea of membership of Ukraine in
NATO came up, I wrote an article in which I said that the ideal
outcome would be if Ukraine could be constituted as a neutral
kind of state, as a bridge between Russia and Europe. Rather
than, it's the front line of groupings within Europe.
I think
that opportunity is now... does not now exist in the same manner,
but it could still be conceived as an ultimate objective.
In my
view, movement towards negotiations and negotiations on peace
need to begin in the next two months so that the outcome of the
war should be outlined.
But before it could create upheaval and
tensions that will be ever... harder to overcome, particularly
between the eventual relationship of Russia, Georgia and of
Ukraine towards Europe.
Ideally, the dividing line should return
the status quo ante.
I believe to join the war beyond Poland
would draw... turn it into a war and not about the freedom of
Ukraine, which has been undertaken with great cohesion by NATO,
but into against Russia itself and so, that seems to me to be
the dividing line that it is just impossible to define.
It will
be difficult for anybody to gauge of that.
Modifications of that
may occur during the negotiations, which of course, have not yet
been established, but which should begin to be the return of the
major participants as the war develops, and I have given an
outline of a possible military outcome.
But would like to keep
in mind that any modifications of that could complicate the
negotiations in which Ukraine has a right to be a significant
participant, but in which one hopes that they match the heroism
that they have shown in the war with wisdom for the balance in
Europe and in the world at large - a relationship that will
develop as a result of this war, between Ukraine, which will be
probably the strongest conventional power on the continent, and
the rest of Europe will develop over a period of time.
But one has to look both at the relationship of Europe to Russia
over a longer period and in a manner that is separated from the
existing leadership whose status, however, will be affected
internally over a period of time by its performance in
this period.
Looked at from a long-term point of view, Russia
has been, for 400 years, an essential part of Europe, and
European policy over that period of time has been affected,
fundamentally, by its European assessment of the role of Russia.
Sometimes in an observing way, but on a number of occasions as
the guarantor, or the instrument, by which the European balance
could be re-established.
Current policy should keep in mind the
restoration of this role is important to develop, so that
Russia
is not driven into a permanent alliance with China.
But European
relations with it are not the only key element of this
[unintelligible].
China and United States, we know that in the next years have to
come to some definition of how to conduct the long-term
relationship of countries, it depends on their strategic
capacities, but also on their interpretation of these
capacities.
In recent years, China and the United States evolved
into a relationship that is unique in each side's history. That
is that they, from the point of view of strategic potential,
they are the greatest threat to each other - in fact, the only
military threat that each side needs to deal with continuously.
And so the challenge, the period in which I was involved in the
creation of this relationship, in which it was thought that a
period of permanent collaboration might emerge of the two
countries becoming [unintelligible] has been partly jeopardized
and for the period probably terminated by the growth in the
strategic and technical competence of each other.
So on that
level, there is an inherent adversarial aspect.
The challenge is
whether this adversarial aspect can be mitigated and
progressively eased by the diplomacy that both sides conduct and
it cannot be done unilaterally by one side.
So, both sides have
to come to the conviction that some easing of the political
relationship is essential because they are in a position that
has never existed before - plainly, that a conflict with modern
technology, conducted in the absence of any preceding arms
control negotiations, so they have no established criteria of
limitations, will be a catastrophe for mankind.
Whatever, their differences are within the context of historical politics,
the leaders have an obligation to prevent this and ensure, at a
minimum, permanent consultations, serious consultations on the
subject, legal gameplays on a permanent basis.
And then it's an
evolution of this.
Of course, there are many unfinished periods in the future of
world. The emergence of additional nuclear powers, of which the
most urgent is the rise of Iran and the consequent divisions in
the Middle East.
And as in the period directly affected by the
Ukrainian issue, but affected by the balance that will emerge,
the rise of countries like India and Brazil and other countries,
will have to be integrated into an international system.
They
seem to me to be the key issues, together with the fact that the
Ukraine conflict has produced a rupture in the economic
arrangements that have been made in the period before, so that
the definition and operation of a global system will have to be
reconsidered.
It is these challenges I put forward as an analogy, but I
believe they must be overcome, if we not going to live in an
increasingly confrontational and chaotic world.
Klaus Schwab: [00:19:02] Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for
this state of the world description.
We have, and I know he's
not prepared for it, but we have here someone sitting whom I
most admire also for his ideas, and he just has also published a
very significant book.
So, Graham Allison, would you be ready to
comment - and we need the microphone - could you be ready to
comment and maybe ask also, Dr. Kissinger, a final question.
What is prodding in your mind? But first, it would be
interesting to have your comments.
Graham Allison: [00:19:55] Thank you very much.
Henry Kissinger: [00:19:57] I didn't get the name.
Graham Allison: [00:20:00] Your oldest student.
Klaus Schwab: [00:20:02] Graham Allison.
Henry Kissinger: [00:20:06] Oh Graham Allison, yes.
Graham Allison: [00:20:13] I think Henry often refers to me as
his oldest student and course assistant, and I tell him that's
because I've been the slowest learner.
So, Henry, you're looking
great.
Though, Henry was supposed to be having a 99th birthday
party tonight in New York, but the circumstances didn't permit.
So I can see you're dressed up for the party, in any case and
I'm sorry I'm missing you there, but it's good to see you here.
Henry, you hear overview, was as always wonderful. And I think
Klaus did a good job in reminding us of the 1980 remarks where
we can hear echoes.
In 1980, though, China hardly figured in the
picture the way it does today.
So, as you look at the
relationship between the US and China, which as you say, is
inevitably inherently going to be rivalrous and adversarial, but
at the same time, if unmanaged, may and in a catastrophic war.
And as we watch what's happening in Taiwan and just to be timely
in terms of the news, the comment of President
Biden yesterday
in Japan about Taiwan - you and I talked about this before - I
think that seems to be about the fastest path to a general full
scale war between the U.S. and China.
So, I wonder how you are
thinking about Taiwan in the context of the need for the
constraints and rules of the road that you described the
necessity for, but that we now see the absence of.
Klaus Schwab: [00:22:25] Henry, do you want to respond?
Henry Kissinger: [00:22:29] It's been an unexpected pleasure to
see Graham appear and to put me a question. He was my student
and he is my friend and we have sewn along parallel lines over
many decades.
I negotiated the understanding on Taiwan at the very beginning
of the US-Chinese relationship.
There had been hundreds of
meetings on the subject between Chinese and American diplomat,
and they always ended on the first day because the Chinese
demanded the immediate turnover of Taiwan, and we insisted on
the continuation of the use of [unintelligible] methods of
achieving this objective.
So, I will not go through the process
of which it was achieved, but my understanding of the agreement
has been that the United States would uphold the principle of
one China, that we would now exist on a two-China solution, and
the Western world was prepared to live with a long period in
which this process would work itself out, and in which it was
always understood that the United States was opposed
[unintelligible] a military solution to that problem.
I believe
that these principles have enabled Taiwan to develop for 50
years as a democratic system.
And I think it is essential that these principles be maintained,
and the United States should not by subterfuge or a gradual
process, develop something of a two-China solution, but that
China will continue to exercise patience that has been exercised
up to now.
A direct confrontation should be avoided, and Taiwan cannot be
the core of the negotiations between China and the United
States.
For the core of the negotiations, it is important that
the United States and China discuss principles that affect the
adversarial relationship, and that permit at least some scope
for cooperative efforts.
The Taiwan issue will no disappear, but
as the direct subject of confrontation and adversarial conduct
it is bound to lead to situation that may mutate into the
military field, which is against the world interest and against
the long-term interest of China and the United States.
These are the causes I address to my friends in the American
government, but also to the friends that over the years I have
had an opportunity with on the Chinese side.
So, it is important
to the overall needs of the world for the United States and
China to mitigate their adversarial relationship by recognition
that, if a World War 1 type situation were to arise, of sliding
into a conflict, the consequences will be more dire than they
were then.
So, how to manage between an existing adversarial relationship
and the need for cooperation in the economic sense and
[unintelligible] is a big challenge for both governments, and it
will be affected [unintelligible] because China will have to re-analyze
its relationship with its established with Russia, because it
could not have expected when it was made that it would evolve in
the direction that it has.
And it will also be important for the
United States to go beyond its assessments of adversarial
relations and to some concept of a world order in which the
United States and China, partly due to the evolution of
economies and partly due to the evolution of ideologies, in an
ugly confrontation, and to turn it into something that is
compatible with world order.
Klaus Schwab: [00:30:44] Thank you. Thank you.
And we are coming
to an end of our session, and it was fascinating to hear your
still very visionary perspectives and to hear from you. Thank
you very much.
I have a very unusual idea. You may forgive for me, but as we
have heard also from Graham, Henry is celebrating his 99th
birthday this week.
So let's say all together: Happy birthday to
you Henry.
Audience: Happy birthday to you Henry.
Klaus Schwab: All the best and thank you. So, we have
one minute.
And I would I would like to use this minute because
Graham, you have written this book - keep the microphone Graham
- you have written this book, arguing that if you take
historical examples, a war between a competition which may end
in a war, let's put it in this way, between the US and China is
inevitable.
May you just in some very few sentences share with the
audience.
Do you still think this case is coming?
Graham Allison: [00:32:38] So, basically, I didn't come to
speak.
I came to listen to Henry. But this is an idea that
emerged over some years.
Henry uses history to help inform and illuminate the present and
the choices and the challenges.
In my book
The Thucydides Trap,
I look at the last 500 years, we find 16 cases in which a
rapidly rising power like Athens in classical Greece or Germany
at the beginning of the 20th century, challenges a colossal
ruling power like Sparta or Great Britain or the US today.
So,
12 of those 16 end in war - so war is not inevitable, just it's
been the way that things have happened.
Several people since I've gotten there have asked me:
"Well, so
what would Thucydides say now?" since this book was written five
years ago, just as Trump become President.
And I think he would say both the rising power and the ruling
power seem right on script, almost as if each is competing to
see which can better exemplify the typical rising power and
typical ruling power.
So, (Thucydides) is sitting on the edge of
his seat, anticipating the greatest war of all time.
Klaus Schwab: [00:34:15] If you follow the advice of Henry that
would be the-
Graham Allison: [00:34:23] The fifth of the four that escaped
Thucydides' trap - rather than the thirteen or the twelve that
led to catastrophic outcomes.
Klaus Schwab: [00:34:34] So Henry, you have given us very
valuable advice and thank you again and thank you also Graham.
Thank you Henry.
We wish you all the best, and this concludes
our session.
