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by Fyodor A. Lukyanov
July 01, 2026
from
GlobalAffairsEng Website
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Fyodor A.
Lukyanov
Russia in Global Affairs Editor-in-Chief;
National Research University–Higher School of Economics,
Moscow, Russia.
Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs,
Research Professor;
Valdai Discussion Club, Research Director |

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After
the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
American commentator Charles Krauthammer juxtaposed 'wars
of necessity' (defense of territory and national survival) to 'wars
of choice.'
Richard Haas classified the
2003 invasion in Iraq as a
war of choice, launched by the U.S. administration not to
eliminate real threats, but for political and ideological reasons.
By definition,
wars of necessity were responses to attacks,
while wars of choice were preventive.
The discussion was a product of its time,
reflecting internal U.S. political struggles.
Broader discussions of 'just war' have
accompanied social science for centuries. But until the UN Charter
declared aggressive wars illegal, judgment of wars was largely a
theoretical exercise.
Just or unjust, they were widely used tools,
'the continuation of politics by other
means.'
The destruction wrought by the two World Wars,
and the development of nuclear weapons, prompted the post-1945
liberal world order to,
make military force a matter of morality and
ideology and minimize its use...
The erosion of this intention is one cause of the
liberal order's crisis.
When the balance of power disappeared along with the USSR, the
West's sense of complete moral and political righteousness drove it
to remold humanity in its own (allegedly, uniquely valid) image...
by any means necessary, including military ones.
Within the liberal paradigm, military force
became legitimate,
when used by those 'on the right side of
history.'
The liberal order's exhaustion has eliminated
this ideological-normative framework, but left military force once
again in its classical function:
as a tool for positioning states in a
disorderly international environment.
This environment erases the choice/necessity
dichotomy:
the decision to launch a war is based on the
government's assessment of the ever-changing situation and
respective political choice - or on the perception that it has
no choice.
The formation of the
new international order is
a long and chaotic process.
Nuclear weapons are prolonging it, as they
prevent (at least so far) a decisive showdown. And as long as the
process continues, the use of military force will be predicated on
ever-changing calculations of what will provide advantages in the
present and (still unknowable) future order.
The accuracy of these calculations - and whether
a war was 'of necessity' or 'of choice' - is revealed only by a
campaign's outcome.
Modern wars generally end not in total
victory, but in some affixation of a new status quo that
implies the confrontation's likely continuation.
This status quo may be quite stable and even
enduring, but rarely resolves the contradictions that have caused
the conflict.
The ability and willingness to wage a long war of
attrition are a rarity, even an exception,
since in the absence of obvious victory such
wars entail rapidly growing costs without achievement of
the declared objective...!
This is a product of today's realities.
The versatility of power,
-
new methods of warfare
-
'weaponization' of economic ties
-
the inability to impose a total embargo
-
flexible concentration of resources for
asymmetric response
-
state resilience,
...complicate the balance of power and often
benefit the weaker party.
The variables that a state must consider when faced with the choice
of 'necessity' are multiplying so fast that they make calculation of
the outcome almost impossible, and necessity demands not just
responses, but proactive and preventative steps to avoid having to
respond from much less advantageous positions.
This is also a return to the pre-liberal world order, in
which preventive actions were considered a natural part of military
strategy.
External threats impose the necessity
of choice upon a state.
And the choice of necessity is based
not only on external circumstances, but on the state's various
baggage:
its capabilities, strategic traditions,
history, and culture...
In this sense, the choice of imperative truly is
a civilizational choice, a test of a civilization's strength
and ability to cope with the global situation...
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